Add CIP-57 updates

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/bonding_pools.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+id: bonding-pools
+---
+
+# Setting up a bonding pool
+The first step for setting up a bonding pool is to deploy a Gnosis safe on Mainnet with only [the CoW DAO safe](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcA771eda0c70aA7d053aB1B25004559B918FE662) as a signer as is described in [CIP-7](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x267edf7a0bd3c771cfca763322f011ee106d8d5158612c11da29183260d1dba7).
+
+Once this safe has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the safe should be funded with $500.000 USD in yield bearing stable coins and 1.500.000 COW tokens. After this is done, the bonding pool can be used to vouch for solvers in the solver competition.
+
+# Setting up a reduced bonding pool
+Solvers that are currently vouched under the CoW Bonding pool may decide to set up a reduced bonding pool according to [CIP-44](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x1b6f1171633ec3d20c4370db37074aa1bd830486d4d0d6c26165915cc42d9412).
+
+The first step for setting up a reduced bonding pool is to deploy a Gnosis safe on Mainnet that has only one signer ([the CoW DAO Solver Payouts safe](0xA03be496e67Ec29bC62F01a428683D7F9c204930)). After this is done and has been confirmed by the CoW DAO team, the solver will deposit $50.000 in yield bearing stable coins or ETH and 500.000 COW tokens to the newly created safe.
+
+# How to join a bonding pool
+This is done by vouching for a solver's submission address and rewards address with the bonding pool address. This is done by calling the `Vouch` method on the [VouchRegister contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb422f2520b0b7fd86f7da61b32cc631a59ed7e8f) using the address that owns the bonding pool (the address that created the bonding pool). 
+
+Vouching contracts:
+- [Mainnet](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb422f2520b0b7FD86f7DA61b32Cc631A59ed7E8F)
+- [Gnosis Chain](https://gnosisscan.io/address/0xAAA4De096D02AE21729aA31D967E148D4e3Ae501)
+- [Arbitrum](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xAAA4De096D02AE21729aA31D967E148D4e3Ae501)
+- [Base](https://basescan.org/address/0xAAA4De096D02AE21729aA31D967E148D4e3Ae501)
+
+The `Vouch` method receives a list as an argument and can vouch for multiple submission addresses in a single transaction. The transaction must contain: the submission address for the solver, the bonding pool that is vouching for the solver, and the rewards address that the solver would like to use to receive their [rewards](https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/rewards).
+
+# How to leave a bonding pool
+Leaving a bonding pool involves the same process as joining a bonding pool, except that the owner of the bonding pool will call the `invalidateVouching` method instead with the solver's submission address and the bonding pool that vouched for the solver as arguments.
+
+# How to dissolve a bonding pool
+In order to dissolve a bonding pool you must first unvouch for all solvers that have been vouched for by this bonding pool. Then you can post a CIP to unwind the bonding pool. This involves first writing a post on [the CoW forum](https://forum.cow.fi/). This can be a very short post detailing the safe creation address and which address funded the pools together with the transaction details for dissolving the bonding pool. [Here is an example from the dissolution of the Project Blanc bonding pool.](https://forum.cow.fi/t/cip-54-dissolve-project-blanc-bonding-pool/2645)
+
+After the post has been in the forum for at least 6 days, you will need to post a [CIP on snapshot](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth). This CIP should contain details of the creation of the bond and details of how the bond will be dissolved. Alongside this it should contain a simulation of the transaction to dissolve the bond that would be executed if the CIP passes. [For example, here is the CIP that proposed the dissolution of the Project Blanc bonding pool.](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x2638ee59df1f402421fe69abe76cd0154ec32d8b4ad88a136318c6c8c76b210d)

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/competition_rules.md

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ All solvers participating in the solver competition must abide by certain rules.
 ## Smart contract
 
 - Limit price constraint: this rule enforces that an order cannot be executed if its limit price is violated.
+- Solver submitting a transaction needs to be whitelisted (the process about how a solver can get whitelisted is described [here](/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/bonding-pools)).
 
