extraction_translation.ipynb

{
 "cells": [
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 1,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [
    {
     "name": "stderr",
     "output_type": "stream",
     "text": [
      "/Users/visheshmistry/Library/Python/3.9/lib/python/site-packages/tqdm/auto.py:21: TqdmWarning: IProgress not found. Please update jupyter and ipywidgets. See https://ipywidgets.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user_install.html\n",
      "  from .autonotebook import tqdm as notebook_tqdm\n"
     ]
    }
   ],
   "source": [
    "import PyPDF2 as pdf\n",
    "from transformers import AutoTokenizer, MBartForConditionalGeneration, MBart50TokenizerFast"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 7,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [],
   "source": [
    "model = MBartForConditionalGeneration.from_pretrained(\"facebook/mbart-large-50-many-to-many-mmt\")\n",
    "tokenizer = MBart50TokenizerFast.from_pretrained(\"facebook/mbart-large-50\", src_lang = \"fr_XX\")"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 3,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [],
   "source": [
    "file = open('/Users/visheshmistry/Documents/DataHack/lawyantra files/AFFAIRE KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES c. HONGRIE.pdf', 'rb')\n",
    "pdf_reader = pdf.PdfReader(file)"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": null,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [],
   "source": [
    "dataset = load_dataset(\"tatoeba\", lang1=\"es\", lang2=\"en\")\n",
    "\n",
    "model_name = 'facebook/mbart-large-50'\n",
    "\n",
    "tokenized_dataset = tokenizer.prepare_seq2seq_batch(\n",
    "    src_texts=dataset[\"train\"][\"translation\"][\"es\"],\n",
    "    tgt_texts=dataset[\"train\"][\"translation\"][\"en\"],\n",
    "    max_length=128,\n",
    "    max_target_length=128,\n",
    "    padding=\"max_length\",\n",
    "    return_tensors=\"pt\",\n",
    ")\n",
    "\n",
    "optimizer = AdamW(model.parameters(), lr=1e-5)\n",
    "\n",
    "dataloader = DataLoader(tokenized_dataset, batch_size=8, shuffle=True)\n",
    "\n",
    "for epoch in range(3):\n",
    "    for batch in dataloader:\n",
    "        optimizer.zero_grad()\n",
    "        outputs = model(\n",
    "            input_ids=batch['input_ids'],\n",
    "            attention_mask=batch['attention_mask'],\n",
    "            decoder_input_ids=batch['labels']\n",
    "        )\n",
    "        loss = outputs.loss\n",
    "        loss.backward()\n",
    "        optimizer.step()\n",
    "        print(f\"Epoch {epoch + 1}, Loss: {loss.item()}\")\n",
    "\n",
    "output_dir = \"fine_tuned_bert_model\"\n",
    "model.save_pretrained('/Users/visheshmistry/Documents/DataHack')\n",
    "tokenizer.save_pretrained('/Users/visheshmistry/Documents/DataHack')"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 4,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [],
   "source": [
    "translated_text = []\n",
    "text_to_be_translated = []\n",
    "number_of_pages = len(pdf_reader.pages)\n",
    "for i in range(number_of_pages):\n",
    "    text_to_be_translated.append(pdf_reader.pages[i].extract_text())"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 5,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [],
   "source": [
    "for i in range(number_of_pages):\n",
    "    encoded_text = tokenizer(text_to_be_translated[i], return_tensors=\"pt\")\n",
    "    generated_tokens = model.generate(\n",
    "        **encoded_text,\n",
    "        forced_bos_token_id=tokenizer.lang_code_to_id[\"en_XX\"]\n",
    "    )\n",
    "    translated_text.append(tokenizer.batch_decode(generated_tokens, skip_special_tokens=True))"
   ]
  },
  {
   "cell_type": "code",
   "execution_count": 6,
   "metadata": {},
   "outputs": [
    {
     "data": {
      "text/plain": [
       "[['GRANDE CHAMBRE AFFAIRE KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary (Requests Nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13) STRASBOURG DECISION 17 May 2016 This judgment is final.'],\n",
       " [\"This is the first time I've heard of it.\"],\n",
       " ['REFERENCE KARÁCSONY AND OTHERS v. Hungary 1 In the case of Nyugat and Others v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights, sitting in a Grand Chamber composed of: Luis López Guerra, President, András Sajó, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Angelika Nußberger, Mark Villiger, Boštjan Mr. Zupančič, Khanlar Hajiyev, Ján Šikuta, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Erik Møse, Helena Jäderblom, Johannes Silvis, Valeriu Griţco, Ksenija Turković, Branko Lubarda, Yonko Grozev, Judges, and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Registrar of the Grand Chamber, After deliberating in the Chamber of Council on 8 July 2015 and 27 April 2016, renders the following judgment, adopted on that latter date: PROCEDURE'],\n",
       " ['2 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary infringed their right to freedom of expression contrary to Article 10 of the Convention. In view of Article 13, they further considered that no recourse had been opened to them to challenge the contested decisions. 4. The requests were assigned to the second section of the Court (Article 52 § 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court – \"the Rules of Procedure\"). On 16 September 2014, a Chamber of that Section, composed of Guido Raimondi, President, Işıl Karakaş, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Egidijus Kūris, Robert Spano, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, Judges, and Stanley Naismith, Registrar of the Section, delivered a judgment in each of the two cases. In both cases, the Chamber unanimously declared the request admissible in respect of'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 3 Mr. A. VÁGI, lawyer, Codification Department, Bureau of the AssemblyCounsellors; – for the applicants Mr. D. KARSAI, counsel, V. KAZAI, Ms.F. KOLLARICS, counsel. Two applicants, Ms. Horváth and Ms. Szél, were also present. The Court heard Mr. Karsai and Mr. Tallódi in their statements and in their replies to questions put by Judges Nußberger and López Guerra. IN FACT I. THE CIRCONSTANCES OF THE ESPCE A. The authors of Request No. 42461/13 10. The authors of this Request, Mr. Kastriot, Szilágyi, Dorosz and Ms. Szabó, were born in 1975, 1981, 1985 and 1977, respectively, and reside in Budapest.'],\n",
       " ['4 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Leading Hungary. Exclamations in the ranks of majority Members: \"Apply the Rules of Procedure, Minister!\" The Chairman makes his noise.) The Chairman: \"Ladies and gentlemen! (Continuing Exclamations in the ranks of majority Members; Gergely Zrt. and Péter Szilágyi put the banner near the speaker’s gallery.) I ask Gergely Zrt. to put the banner in the same way as they put it. (Gergely Zrt. and Péter Szilágyi put the banner near the speaker’s gallery. Continuing Exclamations in the ranks of majority Members. The Chairman makes his noise.) I ask the housekeepers to put the banner. (Exclamations in the ranks of majority Members, in particular, saying:'],\n",
