diff --git a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/.env.sample b/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/.env.sample deleted file mode 100644 index e16af2def..000000000 --- a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/.env.sample +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -OPENAI_API_KEY=your_openai_key -ANYSCALE_ENDPOINT_API_KEY=your_anyscale_key \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/data/books/pg72846.txt b/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/data/books/pg72846.txt deleted file mode 100644 index eb2ca3d11..000000000 --- a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/data/books/pg72846.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11335 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the United States of America, Volume 7 (of 9) - -This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online -at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, -you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located -before using this eBook. - -Title: History of the United States of America, Volume 7 (of 9) - During the second administration of James Madison - - -Author: Henry Adams - -Release date: January 31, 2024 [eBook #72846] - -Language: English - -Original publication: New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889 - -Credits: Richard Hulse and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VOLUME 7 (OF 9) *** - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Additional -notes will be found near the end of this ebook. - - - - - THE - - SECOND ADMINISTRATION - - OF - - JAMES MADISON - - 1813–1817 - - - - - HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. - - BY - - HENRY ADAMS. - - - VOLS. I. AND II.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON. - 1801–1805. - - VOLS. III. AND IV.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON. - 1805–1809. - - VOLS. V. AND VI.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF MADISON. 1809–1813. - - VOLS. VII., VIII., AND IX.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF MADISON. - 1813–1817. WITH AN INDEX TO THE ENTIRE WORK. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF - - JAMES MADISON - - - BY HENRY ADAMS - - - VOL. I. - - - NEW YORK - CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS - 1891 - - - - - _Copyright, 1890_ - BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS. - - - University Press: - JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE. - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. I. - - - CHAPTER PAGE - I. ENGLAND ANGRY 1 - - II. RUSSIAN MEDIATION 26 - - III. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813 48 - - IV. THE RIVER RAISIN 72 - - V. PROCTOR AND PERRY 99 - - VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES 128 - - VII. DEARBORN’S CAMPAIGN 144 - - VIII. WILKINSON’S CAMPAIGN 172 - - IX. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS 206 - - X. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS 232 - - XI. THE BLOCKADE 262 - - XII. “CHESAPEAKE” AND “ARGUS” 285 - - XIII. PRIVATEERING 309 - - XIV. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 339 - - XV. THE LAST EMBARGO 364 - - XVI. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG 391 - - - - -HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -THE American declaration of war against England, July 18, 1812, annoyed -those European nations that were gathering their utmost resources for -resistance to Napoleon’s attack. Russia could not but regard it as an -unfriendly act, equally bad for political and commercial interests. -Spain and Portugal, whose armies were fed largely if not chiefly on -American grain imported by British money under British protection, -dreaded to see their supplies cut off. Germany, waiting only for -strength to recover her freedom, had to reckon against one more element -in Napoleon’s vast military resources. England needed to make greater -efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in Russia -and Spain. Even in America, no one doubted the earnestness of England’s -wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe insisted on her acquiescence -in their terms, they insisted because they believed that their military -position entitled them to expect it. The reconquest of Russia and -Spain by Napoleon, an event almost certain to happen, could hardly fail -to force from England the concessions, not in themselves unreasonable, -which the United States required. - -This was, as Madison to the end of his life maintained, “a fair -calculation;”[1] but it was exasperating to England, who thought that -America ought to be equally interested with Europe in overthrowing -the military despotism of Napoleon, and should not conspire with him -for gain. At first the new war disconcerted the feeble Ministry that -remained in office on the death of Spencer Perceval: they counted on -preventing it, and did their utmost to stop it after it was begun. -The tone of arrogance which had so long characterized government and -press, disappeared for the moment. Obscure newspapers, like the London -“Evening Star,” still sneered at the idea that Great Britain was to be -“driven from the proud pre-eminence which the blood and treasure of her -sons have attained for her among the nations, by a piece of striped -bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by -a handful of bastards and outlaws,”--a phrase which had great success -in America,--but such defiances expressed a temper studiously held in -restraint previous to the moment when the war was seen to be inevitable. - -Castlereagh did not abandon the hope of peace until Jonathan Russell, -August 24, reported to him the concessions which the President required -antecedent to negotiation, the stoppage of impressments, dismissal -of impressed seamen, indemnity for spoliations, and abandonment of -paper blockades. The British secretary intimated that he thought -these demands, as conditions precedent to an armistice, somewhat -insulting;[2] and in conversation he explained to Russell that such -concessions would merely cost the Ministry their places without result. -“You are not aware,” he said,[3] “of the great sensibility and jealousy -of the people of England on this subject; and no administration could -expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right -of impressment or to suspend the practice, without certainty of an -arrangement which should obviously be calculated to secure its object.” -Russell then proposed an informal understanding,--adding of his own -accord, without authority from his Government, a proposal, afterward -adopted by Congress, that the United States should naturalize no more -British seamen. Castlereagh made the obvious reply that an informal -understanding offered no more guaranty to England than a formal one; -that it had the additional disadvantage of bearing on its face a -character of disguise; that in any case the discussion of guaranties -must precede the understanding; and that Russell had on this subject -neither authority nor instructions.[4] - -The correspondence closed September 19, and Russell left England; but -not until October 13, after learning that the President had refused to -ratify the armistice made by Prevost with Dearborn, did the British -government order general reprisals,--and even this order closed with -a proviso that nothing therein contained should affect the previous -authority given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to arrange a -cessation of hostilities. - -The realization that no escape could be found from an American war -was forced on the British public at a moment of much discouragement. -Almost simultaneously a series of misfortunes occurred which brought -the stoutest and most intelligent Englishmen to the verge of despair. -In Spain Wellington, after winning the battle of Salamanca in July, -occupied Madrid in August, and obliged Soult to evacuate Andalusia; but -his siege of Burgos failed, and as the French generals concentrated -their scattered forces, Wellington was obliged to abandon Madrid -once more. October 21, he was again in full retreat on Portugal. -The apparent failure of his campaign was almost simultaneous with -the apparent success of Napoleon’s; for the Emperor entered Moscow -September 14, and the news of this triumph, probably decisive of -Russian submission, reached England about October 3. Three days later -arrived intelligence of William Hull’s surrender at Detroit; but this -success was counterbalanced by simultaneous news of Isaac Hull’s -startling capture of the “Guerriere,” and the certainty of a prolonged -war. - -In the desponding condition of the British people,--with a deficient -harvest, bad weather, wheat at nearly five dollars a bushel, and the -American supply likely to be cut off; consols at 57½, gold at thirty -per cent premium; a Ministry without credit or authority, and a general -consciousness of blunders, incompetence, and corruption,--every new -tale of disaster sank the hopes of England and called out wails of -despair. In that state of mind the loss of the “Guerriere” assumed -portentous dimensions. The “Times” was especially loud in lamenting the -capture:-- - - “We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and - honorable minds.... Never before in the history of the world did - an English frigate strike to an American; and though we cannot say - that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for - this act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English navy - who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colors - flying, than have set their fellow sailors so fatal an example.” - -No country newspaper in America, railing at Hull’s cowardice and -treachery, showed less knowledge or judgment than the London “Times,” -which had written of nothing but war since its name had been known -in England. Any American could have assured the English press that -British frigates before the “Guerriere” had struck to American; -and even in England men had not forgotten the name of the British -frigate “Serapis,” or that of the American captain Paul Jones. Yet -the “Times’s” ignorance was less unreasonable than its requirement -that Dacres should have gone down with his ship,--a cry of passion -the more unjust to Dacres because he fought his ship as long as she -could float. Such sensitiveness seemed extravagant in a society which -had been hardened by centuries of warfare; yet the “Times” reflected -fairly the feelings of Englishmen. George Canning, speaking in open -Parliament not long afterward,[5] said that the loss of the “Guerriere” -and the “Macedonian” produced a sensation in the country scarcely to -be equalled by the most violent convulsions of Nature. “Neither can I -agree with those who complain of the shock of consternation throughout -Great Britain as having been greater than the occasion required.... It -cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility of -the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures.” - -Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of believing itself -invincible was perhaps the one most profitably broken; but the process -of recovering its senses was agreeable to no nation, and to England, at -that moment of distress, it was as painful as Canning described. The -matter was not mended by the “Courier” and “Morning Post,” who, taking -their tone from the Admiralty, complained of the enormous superiority -of the American frigates, and called them “line-of-battle ships in -disguise.” Certainly the American forty-four was a much heavier ship -than the British thirty-eight, but the difference had been as well -known in the British navy before these actions as it was afterward; and -Captain Dacres himself, the Englishman who best knew the relative force -of the ships, told his court of inquiry a different story:[6] “I am so -well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that -it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest period of my life, to -be once more opposed to the ‘Constitution,’ with them [the old crew] -under my command, in a frigate of similar force with the ‘Guerriere.’” -After all had been said, the unpleasant result remained that in future -British frigates, like other frigates, could safely fight only their -inferiors in force. What applied to the “Guerriere” and “Macedonian” -against the “Constitution” and “United States,” where the British force -was inferior, applied equally to the “Frolic” against the “Wasp,” where -no inferiority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward -admitted what America wished to prove, that, ship for ship, British -were no more than the equals of Americans. - -Society soon learned to take a more sensible view of the subject, -but as the first depression passed away a consciousness of personal -wrong took its place. The United States were supposed to have stabbed -England in the back at the moment when her hands were tied, when her -existence was in the most deadly peril and her anxieties were most -heavy. England never could forgive treason so base and cowardice so -vile. That Madison had been from the first a tool and accomplice of -Bonaparte was thenceforward so fixed an idea in British history that -time could not shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so historical had -the causes of war become that no one even in America could explain or -understand them, while Englishmen could see only that America required -England as the price of peace to destroy herself by abandoning her -naval power, and that England preferred to die fighting rather than to -die by her own hand. The American party in England was extinguished; -no further protest was heard against the war; and the British people -thought moodily of revenge. - -This result was unfortunate for both parties, but was doubly -unfortunate for America, because her mode of making the issue told -in her enemy’s favor. The same impressions which silenced in England -open sympathy with America, stimulated in America acute sympathy with -England. Argument was useless against people in a passion, convinced -of their own injuries. Neither Englishmen nor Federalists were open to -reasoning. They found their action easy from the moment they classed -the United States as an ally of France, like Bavaria or Saxony; and -they had no scruples of conscience, for the practical alliance was -clear, and the fact proved sufficiently the intent. - -This outbreak of feeling took place in the month of October, when the -hopes of England were lowest. While Wellington retreated from Madrid -and Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo; while Napoleon was supposed to be still -victorious at Moscow, although his retreat began October 19, two days -before Wellington abandoned the siege of Burgos; and while, October 18, -the “Wasp” captured the “Frolic,” and October 25 the “United States” -captured the “Macedonian,”--in England public opinion broke into outcry -against the temporizing conduct of the government toward America, and -demanded vigorous prosecution of the war. - - “In any other times than the present,” said the “Times” of October - 30, “it would appear utterly incredible that men should adopt - so drivelling a line of conduct as to think of waging a war of - conciliation and forbearance, and that with enemies whom they - themselves represent as alike faithless and implacable.” - -The Government hastened to pacify these complaints. Orders were given -to hurry an overwhelming force of ships-of-the-line and frigates to the -American coast. Almost immediately England recovered from her dismay; -for November 11 news arrived that the Russians were again masters of -Moscow, and that Napoleon was retreating. Day after day the posts -arrived from Russia, bringing accounts more and more encouraging, until -when Parliament met, November 24, the hope that Napoleon might never -escape from Russia had become strong. - -Thus the new Ministry found themselves able to face opposition with -unexpected strength. Madison’s calculations, reasonable as they seemed -to be, were overthrown, and the glow of English delight over the -success of Russia made the burden of the American war seem easy to -bear. In Parliament hardly a voice was raised for peace. The Marquess -Wellesley in the debate on the King’s speech attacked ministers, -not because they had brought the country into war with America, but -because they had been unprepared for it; “they ought as statesmen to -have known that the American government had been long infected with -a deadly hatred toward this country, and, if he might be allowed -an unusual application of a word, with a deadly affection toward -France.”[7] America had been suffered to carry on hostilities without -danger to herself, and must be convinced of her folly and desperation. -Lord Grenville also asserted that the American government was always -hostile to England, but that only the conduct of ministers had enabled -it to pluck up courage to show its enmity.[8] Canning, in the Commons, -attacked still more sharply the forbearance of the Ministry and their -silence toward America: - - “It never entered into my mind that the mighty naval power of - England would be allowed to sleep while our commerce was swept - from the surface of the Atlantic; and that at the end of six - months’ war it would be proclaimed in a speech from the throne that - the time was now at length come when the long-withheld thunder of - Britain must be launched against an implacable foe, and the fulness - of her power at length drawn out. It never entered into my mind - that we should send a fleet to take rest and shelter in our own - ports in North America, and that we should then attack the American - ports with a flag of truce.”[9] - -From such criticisms Lord Castlereagh had no difficulty in defending -himself. Whitbread alone maintained that injustice had been done to -America, and that measures ought to be taken for peace. - -This debate took place November 30, two days after the destruction of -Napoleon’s army in passing the Beresina. From that moment, and during -the next eighteen months, England had other matters to occupy her mind -than the disagreeable subject of the American war. Napoleon arrived in -Paris December 18, and set himself to the task of renewing the army of -half a million men which had been lost in Russia, and of strengthening -his hold on Germany, where a violent popular emotion threatened to -break into open alliance with the Russian Czar. December 30 the -Prussian corps of the Grand Army deserted to the Russians; and soon -afterward the French abandoned Poland and the province of old Prussia, -and with difficulty, no enemy attacking, held Berlin. The interest -of England turned to the negotiations and military movements of the -Continent, After January 1, 1813, Englishmen never willingly thought of -the American war, or gave attention to terms of peace. They regarded -the result in America as dependent on the result in Germany; and they -would have ignored the war altogether had not the American frigates and -privateers from time to time compelled their attention. - -With the prospect of a great trade about to open with the continent -of Europe, as the French garrisons were driven out of Germany and -Spain, English manufacturers could afford to wait with patience for -better times; but although a nation so long accustomed to the chances -of war could adapt itself quickly to changes in the course of trade, -England felt more than it liked to admit the annoyance of American -hostilities on the ocean. During the first few months this annoyance -was the greater because it was thought to be the result of official -negligence. December 30, a merchant writing to the “Times” declared -that “the Americans have taken upward of two hundred sail of British -merchantmen and three or four packets from the West Indies. Recent -advices from the Windward Islands state that the Admiral is mortified -at the depredations of the American privateers, it not being in his -power to prevent them, most of the few cruisers under his orders having -been out so long from England that their copper is nearly off,--so that -the privateers remain unmolested, as they can sail round our ships -whenever they think proper; they are in consequence become so daring -as even to cut vessels out of harbors, though protected by batteries, -and to land and carry off cattle from plantations. The accounts from -Jamaica by the mail which arrived on Friday represent that island to be -literally blockaded by American privateers.” - -When the press spoke at all of naval matters, it talked wildly about -the American frigates. “Such fearful odds,” said the “Morning Post” in -regard to the “Macedonian,” December 26, “would break the heart and -spirit of our sailors, and dissolve that charm, that spell, which has -made our navy invincible.” “The land-spell of the French is broken, -and so is our sea-spell,” said the “Times.” The American frigates were -exaggerated into ships-of-the-line, and were to be treated as such, -British frigates keeping out of their way. At first, the British naval -officers hesitated to accept this view of a subject which had never -before been suggested. Neither Captain Dacres nor his court-martial -attributed his defeat to this cause; but before long, nearly all -England agreed to rate the American frigates as seventy-fours, and -complained that the Americans, with their accustomed duplicity, should -have deceived the British navy by representing the “Constitution” and -“United States” to be frigates. The “Times” protested in vain against -this weakness:-- - - “Good God! that a few short months should have so altered the tone - of British sentiments! Is it true, or is it not, that our navy was - accustomed to hold the Americans in utter contempt? Is it true, or - is it not, that the ‘Guerriere’ sailed up and down the American - coast with her name painted in large characters on her sails, in - boyish defiance of Commodore Rodgers? Would any captain, however - young, have indulged such a foolish piece of vain-boasting if he - had not been carried forward by the almost unanimous feeling of his - associates?”