fix: handle demote 2 token to isolate at once

alpaca-finance · Jul 21, 2023 · f816455 · f816455
1 parent 3a78cd0
commit f816455
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Showing 2 changed files with 67 additions and 6 deletions.
diff --git a/solidity/contracts/money-market/facets/BorrowFacet.sol b/solidity/contracts/money-market/facets/BorrowFacet.sol
@@ -48,12 +48,7 @@ contract BorrowFacet is IBorrowFacet {
   /// @param _subAccountId An index to derive the subaccount
   /// @param _token The token to borrow
   /// @param _amount The amount to borrow
-  function borrow(
-    address _account,
-    uint256 _subAccountId,
-    address _token,
-    uint256 _amount
-  ) external nonReentrant {
+  function borrow(address _account, uint256 _subAccountId, address _token, uint256 _amount) external nonReentrant {
     LibMoneyMarket01.MoneyMarketDiamondStorage storage moneyMarketDs = LibMoneyMarket01.moneyMarketDiamondStorage();
 
     LibMoneyMarket01.onlyLive(moneyMarketDs);
@@ -335,6 +330,14 @@ contract BorrowFacet is IBorrowFacet {
       ) {
         revert BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier();
       }
+      // Edge case: when demote multiple market to ISOLATE at once
+      // there could be ISOLATE token along with something else in subaccount, forbid user from borrowing anything
+      if (
+        moneyMarketDs.subAccountDebtShares[_subAccount].has(_token) &&
+        moneyMarketDs.subAccountDebtShares[_subAccount].size > 1
+      ) {
+        revert BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier();
+      }
       // Revert if trying to borrow other tier while borrowing ISOLATE token
     } else if (_hasIsolateAsset) {
       revert BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier();

diff --git a/solidity/tests/money-market/over-collat/MoneyMarket_OverCollatBorrow_Borrow.t.sol b/solidity/tests/money-market/over-collat/MoneyMarket_OverCollatBorrow_Borrow.t.sol
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { MoneyMarket_BaseTest, MockERC20, console } from "../MoneyMarket_BaseTes
 // libraries
 import { LibMoneyMarket01 } from "../../../contracts/money-market/libraries/LibMoneyMarket01.sol";
 import { LibDoublyLinkedList } from "../../../contracts/money-market/libraries/LibDoublyLinkedList.sol";
+import { LibConstant } from "../../../contracts/money-market/libraries/LibConstant.sol";
 // interfaces
 import { IBorrowFacet } from "../../../contracts/money-market/interfaces/IBorrowFacet.sol";
 import { IAdminFacet } from "../../../contracts/money-market/interfaces/IAdminFacet.sol";
@@ -414,4 +415,61 @@ contract MoneyMarket_OverCollatBorrow_BorrowTest is MoneyMarket_BaseTest {
     _poolId = viewFacet.getMiniFLPoolIdOfToken(_debtToken);
     assertEq(_miniFL.getUserTotalAmountOf(_poolId, BOB), _borrowAmount);
   }
+
+  function testRevert_WhenDemoteMarket_UserHasMoreThanOneIsolate_ShouldNotBeAbleToBorrow() public {
+    // prepare
+    usdc.mint(ALICE, 1e10);
+    vm.prank(ALICE);
+    accountManager.deposit(address(usdc), 1e10);
+
+    btc.mint(BOB, 1 ether);
+    mockOracle.setTokenPrice(address(btc), 30000 ether);
+
+    // BOB borrow weth and usdc
+    vm.startPrank(BOB);
+    btc.approve(address(accountManager), type(uint256).max);
+    accountManager.addCollateralFor(BOB, subAccount0, address(btc), 1 ether);
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(weth), 1 ether);
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(usdc), 1e8);
+    vm.stopPrank();
+
+    // Demote both token to ISOLATE tier
+    IAdminFacet.TokenConfigInput[] memory tokenConfigs = new IAdminFacet.TokenConfigInput[](2);
+    tokenConfigs[0] = IAdminFacet.TokenConfigInput({
+      tier: LibConstant.AssetTier.ISOLATE,
+      collateralFactor: 9000,
+      borrowingFactor: 9000,
+      maxBorrow: 30 ether,
+      maxCollateral: 100 ether
+    });
+    tokenConfigs[1] = IAdminFacet.TokenConfigInput({
+      tier: LibConstant.AssetTier.ISOLATE,
+      collateralFactor: 9000,
+      borrowingFactor: 9000,
+      maxBorrow: normalizeEther(100 ether, 6),
+      maxCollateral: normalizeEther(100 ether, 6)
+    });
+    address[] memory tokens = new address[](2);
+    tokens[0] = address(weth);
+    tokens[1] = address(usdc);
+    adminFacet.setTokenConfigs(tokens, tokenConfigs);
+
+    // Should not be able to borrow anything after both got demoted
+    vm.startPrank(BOB);
+    vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IBorrowFacet.BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier.selector));
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(usdc), 1e8);
+    vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IBorrowFacet.BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier.selector));
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(btc), 0.01 ether);
+    // Should be able to repay
+    accountManager.repayFor(BOB, subAccount0, address(usdc), 1e8, 1e8);
+
+    // After repay one ISOLATE debt
+    // should be able to borrow more of the remaining token
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(weth), 0.01 ether);
+    // should not be able to borrow any other token
+    vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IBorrowFacet.BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier.selector));
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(usdc), 1e8);
+    vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(IBorrowFacet.BorrowFacet_InvalidAssetTier.selector));
+    accountManager.borrow(subAccount0, address(btc), 0.01 ether);
+  }
 }