       " ['A decision approving this proposal was adopted in plenary on 27 May 2013, without debate. B. The authors of Request No. 44357/13 18. The authors of this Request, Mrs Szél, Osztolykán and Horváth, were born in 1977, 1974 and 1971 and reside in Budakeszi, Budapest and Gödöllő, respectively. 19. At the time of events, they were Members of the Opposition Party The policy can be different (Lehet Más a Politika, LMP). 20. On 21 June 2013, the Assembly proceeded to the final vote on a new text, Bill No. T/7979 on the transfer of agricultural and forestry land. This was highly controversial and provoked strong reactions among the members of the Opposition. During this vote, as a protest, Mrs Győri placed on the table of the Prime Minister a small golden pot full of land, while Mrs Szél and O'],\n",
       " ['6 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary to conduct the vote and announce the results (continuous noise) I ask Members to sit down and listen to me! I ask the Assembly to confirm that, since Jobbik members obstruct the conduct of the vote by roll-call, we will vote by electronic means. (Applause from the ranks of the parliamentary group in power. Exclamations from the same ranks: \" Hourra!\") Ladies and gentlemen, I ask those and those of you who, in these unusual circumstances, approve this method of voting by electronic means rather than by roll-call. (Members of the Jobbik parliamentary group occupy the President’s gallery scanning \"traitors, traitors\" for several minutes. Szilvia Molnár puts a small golden piece of paper filled with earth on'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 7 Article C \" 1. The functioning of the Hungarian State is based on the principle of separation of powers.\" Article I \" 1. Respect for human rights, inviolable and inalienable, is ensured. Their protection is the primary duty of the State. 2. Hungary recognises human rights, both individual and collective. 3. The rules applicable to fundamental rights and obligations are set out in a law. A fundamental right may be restricted only in order to allow the effective exercise of another fundamental right or to protect a constitutional principle, provided that such restriction is absolutely necessary and proportionate to the purpose pursued and that it fully respects the essential content of the restricted fundamental right.\" Article IX \" 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 2. Hungary recognises and protects the freedom and diversity of the press, and ensures'],\n",
       " ['8 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHER c. HONGRIE 25. Paragraph 5 of the final and various provisions of the Basic Law, which entered into force on April 1, 2013, reads as follows: \"The decisions of the Constitutional Court before the entry into force of the Basic Law shall be repealed, without prejudice to their legal effects.\" B. The Law on the National Assembly 26. Law No. XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly (\"the Law on the Assembly\"), which entered into force on April 20, 2012, contained, in its relevant parts at the time of the facts: 1. The President of the Assembly Article 2 \"The President:... 2 (f) shall open the meetings, conduct them impartially and shall order them to be adjourned; he shall give the floor to Members, ensure compliance with the rules of procedure, announce the result of the'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHER c. HONGRIE 9 in his intervention, would use an expression that is severely offensive to the authority of the Assembly or to a person or group, in particular national, ethnic, racial or religious, or an expression that is offensive to cause serious disturbances. 4. The Assembly shall decide, without debate, on the proposal for exclusion. If the quorum is not reached, the Chairman of the sitting shall decide. At the next sitting, he shall inform the Assembly of the exclusion and the reason for the exclusion, then the Assembly shall decide, without debate, on the legality of the decision of the Chairman of the sitting. 5. An excluded Member shall not be allowed to speak on the day on which he is excluded. He shall not be entitled to his votes for that day. 6. In the absence of a proposal for'],\n",
       " ['Article 50 \" 1. The Chairman of the sitting may propose to exclude from the sitting, suspend in his rights or fine any Member who, in the sitting, would resort to physical violence, threaten to resort to direct physical violence or call for such violence. 2. The Assembly shall decide, without debate, on the proposal for exclusion. If the quorum is not reached, the Chairman of the sitting shall decide. A Member who is excluded from the sitting under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be allowed to sit in either the sitting or the committee and shall not be allowed to vote during the period of his exclusion. At the next sitting, the Chairman of the sitting shall inform the Assembly of the exclusion and the reason for the exclusion, and the Assembly shall decide, without debate, on the legality of the decision of the Chairman of the sitting. 2 (a) In the absence of a proposal'],\n",
       " ['Amendment of the Assembly Act 28. On 13 February 2014, the Assembly amended the Assembly Act by amending the Rules of Procedure for Members of Parliament (Act No. XIV of 2014, which added a new Article 51/A to the Assembly Act). This amendment now allows, inter alia, any Member punishable by a fine to bring an appeal to a committee. It entered into force on 4 March 2014. 29. New Article 51/A provides in its relevant parts: Article 51/A \"1. On the proposal of any of its members, the Assembly Committee [Házmið2] may, if this does not have any other legal consequence, order the reduction of the votes of a Member within fifteen days of the adoption by that Member of a behaviour referred to in Articles 48 § 3, 49 § 4 or 50 § 1 of this Act. The decision specifies the grounds'],\n",
       " ['12 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs c. HONGRIE pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article (...) It may hear the Member concerned in person if the Member concerned so requests. 7. If the Committee on Immunities, Conflicts of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Power grants the Member’s request, the Member’s immunities are not reduced and the closing of the procedure provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article is pronounced. 8. If the Committee on Immunities, Conflicts of Interest, Discipline and Verification of Power rejects the Member’s request or does not act within the time limit provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, the Member’s immunities are reduced in accordance with the conditions laid down in the decision taken on the basis of paragraph 1 of this Article. 9. If the Committee on Immunities, Conflicts of Interest,'],\n",