[10] - -To the charge that the British Admiralty had been taken unprepared by -the war, the Admiralty replied that its naval force on the American -station at the outbreak of hostilities exceeded the American in the -proportion of eighty-five to fourteen. - - “We have since sent out more line-of-battle ships and heavier - frigates,” added the “Times,” January 4, 1813. “Surely we must now - mean to smother the American navy.... A very short time before the - capture of the ‘Guerriere’ an American frigate was an object of - ridicule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually setting - the other way, and great pains seem to be taken by the friends of - ministers to prepare the public for the surrender of a British - seventy-four to an opponent lately so much contemned.” - -The loss of two or three thirty-eight gun frigates on the ocean was a -matter of trifling consequence to the British government, which had a -force of four ships-of-the-line and six or eight frigates in Chesapeake -Bay alone, and which built every year dozens of ships-of-the-line -and frigates to replace those lost or worn out; but although the -American privateers wrought more injury to British interests than was -caused or could be caused by the American navy, the pride of England -cared little about mercantile losses, and cared immensely for its -fighting reputation. The theory that the American was a degenerate -Englishman,--a theory chiefly due to American teachings,--lay at -the bottom of British politics. Even the late British minister at -Washington, Foster, a man of average intelligence, thought it manifest -good taste and good sense to say of the Americans in his speech of -February 18, 1813, in Parliament, that “generally speaking, they were -not a people we should be proud to acknowledge as our relations.”[11] -Decatur and Hull were engaged in a social rather than in a political -contest, and were aware that the serious work on their hands had little -to do with England’s power, but much to do with her manners. The -mortification of England at the capture of her frigates was the measure -of her previous arrogance. - -The process of acquiring knowledge in such light as was furnished by -the cannon of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge could not be rendered easy -or rapid. News of the American victories dropped in at intervals, as -though American captains intentionally prolonged the enjoyment of their -certain success, in order to keep England in constant ill temper. -News of the “Java” arrived about the middle of March, and once more -the press broke into a chorus of complaints. The “Times” renewed its -outcry; the “Courier” abused the “Times” for its “tone of whining -lamentation, of affected sensibility, and puerile grief,” but admitted -that the behavior of the American frigates seemed extraordinary; while -the “Pilot,” the chief naval authority, lamented in set periods the -incomprehensible event:-- - - “The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall not - presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has struck - to an American. This is an occurrence that calls for serious - reflection,--this, and the fact stated in our paper of yesterday, - that Loyd’s list contains notices of upwards of five hundred - British vessels captured in seven months by the Americans. Five - hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these statements be - true; and can the English people hear them unmoved? Any one who - had predicted such a result of an American war this time last year - would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He would have - been told, if his opponents had condescended to argue with him, - that long ere seven months had elapsed the American flag would be - swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States - annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. - Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck - her flag. They insult and laugh at our want of enterprise and - vigor. They leave their ports when they please, and return to them - when it suits their convenience; they traverse the Atlantic; they - beset the West India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the - Channel; they parade along the coasts of South America; nothing - chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them but to yield them - triumph.” - -The immediate moral drawn from these complaints was the necessity of -punishing the United States; but no one could longer deny that the -necessary punishment was likely to prove tedious and costly. February -18 Parliament took up the subject of the American war, and both -Houses debated it. In the Lords, Bathurst made a temperate speech -devoted to showing that America in claiming immunity from impressments -claimed more than England could afford to yield,--“a right hitherto -exercised without dispute, and of the most essential importance to our -maritime superiority.” Lord Lansdowne replied with tact and judgment, -rather hinting than saying that the right was becoming too costly -for assertion. “Some time ago it was imagined on all hands that in -the event of a war with America, the first operation would be the -destruction of her navy. What the fact had turned out to be, he was -almost ashamed to mention. If any one were asked what had been the -success of our navy in this war, he would unfortunately find some -difficulty in giving an answer.”[12] Lord Liverpool, while defending -his administration from the charge of imbecility, tended to strengthen -the prevailing impression by the tone of his complaints against -America: “Although she might have had wrongs, although she might -have had grounds for complaint, although she might have had pressing -provocations, yet she ought to have looked to this country as the -guardian power to which she was indebted not only for her comforts, -not only for her rank in the scale of civilization, but for her very -existence.”[13] Perhaps these words offered as good an explanation as -the Prime Minister could give of the war itself, for apart from the -unconscious sarcasm they contained, they implied that England assumed -to act as guardian to the United States, and had hitherto denied to the -United States the right to act independently. - -Both Lord Holland and Lord Erskine gently glanced at this assumption; -and Erskine went so far as to intimate that sooner or later England -must give way. “It has been said that this war, if the Americans -persist in their claims, must be eternal. If so, our prospects are -disheartening. America is a growing country,--increasing every day -in numbers, in strength, in resources of every kind. In a lengthened -contest all the advantages are on her side, and against this country.” -The warning lost none of its point from Lord Eldon, who, always ready -to meet any logical necessity by an equally logical absurdity, granted -that “unless America should think proper to alter her tone, he did not -see how the national differences could be settled.” - -Such a debate was little likely to discourage America. Every country -must begin war by asserting that it will never give way, and of all -countries England, which had waged innumerable wars, knew best when -perseverance cost more than concession. Even at that early moment -Parliament was evidently perplexed, and would willingly have yielded -had it seen means of escape from its naval fetich, impressment. -Perhaps the perplexity was more evident in the Commons than in the -Lords, for Castlereagh, while defending his own course with elaborate -care, visibly stumbled over the right of impressment. Even while -claiming that its abandonment would have been “vitally dangerous if -not fatal” to England’s security, he added that he “would be the last -man in the world to underrate the inconvenience which the Americans -sustained in consequence of our assertion of the right of search.” The -embarrassment became still plainer when he narrowed the question to one -of statistics, and showed that the whole contest was waged over the -forcible retention of some eight hundred seamen among one hundred and -forty-five thousand employed in British service. Granting the number -were twice as great, he continued, “could the House believe that there -was any man so infatuated, or that the British empire was driven to -such straits, that for such a paltry consideration as seventeen hundred -sailors, his Majesty’s government would needlessly irritate the pride -of a neutral nation or violate that justice which was due to one -country from another?” If Liverpool’s argument explained the causes of -war, Castlereagh’s explained its inevitable result, for since the war -must cost England at least ten million pounds a year, could Parliament -be so infatuated as to pay ten thousand pounds a year for each American -sailor detained in service, when one tenth of the amount, if employed -in raising the wages of the British sailor, would bring any required -number of seamen back to their ships? The whole British navy in 1812 -cost twenty million pounds; the pay-roll amounted to only three million -pounds; the common sailor was paid four pounds bounty and eighteen -pounds a year, which might have been trebled at half the cost of an -American war. - -No one rose in the House to press this reasoning. Castlereagh completed -his argument, showing, with more temper than logic, that England was -wholly in the right and America altogether in the wrong; the American -government and people were infatuated; they had an inordinate and -insolent spirit of encroachment and unreasonable hostility; had -prostituted their character and showed an unexampled degeneracy of -feeling. “For America he confessed that he deeply lamented the injury -which her character had sustained by the conduct of her government; it -was conduct unworthy of any State calling itself civilized and free.” - -Castlereagh’s invective had the merit of being as little serious as his -logic, and left as little sting; but what Castlereagh could say without -causing more than a smile, never failed to exasperate Americans like -drops of vitriol when it came from the lips of George Canning. Canning -had not hitherto succeeded better in winning the confidence of England -than in curbing the insolence of America; he was still in opposition, -while the man whom in 1807 he could hardly condescend to consider a -rival was Secretary for Foreign Affairs and leader of the House. Worst -of all, Canning could not escape the necessity of supporting him, for -Castlereagh’s position in regard to America was strong, while Canning’s -own position was weak and needed constant excuse. In the debate of -Feb. 18, 1813, he undertook the difficult task of appearing to attack -Castlereagh while defending himself. - -Canning’s speech began by an argument so characteristic as to win the -praise of John Wilson Croker, Secretary to the Admiralty,--a man less -than most politicians prone to waste praise on opponents. Whitbread -had quoted, in excuse of the American practice of naturalization, two -Acts of Parliament,--one the 6th Anne, according to which any foreigner -who served two years in any British vessel, military or merchant, -without further condition or even oath, or more than the statement of -the fact of service, became entitled to every protection of a natural -subject of the realm. No words could be more emphatic than those of -the statutes. “Such foreign mariner,” said the 6th Anne, “shall to all -intents and purposes be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject -of his Majesty’s kingdom of Great Britain, and have and enjoy all the -privileges, powers, rights, and capacities” which a native could enjoy. -Again, by the 13th George II. every foreign seaman who in time of war -served two years on board an English ship by virtue of the king’s -proclamation was _ipso facto_ naturalized. Other naturalization laws -existed, guaranteeing all the privileges of a natural-born subject to -foreigners under certain conditions; but the Acts of Anne and George -II. were most in point, as they referred to foreign sailors alone; -and with these laws on the statute-book Parliament seemed to stand in -an unfavorable position for disputing the right of America to adopt a -similar system. Canning’s argument on the meaning of these statutes was -interesting, not only as an example of his own mind, but as the only -legal justification of a long war which England fought against America -at prodigious expense,--a justification which she maintained for years -to be sound. - - “My construction of the Acts of Anne was altogether different,” - said Canning in reply to these quotations. “I understood that by - it this country professed to give that only which it is competent - to bestow without interfering in any degree with the rights or - claims of other Powers; that it imparted to foreigners on certain - conditions certain municipal privileges, but leaves untouched and - unimpaired their native allegiance.... The enactments of this - statute are a testimony of national gratitude to brave men of - whatever country who may lend their aid in fighting the battles - of Great Britain, but not an invitation to them to abandon the - cause of their own country when it may want their aid; not an - encouragement to them to deny or to undervalue the sacred and - indestructible duty which they owe to their own sovereign and to - their native soil.” - -Something peculiarly sacred must have inhered in the statute of Anne -which thus conferred naturalization on Dutch or Swedish seamen as “a -testimony of national gratitude” for “fighting the battles of Great -Britain” for two years in the British merchant service in time of -peace, and converted them into citizens enjoying “all the privileges, -powers, rights, and capacities” of natural-born subjects of Great -Britain, which consisted, according to Canning, only in “certain -municipal privileges” in England, subject to the will of a foreign -sovereign. Such a definition of the “privileges, powers, rights, and -capacities” of a natural-born subject of his Majesty’s kingdom of -Great Britain seemed new to American lawyers; but it was received with -applause by the House, and was further developed by Croker, who laid -down the principle, new to the popular view of England’s pride, that -the naturalized citizen, who was by the law required “to all intents -and purposes” to “be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject,” -was in fact by the Admiralty “considered as having two countries,--the -voluntary service of the one being looked upon as unable to debar the -natural allegiance to the other.” - -The rest of Canning’s speech consisted in defence of impressment -and of paper blockades, and in panegyric upon European republics -at the expense of “the hard features of transatlantic democracy.” -While assailing the British government because “the arm which should -have launched the thunderbolt was occupied in guiding the pen,” he -expressed his devout wish that the war might not be concluded until -England had smothered in victories the disasters to which she was -so little habituated. If an harangue of this character served in -any degree to guide or aid the councils of England, it served much -more effectually the war-party of America, where Canning was held in -singular antipathy, and where every admission he made in regard to “the -shock of consternation” caused by the American frigates gave pleasure -more acute than any pain his sarcastic phrases could thenceforward -inflict. - -Alexander Baring spoke with his usual good sense, pointing out that -Castlereagh’s speech proved chiefly the greater interest of England -to call for and court negotiation on the subject of impressments. -Whitbread challenged public opinion by going to the verge of actual -sympathy with America. The debate ended in an unopposed vote for -a vigorous prosecution of the war, leaving the subject in truth -untouched, except that England had avowed an extreme desire to punish -America, and naturally felt an extreme irritation because America -showed ability to bear punishment. - -The spring came, bringing no new prospects. England refused to make a -suggestion on which the governments could discuss terms of peace. She -refused even to think upon the problem, but massed a huge armament in -Chesapeake Bay and Delaware River to restore her naval invincibility. -Yet reflection seemed still to be silently at work, for, March 22, -the “Times” interrupted its outcry over the loss of the “Java” by -publishing a temperate article on the new Foreign Seamen Bill of -Congress,--an article in which the suggestion first appeared that peace -might after all be restored by simply omitting in the pacification any -mention of impressment. The idea found support nowhere; but while, -insufficient as it seemed, the human imagination could hardly conceive -of any other expedient, at the same moment the uselessness of trying -to obtain peace on any terms was made clear by the interference of the -Russian Czar. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -NAPOLEON declared war against Russia June 22, four days after the -American declaration against England; crossed the Niemen June 24, -and August 1 was already at Vitebsk, about three hundred miles south -of St. Petersburg, and about equally distant from the frontier and -from Moscow. There, in the heart of Russia, he paused to collect his -strength for some blow that should lay the Russian empire at his feet; -and while he hesitated, the Czar, August 3, returned to his capital to -wait. At that moment the chances of war favored Napoleon. Nothing was -more likely than his success in destroying the Russian army, and in -dictating terms of peace in St. Petersburg. - -News of the American declaration of war reached St. Petersburg August -6, and added a new anxiety to the overburdened mind of Alexander. The -American minister at that court found himself in a delicate position. -His Government declared war against England and became for military -purposes an ally of France at the moment when Russia entered into -formal alliance with England and went to war with France. If Napoleon -caught and crushed the Russian army and marched on St. Petersburg, -the American minister would certainly be no favorite with Russians; -if Napoleon were beaten, the American minister need expect no -consideration, for in that case every influence at the Russian Court -was certain to be English, and from England could come no favors. - -At the moment when Brock, with his force of a few hundred men attacked -Detroit, Napoleon with two hundred thousand men moved upon Smolensk and -the Russian army. August 15, he celebrated his fête-day on the banks -of the Dnieper; and while Hull was surrendering the fort of Detroit, -the Russian army, hardly in better humor than the Ohio militia, were -preparing to abandon Smolensk to save themselves from Hull’s fate. -Napoleon took possession of the town August 18, but failed to destroy -the Russian army, and then, turning away from St. Petersburg, pursued -his retreating enemy toward Moscow. The battle of Borodino, or Moscowa, -followed, September 6, and the French army entered Moscow September 14. -There it remained more than a month. - -During these weeks of alarm and incessant fighting, the Czar still -found time to think of American affairs. The influence of Count -Roumanzoff, though lessening every day, still controlled the regular -course of foreign relations. September 21 Roumanzoff sent for Adams, -and said that the Emperor had been much concerned to find the interests -of his subjects defeated and lost by the new war, and it had occurred -to him that perhaps an arrangement might be more easily made by an -indirect than by a direct negotiation: he wished to know whether an -offer of mediation on his part would meet with any difficulty on the -part of the United States.