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We have mappings between MRM and ECU failure situations when we can use redundant ECUs.
I want to ask whether this mapping is appropriate or need to be fixed.
Background
We are currently implementing the ECU redundant system of the Minimal Risk Maneuver. The system extends MRM behavior: When one ECU fails, we can operate the MRM operation in another ECU.
Structure
The following figure shows the current ECU structure we are working on. (For ease, the figure omits some components and lacks topic name accuracy.)
Main, Sub, and Supervisor ECU exist in the architecture. The voter in the Supervisor ECU judges the appropriate MRM behavior from operation mode availability.
External monitors deal with ECU failure in the monitored ECU, such as CPU high load. External monitoring has two different characteristics from self-monitoring:
External monitoring results is used when two out of three ECUs indicate the same failure ECU. Ex. When Sub and Supervisor ECU says Main ECU is failing, the voter judges Main ECU has failed. If only Sub ECU said Main ECU is failing, this monitoring result will be ignored.
External monitors are given priority over Self-monitors.
Currently, available stop operations are as follows:
Emergency Stop: The vehicle will stop quickly with a comfortable deceleration.
Comfortable Stop: The vehicle will stop immediately with as much deceleration as possible.
Pull Over: The vehicle will stop after moving to the side of the road.
Supervisor ECU does not have Autoware functionality, so the Supervisor can only operate Emergency stop by itself.
We need to combine the above operations to map with failure patterns.
Current MRM behavior mappings
Suppose we are using the Main ECU for vehicle control, and then failure occurs.
The following figure shows current mappings between failure situations and MRM behaviors:
failed ECU
available stop operation on failed ECU
MRM behavior in Cold Standby
MRM behavior in Hot Standby
additional info
Main
Emergency Stop
Emergency Stop by Main
Emergency Stop by Main
When a failure such as software failure occurs, Sub ECU Stop operations are also thought of as unavailable.
Main
Comfortable Stop
Comfortable Stop by Main
Comfortable Stop by Main
Main
Pull Over
Pull over by Main
Pull over by Main
Main
None
Emergency Stop by Supervisor, then Pull over by Sub
Pull over by Sub
Sub
Emergency Stop
Pull over by Main
Pull over by Main
We are planning to continue running to next goal, then Pull over by Main.
Sub
Comfortable Stop
Pull over by Main
Pull over by Main
We are planning to continue running to next goal, then Pull over by Main.
Sub
Pull Over
Pull over by Main
Pull over by Main
We are planning to continue running to next goal, then Pull over by Main.
Sub
None
Pull over by Main
Pull over by Main
We are planning to continue running to next goal, then Pull over by Main.
Supervisor
Emergency Stop
Stop CAN frame, and detect it by VCU
Stop CAN frame, and detect it by VCU
If the VCU is connected to Main ECU directly, we can use Main Can frame
Supervisor
None
Stop CAN frame, and detect it by VCU
Stop CAN frame, and detect it by VCU
If the VCU is connected to Main ECU directly, we can use Main Can frame
Multiple ECU
-
Stop CAN frame, and detect it by VCU
Stop CAN frame and detect it by VCU
We cannot switch the Main ECU to the Sub ECU directly if the system is Cold/Warm Standby. We need to implement time sync between Main/Sub ECU to switch directly.
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We have mappings between MRM and ECU failure situations when we can use redundant ECUs.
I want to ask whether this mapping is appropriate or need to be fixed.
Background
We are currently implementing the ECU redundant system of the Minimal Risk Maneuver. The system extends MRM behavior: When one ECU fails, we can operate the MRM operation in another ECU.
Structure
The following figure shows the current ECU structure we are working on. (For ease, the figure omits some components and lacks topic name accuracy.)
Main, Sub, and Supervisor ECU exist in the architecture. The voter in the Supervisor ECU judges the appropriate MRM behavior from operation mode availability.
External monitors deal with ECU failure in the monitored ECU, such as CPU high load. External monitoring has two different characteristics from self-monitoring:
Operation mode availability
The operation mode availability shows whether the component, such as
autonomous
,comfortable stop
, orpull over
, can be operated.autowarefoundation/autoware.universe#3829
https://github.com/tier4/tier4_autoware_msgs/blob/tier4/universe/tier4_system_msgs/msg/OperationModeAvailability.msg
Stop operations
Currently, available stop operations are as follows:
Supervisor ECU does not have Autoware functionality, so the Supervisor can only operate Emergency stop by itself.
We need to combine the above operations to map with failure patterns.
Current MRM behavior mappings
Suppose we are using the Main ECU for vehicle control, and then failure occurs.
The following figure shows current mappings between failure situations and MRM behaviors:
We cannot switch the Main ECU to the Sub ECU directly if the system is Cold/Warm Standby. We need to implement time sync between Main/Sub ECU to switch directly.
The idea of new MRM behavior is also welcome.
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