       " ['Article 27 \"In accordance with Article 24(2)(d) of the Basic Law, any natural or legal person injured by a judicial decision contrary to the Basic Law may bring an action before the Constitutional Court: (a) if the decision on the merits or the decision closing the judicial procedure infringes his or her rights under the Basic Law, and (b) if the remedies available to him or her have already been exhausted or if there is no remedy available to him or her.\" Article 30(4) of the CLC states: \"The Constitutional Court shall no longer be seized after the expiry of one hundred and eighty days from the date of the meaning of the decision, of the violation of the rights guaranteed by the Basic Law and, in the cases specified in Article 26(2) of this Law, of the entry into force of the law contrary to the Basic Law.\" E. Judgment No.'],\n",
       " ['Analysing the constitutionality of Article 52(2)(a) of the same Act4, the Constitutional Court considered that parliamentary freedom of expression constituted an important element of freedom of expression, protected by Article IX(1) of the Constitutional Act. It highlighted the particularly important role of the Assembly, as a decision-making body dealing with matters directly affecting the life of the nation, in the realization of this freedom. It considered that, with regard to the freedom of expression of Members, a distinction should be made between freedom of expression itself and the means employed for its realization. In its view, the Assembly was justified in adopting provisions in its Rules of Procedure to ensure its dignity and proper functioning. 34. The Constitutional Court recalled that, under Article 5(2)(a) of the Constitutional Act, the President exercised his powers of police and discipline, as set out in'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. HONGRIE 15 it was not expected or even sometimes envisaged that a Member should be informed in advance of the consequences incurred. 37. The Constitutional Court then examined the argument arising from the absence of recourse against disciplinary decisions in the contested provisions of the Assembly Act. The Constitutional Court found that Article XXVIII § 7 of the Basic Law had created a right of recourse against any decision of a judicial, administrative or other authority. However, the Constitutional Court considered that the absence of recourse in respect of disciplinary decisions taken by the Assembly falling within any of these categories was not unconstitutional in itself. The Constitutional Court added that, from a historical and comparative point of view, the exercise of disciplinary powers against Members fell within the autonomy of the Assembly. The Constitutional Court concluded'],\n",
       " ['16 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary F. Judgment No. 3207/2013 (XI.18) AB of 4 November 2013 by the Constitutional Court 39. The same Member, E.N., filed a constitutional appeal against Articles 48 §§ 3 and 4 and 48 § 7 of the Assembly Act. In a judgment of 4 November 2013, the Constitutional Court dismissed that appeal with regard to Article 48 § 36 and declared him inadmissible for the surplus. 40. In its analysis of Article 48 § 3, the Constitutional Court held that a Member intervening in the Assembly expressed his views not as a \"simple individual\" but as a Member, i.e. as a member of the supreme representative body of the country. It considered that, as a representative, the limits of freedom of speech for a Member were not the same as for an'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHER c. HONGRIE 17 III. PERTINENT TEXTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE A. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 42. Article 28 of the Statute of the Council of Europe provides, in its relevant parts: \"a) The Advisory Assembly (Parliamentary) adopts its Rules of Procedure. It elects from among its members its Chairman, who shall remain in office until the next ordinary session. b) The Chairman shall lead the work, but shall not take part in the debates or votes. (...)\" 43. Article 22 of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly (Resolution 1202 (1999) adopted on 4 November 1999 with subsequent amendments to the Rules of Procedure), which is devoted to discipline, provides: \"22.1. The Chairman shall'],\n",
       " ['In paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly recalled that, under Article 28 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, it had the right to regulate and manage its internal affairs and that it therefore had the competence to take disciplinary measures against its members who engaged in unacceptable conduct and to impose sanctions in the event of infringements of its rules of procedure. 47. In its Resolution 1601 (2008) laying down procedural guidelines on the rights and duties of the opposition in a democratic parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe said: \"5. To give the parliamentary opposition a statute with rights contributes to the effectiveness of representative democracy and to respect for political pluralism, and thus to the accession and confidence of citizens in the proper functioning of the institutions. To establish a fair legal and procedural framework'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 19 in a form that the majority cannot arbitrarily alter or amend, at least immediately. (...) 147. The political opposition has a fundamental obligation to perform its functions within the framework of the law, including by respecting the Constitution, civil law and classical criminal law, as well as Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. Opposition parties may call for amendments to the law, but until such time as such amendments are adopted, they are obliged to comply with the law, as everyone else. Once their parliamentary immunity has been amended, the opposition may be held liable for any unlawful act, as any other organisation or person. Most parliaments also have internal disciplinary sanctions for parliamentary groups and parliamentarians who do not comply with the rules; they are relevant as long as'],\n",
       " ['20 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHER c. HONGRIE 100. The Venice Commission observes that if parliamentarians are protected from external action in court for their opinions or statements, they can always be subject to disciplinary sanctions from the Parliament itself. This is the case in most national parliaments, and it is legitimate as long as the sanctions are relevant and proportionate, and not diverted by the parliamentary majority to restrict the rights and freedoms of their political opponents.\" IV. PERTINENT TEXTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION A. The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament 50. Article 11 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (8th Legislature, September 2015) states: \"2. Members’ behaviour is inspired by mutual respect, is based on the values and principles defined in the fundamental texts of'],\n",