[14] Adams replied that his Government could -not fail to consider it as a new evidence of the Czar’s friendship, but -suggested that there was a third party to be consulted,--the British -government. Roumanzoff answered that he had already sounded the British -minister, who had written to Lord Castlereagh on the subject. - -The British minister, lately arrived in Russia, was not a person -calculated to aid Roumanzoff. Lord Cathcart, who had been chosen by -Castlereagh for the post of ambassador at St. Petersburg, was best -known as the commander of the Copenhagen expedition in 1807. Some -Americans might perhaps remember that he had served in America during -the Revolutionary War. A well-informed writer in the London “Times,” -who belonged to the Wellesley interest, seemed to doubt Lord Cathcart’s -qualifications for his new post. “He is only better fitted for it than -the horse he rides,” was the criticism;[15] but the better he had been -fitted for it, the worse he would have suited Roumanzoff’s purpose, -for his first object could be no other than to overthrow Roumanzoff -and thwart his policy. No serious support of Russian mediation could -be expected from him. He began his career by seeking access to the -Emperor through other channels than the chancellor.[16] - -Adams, September 30, advised his Government of the Czar’s proposed -mediation. October 15, Roumanzoff announced that his proposal was -ready, and would be sent at once to Washington,--which was actually -done, before receiving a reply from London. The step could hardly -please the British government; but Roumanzoff seemed almost to take -pleasure in disregarding England, and perhaps felt that the course of -events must either remove him entirely from the government, or make him -independent of British support. He clung to the American mediation as -the last remnant of his anti-British policy. - -The British government would have preferred to make no answer to the -Russian offer of mediation. To English statesmen the idea was absurd -that England could allow Russia, more than France or the United States -themselves, to mediate on blockade and impressment, or upon points of -neutrality in any form; but Castlereagh had every reason to conciliate -the Czar, and rather than flatly reject a suggestion from such a -source, he replied that he thought the time had not yet come, and that -the offer would not be accepted by America.[17] So it happened that the -offer of Russian mediation went to America without positive objection -from England, finding its way slowly across the Atlantic during the -winter months. - -With it went the tale of Napoleon’s immense disaster. October 23 he -began his retreat; November 23 he succeeded in crossing the Beresina -and escaping capture; December 5 he abandoned what was still left of -his army; and December 19, after travelling secretly and without rest -across Europe, he appeared suddenly in Paris, still powerful, but in -danger. Nothing could be better calculated to support the Russian -mediation in the President’s mind. The possibility of remaining without -a friend in the world while carrying on a war without hope of success, -gave to the Czar’s friendship a value altogether new. - -Other news crossed the ocean at the same time, but encouraged no hope -that England would give way. First in importance, and not to be trifled -with, was the British official announcement, dated December 26, 1812, -of the blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware. Americans held that -this blockade was illegal,[18]--a blockade of a coast, not of a port; a -paper-blockade, one of the grievances against which the war was waged; -but whatever they might choose to call it, they could not successfully -disprove its efficiency, or deny that it made Chesapeake Bay, Delaware -River, and the Vineyard Sound little better than British waters. Export -of American produce from the Chesapeake and Delaware ceased. - -The blockade, though serious beyond all other military measures, -roused less attention and less protest than another measure of the -British government which had the character of a profitable insult. A -circular dated November 9, addressed to the governors of West Indian -colonies by the British government, authorized them to issue licenses -for importation of necessary supplies during the war,--a precaution -commonly taken to meet the risk of famine in those regions. The -Governor of the Bermudas, in issuing a proclamation January 14, 1813, -published the circular, which contained one unusual provision:[19]-- - - “Whatever importations are proposed to be made, under the order, - from the United States of America, should be by your licenses - confined to the ports in the Eastern States exclusively, unless - you have reason to suppose that the object of the order would not - be fulfilled if licenses are not also granted for the importations - from the other ports in the United States.” - -Probably the discrimination was intended, like the exemption from -blockade, as a favor to New England, and must have been meant to be -more or less secret, since publication was likely to counteract its -effect; but in time of war the British government was at liberty to -seek supplies where it chose. - -Madison thought differently. He sent to Congress, February 24, 1813, a -special Message expressing indignation at the conduct of England. - - “The policy now proclaimed to the world,” he charged, “introduces - into her modes of warfare a system equally distinguished - by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its - character,--having for its object to dissolve the ties of - allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation, - and to seduce and separate its component parts the one from the - other. The general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing - contrivances will be reprobated by the civilized world.” - -Although many persons shared Madison’s view of war as a compulsory -process of international law, Federalists and Republicans were at a -loss to understand his view of “deformity” and “depravity” in modes -of warfare. The whole truth in regard to West and East Florida was -not known, but so much was notorious, even in 1811, as to warrant the -British minister in protesting “against an attempt so contrary to every -principle of public justice, faith, and national honor.”[20] What the -United States could do in Florida in time of peace, England could -surely do in Massachusetts in time of war; but if England’s conduct -was in reality deformed and depraved, as charged, the celebrated -proclamation of William Hull to the Canadians in 1812, inviting them -to quit their allegiance and to “choose wisely” the side of the United -States, should have been previously disavowed by the United States -government. No little ridicule was caused by the contrast between -Madison’s attitude toward Canada and his denunciation of England’s -attitude toward Massachusetts. - -Taken together, the news from Europe in the last days of winter gave -ground for deep reflection. With the overthrow of Napoleon’s authority -and the close alliance between Great Britain and Russia, the last -chance of forcing concessions from England vanished. A long war, -with no prospect of success, lay before the United States. New York -harbor, the Delaware River, and Chesapeake Bay were already so nearly -closed to commerce as to foreshadow complete stoppage; and if Boston -was still open, its privileges must soon cease unless Great Britain -deliberately intended to regard New England as neutral. All this, -though alarming enough, might be met with courage; but against the -pronounced disaffection of Massachusetts and Connecticut no defence -existed; and whenever those States should pass from stolid inertia into -the stage of active resistance to the war, the situation would become -hopeless. Under such circumstances England would have a strong motive -for refusing peace on any terms. - -The shadow of these fears lay over the Inaugural Address which the -President pronounced March 4, 1813, after taking for a second time the -oath of office at the Capitol. His speech contained only the defence -of a war that needed no defence, and complaints against England which -were drowned in the tumult of war, the loudest complaint that man could -make. Every tone showed that Madison felt doubtful of support, and that -in proving the war to be just he betrayed consciousness that it was not -energetic. Perhaps the most characteristic sentence in the Address was -that in which he congratulated the country “with a proud satisfaction,” -that in carrying on the war, “no principle of justice or honor, no -usage of civilized nations, no precept of courtesy or humanity, have -been infringed; the war has been waged on our part with scrupulous -regard to all these relations, and in a spirit of liberality which was -never surpassed.” Madison’s phrases were the more remarkable because -at about the same time the British government announced its intention -of making America feel what war meant. The courtesy and humanity of -the war were to be all on the American side; while not a word in the -Inaugural Address gave the pledge which could win victories,--the -assurance that the President himself had energy and meant to exert it. - -Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly from failure of -military calculations at home and abroad, but chiefly from want of -national experience in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded -the President, and could not fail to make him wish for peace. Armstrong -had not been six weeks in the War Department before he set the -members of Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert Smith -returned, and the President found the task of maintaining discipline -as great in the Cabinet as it was in the army. One of the strongest -characters called into prominence by the war, who was himself destined -to have charge of the War Department, spoke of Armstrong, four months -later, in language hinting impatient consciousness of something too -complicated to describe. “And Armstrong!--he was the devil from the -beginning, is now, and ever will be.”[21] Only by studying what -Armstrong did, could the causes be understood of the passion which he -excited in every man he crossed. - -Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong’s proceedings. Monroe’s -character, the opposite of Armstrong’s, was transparent; no one could -mistake his motives, except by supposing them to be complex; and in -his relations with Armstrong his motives were simpler than usual, for -Armstrong’s views could not be carried into effect without loss of -pride to Monroe. Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to -him, with the expectation that if any one was to have general command -of the armies in the field, Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time -when Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that the next -campaign was to be fought by Monroe. Jan. 13, 1813, Serurier wrote to -his Government:[22] - - “There is much talk of Mr. Monroe for the command of the army, and - he has shown a zeal in organizing his Department which tends to - confirm me in that belief.... Mr. Monroe is not a brilliant man, - and no one expects to find a great captain in him; but he served - through the War of Independence with much bravery under the orders - and by the side of Washington. He is a man of great good sense, - of the most austere honor, the purest patriotism, and the most - universally admitted integrity. He is loved and respected by all - parties, and it is believed that he would soon gain the hearts - of all his officers and soldiers. He would be given a staff as - good as possible, and with this assistance as well as all his own - recognized resources, it is believed that he would be perfectly - suited to carry on the campaign about to open against the last - continental possession of England in America.” - -As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged Congress to increase -the number of major-generals; and after Armstrong took charge of the -Department Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing -the increase. February 27 the nominations were sent to the Senate. In a -letter to Jefferson, Monroe told the story:[23]-- - - “On the day that the nomination of these officers was made to the - Senate the President sent for me and stated that the Secretary of - War had placed me in his list of major-generals, at their head, and - wished to know whether I would accept the appointment, intimating - that he did not think I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to leave - my present station. I asked where I was to serve. He supposed it - would be with the Northern army under General Dearborn. I replied - that if I left my present office for such a command it would be - inferred that I had a passion for military life, which I had not; - that in such a station I could be of no service in any view to - the general cause or to military operations, even perhaps with - the army in which I might serve; that with a view to the public - interest the commander ought to receive all the support which the - government could give him, and by accepting the station proposed, - I might take from General Dearborn without aiding the cause by - anything that I might add. I stated, however, that the grade made - no difficulty with me, a desire to be useful being my only object; - and that if the command was given me even with a lower grade than - that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it. The - difficulty related to General Dearborn, who could not well be - removed to an inactive station.” - -Monroe said, in effect, that he would have the command in chief -or nothing. Armstrong said, in effect, that he meant to be -commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James -Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina, Morgan -Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison of Indiana Territory, and -Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left -to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn’s incompetence to conduct -a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to -conduct it as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in the field, -performing the duties of lieutenant-general. - -No sooner was Monroe satisfied that Armstrong meant to follow this -course than he took the unusual step of writing to the President a -formal remonstrance against his colleague’s supposed plan. The act -appointing six major-generals was approved February 24. The same -evening Monroe had a conversation on the subject with the President, -and the next day, February 25, submitted the substance of his remarks -in writing.[24] His argument chiefly regarded the inconvenience and -unconstitutionality of separating the War Department from the President -and of mixing military with civil functions:-- - - “As soon as General Armstrong took charge of the Department at - War, I thought I saw his plan; that is, after he had held it a few - days. I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the - army which should be competent to a general control of military - operations; that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands; that - each operation should be distinct and separate, with distinct and - separate objects, and of course to be directed by himself, not - simply in outline but in detail. I anticipated mischief from this, - because I knew that the movements could not be directed from this - place. I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in mind.” - -From that moment began a feud between the two Cabinet ministers. The -cause was obvious. Armstrong had found that if a general command were -to be created, it must be given to Monroe. Probably he felt no more -confidence in Monroe’s military abilities than in those of Dearborn; -but determined that his hand should not be thus forced, Armstrong -decided to retain Dearborn, although his opinion of Dearborn, as shown -afterward,[25] made the retention an act of grave responsibility. The -decision once taken, he had no choice but to supply Dearborn’s wants -by his own presence with the army,--a course certain to challenge -attack from all Virginia. Had Armstrong been bent on destroying his -rival by means which the world could have found no chance to oppose or -criticise, he would have removed Dearborn, and would have sent Monroe -to waste his reputation in the task of conquering and holding Canada. -The retention of Dearborn was an unfortunate beginning for the new -Secretary of War. - -The first effect of Armstrong’s administration was to turn Monroe into -a vindictive enemy; the second was to alienate Gallatin. Of all the -old Republican leaders, Gallatin cared least for office and most for -consistency. Under any reasonable distribution of party favors, the -Presidency should have fallen to him after Madison, not only because he -was the fittest man, the oldest, ablest, and most useful member of the -Executive government, but also because he represented Pennsylvania; and -if any State in the Union had power to select a President, it was she. -Madison would have been glad to secure for Gallatin the succession; -he had no special love or admiration for Monroe, while his regard for -Gallatin was strong and constant; but Pennsylvania cared more for -interests than for men, while Virginia cared so much for men that she -became prodigal of interests. Pennsylvania allowed Virginia, through -the agency of William B. Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, to -thrust Gallatin aside and to open the path for a third Virginian at -the risk of the Union itself. Gallatin, too proud to complain, had no -longer an object of ambition; and from the moment ambition ceased -abstract ideas of duty alone remained to counteract the disgusts of -disappointment. - -Gallatin’s abstract ideas were those of 1801,--simplicity, economy, -and purity. Financiering--the providing of money for wasteful -expenditure--was his abhorrence. “I cannot consent to act the part of -a mere financier,” he wrote to Jefferson in 1809;[26] “to become a -contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a seeker of resources for the -purpose of supporting useless baubles, of increasing the number of idle -and dissipated members of the community, of fattening contractors, -pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all its ramifications that -system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness which you so justly -execrate.” These words were meant to apply only to a state of peace, -but they applied equally well to a state of war from the moment war -became useless. In the beginning of Madison’s second term, no man of -intelligence denied that the war had failed; that its avowed objects -could not be gained; that every month of war increased the danger of -disunion, brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened habits -of extravagance and corruption on the country. From his post at the -Treasury, Gallatin could see better than most men the dangers, both -financial and political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance -with European affairs showed him the need of rapid diplomacy. - -Armstrong represented everything antagonistic to Gallatin; his methods -were arbitrary and underhand; his political training was that of -the New York school, tempered by personal contact with the court of -Napoleon; from him economy could hardly be expected. Yet perhaps -the worst feature of his administration was likely to be his use of -patronage. The number of Gallatin’s personal enemies was small, and -the use of patronage in a way that would outrage him seemed difficult; -yet within a few weeks Armstrong offended him deeply. March 18, 1813, -William Duane, of the “Aurora” newspaper, was appointed to the post -of adjutant-general. The appointment was improper, and the motives to -which it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous than the -unfitness of the person made it harmful to the service. Gallatin’s -anger was deep: “Duane’s last appointment has disgusted me so far as to -make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who have -appointed him.”[27] - -Into this embroglio of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff, -the Russian _chargé_ at Washington, suddenly dropped the Czar’s offer -to mediate a peace. Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances, -no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united. -Daschkoff’s letter bore date March 8, and Monroe’s reply was sent -March 11. The letter of reply was a civil and somewhat flattering -compliment to Alexander;[28] the mission itself was a matter to be more -deliberately arranged. - -The next decision regarded the character of the mission. The necessary -powers might have been sent, without further form, to Minister Adams -at St. Petersburg, but the President and his advisers thought with -reason that the addition of other negotiators to the mission would give -more weight and political effect to the measure.