 ## Off-chain protocol
 

docs/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/rewards.md

@@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ sidebar_position: 3
 
 # Solver rewards
 
-The protocol is currently subsidizing the solver competition on Ethereum Mainnet (but not on Gnosis Chain nor Arbitrum One), by rewarding solvers on a weekly basis (currently, every Tuesday) with rewards paid in COW. Solvers are rewarded based on their performance as solvers (i.e., when participating in the standard solver competition) as specified by [CIP-20](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x2d3f9bd1ea72dca84b03e97dda3efc1f4a42a772c54bd2037e8b62e7d09a491f), [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986), [CIP-38](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0xfb81daea9be89f4f1c251d53fd9d1481129b97c6f38caaddc42af7f3ce5a52ec), and [CIP-48](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x563ab9a66265ad72c47a8e55f620f927685dd07d4d49f6d1812905c683f05805). Solver rewards for participating in the price estimation competition and providing quotes that are needed for the gas estimates and limit price computations of market orders are specified in [CIP-27](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x64e061568e86e8d2eec344d4a892e4126172b992cabe59a0b24c51c4c7e6cc33) and [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986).
+The protocol is currently subsidizing the solver competition on all chains it operates on, by rewarding solvers on a weekly basis (currently, every Tuesday) with rewards paid in COW. Solvers are rewarded based on their performance as solvers (i.e., when participating in the standard solver competition) as specified by [CIP-20](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x2d3f9bd1ea72dca84b03e97dda3efc1f4a42a772c54bd2037e8b62e7d09a491f), [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986), [CIP-38](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0xfb81daea9be89f4f1c251d53fd9d1481129b97c6f38caaddc42af7f3ce5a52ec), [CIP-48](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x563ab9a66265ad72c47a8e55f620f927685dd07d4d49f6d1812905c683f05805) and [CIP-57](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x46d4fea1492207cf400fcb7a01141a7d4c730791d658cc77236941fc9eb7dccb). Solver rewards for participating in the price estimation competition and providing quotes that are needed for the gas estimates and limit price computations of market orders are specified in [CIP-27](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x64e061568e86e8d2eec344d4a892e4126172b992cabe59a0b24c51c4c7e6cc33) and [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986).
 
 
 :::note
 
-For the interested reader, the main source of truth for the weekly payments to solvers is this [Dune dashboard](https://dune.com/cowprotocol/cow-solver-rewards). The dashboard is populated with data aggregated by scripts within the [solver-rewards](https://github.com/cowprotocol/solver-rewards) and [dune-sync](https://github.com/cowprotocol/dune-sync/) repositories.
+For the interested reader, the main source of truth for the weekly payments to solvers is this [Dune dashboard](https://dune.com/cowprotocol/cow-solver-rewards). The dashboard is populated with data aggregated by scripts within the [solver-rewards](https://github.com/cowprotocol/solver-rewards) repository.
 
 :::
 
-## Solver competition rewards (CIP-20 & CIP-36 & CIP-38 & CIP-48)
+## Solver competition rewards (CIPs 20, 36, 38, 48, 57)
 
 Solver rewards are computed using a mechanism akin to a second-price auction. First, each solver commits a solution, which includes a price vector and a list of trades to execute. The solver proposing the solution with the highest quality wins the right to settle their submitted solution on chain, where quality is the sum of surplus delivered to users and fees paid to the protocol.
 
@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ The payment calculation can result in a negative figure, in which case the solve
 
 :::
 
-The payment is capped from above and below using the function $$\textrm{cap}(x) = \max(-c_l, \min(c_u, x))$$ with $$c_l = 0.010 \;\textrm{ETH}$$ and $$c_u = 0.012 \;\textrm{ETH}$$.
+The payment is capped from above and below using the function $$\textrm{cap}(x) = \max(-c_l, \min(c_u, x))$$ that is chain-specific, and is determined by the following values:
+- Ethereum mainnet and Arbitrum: $$c_l = 0.010 \;\textrm{ETH}$$ and $$c_u = 0.012 \;\textrm{ETH}$$,
+- Gnosis Chain: $$c_l = c_u = 10 \;\textrm{xDAI}$$.
 