       " ['The powers laid down in paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be conferred, mutatis mutandis, on the Chairman of the bodies, committees and delegations, as defined in these Rules. 6. Where appropriate, taking into account the gravity of the violation of the rules of conduct, the Chairman of the sitting may refer to the Chairman a request for the implementation of Article 166, not later than before the next part-session or the next meeting of the organ, committee or delegation concerned. Article 166 Sanctions \" 1. Where a Member disturbs the sitting in an exceptionally serious manner or disturbs the work of Parliament in breach of the principles defined in Article 11, the Chairman, after hearing the Member concerned, shall, in order to restore order, suspend the sitting for a specified period or lift it. If the President cannot be heard, he shall leave the Chairman'],\n",
       " ['22 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 52. Annex XV (Guidelines for the interpretation of the rules of conduct applicable to Members of the European Parliament) to the Regulation provides, in its relevant parts: \" 1. Behaviours of a visual nature, which may be tolerated, provided that they are not prejudicial and/or defamatory, maintain reasonable proportions and do not generate conflict, must be distinguished from those which cause an active disturbance of any parliamentary activity.\" 53. Having appealed, inter alia, against a Member of the European Union for the annulment of the penalty for the loss of his right to ten-day residence allowance, the Court of Justice of the European Union dismissed that appeal on 5 September 2012, inter alia on grounds of exclusion9. B. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 54. Article 41'],\n",
       " ['Articles 37 and 38 of the same regulation lay down the penalties to be applied in the event of \"injury to the order or dignity of the Bundestag\", whether minor or major. In the Netherlands, under the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies may take measures against any Member who, inter alia, \"causes trouble\" (Articles 58(2) and 59). 57. The nature and severity of the disciplinary measures applicable to parliamentarians vary greatly from one Member State to another. Such measures may be grouped into the following categories: (a) reminder and/or warning: this is the most common measure known to thirty-three Member States (Albania, Germany, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Spain,'],\n",
       " ['24 KARÁCSONY AND OTHER c. HONGRIE Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Switzerland) to the exclusion of a certain number of sittings or sessions (Albania, Germany, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova and Turkey). The exclusion of a parliamentarian necessarily results in the impossibility for him or her to speak in the course of the debate. 58. Other types of disciplinary measures may include the submission of apologies (Czech Republic and Slovakia), the designation of a parliamentarian for disobedience (Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom) or reprimande (e.g. Estonia, Italy and Turkey). 59. With regard to the penalties applicable to parliamentarians for disturbing behaviour, eighteen out of the forty-four Member States studied provide for different types'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 25 is, in principle, entitled to a remedy allowing it to oppose it. In most of the above-mentioned Member States, the remedy consists of an internal dispute procedure. In six Member States (Germany, Spain, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine), a judicial remedy (court of the Constitutional Court) is, in principle, open, in parallel or subsidiary to the internal remedy, against any disciplinary measure imposed on a parliamentarian who would be misbehaving in the parliamentary courtroom. In a number of Member States, parliamentarians enjoy certain procedural guarantees, including the possibility of explaining themselves, especially prior to the imposition of disciplinary measures, but sometimes also afterwards.'],\n",
       " ['26 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary A. Preliminary exception raised by the Government 64. The Government contends that the complainants did not exhaust domestic remedies, contrary to the requirement of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, with regard to their grievance under Article 10. They could, in its view, have challenged the relevant provisions of the Act relating to the Assembly itself by means of a constitutional remedy. 1. The judgments of the Chamber 65. The Chamber noted in both its judgments that the Constitutional Court had already rejected a constitutional remedy dealing with a similar issue, namely, the \"serious offending expression\" referred to in Article 48 § 3 of the Act relating to the Assembly (paragraphs 32-41 above). It noted that the High Court had found that restrictions of this nature were compatible with the'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 27 68. The Government submits that a constitutional appeal based on Article 26 § 2 of the CLC would have been deemed admissible for substantive consideration since, in its view, all the procedural and material conditions laid down in the CLC were met. It adds in particular that the Constitutional Court had not yet considered Article 49 § 4 of the Assembly Act which had been applied in the case of the applicants. 69. Citing inter alia Judgments Nos. 3206/2013 and 3207/2013 rendered by the Constitutional Court on 4 November 2013 (paragraphs 32-41 above), the Government considers that a constitutional appeal based on Article 26 § 2 of the CLC constituted an effective remedy. It adds that, in principle, a decision of the Constitutional Court declaring a legal provision contrary to'],\n",
       " ['28 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Constitutional Hungary. According to them, they could therefore not in the present case invoke the previous case-law of that court. The new CLC would, inter alia, have instituted three types of constitutional appeals. The constitutional appeal procedures governed by Articles 26 § 1 and 27 of the CLC would not have been applicable in their case, since they could, respectively, have been brought against a legal provision applied before the courts or against a final court decision. The only possible type of constitutional appeal in their case would have been that provided for in Article 26 § 2 of the CLC. 72. The applicants state that, in its two judgments Nos. 3206/2013 and 3207/2013 of 4 November 2013, the Constitutional Court examined a constitutional appeal against the Assembly Act on the basis of Article 26 § 2 of the C'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 29 3. The Court’s assessment 75. The Government having already raised the same preliminary exception before the Chamber in its observations on the admissibility of applications (paragraphs 32 and 30 of the Chamber’s judgments of 16 September 2014 in the Cases 42461/13 and 44357/13 Szél and Others v. Hungary), the Grand Chamber has jurisdiction to hear them, in accordance with Articles 54 and 55 of the Rules of Procedure (see, inter alia, Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], No. 22978/05, § 141, ECHR 2010, with other references). 76. The Court recalls, first of all, that under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it can be brought before the Court only after exhaustion of all domestic remedies. Any applicant must have given the domestic courts the opportunity that'],\n",