[29] They decided to -send two new envoys to join Adams; and on the same reasoning to select -prominent men. As a guaranty of their wish for peace, they decided -that one of these men should be a Federalist, and they chose James -A. Bayard of Delaware for the post. For the other, Monroe thought -of naming some Western man, to secure the confidence of the Western -country, and reconcile it to the result; but a different turn was given -to the measure by Gallatin, who asked the appointment for himself. -Gallatin’s exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections. -The President consented to appoint him; and Monroe, who had from the -first attached himself to Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the -consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury. - -A question less easy to decide was whether the new mission should -be despatched at once, or should wait until England should formally -accept the mediation. There again political motives dictated immediate -action. If England should accept, much time might be saved if the -mission were on the spot; if she did not accept, the peace-party in -America would be more effectually silenced. In either case, Russia -would be deeply pledged to support her own undertaking. - -The President did not intend to lose Gallatin in the Treasury. Abundant -precedents warranted the double employment of government officers. In -1794 John Jay, then chief-justice, had been sent to negotiate with -England, and the Senate had approved the appointment. In 1799 Oliver -Ellsworth, also chief-justice, was sent to negotiate with France, -and the Senate had again approved. These were Federalist precedents, -supposed to be binding, at least on the Federalist party. If the -chief-justice, the head of an independent branch of government, could -be sent abroad as an Envoy Extraordinary in Executive employment, no -objection could exist to sending an Executive officer on a temporary -service of the same kind, unless on the score of expediency. To prevent -difficulty on that account, the Secretary of the Navy consented to -act as head of the Treasury until Gallatin’s return. Gallatin himself -inclined to look on his separation from the Treasury as final,[30] but -made his arrangements in agreement with the President’s views, which -looked to his return in the autumn. - -Before he could depart he was obliged to complete the necessary -financial arrangements for the coming year, on which he was busily -engaged at the moment when Daschkoff’s letter arrived. First in -importance was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12, -subscription books were opened in all the principal towns, and the -public was invited to take the whole amount at seven per cent interest, -to be reduced to six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four -million dollars were offered on these terms. Proposals in writing were -then invited by a Treasury circular, dated March 18, and after an -active negotiation between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of -New York and Philadelphia,--John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, David -Parish,--the remainder of the loan was provided. In all about eighteen -millions were offered. Fifteen and a half millions were taken, in the -form of six per cent stock, issued at eighty-eight dollars for every -hundred-dollar certificate, redeemable after the year 1825. About half -a million was taken at par, with an annuity of 1½ per cent for thirteen -years, in addition to the six per cent interest. - -Calculated as a perpetual annuity, as English borrowers would have -viewed it, the rate of this loan was less than seven per cent; but if -the nominal capital must or should be repaid after twelve years, the -rate was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government paid 7.487 -per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years. -The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England -in effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could not have been -taken at all, had not credit and currency been already expanded to the -danger-point, as the allotment showed; for while New England, where -most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half a million, and -Boston took but seventy-five thousand, Pennsylvania, where banking had -become a frenzy, took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore -together contributed only half a million more than was given by -Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars were taken by Astor, Girard, -and Parish,--three foreign-born Americans, without whose aid the money -could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all. Doubtless they -were bold operators; but Americans were supposed to be not wanting in -the taste for speculation, and the question could not but rise how -these men knew the secret of distributing the load which no native -American dared carry. - -The bargain was completed April 7. At that moment the Treasury was -empty, and could not meet the drafts of the other departments; but -with sixteen millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and -an estimated revenue of something more than nine millions, Gallatin -collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the -Secretaries of War and Navy,[31] allotting to the one thirteen millions -and a quarter, to the other four and a half millions, which could not -be exceeded without the consent of Congress. This done, and every -question having been settled that could be foreseen,--the tax-bills -ready to be laid before Congress, and even the draft for a new -bank-charter prepared,--Gallatin bade farewell to the Treasury, and May -9 sailed from the Delaware River, with Bayard, for the Baltic. - -Twelve years had passed since Gallatin took charge of the finances, -and his retirement was an event hardly less serious than a change of -President; for it implied that the political system he had done so -much to create and support stood so near the brink of disaster as to -call him from the chosen field of his duties into a new career, where, -if anywhere, he could save it. As Monroe felt called to the army, so -Gallatin turned naturally to diplomacy. He knew that after another -year of war the finances must be thrown into disorder like that of -the Revolutionary War, beyond the reach of financial skill; and he -believed that if any one could smooth the path of negotiation, that -person was likely to serve best the needs of the Treasury. Yet he took -grave responsibility, of which he was fully aware, in quitting his -peculiar post at a moment so serious. Success alone could save him from -universal censure; and perhaps nothing in his career better proved the -high character he bore, and the extraordinary abilities he possessed, -than the ease with which he supported responsibility for this almost -desperate venture. - -The task he had set for himself was hopeless, not so much because of -the concessions he was to require, as on account of the change in -European affairs which made England indifferent for the moment to -any injury the United States could inflict. Monroe’s instructions -to the new commission, though long, consisted largely in arguments -against the legality of impressment as a part of the _jus gentium_; -although the legality of European war-measures had long ceased to be -worth discussing. As the solution of the dispute, Monroe could offer -only the new Foreign Seamen Act, which England had refused from the -first to consider, and which was certainly open to objections,--on -the American side because it offered too much; on the British side -because it offered more than could in practice be performed. To make -the utmost possible concession, Monroe proposed that no native-born -British subject, thenceforward naturalized in America, should be -allowed to serve either in the national or the private vessels of the -United States,--a provision which carried one step further the offer to -naturalize no British seamen except on condition of leaving the sea, -and which went to the verge of conceding the right of impressment. -Notwithstanding these concessions, the instructions were still positive -on the main point. Without a clear and distinct stipulation against -impressments, no treaty was to be signed; negotiations must cease, and -the negotiators must return home.[32] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -During the winter the Republican legislature of New York chose Rufus -King, the chief Federalist in the country, to succeed John Smith as -United States senator. Some Republicans charged that this election -was the price paid by De Witt Clinton for Federalist votes in the -Presidential contest; but Clinton’s friends declared it to be the price -paid by the Administration Republicans for Federalist aid in granting -a corrupt bank charter. That the choice was due to a bargain of some -kind no one denied, and possibly both stories were true. Rufus King -himself stood above suspicion, and had been considered an opponent of -the Federalist alliance with Clinton; but he was a powerful recruit -to the opposition in the Senate, which numbered thenceforward nine -votes, or precisely one fourth of the body. The annoyance to the -Administration was the greater because King’s Republican colleague, -Obadiah German, belonged to the Clintonian opposition, and voted with -the Federalists. At the same time Charles Cutts of New Hampshire was -succeeded by Jeremiah Mason, a very able and extreme Federalist. -Three more senators--Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib--could -be counted as personally hostile to the President. Jesse Franklin of -North Carolina was succeeded by David Stone, an independent, opposed -to the war. Already the opposition threatened to outweigh the votes -on which the President could depend. As though legislation had become -a matter of inferior importance, William H. Crawford of Georgia, the -only vigorous Republican leader in the Senate, resigned his seat, and -followed Gallatin to Europe. He was sent to take the place of Joel -Barlow at Paris, and hurried to his post. In this condition of party -weakness, the election of Rufus King and Jeremiah Mason to the Senate -was a disaster to the Administration; and all the more anxiously the -President feared lest the popular election in May should convert New -York altogether into a Federalist State, and give Massachusetts the -necessary strength to stop the war. - -This election, on which the fate of the war was believed to turn, -took place as usual, May 1, and began by a Federalist success in -the city of New York, followed by another in Kings, Queens, and -Westchester counties. These counties before the century ended had a -voting population of near half a million, but in 1813 they cast in -State elections about eight thousand votes, and gave a majority of -eight hundred for the Federalist candidate Stephen Van Rensselaer, -the unfortunate general of the Niagara campaign. Throughout the -eastern and central counties the election was disputed; three of the -four districts into which the State was divided left the result so -close--within about three hundred votes--that only the western counties -of Cayuga, Seneca, and Genesee turned the scale. Governor Tompkins was -re-elected by the moderate majority of three thousand in a total vote -of eighty-three thousand; but the Federalists obtained a majority of -ten in the Assembly, and gained confidence with their strength. In this -election, for the first time, the issue was distinct between those who -supported and those who opposed the war. The chief towns, New York, -Hudson, and Albany, were strong in opposition; the country districts -tended to support. - -In Massachusetts the Federalist governor Caleb Strong, who had made -himself peculiarly obnoxious by refusing to call out the State’s quota -of militia, received nearly fifty-seven thousand votes, while Senator -Varnum, the Republican candidate, received forty-three thousand. -Considering that the population of Massachusetts was about one fourth -smaller than that of New York, the vote of one hundred thousand persons -in the smaller State, and only eighty-three thousand in the larger, -seemed a proof of popular indifference; but in truth the vote of New -York was larger than usual, and only one thousand less than at the next -election of governor, in 1816. The difference was due to the unequal -suffrage, which in New York State elections was restricted to one -hundred pound free-holds, while in Massachusetts all citizens worth -sixty pounds were entitled to vote. - -At the same time John Randolph met with defeat, for the only time in -his life. John W. Eppes, one of Jefferson’s sons-in-law, took residence -within Randolph’s district for the purpose of contesting it; and after -a struggle succeeded in winning the seat, on the war-issue, by a vote -of eleven hundred and twelve to nine hundred and forty-three.[33] This -change of membership tended, like the New York election, to show that -the people were yielding to the necessity of supporting the war. Yet -the process was alarmingly slow. In the second year of hostilities, New -Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey -were Federal in all branches of their State governments; New York, -Delaware, and Maryland were partly Republican and partly Federalist; -of the eighteen States only ten were wholly Republican, and seven of -these were Southern. In the United States Senate the Administration -could count upon twenty-two votes, with reasonable certainty; the other -fourteen senators were more or less lukewarm or hostile. In the House, -one hundred and fourteen members supported the Administration, and -sixty-eight opposed it. As far as concerned numbers, the Administration -was strong enough in Congress; but the universal want of faith in its -capacity to conduct a war of such consequence gave the Federalists -an advantage beyond proportion to their numerical strength. The task -of opposition was easy, and its force irresistible when the ablest -and oldest Republican in office--the Secretary of the Treasury--felt -himself helpless in face of the Government’s inaptitude for war, -and wrote to his closest intimates that no one could “expect much -improvement in the manner of making it more efficient. I think that -there exists real incapacity in that respect,--an incapacity which must -necessarily exhaust our resources within a very short time.”[34] - -Fortunately for the Government the same slowness of movement which -counteracted its undertakings, affected equally its internal enemies -in their hostility. The New England extremists wished and expected -to act energetically against the war. Chief-Justice Parsons quieted -Pickering in the autumn of 1812 by assuring him that the Massachusetts -House of Representatives would act at its winter session;[35] yet the -legislature met and adjourned without action. The party waited for -the spring election of 1813, which was to give them control of New -York. Their disappointment at the re-election of Governor Tompkins -was extreme, and the temptation to wait until the national government -should become bankrupt and disgraced became irresistible. Another -campaign was likely to answer their purpose. While England grew -stronger every day, America grew weaker; the struggle became more -and more unequal, the result more and more certain; and the hope of -peaceably restoring the Federalist party to power diminished the -temptation to adopt measures of force. - -Thus when the Thirteenth Congress met for its extra session, May 24, -the Government felt stronger than on March 5, when the old Congress -expired. The elections were safely passed; the peace negotiations might -be considered as begun; taxation was no longer a matter of taste. The -majority liked taxation as little in 1813 as they had liked it in -1812 or in 1801; but they could no longer dispute or even discuss it. -Gallatin had gone, leaving the bills for them to pass; and Congress, -which at any other time would have rebelled, had no choice but to pass -them. - -Once more Henry Clay was chosen Speaker, and setting Cheves aside he -placed John W. Eppes at the head of the Ways and Means Committee. The -House missed John Randolph, but gained John Forsyth of Georgia, and -Daniel Webster,--a new member from New Hampshire, of the same age as -Calhoun and Lowndes, but five years younger than Clay. Otherwise the -members varied little from the usual type, and showed more than their -usual faculty for discussing topics no longer worth discussion. - -President Madison’s Message of May 25 challenged no angry comment. Its -allusion to the Russian mediation and the terms of peace had an accent -of self-excuse, as though he were anxious to convince England of her -true interests; its allusion to France contained the usual complaint of -delays “so unreasonably spun out;” and its reference to the war and -the finances was rather cheerful than cheering. Daring as Madison’s -policy had been, he commonly spoke in tones hardly to be called bold; -and this Message had the disadvantage, which under the circumstances -could not be called a fault, of addressing itself rather to Europe and -to enemies, than to a spirited and united nation. It had also the merit -of directing Congress strictly to necessary business; and Congress -acted on the direction. - -Nothing less than necessity could at that moment of early summer have -induced the members of Congress to remain in session at all. Stout -as the majority might be in support of the war, the stoutest were -depressed and despondent. They saw themselves disappointed in every -hope and calculation on which they had counted a year before. Even -their unexpected naval glory was lost for the moment by the victory -of Broke’s frigate the “Shannon” over the “Chesapeake,” June 1, as -Congress began its work. Disaster after disaster, disgrace upon -disgrace, had come and were every moment multiplying. Suffocated with -heat, members were forced to sit day by day in the half-finished -Capitol, with a Southern village about them, their nearest neighbor a -British fleet. “Defeated and disgraced everywhere,” said one of the -stanchest war members describing the scene, “Congress was to impose the -burden of taxes on a divided people, who had been taught by leaders -of the war party to look upon a tax-gatherer as a thief, if not to -shoot him as a burglar.”[36] According to the same authority, “the -country was at the lowest point of depression, where fear is too apt to -introduce despair.” In this condition of spirits, Gallatin’s tax-bills -were reported to the House June 10,--measures such as the Republican -party had, till very lately, not conceived as within the range of its -possible legislation. They included a direct tax of three million -dollars; taxes on salt, licenses, spirits, carriages, auctions, sugar -refineries; a stamp tax, and a complete machinery for the assessment -and collection of these odious and oppressive imposts. - -At the same moment, Daniel Webster began his career in Congress by -moving Resolutions which caused a long and unprofitable debate on the -conduct of France and the character of the French repealing Decree of -April 28, 1811,--a debate that could have no other result or object -than to mortify and annoy the President, who had been, like so many -other rulers, the victim of Napoleon’s audacity. Pending this debate, -June 13, the President took to his bed with a remittent fever, and for -five weeks his recovery was doubtful. Madison was still confined to -his bed, when, July 15, messengers from the lower Potomac brought news -that the British fleet, consisting of eight or ten ships-of-the-line -and frigates, was in the river, sixty miles below, making its way up -the difficult channel to Washington. A reasonable and well-grounded -fear took possession of the city. July 21, Serurier wrote to his -Government:[37]-- - - “Every one is making ready to move. I know that they are secretly - packing up at the Departments. I have as yet sent nothing away, - in order not to show distrust of the Government’s power; but I - have got ready my most valuable papers, and from the moment the - President shall quit his residence, I shall follow where he goes, - with my principal portfolios in one of my carriages.” - -The British ships were approaching the city; the sound of their guns -was believed to be heard; and the Government had little means of -stopping them. Every man prepared for volunteer duty; other work was -suspended. About three thousand militia and volunteers, among whom -were all the Cabinet and many members of Congress, were mustered, and -marched to Fort Washington, which was occupied by some six hundred -regular troops, with the Secretary of War at their head; while the -Secretary of the Navy took his post on the 28-gun frigate “Adams” in -the river beneath, and the Secretary of State rode down the river shore -with a cavalry scouting party to reconnoitre the British ships.