 Submitted scores that are non-positive will be ignored. If only one solution is submitted, $$\textrm{referenceQuality}$$ is set to zero. Formally, this corresponds to always considering the empty solution which does not settle any trades and has quality zero as part of the submitted solutions. 
 
@@ -75,8 +77,13 @@ The presence of the cap on rewards $$c_u$$, however, makes the problem more comp
 
 To summarize, there is a simple strategy that guarantees positive expected profits to solvers. This strategy may not be optimal in uncompetitive auctions when the difference between the best and second best solution may be large. However, in these cases, deriving the optimal strategy is a very complex problem. We conclude by noting that most CoW Protocol batches are very competitive: the cap of on rewards is binding only in about 9% of auctions. 
 
-## Price estimation competition rewards (CIP-27)
+## Price estimation competition rewards (CIPs 27, 57)
 
 The price estimation competition is a separate competition where solvers compete to provide the best response to a quote request. Quote requests look almost identical to single-order batch auctions, where there is only one order with a trivial limit price, and solvers propose executions of this order with the goal to maximize "out amount minus gas costs", in the case of a sell request, or minimize "in amount + gas costs" in the case of a buy request.
 
-As specified in [CIP-27](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x64e061568e86e8d2eec344d4a892e4126172b992cabe59a0b24c51c4c7e6cc33) and [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986), solvers that participate in the price estimation competition are rewarded for each order that is within the market price, is associated with a quote that was computed as part of the price estimation competition, and was used in order to compute the limit price of the order. The protocol keeps track of the quote associated with each created order and the corresponding solver that provided the quote. If and when the order gets executed, the solver that provided the quote (which can be different than the solver that ended up executing the order) gets rewarded with $$min\{0.0006 ~ETH, 6 ~COW\}$$ where, again, the conversion from ETH to COW is done by using an up-to-date price.
+As specified in [CIP-27](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x64e061568e86e8d2eec344d4a892e4126172b992cabe59a0b24c51c4c7e6cc33), [CIP-36](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x4e58f9c1208121c0e06282b5541b458bc8c8b76090263e25448848f3194df986) and [CIP-57](https://snapshot.box/#/s:cow.eth/proposal/0x46d4fea1492207cf400fcb7a01141a7d4c730791d658cc77236941fc9eb7dccb), solvers that participate in the price estimation competition are rewarded for each order that is within the market price, is associated with a quote that was computed as part of the price estimation competition, and was used in order to compute the limit price of the order. The protocol keeps track of the quote associated with each created order and the corresponding solver that provided the quote. If and when the order gets executed, the solver that provided the quote (which can be different than the solver that ended up executing the order) gets rewarded as follows:
+- Ethereum mainnet: $$\min\{0.0006 ~\textrm{ETH}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
+- Arbitrum: $$\min\{0.0002 ~\textrm{ETH}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
+- Gnosis Chain: $$\min\{0.15 ~\textrm{xDAI}, 6 ~\textrm{COW}\}$$,
+
+where, again, the conversion from ETH and xDAI to COW is done by using an up-to-date price (specifically, the average ETH/xDAI/COW Dune prices of the past 24h before the payout are used to determine these exchange rates).

docs/cow-protocol/tutorials/solvers/from_shadow_to_prod.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ In order to get connected to the shadow competition, feel free to reach out to a
 
 ## Live competition (production)
 
-- To connect to the live competition, each solver is required to be part of a "bonding pool", as specified by [CIP-7](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x267edf7a0bd3c771cfca763322f011ee106d8d5158612c11da29183260d1dba7). The main rationale behind this is that a solver in the live competition gets access to the settlement contract, its buffers and the orderflow of the protocol. For the protocol to be protected from a potentially malicious solver, a substantial bonding pool is required so that in case of misbehavior, there are sufficient funds to reimburse the affected parties (users and/or the DAO).
+- To connect to the live competition, each solver is required to be part of a "bonding pool", as specified by [CIP-7](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x267edf7a0bd3c771cfca763322f011ee106d8d5158612c11da29183260d1dba7); see [this section](/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/bonding-pools) for more details.
 
 :::note