       " ['30 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. HONGRIE the Assembly” referred to in Article 48 § 3 of the Assembly Act (Karácsony et al., supra, §§ 32-33, and Szél et al., supra, §§ 30-31). 79. The Grand Chamber notes that the constitutional appeal brought by MEP E.N. in June 2013 was contemporary to the events at the origin of the present case and that the constitutionality of Article 49 § 4 of the Assembly Act, i.e. the legal basis for the sanctions imposed on the applicants, was not contested in this context. The question of whether, under these circumstances, Judgments Nos. 3206/2013 and 3207/2013 rendered by the Constitutional Court on 4 November 2013 could provide precedents to be followed in deciding on a possible constitutional appeal of the applicants is not to be'],\n",
       " ['82. In the light of these elements, the Court considers that the constitutional remedy based on Article 26 § 2 of the CLC could not be regarded as an effective remedy for the purposes of the application of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, since, even if successful, it would not have allowed the alleged violation to be remedied (Vučković et al., cited above, §§ 69-77, and, mutatis mutandis, Magyar Osimény Mennonita Szövetség et al. v. Hungary, Nos 70945/11 and 8 others, § 50, 8 April 2014). 83. Therefore, the Court dismisses the exception of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies formulated by the Government. B. Observation of Article 10 1. The judgments of the Chamber12 84. The Chamber unanimously concluded that Article 10 of the Convention was violated. It noted that the'],\n",
       " ['32 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 2. The arguments of the parties a) The applicants 86. The applicants state that the arrival in power in 2010 of the FIDESZ-KDNP coalition marks the beginning of a clear trend towards a regression in terms of the situation and rights of the parliamentary opposition. With a two-thirds majority, the coalition would have sought to move the opposition increasingly away from the decision-making process. For example, it would have used the exceptional emergency procedure to enable important laws to be adopted within an extremely short period of time and under conditions that prevent any examination worthy of the name of the proposed bill. Not only national and international NGOs, but also international organisations and entities such as the Venice Commission, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, as well as various bodies'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 33 The definition of disciplinary offence in Article 49 § 4 of the Act had been extended to include \"behaviour seriously offending to the authority of the Assembly or to the order within the Assembly\", a notion which the applicants considered vague. The latter disagreed with the Chamber’s conclusion that parliamentary practice would subsequently allow sufficient clarification of the meaning of this notion. 90. The applicants acknowledged that the purpose of the interference in question was to \"ensure the proper functioning of the Assembly\" and related to the protection of the rights of others. 91. In their view, this interference did not meet the requirement of necessity in a democratic society. Their words would be called the highest protection for several reasons and the margin of concomitant assessment of the State would be reduced'],\n",
       " ['34 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs c. HONGRIE politically highly controversial and that their actions did not, or at least did not, disturb the work of the Assembly. Their actions would not deprive their fellow Members of their right to speak or vote. It would be clear from the minutes of the meetings in question that after a short time, the other Members were able to continue to speak and vote. 93. Referring to the Chamber’s judgments, the petitioners stress that political discourse within Parliament calls for increased protection and that the autonomy of Parliament does not in itself justify excluding the Court from exercising control over this matter. In a democratic society, Parliament would not only be the place for the adoption of laws: it would also be the place for the expression and confrontation of ideas and politics in the context of democratic competition between political parties. As for'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 35 parliamentarian. He argues that the present case should not be examined in isolation, but with due regard for the guiding principles applied in this respect by other Member States of the Council of Europe and by European organisations. Despite the differences in their modalities, none of the Member States’ disciplinary rules would tolerate that parliamentarians behave in a manner that constitutes a threat to the proper functioning of Parliament. The Government rejects the allegations of the complainants concerning the functioning of Hungarian parliamentary democracy. 98. The Government stresses that the Court should not examine the disciplinary rules of the Member States and the European institutions by relying on the provisions of parliamentary law authorising the imposition of a fine. It stresses that the disciplinary rules'],\n",
       " ['The Government states that parliamentarians contribute to the exercise of Parliament’s constitutional functions (e.g. the adoption of laws and the control of the government) and that their rights and any restrictions on them relate to those functions. A restriction on the freedom of speech of a parliamentarian would not call for the same assessment as that relating to freedom of expression as a fundamental right. While remaining within its discretion, a State would have the power to say what type of behaviour is considered to be illegitimate and what sanctions are applicable. In this regard, the rules adopted by the various Member States, as well as by the PACE and the European Parliament, like the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly in Hungary which speak of \"serious offending behaviour\", would not limit to acts falling under similar concepts. 101. The Government considers that the behaviour of the petitioner'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 37 in this context would apply to all means of communication and those which would be unusual or symbolic would therefore not require greater protection than parliamentarians’ interventions. The Government stresses that, in their majority, Member States do not tolerate non-verbal forms of political expression, and it gives some examples from the practice of the Bundestag and the EAP. It also draws the Court’s attention to the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs of the EAP of 22 October 2013 on the discipline of its members, which it subsequently adopted in its Resolution 1965 (2013). 104. The Government acknowledges that the interference in question pursued the two legitimate purposes cited in the Chamber’s judgments, namely the protection of the rights of others, which includes the rights of other Members'],\n",