[38] -July 15 and 16 the House of Representatives ordered a Fast, and went -into secret session to consider modes of defence. - -Unfortunately the motion for inquiry was made by a Federalist. The -majority, determined to make no admissions, referred the subject -to the Military Committee, which reported the next day through its -chairman, Troup of Georgia, that the preparation was “in every respect -adequate to the emergence.” When a majority could benefit only its -enemies by telling the truth, history showed that honorable men often -preferred to tell what was untrue. In this case the British ships -made their soundings, and obtained whatever knowledge they sought; -then left the river to visit other parts of the Bay, but never were -so far distant that they might not, with energy and a fair wind, -within four-and-twenty hours, have raided the defenceless village. -They had but to choose their own time and path. Not a defensible fort -or a picket-fence stood within ten miles of Washington, nor could a -sufficient garrison be summoned in time for defence. Armstrong, Jones, -and Monroe doubtless assured Congress that their means of defence were -“in every respect adequate,” but Congress took the responsibility on -its own shoulders when it accepted their assurance. - -Perhaps of all the incompetence shown in the war this example most -exasperated patriotic citizens, because it was shared by every branch -of the government. For six months the Administration and its friends -had denounced Hull, Van Rensselaer, and Smyth for betraying the -government, while the Clintonians and peace Democrats had denounced -the President for imbecility; but in regard to the city of Washington -the generals were not in question, for no generals were there, while -the President was dangerously ill in bed. The Legislature and Cabinet -were chiefly responsible for whatever should happen,--the more because -their warning was ample, even if under such circumstances warning was -needed. If Jefferson assumed as a matter of course that William Hull -was to be shot and Stephen Van Rensselaer broken for their mistakes, -Republicans might properly ask what punishment should be reserved for -Armstrong, Jones, and Monroe of the Cabinet, Troup of Georgia, Sevier -of Tennessee, Wright of Maryland, and other members of the Military -Committees of the House and Senate for their neglect of the national -capital. - -The debate on Webster’s Resolutions, and the report made in consequence -by Monroe, July 12, tended to throw additional discredit on the -Government. In no respect did Madison’s Administration make an -appearance less creditable than in its attitude toward Napoleon’s -Decrees, again and again solemnly asserted by it to have been repealed, -in the face of proof that the assertion was unfounded. No Federalist -rhetoric was necessary to make this mortification felt. Madison seldom -expressed himself with more bitterness of temper than in regard to the -Emperor’s conduct, and with Monroe the subject drew forth recurrent -outbursts of anger and disgust. His report tacitly admitted everything -that the Federalists charged, except that the Administration had a -secret engagement with France: it had deceived itself, but it had not -wilfully deceived the public. - -While the House was busied with these unpleasant subjects, the Senate -took up the President’s recent nominations. May 29, four names were -sent to it for diplomatic appointments,--those of Albert Gallatin, -J. Q. Adams, and James A. Bayard, to negotiate treaties of peace and -commerce with Great Britain, and a treaty of commerce with Russia; -that of Jonathan Russell to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden. -Rufus King immediately began opposition by moving three Resolutions -of inquiry in regard to the nature of the Russian appointments and -the authority under which the Treasury was to be administered in the -Secretary’s absence. The President replied, June 3, that the duties of -the Secretary of the Treasury were discharged by the Secretary of the -Navy under the provisions of the Act of 1792. The Senate, by a vote -of twenty to fourteen, referred the matter to a committee consisting -of Anderson of Tennessee, Rufus King, Brown of Louisiana, and Bledsoe -of Kentucky. Anderson, the chairman, wrote to the President and went -to see him on behalf of the committee, but received only the answer -that the President declined to discuss the matter with them in their -official character. The Senate then adopted a Resolution that the -functions of Secretary of the Treasury and Envoy Extraordinary were -incompatible. The Federalists obtained on this vote the support of -Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smith, German of New York, and Gilman of New -Hampshire, all of whom were disaffected Republicans; but even with -this aid they would have failed without the votes of Anderson, Bledsoe, -and the two Louisiana senators, who joined the malcontents. - -Madison was then slowly recovering strength, and greatly harassed by -anxieties. He would not sacrifice Gallatin to the Senate; he hoped that -firmness would carry the point,[39] and at worst he could throw upon -senators the charge of factious opposition. This he succeeded in doing. -July 16 the Senate committee, naturally expecting Madison to suggest -some arrangement, once more sought and obtained a conference,--“when -the President was pleased to observe,” said their report,[40] “that he -was sorry that the Senate had not taken the same view of the subject -which he had done; and that he regretted that the measure had been -taken under circumstances which deprived him of the aid or advice of -the Senate. After the committee had remained a reasonable time for the -President to make any other observations if he thought proper to do so, -and observing no disposition manifested by him to enter into further -remarks, the committee retired without making any observations on the -matter of the Resolutions, or in reply to those made by the President.” - -Finding itself thus defied, the Senate, without more discussion, -rejected Gallatin’s nomination by eighteen votes to seventeen, Anderson -and the two Louisiana senators still adhering to the hostile interest. -Adams and Bayard were then confirmed with little opposition. - -After the passage of many years, the propriety of the decision may -still be left open to debate. As far as the Federalists were concerned, -their votes contradicted their own precedents; and if they conceded, -as their precedents required, that the question was not one of law but -of expediency, they assumed responsibility in acting as final judges. -The incompatibility asserted by them was a matter of dispute. Two -successive chief-justices had been sent as envoys abroad. No one could -doubt that the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other member of the -Executive or Judicial departments, might be appointed to negotiate -a treaty in Washington. Temporary absence from Washington had never -implied incompatibility. Everyone knew that the Secretary of War meant -in person to conduct the war on the frontier. No one could question -the President’s right to appoint acting secretaries. If convenience -alone was the point at issue, surely the President knew best the -demands of his own Executive departments, and might be trusted with the -responsibility which belonged to him. That he should fail to see, as -soon as the Senate could discover, an incompatibility that would work -only against himself, need not be taken for granted by his own party, -whatever might be the case with the opposition. - -On the other hand every one might admit that as the country grew, -Secretaries of the Treasury were likely to find work in their own -Department that would effectually limit their capacity for foreign -travel; and if the Senate thought that stage to be already reached, -senators were right in insisting upon the appointment of a new -secretary in Gallatin’s place. Unfortunately for their argument, -their power did not extend so far. Gallatin remained Secretary of the -Treasury, and continued to negotiate as such, without paying attention -to the Senate or its theories. - -The Senate further weakened its position in acting on the nomination -of Jonathan Russell as Minister to Sweden. The subject was referred, -June 2, to a committee consisting of Senator Goldsborough of Maryland, -together with Anderson and Rufus King. Jonathan Russell had made -himself obnoxious to the peace party by eagerness shown, while he -was in charge at London, to bring on the war. The committee not -only entered on an investigation of his doings at Paris, but also -introduced a Resolution declaring that any mission to Sweden at that -time was inexpedient, and by order of the Senate asked a conference -with the President. Monroe, angry at this conduct, declared privately -that a faction in the Senate, counting on the death not only of -President Madison but of Vice-President Gerry, and the election of -Giles as President of the Senate, were scheming to usurp the Executive -power.[41] - -In order to counteract their manœuvre, and also to relieve the -President, who was then dangerously ill, Monroe took the ground that -the Executive would not confer with a co-ordinate branch of government -except through an agent, because his dignity would not allow him -to meet a committee except by a committee of his own. Monroe thus -expressed this somewhat unrepublican doctrine: “A committee of the -Senate ought to confer with a committee of the President through a -head of a Department, and not with the Chief Magistrate; for in the -latter case a committee of that House is equal to the President.”[42] -As a necessary conclusion, Monroe’s argument seemed to the Senate not -beyond dispute; but they answered it, three days afterward, still less -logically, by passing Goldsborough’s Resolution that it was inexpedient -at that time to send a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden. - -Whatever might have been the case with Gallatin’s rejection, no one -could doubt that the vote on Russell’s appointment was factious. When -twenty-two senators, including Jeremiah Mason, Christopher Gore, Samuel -Dana, Rufus King, and William B. Giles, declared that a minister -resident in Sweden was inexpedient in the summer of 1813, they declared -what every other well-informed man knew to be an error. If any American -envoy was ever expedient, it was an envoy to Sweden in 1813; for in -Sweden at that moment all that was left of American commerce centred -after being driven from England, and the political interests of Sweden -were greatly involved with those of the United States. The error was -the less to be denied, because, only six months afterward, the Senate -admitted itself in the wrong, and approved the appointment of Russell. - -These votes of the Senate made a deep impression. In time of peace and -safety the Senate might show factiousness without necessarily exciting -public anger, although at no time was the experiment quite safe; but at -a moment like July, 1813, when public opinion tended toward a serious -temper, factiousness was out of place, and was the more dangerous -because President Madison, though never showing great power as a -popular leader, had still a clear perception of the moment when to -strike an enemy. He rarely failed to destroy when he struck. The time -had come when the Republican party, with one voice, would be obliged -to insist that party discipline must be restored; and this result -was precipitated by the Senate’s conduct in regard to the diplomatic -nominations. - -An illustration of the dangers into which the spirit of faction at -that excited moment led the factious, was furnished by the legislature -of Massachusetts, which met, May 26, and after listening to a long -speech from Governor Strong arraigning the national government for its -injustice to England and partiality to France, referred the subject -to committees which lost no time in reporting. One of these reports, -presented June 4 by Josiah Quincy of the State Senate, closed with a -Resolution that the Act admitting Louisiana into the Union violated the -Constitution, and that the Massachusetts senators in Congress should -use their utmost endeavors to obtain its repeal. Another report, by a -joint committee, contained a remonstrance addressed to Congress against -the war, couched in terms of strong sectional hostility to the Southern -States, and marked throughout by a covert argument for disunion. A -third report, also by Josiah Quincy, on a naval victory lately won by -Captain James Lawrence of the “Hornet,” contained a phrase even longer -remembered than Quincy’s assertion that the Government could not be -kicked into a war. The Government had in fact been kicked into the -war, but Quincy was not the better pleased. He reported that in order -not to give offence to many of the good people of the Commonwealth by -appearing to encourage the continuance of an unjust, unnecessary, and -iniquitous war, the Massachusetts senate while admiring Lawrence’s -virtues refrained from approving his acts,-- - - “And to the end that all misrepresentations on this subject may be - obviated,-- - - _Resolved_, as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that - in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and - prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition - are its real motives, it is not becoming a moral and religious - people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits - which are not immediately connected with the defence of our - sea-coast and soil.” - -Such tactics, whether in or out of Congress, were more dangerous to -their authors than any blunders of the Administration could ever be -to the party in power. If the nation should be successful in the war, -it might perhaps in good nature leave unpunished the conduct of its -malcontents; but if by their means the nation should be conquered or -forced into a humiliating peace, the people would never forget, and -never forego revenge. Mere opposition to foreign war rarely injured -public men, except while the war-fever lasted. Many distinguished -statesmen of Europe and America had been, at one time or another, in -opposition to some special war,--as was the case with Talleyrand, -Charles James Fox, Lord Grey, Jefferson, and Madison; but opposition -became unpardonable when it took a form which could have no apparent -object except national ruin. The Federalists who held the ideas -expressed by the legislature of Massachusetts could explain or defend -their future course only by the conviction that the inevitable -and long-expected “crisis” was at hand, which must end either in -disunion or in reconstruction of the Union on new ground. As “a moral -and religious people,” they separated from the common stock, and -thenceforward, if the Union lasted, could expect no pardon. - -The extravagance of the Massachusetts Federalists was counterbalanced -by the same national disasters which caused it. Nothing showed that -the war was popular in any of the sea-board States; but the pressure -of circumstances, little by little, obliged lukewarm and even hostile -communities to support it. Virginia and the Southern States were drawn -into relations toward the government which they had never intended to -accept. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee submitted to exactions -that would at any previous stage of their history have produced a -revolution. Perhaps the strongest proof of change in popular prejudices -was furnished by the taxes. Tax-bills which were supposed to have -already overthrown one great political party,--bills which inflicted -the evils so hotly and persistently denounced by Jefferson, Gallatin, -and John Randolph in opposition, and which had been long delayed by -fear of their popular effect,--were passed by Congress quickly, by -decided votes, and with less debate than was given to the discussion -whether the President had or had not told all he knew about Bassano’s -Decree of April 28, 1811. From the time they were approved by the -President, in July and August, 1813, to the time of their repeal, -neither the President nor his party was troubled by popular discontent -on account of the passage of these Acts. They were accepted as a -necessary part of the national system, and of a war-policy. - -The most curious symptom, and the one which most perplexed the -Federalists, was that this popular movement of concentration acted -in direct resistance to the movement of events. In every respect as -the Federalists looked back at the past twelve years their prophecies -had come true. The Republican party, they argued, had proved itself -incompetent, and had admitted the failure of its principles; it had -been forced to abandon them in practice, to replace the government -where the Federalists had put it, and to adopt all the Federalists’ -methods; and even then the party failed. Equally imbecile in peace -and war, the democratic movement had ended in such disgrace and -helplessness as few governments had ever outlived, and such as no -nation with a near and powerful neighbor could have survived. In 1813 -the evidence of downfall had become patent. The government was ruined -in credit and character; bankrupt, broken, and powerless, it continued -to exist merely because of habit, and must succumb to the first shock. -All this the Federalists had long foreseen. Fisher Ames in the press, -scores of clergymen in the pulpit, numberless politicians in Congress, -had made no other use of their leisure than to point out, step by step, -every succeeding stage in the coming decline. The catastrophe was no -longer far away, it was actually about them,--they touched and felt it -at every moment of their lives. Society held itself together merely -because it knew not what else to do. - -Under circumstances following each other in necessity so stringent, -no Federalist could doubt that society would pursue the predicted -course; but it did not. Illogical and perverse, society persisted in -extending itself in lines which ran into chaos. The threatened “crisis” -had arrived, wanting no characteristic of those so long foretold; -but society made no effort to save itself. A vaster ruin and still -more terrible retribution lay beyond. The Federalists were greatly -and naturally perplexed at discovering the silent under-current which -tended to grow in strength precisely as it encountered most resistance -from events. They tried to explain the phenomenon in their own -way,--the clergy according to religious conceptions, the politicians -according to their ideas of popular character. The political theory -was the more plausible and less respectable. A. C. Hanson, the extreme -Maryland Federalist, mobbed and nearly killed in Baltimore in June, -1812, only to be elected to Congress in November, thought that the -national movement of 1813 was due to military glory. Hanson wrote to -Pickering on the subject, in the autumn:[43]-- - - “The war is becoming more popular every day in this State - [Maryland]. Our successes, and the weak manner in which it is - conducted by the enemy make it so.... It would seem that after - a while, unless the British can gather the sense and courage to - strike some severe blows, the war by its own generative powers - will create the means for its support. The vanity of a people - cannot bear these brilliant naval victories, and there is no - passion to which the rulers of a people can address themselves - with greater effect. Even in my district the active opposers of - the war are falling off every day, and unless we shortly meet with - some reverses, the Administration will shortly find more friends - than enemies in this State by a great deal.... The impression is - becoming universal that the enemy cannot harm us if he would. A few - hard blows struck in the right place would be of great service to - the country.” - -A people that could feel its vanity flattered by such glories as the -war gave in 1813 must have felt the want of flattery to an unusual -degree. The idea was extravagant. Not so much the glories as the -disgraces of the war roused public sympathy; not so much the love -of victory as the ignominy of defeat, and the grinding necessity of -supporting government at any cost of private judgment. At such a moment -any success was keenly felt, and covered every failure. The slow -conviction that come what would the nation must be preserved, brought -one man after another into support of the war, until the Federalists -found their feet in a quicksand. The “crisis” produced the opposite -effect to that which Burke’s philosophy predicted. - -Congress finished its work, and August 2 adjourned. Immediately -afterward the President went to Montpelier to recover his strength in -the air of the Blue Ridge. The session had not been unsatisfactory, -for although the Senate refused to impose an embargo, wanted by the -President in order to cut off illegitimate trade with England’s -dependencies, and although the same body put its negative on the -appointments of Gallatin and Jonathan Russell, yet Congress passed the -tax-bills, authorized another loan of seven and a half millions, and -made the business of trading under a British license a penal offence. -The operations of war alone remained to burden the President’s mind. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The fall of Detroit and Chicago in August, 1812, threw the American -frontier back to the line of the Wabash and the Maumee, and threatened -to throw it still farther back to the Indian boundary itself. The Miami -or Maumee River was defended by Fort Wayne; the Wabash had no other -defence than the little fort or blockhouse which Harrison built during -the Tippecanoe campaign, and named after himself. Fort Harrison stood -near the later city of Terre Haute, close to the border of Illinois; -Fort Wayne stood within twenty miles of the Ohio border. The width of -Indiana lay between the two. - -Had Brock been able, after the capture of Detroit, to lead his little -army into Ohio, he might have cleared not only the Maumee River, but -the whole western end of Lake Erie from American possession. Recalled -in haste to defend Niagara, Brock left only two or three companies of -troops as garrison at Detroit and Malden. The Indians could do little -without the aid of regular forces, but they tried to carry both Fort -Wayne and Fort Harrison by stratagem. The attacks were made almost -simultaneously a few days after September 1, and not without skill. -In the case of Fort Harrison the Indians were nearly successful, not -so much in fighting as in burning it. With great difficulty its young -captain, Zachary Taylor, of the Seventh Infantry, succeeded in saving -his post. Fort Wayne was held by Captain James Rhea of the First -Infantry until reinforcements arrived, September 12. Except the usual -massacres of scattered families, the Indians accomplished nothing. - -Upon the State of Ohio, with its quarter of a million inhabitants, and -of Kentucky with four hundred thousand, fell the immediate burden of -defending the border between the Ohio and the Lakes. Governor William -Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory leaving Vincennes June 19, the -day after the declaration of war, was at Cincinnati when threatening -news began to arrive from Detroit. Harrison had military knowledge and -instincts. He saw that after the capture of Mackinaw Detroit must fall, -and that Hull could save himself only by evacuating it.[44] Harrison’s -ambition, which had drawn him to Tippecanoe, drew him also to lead -the new crusade for the relief or recovery of Detroit. He went to -Kentucky at the invitation of Governor Scott, and under the patronage -of Scott and Henry Clay he took the direction of military affairs. -August 24 news reached Kentucky that Hull was shut in Detroit, and must -surrender unless immediately relieved.[45] The Governor of Kentucky at -once summoned what was then called a _caucus_, composed of himself, -his successor elect Governor Shelby, Henry Clay, Justice Todd of the -United States Supreme Court, Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky -militia, various Congressmen, judges, and other citizens,[46] whose -whole authority was needed to warrant giving to Harrison, who was not -a citizen of Kentucky, the commission of major-general and the command -of the expedition to Detroit. By general acclamation, and on the warm -assurances of universal popular approval, the measure was taken; and -Harrison started at once for Cincinnati and Detroit to organize the -campaign. The news of Hull’s surrender met him as he left Frankfort. - -By this combination of skill and accident, Harrison reached the object -of his ambition,--the conduct of war on a scale equal to his faith -in his own powers; but the torrent of Western enthusiasm swept him -forward faster than his secret judgment approved. Appointed by caucus -the general of volunteers, he could keep his position only by keeping -his popularity. Without deciding precisely where to march, or what -military object to pursue, he talked and acted on the idea that he -should recover Detroit by a _coup-de-main_.[47] He knew that the idea -was baseless as a practical plan, and futile as a military measure; but -nothing less would satisfy the enthusiasm of his Kentucky volunteers, -and the national government almost compelled him to pretend what he -did not at heart believe possible. - -The confusion thus created was troublesome. First, Harrison insisted -on commanding the troops marching to relieve Fort Wayne, and obliged -the good-natured General Winchester, who outranked him, to yield the -point.[48] Then after a forced march with the Kentuckians down the -St. Mary’s River, having relieved Fort Wayne, Harrison was obliged, -September 19, to surrender the command to Winchester, who arrived -with orders from the Secretary of War to take general charge of the -northwestern army. Harrison then left Fort Wayne for Piqua. Meanwhile -the President and Eustis, learning what had been done in Kentucky, -September 17, after much debate decided to give to Harrison the -commission of brigadier-general, with the command of the northwestern -army, to consist of ten thousand men, with unlimited means and no -orders except to retake Detroit.[49] Brigadier-General Winchester, -who was already at Fort Wayne, was given the option of serving under -Harrison, or of joining the army at Niagara. - -These new orders reached Harrison September 25 at Piqua. Harrison then -resumed command, and two days afterward, September 27, wrote to the -secretary, announcing his plan for the autumn campaign. Three columns -of troops, from widely distant quarters, were to move to the Maumee -Rapids,--the right column, consisting of Virginia and Pennsylvania -troops, by way of the Sandusky River; the centre column, of twelve -hundred Ohio militia, by Hull’s road; the left column, consisting of -four Kentucky regiments and the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, was to -descend the Auglaize River to Fort Defiance on the Maumee, and thence -to fall down that river to the point of junction with the two other -columns. - -Compared with Hull’s resources, Harrison’s were immense; and that he -had no serious enemy to fear was evident from his dividing the army -into three columns, which marched by lines far beyond supporting -distance of each other. At the same time he ordered Major-General -Hopkins of the Kentucky militia to march with two thousand men up the -Wabash into the Indian country, and to destroy the Indian settlements -on the Wabash and Illinois rivers. Had a British force been opposed -to the Americans, its general would have had little difficulty in -destroying some one of these four isolated columns, and driving -Harrison back to central Ohio; but only bands of Indians, not exceeding -five hundred at most, were to be feared before the army should cross -the Maumee, and little anxiety existed on account of enemies, unless -for the safety of Fort Wayne. - -Harrison’s anxieties bore a different character. September 23 he wrote -to the Secretary of War: “If the fall should be very dry, I will take -Detroit before the winter sets in; but if we should have much rain, it -will be necessary to wait at the rapids until the Miami of the Lakes is -sufficiently frozen to bear the army and its baggage.”[50] The promise -was rash. However dry the season might be, the task of marching an army -with siege-artillery past Malden to Detroit, and of keeping it supplied -from a base two hundred miles distant, with the British commanding the -Lake, was one which Harrison had too much sense to attempt. Nothing but -disaster could have resulted from it, even if Detroit had been taken. -In the actual condition of that territory, no army could be maintained -beyond the Maumee River without controlling the Lake. Perhaps Harrison -was fortunate that constant rains throughout the month of October -brought the army to a halt long before it reached the Maumee. Only the -left division of five Kentucky regiments succeeded in getting to the -river, and camped in the neighborhood of old Fort Defiance, waiting for -the other columns to reach the rapids. There the Kentuckians remained, -under the command of General Winchester, without food, clothing, or -sufficient shelter, in a state of increasing discontent and threatening -mutiny, till the year closed. - -Within a month after assuming command Harrison found himself helpless -either to advance or to retreat, or to remain in any fixed position. -The supplies required for ten thousand troops could not be sent forward -by any means then known. October 22 the left column, consisting of -the Kentucky regiments and some regulars, was at Defiance on the -Maumee; the central column of a thousand Ohio troops under General -Tupper was on Hull’s road, a hundred miles from the Maumee, unable to -march beyond Urbana, where its supplies were collecting; the right -column of Pennsylvanians and Virginians was still farther from the -front, slowly approaching the Sandusky River from the southeast, but -far out of reach. General Hopkins’s expedition up the Wabash ended -in failure, his troops becoming a mere mob, and at last disbanding, -leaving their general to follow them home. Harrison himself was riding -indefatigably through the mud, from one end to the other of his vast -concave line,--now at Defiance, making speeches to pacify Winchester’s -Kentuckians; then at Piqua and Urbana with the Ohioans; soon a hundred -miles away at the river Huron, east of Sandusky; next at Wooster, -Delaware, or Franklinton, afterward Columbus, in the centre of Ohio, -looking for his right wing; but always searching for a passable ridge -of dry land, on which his supplies could go forward to the Maumee -Rapids. The result of his search was given in a letter of October 22, -from Franklinton, to the Secretary of War:-- - - “I am not able to fix any period for the advance of the troops to - Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot be done upon proper - principles until the frost shall become so severe as to enable us - to use the rivers and the margin of the Lake for transportation - of the baggage and artillery upon the ice. To get them forward - through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in wagons - or on packhorses which are to carry their own provisions, is - absolutely impossible.” - -The obstacle which brought Harrison’s autumn campaign to this sudden -close was the vast swamp that extended from the Sandusky River on his -right to the Auglaize River on his left, and for the moment barred the -passage of his necessary supplies as effectually as though it had been -the Andes. Hull had crossed it, cutting a road as he went, and no one -had then appreciated his effort; but he had marched with a small force -in May and June. Harrison tried to transport supplies, heavy guns, -military stores, and all the material for an army of ten thousand men -on a long campaign, as the autumn rains set in. On the extreme right, -with great effort and expense, a considerable quantity of rations was -accumulated on the Sandusky River, to be sent to the Maumee Rapids -whenever the frosts should harden the swamps. On the extreme left, -desperate efforts were made to carry supplies to Winchester’s army at -Defiance by way of the Auglaize and St. Mary’s rivers. Hull’s road was -impassable, and for that reason the column of Ohio troops and their -supplies were stopped in the neighborhood of Urbana. - -Throughout the months of October and November Harrison’s army stood -still, scattered over the State of Ohio, while wagons and packhorses -wallowed in mud toward the Maumee Rapids. None arrived. Sometimes -the wagons were abandoned in the mud; sometimes the packhorses broke -down; sometimes the rivers were too low for boats; then they froze and -stopped water-transport. Universal confusion, want of oversight and -organization, added to physical difficulties, gave play to laziness, -incapacity, and dishonesty. No bills of lading were used; no accounts -were kept with the wagoners; and the teams were valued so high, on -coming into service, that the owners were willing to destroy them -for the price to be received.[51] The waste of government funds was -appalling, for nothing short of a million rations at the Maumee Rapids -could serve Harrison’s objects, and after two months of effort not a -ration had been carried within fifty miles of the spot. In Winchester’s -camp at Defiance the men were always on half rations, except when they -had none at all. During the greater part of December they had no flour, -but lived on poor beef and hickory roots. Typhus swept them away by -scores; their numbers were reduced to about one thousand. The exact -force which Harrison had in the field was matter of conjecture, for he -sent no return of any description to the adjutant-general’s office.[52] -The Government gave him _carte blanche_, and he used it.[53] Chaos and -misconduct reigned in every department, while he, floundering through -the mud along his line of two hundred miles front, sought in vain for -a road. - -For the train of errors and disasters in the northwest Secretary Eustis -was chiefly responsible, and his resignation, Dec. 3, 1812, left the -campaign in this hopeless condition. From Dec. 3, 1812, until Jan. 13, -1813, Monroe acted as Secretary of War; and to him Harrison next wrote -from Delaware, December 12, a letter which not only disheartened the -Government, but was calculated to create a prejudice against the writer -in the mind of any Secretary of War who was not invincibly prejudiced -in his favor.[54] - - “If there were not some important political reason,” said - Harrison, “urging the recovery of the Michigan Territory and - the capture of Malden as soon as those objects can possibly be - effected, and that to accomplish them a few weeks sooner expense - was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say that if - a small proportion of the sums which will be expended in the - quartermaster’s department in the active prosecution of the - campaign during the winter was devoted to obtaining the command of - Lake Erie, the wishes of the Government, in their utmost extent, - could be accomplished without difficulty in the months of April and - May. Malden, Detroit, and Mackinaw would fall in rapid succession. - On the contrary, all that I can certainly promise to accomplish - during the winter, unless the strait should afford us a passage - on the ice, is to recover Detroit. I must further observe that no - military man would think of retaining Detroit, Malden being in - possession of the enemy, unless his army was at least twice as - strong as the disposable force of the enemy. An army advancing to - Detroit along a line of operation passing so near the principal - force of the enemy as to allow them access to it whenever they - think proper, must be covered by another army more considerable - than the disposable force of the enemy. I mention this circumstance - to show that the attack ought not to be directed against Detroit, - but against Malden; and that it depends upon the ice affording a - safe passage across the strait, whether I shall be able to proceed - in this way or not. Detroit is not tenable. Were I to take it - without having it in my power to occupy the opposite shore, I - should be under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent - swamp to preserve it from the effects of the shot and shells which - the enemy would throw with impunity from the opposite shore. This - result is so obvious to every man who has the least military - information, that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other - part of General Hull’s conduct that he should choose to defend - Detroit rather than attack Malden.” - -Hull could have asked no better apology for his surrender. Harrison -did not know that the insubordination and refusal of the Ohio colonels -to evacuate Detroit had forced Hull to remain there; but that Detroit -was not tenable came at last to the surface as a self-evident truth of -the campaign,--which Hull had always seen, and which Harrison himself -announced almost as clearly in August as in December, but which he -ignored in the interval. - - “If it should be asked,” he continued, “why these statements were - not made sooner,--I answer that although I was always sensible - that there were great difficulties to be encountered in the - accomplishment of the wishes of the President in relation to the - recovery of Detroit and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper - Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allowance - for the imbecility and inexperience of the public agents and the - villany of the contractors. I am still, however, very far from - believing that the original plan is impracticable. I believe on the - contrary that it can be effected.” - -The excuse did not satisfy the Cabinet, who thought they saw that -Harrison wished to throw upon Government the responsibility for a -military failure fatal to himself. Perhaps a simpler motive guided -Harrison, who from the first never had known precisely what to do, -or had seen any clear path to success. He wrote, January 4, from -Franklinton,-- - - “When I was directed to take the command in the latter end of - September, I thought it possible by great exertions to effect the - objects of the campaign before the setting in of winter.... The - experience of a few days was sufficient to convince me that the - supplies of provisions could not be procured for our autumnal - advance; and even if this difficulty was removed, another of equal - magnitude existed in the want of artillery. There remained then no - alternative but to prepare for a winter campaign.” - -According to this account he had seen early in October that advance was -impossible, yet he wasted millions of money and many of his best troops -in attempting it. Winter had come, and he was pledged to a winter -campaign as impracticable as the autumn campaign had proved to be. -Without the control of the Lake, any army beyond the Maumee must starve -or surrender. The government had already paid a vast price in money and -men in order to obtain this knowledge; yet Harrison proposed a winter -campaign, with full persuasion of its uselessness. - -December 20 he sent orders[55] to Winchester to descend the Maumee -River from Defiance to the rapids, there to prepare sleds for an -expedition against Malden, to be made by a choice detachment when -the whole army should concentrate at the rapids. Early in January, -the ground being at last frozen, provisions in large quantities -were hurried to the Maumee River. Artillery was sent forward. The -Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades moved to the Sandusky River, making -an effective force of fifteen hundred men at that point. The whole -effective force on the frontier amounted to six thousand three hundred -infantry.[56] Harrison intended to move his headquarters forward from -the Sandusky, and to reach the Maumee Rapids January 20, to which point -he supposed General Winchester already in motion from Defiance.