defense_evasion_ec2_flow_log_deletion.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/06/15"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/12/09"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs
in an attempt to evade defenses.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Flow log
    deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it
    can be exempted from the rule.
    """,
]
from = "now-60m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws*"]
interval = "10m"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "AWS EC2 Flow Log Deletion"
note = "The AWS Filebeat module must be enabled to use this rule."
references = [
    "https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/delete-flow-logs.html",
    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "9395fd2c-9947-4472-86ef-4aceb2f7e872"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Cloud", "AWS", "Continuous Monitoring", "SecOps", "Log Auditing"]
type = "query"

query = '''
event.action:DeleteFlowLogs and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.outcome:success
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1562"
name = "Impair Defenses"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1562.001"
name = "Disable or Modify Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"