       " ['38 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs c. Hungary side of the Chamber, thus interrupting the representative of the Government who had spoken. Since the two petitioners were not willing to remove the sign although they had been asked several times to do so, the guardians of the Assembly would take care of it. Furthermore, the penalties imposed on Mrs Szél, Mr Osztolykán and Mr Horváth would have been preceded by a reminder of order and a warning from the President. The penalties in question would thus have been applied progressively. In this regard, the regulation of several Member States would have allowed the President of Parliament or, at his request, the Parliament itself to impose a heavy penalty without prior notice or the application of a less severe measure for certain irregular behaviour. In certain countries (Germany, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Malta and the'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES c. HONGRIE 39 of the Rules of Procedure, which distinguishes between procedural measures and disciplinary procedures15. 111. The President of the Chamber of Deputies would have the right to apply one of the following procedural measures to any Member who would engage in \"inappropriate behaviour\" in plenary sitting: a retreat or, if the Member concerned persists, the exclusion of the Chamber for the remainder of the sitting day (Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure). The Member in question could attack this decision before the Chamber of Deputies, which would rule without discussion. These procedural measures would rarely be used in practice. 112. Furthermore, a disciplinary procedure could be opened against any Member who would engage in criminal proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies (Rule 13(1)) or offending behaviour against another Member'],\n",
       " ['40 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. HONGRIE Members by means of proportionate but dissuasive or exclusionary monetary penalties. 115. The British Government has provided information on the law and practice in force in the United Kingdom concerning the right to freedom of expression within Parliament, starting with Article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 168917. This article would pursue two complementary purposes. First, it would guarantee the right to freedom of expression in debates to parliamentarians, who would enjoy full immunity in civil and criminal matters for any speech held in the exercise of that right. Second, in order to avoid any abuse of that right, parliamentarians would be subject to the authority and discipline of Parliament. Freedom of expression within Parliament would be supervised by Parliament itself, the master of its own procedure. The disenfranchisement of the national judge from the functioning'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. HONGRIE 41 Article 10. However, in the House of Commons, Members would all adhere, in order to express themselves politically, to reasoned oral debates. Their freedom of expression would not be prohibited: each of them would also have the right to speak, question, intervene and vote. However, necessary and reasonable restrictions would be imposed on the time, place and manner in which each Member of Parliament is deemed to exercise that freedom, so that debates in the House of Commons can take place on a fair and equitable basis. These rules would be essential to ensure that all views are clearly understood. Allowing the use of billboards, banners, spokespersons and other processes of this type could lead to an escalation in parliamentarians, which would ultimately harm the freedom of expression itself. Proportional'],\n",
       " ['121. Such interference in the exercise by the applicants of the right to freedom of expression must be \"prescribed by law\", pursue one or more of the legitimate purposes listed in paragraph 2 of Article 10 and be \"necessary in a democratic society\". b) Was interference prescribed by law? 122. In the present case, the parties differ as to whether interference in the freedom of expression of the applicants was prescribed by law. The latter consider the expression used in Article 49 § 4 of the Assembly Law to be vague (\"behaviour seriously offending the authority of the Assembly or the order within it\"). They add that, having entered into force only in January 2013, this provision, in its amended version, has never been applied. The Government maintains that interference was based on the provisions of the Assembly Law. 123. The Court recalls that the words \"prescribed'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 43 125. The level of accuracy of the domestic legislation – which in no case can predict all the assumptions – depends to a large extent on the content of the legislation in question, on the scope it is intended to cover and on the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano, § 142, and Delfi AS, § 122, both cited above). The Court has already stated that professionals, accustomed to having to exercise great caution in the exercise of their profession, should be expected to pay particular attention to assessing the risks involved (Lindon, Otchakovsky- Laurens and July, § 41, cited above, with other references). 126. The Court finds that amended Article 49 § 4 of the Assembly Act governs the'],\n",
       " ['44 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary and, secondly, the ‘protection of the rights of others’, since it was intended to protect the rights of other Members of Parliament. d) Was interference necessary in a democratic society? 130. The applicants contend that the interference in question did not meet the requirement of necessity in a democratic society, whereas the Government considers that it was proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. 131. In the present case, the Court is called for the first time to examine the conformity with Article 10 of the Convention of internal disciplinary measures directed against Members of Parliament because of the way in which they expressed themselves before Parliament. In its analysis, it should therefore take into account the principles governing freedom of expression in general and those relating to the exercise of freedom of expression within Parliament. i. General principles α)'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 45 \"proportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued\" and if the grounds used by the national authorities to justify it appear to be \"relevant and sufficient\" (...) In so doing, the Court must be satisfied that the national authorities have applied rules in accordance with the principles laid down in Article 10 and, furthermore, on the basis of an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (...)\" β) On procedural safeguards for freedom of expression 133. In addition to the above considerations, procedural fairness and procedural safeguards are elements that, in certain circumstances, must also be taken into account when measuring the proportionality of interference in the exercise of freedom of expression (Association Ekin v. France, No 39288/98, § 61, ECHR 2001-VIII, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, No 68416/01'],\n",