[57] - -This was the situation January 12; and although Harrison hinted in -his reports of January 4 and 8 that his winter campaign would probably -fail,[58] he showed the intention of advancing at least as far as the -strait opposite Malden, about thirty-five miles beyond the Maumee. This -he might venture without much danger; and if he reached that point, -supposing the straits to be frozen, the enemy to show little sign of -resistance, and the weather to favor, he might attack Malden. Hull had -been expected to take Malden with twelve or fourteen hundred men, with -an open river behind him, a British fleet on his flank, fifty miles -of road to cover, and supplies for only a few days at Detroit; but -Harrison with six thousand men, the river frozen and the British fleet -frozen in it, a secure base, with a million rations close in his rear, -and no Isaac Brock in his front, still spoke with extreme doubt of his -prospects, and said that “most of the well-informed men who knew the -character of the country”[59] expected a suspension of operations for -the winter. - -Aware that from a military point of view no land-campaign could, except -by accident, effect any result proportionate to its cost, Harrison had -placed himself at the head of a popular movement so strong that he -would have met the fate of Hull and Alexander Smyth, had he not made at -least a demonstration against an enemy whose face he had not yet seen. -Forced by his own pledges and the public discontent to enter on an -unmilitary campaign, he was anxious to risk as little as possible where -he could hardly expect to gain anything; and he would probably have -contented himself with his first scheme of a _coup-de-main_ against -Malden or Detroit, without attempting to hold either place, had not his -subordinate, General Winchester, rescued him from an awkward position -by a blunder that relieved Harrison of further responsibility. - -Brigadier-General Winchester was a planter of Tennessee, sixty-one -years old, and formerly an officer in the Revolutionary War. Though -outranking Harrison, he had allowed himself to be set aside by what he -thought intrigue,[60] and consented to conduct the left wing of the -force under Harrison’s command. Winchester was not a favorite with -his Kentucky militia-men, who had no choice in electing him to their -command. Their term of service was to expire in February; they had -been imprisoned since September in a wilderness at Defiance,--hungry, -cold, sick, and mutinous, able to find no enemy willing to fight them, -and disgusted with idleness. No sooner was the ground frozen and the -general movement of concentration possible, than Winchester’s command -by common consent, under Harrison’s orders, broke up their camp near -Defiance and marched to the rapids, where Hull’s road crossed the -Maumee. There they arrived January 10, as Harrison expected. They -fortified themselves on the north bank, and waited for the arrival of -Harrison, who intended to join them January 20. - -Winchester’s force included three regiments of Kentucky militia, -numbering nine hundred effectives,[61] and the Seventeenth United -States Infantry, numbering three hundred men, also Kentuckians. -Altogether he had under his command at the rapids about thirteen -hundred men,[62]--a force barely sufficient to hold the exposed -position it had taken on the north bank of the river. The three -Kentucky militia regiments were soon to go home. The other columns were -not yet within supporting distance. If Colonel Proctor, who commanded -at Malden, were capable of imitating Brock’s enterprise, he would -hardly throw away an opportunity, which might never recur, to strike a -blow at the Kentuckians, and by defeating them to drive Harrison’s army -behind the Sandusky River. Every military motive warned Winchester not -to divide, detach, or expose his troops without caution. He was himself -a detachment, and he had no support nearer than the Sandusky. - -While the troops were busily engaged in building a store-house and -throwing up log-works in an injudicious and untenable position,[63] -two Frenchmen came into camp, begging protection for the inhabitants -of Frenchtown on the river Raisin, thirty miles in front, and within -the British lines. Thirty-three families, or about one hundred and -fifty persons, were resident at Frenchtown, and the place was held by -a few Canadian militia, supposed to consist of two companies, with -about as many Indians,--in all, some three hundred men.[64] This -force might easily be destroyed, and the loss to the British would be -serious. Winchester’s troops became eager to dash at them. A council -of war decided, January 16, without a voice in remonstrance, that the -movement should be made. The most ardent supporter of the adventure -was Col. John Allen of the Kentucky Rifle regiment; but no one offered -opposition, and Winchester agreed to the council’s opinion.[65] - -The next morning, Jan. 17, 1813, Col. William Lewis, of the Fifth -Kentucky militia, started for the river Raisin, with four hundred and -fifty men.[66] A few hours afterward he was followed by Colonel Allen -with one hundred and ten men. No reports told what regiments were -taken, or where they were at any moment stationed; but Lewis and Allen -probably led twelve companies, drawn from four Kentucky regiments,--the -Seventeenth United States Infantry, recruited in Kentucky, commanded -by Col. Samuel Wells; the Kentucky Rifles, Col. John Allen; the First -Kentucky Infantry; and Colonel Lewis’s regiment, the Fifth Kentucky -Infantry,--in all, six hundred and sixty men, representing the flower -of Kentucky. - -They marched on the ice, along the shore of Maumee Bay and Lake -Erie, until nightfall, when they camped, and at two o’clock the next -afternoon, January 18, reached without meeting resistance the houses -on the south bank of the river Raisin. The north bank was occupied, -according to British authority,[67] by fifty Canadian militia and two -hundred Indians. The British force opened fire with a three-pound -howitzer. The action began at three o’clock and lasted till dark, when -the enemy after an obstinate resistance was driven about two miles -into the woods with inconsiderable loss.[68] The action was sharp, and -cost the Americans not less than twelve killed and fifty-five wounded, -reducing their effective number to six hundred. - -Colonel Lewis had orders to take possession of Frenchtown, and hold -it. He reported his success to General Winchester at the rapids, and -remained at Frenchtown waiting further orders. Winchester became -then aware that the situation was hazardous. Six hundred men were -with him in a half-fortified camp on the north bank of the Maumee; -six hundred more were thirty miles in advance, at the Raisin River; -while fully two thousand--or, according to Harrison’s estimate, four -thousand[69]--enemies held two fortresses only eighteen miles beyond -the Raisin. The Kentuckians at the Maumee, equally aware of their -comrades’ peril, insisted on going to their aid. Winchester promptly -started on the evening of January 19, and arrived at Frenchtown the -next morning. Colonel Wells’s Seventeenth United States Infantry, -two hundred and fifty men, followed, arriving at Frenchtown in the -evening.[70] - -Winchester, before leaving the Maumee Rapids, sent a despatch to -Harrison with a report of the battle of the 18th, which met Harrison -on the road hurrying to the Maumee Rapids. The next morning, January -20, Harrison arrived at the camp on the Maumee, and found there about -three hundred Kentucky troops,[71] the remainder being all with -Winchester at the river Raisin. Probably Harrison, whose own caution -was great, felt the peril of Winchester’s situation,[72] but he sent -his inspector-general, Captain Hart, forward with orders to Winchester -“to hold the ground we had got at any rate,”[73] while he wrote to the -Secretary of War:-- - - “Upon my way to this place [Maumee Rapids] last evening, I received - the letter from the General [Winchester] of which the enclosed is - a copy, informing me of the complete success of the enterprise in - the defeat of the enemy and taking the stores they had collected. - The detachment under Colonel Lewis remain at the river Raisin, - and General Winchester very properly marched yesterday with two - hundred and fifty men to reinforce him and take the command.... - It is absolutely necessary to maintain the position at the river - Raisin, and I am assembling the troops as fast as possible for the - purpose.”[74] - -Harrison added that his only fear was lest Winchester should be -overpowered. He waited at the Maumee Rapids two days, until at noon, -January 22, a messenger arrived with disastrous tidings from the front. - -Winchester afterward told the story of his own proceedings with so much -candor that his narrative became a necessary part of any explanation of -his disaster:-- - - “Suspecting that Proctor would make an attempt to avenge this - stroke, and knowing that our wounded men could not be removed, I - hastened to reinforce Colonel Lewis with Wells’s regiment, two - hundred and fifty men; and set out myself to join him, and arrived - on the morning of the 20th. The town, lying on the north side - of the river, was picketed on three sides, the longest facing - the north, and making the front. Within these pickets Colonel - Lewis’s corps was found. Not thinking the position eligible, nor - the pickets a sufficient defence against artillery, I would have - retreated but for the wounded, of whom there were fifty-five; - but having no sufficient means for transporting these, and being - equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly, I - issued an order for putting the place in the best condition for - defence that might be practicable, intending to construct some new - works as soon as the means for getting out timber might be had. On - the evening of the 20th Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp - on the right, in an open field, immediately without the picketing. - On the 21st a patrol as far as Brownstown [opposite Malden] was - sent out, and returned without seeing anything of an enemy. On the - same day a man from Malden came in who reported that the enemy were - preparing to attack us; but knowing nothing of the kind or extent - of the preparation made or making, what he brought was thought to - be only conjecture and such as led to a belief that it would be - some days before Proctor would be ready to do anything.... Neither - night-patrol nor night-pickets were ordered by me, from a belief - that both were matters of routine and in constant use.... Not to - discommode the wounded men, ... I took quarters for myself and - suite in a house on the southern bank, directly fronting the troops - and only separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and - but between eighty and a hundred yards wide.” - -The only educated officer under Harrison’s command was Major E. D. -Wood of the Engineers, one of the early graduates of West Point, and -an officer of high promise. He was not with Winchester’s division, but -with the right wing on the Sandusky, and arrived at the Maumee Rapids -some ten days afterward, where he built Fort Meigs, in February. During -the campaign he kept a diary, and his criticisms of Winchester, Lewis, -Allen, and their command were quoted with approval by the Kentucky -historian,[75] as well as by Harrison’s biographer:[76]-- - - “The troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such - quarters on the west side of the river as might please him best, - whilst the general ... took his quarters on the east side,--not the - least regard being paid to defence, order, regularity, or system, - in the posting of the different corps.... With only one third - or one fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute - of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen or heard - the least of an enemy; and with but a very inadequate supply of - ammunition,--how he ever could have entertained the most distant - hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is - to me one of the strangest things in the world.... Winchester was - destitute of every means of supporting his corps long at the river - Raisin; was in the very jaws of the enemy, and beyond the reach of - succor. He who fights with such flimsy pretensions to victory will - always be beaten, and eternally ought to be.” - -Defeat under such conditions was disgraceful enough; but defeat by -Colonel Proctor was one of the worst misfortunes that happened to -an American general. The Prince Regent took occasion, at the close -of the war, to express his official opinion of this officer, then -Major-General Proctor, in language of unusual severity.[77] Yet -Proctor’s first movements at the Raisin River showed no apparent sign -of his being “so extremely wanting in professional knowledge, and -deficient in those active, energetic qualities which must be required -of every officer,” as his later career, in the Prince Regent’s opinion, -proved him to be. He had opposed Brock’s bold movement on Detroit; -but he did not hesitate to make a somewhat similar movement himself. -January 21 he marched with artillery across the river on the ice, to -Brownstown opposite Malden, in full view of any American patrol in the -neighborhood. His force consisted of six hundred whites, all told,[78] -besides either four hundred and fifty, six hundred or eight hundred -Indians, under the chief Round Head, Tecumthe being absent collecting -reinforcements on the Wabash.[79] This large body of more than a -thousand men, without an attempt at concealment, crossed to Brownstown -and marched twelve miles, January 21, camping at night within five -miles of Frenchtown.[80] If the British historian James was correct, -they numbered eleven hundred and eighty men, of whom five hundred and -thirty were white, and the rest Indians;[81] but the official return -reported the whites, including every person present, at five hundred -and ninety-seven men. Two hours before dawn, January 22, they again -advanced, and before daybreak approached within musket-shot of the -picket-fence, and half-formed their line, before an alarm was given. - -Had Proctor dashed at once on the defenceless Seventeenth regiment and -the fence that covered the militia, he would probably have captured the -whole without loss; but he preferred to depend on his three-pound guns, -which gave the Kentuckians opportunity to use their rifles. In such -fighting the Americans had much the advantage, especially as British -regulars were opposite them. Within an hour the Forty-first regiment -lost fifteen killed and ninety-eight wounded, and of the entire body -of six hundred British troops not less than twenty-four were killed -and one hundred and sixty-one wounded.[82] Their three-pound guns were -abandoned, so murderous were the Kentucky rifles.[83] Had all the -American troops been under cover, the battle would have been theirs; -but Wells’s Seventeenth regiment was a hundred yards away, on open -ground outside the picket-fence on the right, where it was flanked by -the Canadian militia and Indians and driven back toward the river, -until Allen’s Rifle regiment went out to help it. Gradually forced -toward the rear, across the river, this part of the line was at last -struck with a panic and fled, carrying with it Winchester himself, -Colonel Allen, and Colonel Lewis; while six hundred Indians were in hot -pursuit, or already in advance of them. - -In the deep snow escape was impossible. Nearly a hundred Kentuckians -fell almost side by side, and were scalped. Among these was Colonel -Allen. General Winchester and Colonel Lewis were so fortunate as to -fall into the hands of the chief Round Head, who first stripped them -and then took them to Proctor, who had for the time withdrawn his -forces and ceased firing. By Proctor’s advice, General Winchester sent -an order to the men within the picket-fence to surrender. - -By eight o’clock all resistance had ceased except from three hundred -and eighty-four Kentuckians who remained within the picket-fence, -under the command of Major Madison of the Rifle regiment. Surrounded -by a thousand enemies, they had no chance of escape. Their ammunition -was nearly exhausted; retreat was impossible; they could choose only -between surrender and massacre, and they surrendered.[84] The British -officers looked at them with curiosity, as they came within the British -line. - - “Their appearance,” said Major Richardson,[85] “was miserable - to the last degree. They had the air of men to whom cleanliness - was a virtue unknown, and their squalid bodies were covered by - habiliments that had evidently undergone every change of season, - and were arrived at the last stage of repair.... It was the depth - of winter; but scarcely an individual was in possession of a - great coat or cloak, and few of them wore garments of wool of any - description. They still retained their summer dress, consisting of - cotton stuff of various colors shaped into frocks, and descending - to the knee. Their trowsers were of the same material. They were - covered with slouched hats, worn bare by constant use, beneath - which their long hair fell matted and uncombed over their cheeks; - and these, together with the dirty blankets wrapped round their - loins to protect them against the inclemency of the season, and - fastened by broad leathern belts, into which were thrust axes - and knives of an enormous length, gave them an air of wildness - and savageness which in Italy would have caused them to pass for - brigands of the Apennines. The only distinction between the garb of - the officer and that of the soldier was that the one, in addition - to his sword, carried a short rifle instead of a long one, while - a dagger, often curiously worked and of some value, supplied the - place of the knife.” - -This description gave a lifelike idea of what Harrison justly thought -the best material in the world for soldiery, had it been properly -handled. Men who for four months had suffered every hardship, and -were still unclothed, unfed, uncared for, and sacrificed to military -incompetence, but hardened to cold, fatigue, and danger, had no reason -to be ashamed of their misfortunes or of their squalor. Fortunately -about five hundred were saved as prisoners, and thirty or forty -escaped to the rapids; the rest, four hundred in number, were killed in -battle, or massacred afterward. - -Had Proctor acted with energy, he might have advanced to the rapids, -and there have captured Harrison with his remaining force of nine -hundred men, his artillery train and stores. Even with the utmost -celerity Harrison could hardly have escaped, if an active pursuit -had been made by Indians through the swamp which he had with extreme -difficulty crossed two days before,[86] and in the heavy rain which -followed the battle;[87] but Proctor had no wish for fighting. So far -from thinking of attack, he thought only of escaping it, and hurried -back to Malden at noon the same day, leaving the wounded prisoners -behind without a guard. Nothing excused such conduct, for Proctor -knew the fate to which he was exposing his prisoners. That night -the Indians, drunk with whiskey and mad with their grievances and -losses, returned to Frenchtown and massacred the wounded. About thirty -perished, some apparently burned. Fortunately for the United States the -glamour of Proctor’s victory hid his true character, and he was made a -major-general,--the most favorable event of the war for the American -armies he was to meet, and one which cost Great Britain even more in -pride than in power. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -If Proctor was afraid of Harrison, with more military reason Harrison -was afraid of Proctor; and while the British colonel, deserting his -wounded prisoners, hurried from the field of battle, and felt himself -in danger until the next day he was again entrenched at Malden, at -the same moment Harrison, burning the post at the Maumee Rapids and -destroying such stores as were collected there, hastened back to the -Portage or Carrying River some fifteen miles in the rear. Within -thirty-six hours after the battle, the two enemies were sixty miles -apart. At the Portage River Harrison remained a week, until he had -collected a force of two thousand men. With these he returned to the -rapids February 1, and began to construct a regularly fortified camp on -the south bank of the river. Fort Meigs, as it was called, did credit -to the skill of Major Wood, the engineer officer who constructed it; -but such a fortress seemed rather intended for defence than for the -conquest of Canada. - -In fact, Harrison had succeeded only in making the most considerable -failure that had thus far marked the progress of the war; but while -the public was still assuming treason and cowardice in William Hull, -who had been sent with fifteen hundred men to hold Detroit and conquer -Canada, and had been left unsupported to face destruction,--the same -public admitted the excuses of Harrison, who with ten thousand men, -unlimited means, and active support at Niagara, after four months of -effort, failed even to pass the Maumee River except with a detachment -so badly managed that only thirty-three men in a thousand escaped. This -was the crowning misfortune which wrung from Gallatin the complaint -that a “real incapacity” for war existed in the government itself, -and must inevitably exhaust its resources without good result; but -although it drove Gallatin to Europe, it left Harrison on the Maumee. -Harrison would not take on himself the disgrace of admitting his -inability to recapture Detroit, and the President would not, without -his express admission, order him to desist. As Armstrong afterward -explained:[88] “The Cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military -diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring any responsibility it could -avoid, determined, with perhaps less of patriotism than of prudence, -to leave the question of continuing the winter campaign exclusively -with the General.” The General, not inclined to sink into obscurity -or to admit failure, set himself to a third campaign as hopeless as -either of its predecessors. Ordering all the troops in his rear to -join him, making a body of four thousand men, he fixed February 11 as -the day for his advance on Malden, not expecting to reduce that place, -but merely to raid it.