       " ['46 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. HONGRIE issued in civil proceedings in order to protect the rights of the author’s personality, the Court held that the applicants had not received sufficient guarantees (ibidem, § 75). It took into account (i) the exceptionally wide scope of the prohibition, (ii) its excessive duration, (iii) the failure of the domestic courts to justify the measure, and (iv) the applicants’ inability to challenge it prior to its adoption (ibidem, §§ 62-74). γ) On the freedom of expression of parliamentarians 137. In its case-law, the Court has consistently stressed the importance of the freedom of expression of parliamentarians, which is an excellent vehicle for political discourse. In Castells v. Spain (23 April 1992, series A no 236), which concerned'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 47 to protect a genuinely democratic political regime, which is the cornerstone of the Convention system, in so far as it tends, inter alia, to protect the autonomy of the legislator and the parliamentary opposition (see, inter alia, Kart, cited above, § 81, with other references, and Syngelidis v. Greece, No. 24895/07, § 42, 11 February 2010). The guarantees offered by parliamentary immunity in its two aspects (irresponsibility and inviolability) aim to ensure Parliament’s independence in carrying out its mission. Inviolability contributes to enabling this full independence by preventing any possible criminal prosecution of political movements (fumus persecutionis) and thus protecting opposition to the pressures or abuses of the majority (Kart, cited'],\n",
       " ['However, under the universally recognised principle of parliamentary immunity, the State offers a higher level of protection to speech within Parliament, so that the Court should only rarely be called upon to intervene. 141. The Court recalls that democracy is a fundamental element of the \"European public order\" and that the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial for the establishment and maintenance of the foundations of a genuine democracy governed by the rule of law (see, among many others, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], No. 58278/00, §§ 98 and 103, ECHR 2006-IV). The Convention thus establishes a close link between the genuinely democratic character of a political regime and the effective functioning of Parliament. It is therefore indisputable that the effective functioning of Parliament is an essential value for a democratic society and that, therefore,'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 49 and within the limits of the constitutional framework, to regulate its internal affairs, for example its organisation, the composition of its bodies and the maintenance of order during the debates. Parliamentary autonomy of course encompasses the power for Parliament to apply rules aimed at ensuring the proper conduct of its activities. This is sometimes referred to as ‘Parliamentary judicial autonomy’. According to the Venice Commission, the majority of parliaments have internal rules of procedure which provide for disciplinary sanctions against their members (paragraphs 48-49 above). 143. In principle, the internal rules of a national parliament, since they constitute an aspect of parliamentary autonomy, fall within the discretion of the Contracting State. National authorities, and in particular parliaments (or comparable bodies composed'],\n",
       " ['50 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. HONGRIE the conduct of their proceedings, including reminders of order or warnings, as well as certain more severe measures such as the withdrawal of the right of speech, the exclusion of the sitting and monetary penalties. It can be inferred from this that, despite certain differences in the nature and scope of the disciplinary measures, Member States generally recognise the need for rules aimed at sanctioning speeches or behaviours displaced within the parliamentary space. 146. In the light of these elements, the Court considers that there is an imperative public interest in ensuring that Parliament, while respecting the requirements of freedom of speech, can function properly and fulfil its mission in a democratic society. Therefore, where the relevant disciplinary rules are solely aimed at ensuring the proper functioning of Parliament'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 51 with particular care any measure which would appear to be solely or primarily detrimental to the opposition (see, as regards compatibility with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 on Restrictions on Election Rights, Tănase, cited above, § 179). She adds that the EPC has stressed the need to treat all parliamentarians on an equal footing (paragraph 47 above). ii. Application in this case of the aforementioned principles 148. As recalled above (paragraph 132), the adjective \"necessary\" used in Article 10 § 2 implies the existence of an imperative social need. Contracting States have a margin of discretion to judge the existence of such a need and the Court has recognised that in this case that margin was wide (paragraph 146 above). The Court'],\n",
       " ['52 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. HONGRIE on the matters discussed in the Assembly, but rather on the basis of the time, place and manner in which they had chosen to do so. This conclusion is corroborated by the absence in the parliamentary proceedings at issue of examination of the very content of the statements made by the applicants. 151. Furthermore, in the circumstances of the case, the Court does not see any reason to doubt that the contested disciplinary sanctions imposed on the applicants were based on relevant grounds in relation to the legitimate purposes pursued, namely the defence of order and the protection of the rights of other Members. It does not, however, see any need to rule on whether, in view of the broad discretion of the State, these grounds were also sufficient to demonstrate that the'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. HONGRIE 53 Uni (Dec.), No. 14832/11, 13 November 2014). This would raise a problem from the point of view of the procedural requirements of Article 10 (paragraph 133 above). 155. In this regard, the Government makes a distinction between immediate sanctions, such as the withdrawal of the right of speech and the exclusion from the sitting, which immediately prevent a parliamentarian from speaking, and subsequent sanctions, such as the fine imposed in this case. This distinction can be found, for example, in the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (paragraph 51 above). The Court considers that the procedural guarantees accompanying these different types of sanctions can also vary. Immediate sanctions (excluding speech in this case) are imposed in the event of serious disturbances to parliamentary'],\n",
       " ['54 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. HONGRIE furthermore, if, in view of the universally recognised principles of parliamentary autonomy and separation of powers, a parliamentarian subject to disciplinary sanction is not supposed to enjoy a right of appeal outside the parliamentary framework to oppose it, procedural safeguards are not less necessary in this context with particular force given the length of time that has elapsed between the alleged conduct and the imposition of the sanction itself. 158. Furthermore, the Court considers that any subsequent decision imposing a disciplinary sanction must state the essential reasons therefor, so as to enable not only the parliamentarian concerned to seek its justification but also the public to exercise a certain right of scrutiny in this regard. 159. At the time of the facts, the national legislation did not'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. HONGRIE 55 democratic society\" and that there was therefore a violation of Article 10 of the Convention on that ground. III. ON THE VIOLATION OF Article 13 OF THE CONVENTION COMBINED WITH Article 10 163. In the field of Article 13 of the Convention combined with Article 10, the applicants complain that domestic law did not provide them with a remedy to challenge disciplinary measures against them. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows: \"Any person whose rights and freedoms recognised in the... Convention have been violated is entitled to an effective remedy before a national court, even though the violation would have been committed by persons acting in the exercise of their official duties.\" A. The judgments of the Chamber 164. The Chamber noted that the autonomy and sovereignty of Parliament were important constitutional principles in a'],\n",
       " ['56 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary disciplinary proceedings following the events at the origin of the present case. 167. The applicants ask the Court to find that Article 13 is infringed. 2. The Government 168. The Government contends that, in terms of effective remedies, the Court does not impose any specific requirement on Member States as to how to comply with the obligations set out in Article 13 and that they enjoy procedural autonomy in this respect. 169. It argues that, in view of the principles of separation of powers and Parliament’s autonomy, the possibilities for a parliament to initiate an adequate remedy are extremely limited and that it is apparent from the practice of many European States that, in terms of disciplinary remedies, the possibilities for parliamentarians are very limited. It states that, in this area, there is normal'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 57 represented a legitimate and proportionate aim justifying a restriction of a Member’s right to have an effective remedy in this matter. It would have made it clear, however, that this judicial restraint was not absolute and that it reserved the right to intervene if a Chamber of Parliament had committed an excess of power. 172. The Czech Government considers that when the Constitutional Court exercises a carefully reasoned and proportionate exercise of its judicial restraint in refusing to hear any disciplinary measure imposed by a Chamber of Parliament, there is no violation of Article 13. According to it, the Contracting Parties and their courts have a broad margin of discretion in this matter. 2. The Government of the United Kingdom 173. The British Government argues that the principle of separation of powers requires that any parliament be able to regulate its'],\n",
       " ['58 ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 178. The Government objects to these requests. 179. The Court recalls that Article 41 requires the injured party, where appropriate, to be satisfied as it deems appropriate (O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], No. 35810/09, § 199, ECHR 2014). 180. On the claim for material injury, the Court considers that the fines imposed on the applicants have caused financial damage to the applicants (paragraphs 14, 17 and 22 above). Bearing in mind the link between the fines imposed in the internal proceedings at issue and the infringement of Article 10 found by the Court, the Court states that the applicants are entitled to the full reimbursement of the amounts respectively claimed by each of them. 181. On the claim for moral damage, the Court considers,'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY ET AUTRES v. Hungary 59 representation in court would only be invoiced if the Court found a breach of the Convention. Although not prohibited by the case-law of the Court, contracts for services could lead to abuse, since the parties could indicate excessive amounts for their costs and expenses without taking into account the economic conditions in the country. The applicants would not have submitted to the Court any document proving that they would actually pay their costs of justice if they were to gain cause. 187. The Government further considers that the amounts claimed by the applicants for costs in relation to similar cases brought before the Grand Chamber, namely Jaloud v. Netherlands (No. 47708/08, ECHR 2014), where the lawyers would have invoiced EUR 110 per hour, and Bouyid v. Belgium (No. 23380/09, ECHR 2015), where they would'],\n",
       " ['In the light of the foregoing and of the evidence in its possession, the Court finds reasonable to grant the applicants EUR 12 000, together, for their costs and expenses incurred before it, plus any amount they may have to pay as taxes on that amount. C. Moratorium interest 192. The Court finds appropriate to calculate the rate of the moratorium interest on the rate of interest of the European Central Bank’s marginal loan facility increased by three percentage points. IN THE FOLLOWING REASONS, THE COURT, IN THE UNION, 1. Decides to annex the applications; 2. Rejects the preliminary exception submitted by the Government; 3. Says that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention; 4. Says that there is no need to examine separately the grievance raised from the angle of Article 13 of the Convention combined with Article 10; 5. Says that the finding of'],\n",
       " ['ARRÊT KARÁCSONY AND OTHERs v. Hungary 61 currency of the defendant State at the rate applicable on the date of the settlement, plus any amount that may be due by them as tax on that amount, for costs and expenses; 8. Says that, from the expiry of the said three-month period and until payment, those amounts shall be increased by a simple interest rate equal to that of the European Central Bank’s marginal loan facility applicable during that period, increased by three percentage points; 9. Rejects the request for fair satisfaction for the surplus.']]"
      ]
     },
     "execution_count": 6,
     "metadata": {},
     "output_type": "execute_result"
    }
   ],
   "source": [
    "translated_text"
   ]
  }
 ],
 "metadata": {
  "kernelspec": {
   "display_name": "Python 3",
   "language": "python",
   "name": "python3"
  },
  "language_info": {
   "codemirror_mode": {
    "name": "ipython",
    "version": 3
   },
   "file_extension": ".py",
   "mimetype": "text/x-python",
   "name": "python",
   "nbconvert_exporter": "python",
   "pygments_lexer": "ipython3",
   "version": "3.9.6"
  }
 },
 "nbformat": 4,
 "nbformat_minor": 4
}