[89] When the day arrived, the roads had again -become impassable, the ice was no longer safe; and Harrison, “with much -reluctance and mortification,”[90] was reduced to write from the Maumee -Rapids to the Secretary of War that the campaign must cease. - -Thus the Western movement, likened by Henry Clay to a tenth-century -crusade, ended in failure. The Government would have been in a better -position had it never sent a man to the Maumee, but merely built a few -sloops at Cleveland. The entire result of six months’ immense effort -was confined to raids into the Indian country; and even these were -costly beyond proportion to their results. When the militia of Kentucky -and Ohio, which had been mustered in August for six months’ service, -returned to their homes in February, 1813, not only had they failed to -reoccupy a foot of the ground abandoned by Hull, but they left Harrison -almost alone at Fort Meigs, trembling lest the enemy should descend -on his rear and destroy his supplies, or force him back to protect -them.[91] He had accumulated artillery, ammunition, and stores at the -Maumee Rapids, in a fortress which itself required a garrison of two -thousand men and from which he could neither fall back, as he thought -the wiser course,[92] nor remain with safety exposed to an active -enemy. He called for more militia from Kentucky and Ohio, but the -people no longer felt enthusiasm for war. - - “I am sorry to mention,” reported Harrison, March 17,[93] “the - dismay and disinclination to the service which appear to prevail in - the Western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought - to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never - existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater - part of the militia who were with me through the winter. The new - drafts from this State [Ohio] are entirely of another character, - and are not to be depended on.” - -In short, Harrison, who had in 1812 commanded ten thousand militia, -seemed to think double the number necessary for 1813, besides regular -troops and a fleet. - -President Madison and two successive Secretaries of War had allowed -themselves, for fear of displeasing Kentucky, to give Harrison _carte -blanche_,[94] which Harrison had used without other limit than that -of the entire resources of the West. The time at last came when -such management must be stopped, and Secretary Armstrong, naturally -impatient under the load of Eustis’s and Monroe’s failures, quickly -decided to stop it. Harrison’s letter of February 11, announcing his -failure, reached the Department March 1. March 5 the secretary wrote -to Harrison ordering him to maintain a threatening attitude, but -altering the mode of warfare. Henceforward the army was to be made -subordinate,--the navy was to take the lead; and until the middle of -May, when the fleet on Lake Erie should be constructed, Harrison was to -maintain a strict defensive, and to protect the line of the Maumee with -six regular regiments, only three of which had been yet partly raised. - -Meanwhile, Harrison had but a few hundred regulars and some -Pennsylvania and Virginia militia,--perhaps five hundred men in -all,--to hold Fort Meigs, and mere squads of militia to guard eight -other posts which had cost the government some millions of dollars. -These five hundred troops, whose service was mostly near its end, -he left at Fort Meigs, and in the middle of March he set out for -Chillicothe and Cincinnati. Greatly annoyed at the summary manner in -which Armstrong had put an end to his campaigning, he protested only -against the inadequacy of his force for the defence required of it, -and insisted on a temporary reinforcement of militia to garrison the -fortress that had cost him so much effort to construct at the Maumee -Rapids. - -Then the value of General Proctor to his enemy became immense. Between -January 22, when he attacked Winchester, and the end of April, when -he moved on Fort Meigs, Proctor molested in no way the weak and -isolated American garrisons. With hundreds of scouts and backwoodsmen -at his command, he had not the energy or the knowledge to profit by -his opponents’ exposed and defenceless condition. He allowed Major -Wood to make Fort Meigs capable of standing a siege; he let Harrison, -unmolested, pass a month away from his command; he looked on while the -Virginia militia marched home, leaving only a handful of sickly men, -under a major of artillery, to defend the unfinished fort; he made no -attempt to waylay Harrison, who returned with reinforcements by way of -the Auglaize River; and not until Harrison had enjoyed all the time -necessary to prepare for attack, did Proctor disturb him. - -Harrison, expecting an assault, hurried back from Cincinnati to Fort -Meigs with some three hundred men, leaving a brigade of Kentucky -militia to follow him. April 12 he reached the fort, but not till -April 28 did Proctor appear at the mouth of the Maumee, with about -five hundred regulars and nearly as many militia,--nine hundred and -eighty-three whites, all told, and twelve hundred Indians under -Tecumthe and other chiefs.[95] Besides this large force, he brought -two twenty-four pound guns with other artillery from Detroit, and -two gunboats supported the land-battery. While the guns were placed -in position on the north bank of the river, the Indians crossed and -surrounded the fort on the south. May 1 the batteries opened, and -during four days kept up a heavy fire. Proctor, like Harrison, moved in -the wilderness as though he were conducting a campaign on the Rhine; -he liked regular modes of warfare, and with a force almost wholly -irregular, after allowing Fort Meigs to be built, he besieged it as -though he could take it by battering its earthen ramparts. Untaught -by his losses at the river Raisin, he gave once more advantage to -the Kentucky rifle; and with every opportunity of destroying the -reinforcement which he knew to be near, he allowed himself to be -surprised by it. - -The Kentucky brigade of twelve hundred men, under Brigadier-General -Green Clay, had descended the Auglaize River in boats, and arrived -at Defiance May 3, where they learned that Fort Meigs was invested. -So neglectful of his advantages was Proctor that he not only failed -to prevent General Clay from advancing, but failed to prevent -communication between the besieged fort and the relief-column, so that -Harrison was able to arrange a general attack on the investing lines, -and came near driving the British force back to Malden with the loss -of all its artillery and baggage. At about nine o’clock on the morning -of May 5, Clay’s brigade descended the rapids, and eight hundred -and sixty-six men under Colonel William Dudley,[96] landing on the -north side of the river, surprised and took possession of the British -batteries, which were entirely unsupported. Had Clay’s whole force -been on the ground, and had it been vigorously pushed forward, the -small British division which held the north bank must have abandoned -all its positions; but Dudley’s men were under no discipline, and -though ready to advance were in no hurry to retreat, even when ordered. -Three companies of the British Forty-first, and some of the Canadian -militia soon gathered together; and although these could hardly have -been half the number of Dudley’s force,[97] yet with Tecumthe and a -body of Indians they attacked the batteries, drove the Kentuckians out, -dispersed them, and either captured or massacred the whole body, under -the eyes of Harrison and Fort Meigs. - -This affair, though little less fatal to the Americans than that of the -river Raisin, was much less dearly bought by the British. Five hundred -prisoners fell into Proctor’s hands; two or three hundred more of the -Kentucky brigade, including “the weak and obstinate but brave”[98] -Dudley himself, must have been either killed in battle or massacred -after surrender;[99] only one hundred and seventy escaped; the boats -with the baggage were captured; while the whole British loss on the -north side of the river hardly exceeded fifty killed and wounded. A -bitter feeling against Proctor was caused by the massacre of some -forty American prisoners while under a British guard, and also, as was -alleged, under the eyes of General Proctor, who did not interpose, -although a soldier of the Forty-first was murdered in trying to -protect them. Probably all the prisoners would have been massacred had -Tecumthe not ridden up at full speed, tomahawk in hand, and threatened -to kill the first Indian who defied his authority.[100] - -On the south side Harrison had better fortune, and Colonel John Miller -of the Nineteenth U. S. Infantry by a sortie gallantly captured a -battery, with some forty prisoners; but neither on the north nor on the -south did the fighting of May 5 decide any immediate military result. -Besides losing on the north bank half the reinforcement brought by -General Green Clay, Harrison had lost in the siege and in the sorties -on the south bank nearly three hundred men in killed and wounded.[101] -If the numbers loosely reported in the American accounts were correct, -the siege cost Harrison one thousand men, or fully half his entire -force, including his reinforcements. After the fighting of May 5, he -withdrew once more into the fort; the British batteries reopened fire, -and the siege went on. No further attempt was made to trouble the enemy -in open field. Harrison felt himself too weak for further ventures; yet -never had his chance of a great success been so fair. - -Proctor’s siege of Fort Meigs was already a failure. Not only had the -fort proved stronger than he expected, but the weather was bad; his -troops were without shelter; dysentery and loss in battle rapidly -weakened them; half his militia went home, and, what was fatal to -further action, his Indians could not be held together. Within three -days after the battle of May 5, the twelve hundred Indians collected -by Tecumthe’s influence and exertions in the northwest territory -dispersed, leaving only Tecumthe himself and a score of other warriors -in the British camp.[102] Proctor had no choice but to retire as -rapidly as possible, and May 9 embarked his artillery and left his -encampment without interference from Harrison, who looked on as a -spectator while the movement was effected. - -From that time until the middle of July Proctor remained quiet. -Harrison moved his headquarters to Upper Sandusky and to Cleveland, and -began to prepare for advance under cover of a naval force; but he was -not allowed to rest, even though Proctor might have preferred repose. -Proctor’s position was difficult. Told by Sir George Prevost[103] -that he must capture what supplies he needed from the Americans, and -must seek them at Erie and Cleveland, since Lower Canada could spare -neither food nor transport, he was compelled to look for support to the -American magazines. He was issuing ten thousand rations a day to the -Indian families at Malden, and his resources were near an end.[104] -Leaving Malden with either three hundred and ninety-one regulars, -or about five hundred regulars and militia, and by one British -account nearly a thousand Indians, by another between three and four -thousand,[105] Proctor returned by water to the Maumee Rapids July -20, and tried to draw the garrison of Fort Meigs into an ambush. The -attempt failed. General Green Clay, who was in command, had learned -caution, and imposed it on his troops. Proctor then found that his -Indians were leaving him and returning to Detroit and Amherstburg. To -occupy them, Proctor took again to his boats and coasted the Lake shore -as far as the Sandusky River, while the Indians who chose to accompany -him made their way by land. August 1 the expedition effected a landing -at the mouth of the Sandusky, and scattered panic into the heart of -Ohio. - -In truth, nothing could be more alarming than this movement, which -threatened Harrison in all directions,--from Fort Meigs, on the Maumee, -to Erie, or Presqu’isle, where Perry’s fleet was building. On Sandusky -River Harrison had collected his chief magazines. All the supplies -for his army were lying at Upper Sandusky, some thirty miles above -the British landing-place, and he had only eight hundred raw recruits -to defend their unfortified position.[106] Nothing but an untenable -stockade, called Fort Stephenson, on the Sandusky River, where the -town of Fremont afterward grew, offered an obstacle to the enemy in -ascending; and Tecumthe with two thousand Indians was said to be -moving from Fort Meigs by the direct road straight for the magazines, -thus flanking Fort Stephenson and every intermediate position on the -Sandusky. - -In just panic for the safety of his magazines, the only result of a -year’s campaigning, Harrison’s first thought was to evacuate Fort -Stephenson in order to protect Upper Sandusky. The flank-attack from -two thousand Indians, who never showed themselves, impelled him to -retire before Proctor, and to leave the river open. July 29, after a -council of war, he sent down a hasty order to young Major Croghan who -commanded Fort Stephenson, directing him immediately to burn the fort -and retreat up the river or along the Lake shore, as he best could, -with the utmost haste.[107] Croghan, a Kentuckian, and an officer of -the Seventeenth U. S. regiment, refused to obey. “We have determined -to maintain this place, and by Heaven, we will,” he wrote back.[108] -Harrison sent Colonel Wells, of the same regiment, to relieve him; but -Croghan went to headquarters, and by somewhat lame excuses carried his -point, and resumed his command the next day. Harrison gave him only -conditional orders to abandon the fort,--orders which Croghan clearly -could not regard, and which Harrison seemed to feel no confidence in -his wishing to follow.[109] In the face of British troops with cannon -he was to retreat; but “you must be aware that the attempt to retreat -in the face of an Indian force would be vain.” Proctor’s main force was -believed to be Indian. - -Neither evacuating nor defending Fort Stephenson, Harrison remained -at Seneca, ten miles behind it, watching for Tecumthe and the -flank attack, and arranging a plan of battle for his eight hundred -men by which he could repel the Indians with dragoons in the open -prairie.[110] Croghan remained at Fort Stephenson with one hundred and -sixty men, making every preparation to meet an attack. August 1 the -woods were already filled with Indians, and retreat was impossible, -when the British boats appeared on the river, and Proctor sent to -demand surrender of the fort. Immediately on Croghan’s refusal, the -British howitzers opened fire and continued until it became clear that -they were too light to destroy the stockade. - -If experience had been of service to Proctor, he should have learned to -avoid direct attack on Americans in fortified places; but his position -was difficult, and he was as much afraid of Harrison as Harrison was -afraid of him. Fearing to leave Croghan’s little fort in the rear, -and to seek Harrison himself, ten miles above, on the road to Upper -Sandusky; fearing delay, which would discontent his Indian allies; -fearing to go on to Cleveland or Erie without crippling Harrison; still -more afraid to retire to Malden without striking a blow,--Proctor again -sacrificed the Forty-first regiment which had suffered at the river -Raisin and had been surprised at Fort Meigs. On the afternoon of August -2 the Forty-first regiment and the militia, in three columns of about -one hundred and twenty men each,[111] with the utmost gallantry marched -to the pickets of Fort Stephenson, and were shot down. After two hours’ -effort, and losing all its officers, the assaulting column retired, -leaving twenty-six dead, forty-one wounded, and about thirty missing, -or more than one fifth of their force. The same night the troops -re-embarked and returned to Malden. - -Proctor’s report[112] of this affair was filled with complaints of -the Indians, who could not be left idle and who would not fight. At -Sandusky, he said, “we could not muster more hundreds of Indians than I -might reasonably have expected thousands.” - - “I could not, therefore, with my very small force remain more than - two days, from the probability of being cut off, and of being - deserted by the few Indians who had not already done so.... On the - morning of the 2d inst. the gentlemen of the Indian department who - have the direction of it, declared formally their decided opinion - that unless the fort was stormed we should never be able to bring - an Indian warrior into the field with us, and that they proposed - and were ready to storm one face of the fort if we would attempt - another. I have also to observe that in this instance my judgment - had not that weight with the troops I hope I might reasonably - have expected.... The troops, after the artillery had been used - for some hours, attacked two faces, and impossibilities being - attempted, failed. The fort, from which the severest fire I ever - saw was maintained during the attack, was well defended. The troops - displayed the greatest bravery, the much greater part of whom - reached the fort and made every effort to enter; but the Indians - who had proposed the assault, and, had it not been assented to, - would have ever stigmatized the British character, scarcely came - into fire before they ran out of its reach. A more than adequate - sacrifice having been made to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave - assailants.” - -Sir George Prevost seemed to doubt whether Proctor’s excuse for the -defeat lessened or increased the blame attached to it.[113] The defeat -at Sandusky ruined Proctor in the esteem of his men. On the American -side, Harrison’s conduct roused a storm of indignation. Through the -whole day, August 2, he remained at Seneca with eight hundred men, -listening to the cannonade at Fort Stephenson till late at night, -when he received an express from Croghan to say that the enemy were -embarking. The story ran, that as the distant sound of Croghan’s guns -reached the camp at Seneca, Harrison exclaimed: “The blood be on his -own head; I wash my hands of it.[114]” Whatever else might be true, -his conduct betrayed an extravagant estimate of his enemy’s strength. -The only British eye-witness who left an account of the expedition -reckoned Proctor’s force, on its departure from Malden, at about four -hundred troops, and “nearly a thousand Indians.”[115] The Indians -dispersed until those with Proctor at Fort Stephenson probably numbered -two or three hundred,[116] the rest having returned to Detroit and -Malden. Harrison reported the British force as five thousand strong, on -the authority of General Green Clay.[117] - -Whether the British force was large or small, Harrison’s arrangements -to meet it did not please Secretary Armstrong. “It is worthy of -notice,” he wrote long afterward,[118] “that of these two commanders, -always the terror of each other, one [Proctor] was now actually flying -from his supposed pursuer; while the other [Harrison] waited only the -arrival of Croghan at Seneca to begin a camp-conflagration and flight -to Upper Sandusky.” - -The well-won honors of the campaign fell to Major George Croghan, -with whose name the whole country resounded. Whatever were the faults -of the two generals, Major Croghan showed courage and intelligence, -not only before and during the attack, but afterward in supporting -Harrison against the outcry which for a time threatened to destroy the -General’s authority. Immediately after the siege of Fort Stephenson -every energy of the northwest turned toward a new offensive movement by -water against Malden, and in the task of organizing the force required -for that purpose, complaints of past failures were stifled. Secretary -Armstrong did not forget them, but the moment was not suited for -making a change in so important a command. Harrison organized, under -Armstrong’s orders, a force of seven thousand men to cross the Lake in -boats, under cover of a fleet. - -The fleet, not the army, was to bear the brunt of reconquering the -northwest; and in nothing did Armstrong show his ability so clearly -as in the promptness with which, immediately after taking office, he -stopped Harrison’s campaign on the Maumee, while Perry was set to work -at Erie. Feb. 5, 1813, Armstrong entered on his duties. March 5 his -arrangements for the new movements were already made. Harrison did not -approve them,[119] but he obeyed. The Navy Department had already begun -operations on Lake Erie, immediately after Hull’s surrender; but though -something was accomplished in the winter, great difficulties had still -to be overcome when February 17 Commander Perry, an energetic young -officer on gunboat service at Newport, received orders from Secretary -Jones to report to Commodore Chauncey on Lake Ontario. Chauncey ordered -him to Presqu’isle, afterward called Erie, to take charge of the -vessels under construction on Lake Erie. March 27 he reached the spot, -a small village in a remote wilderness, where timber and water alone -existed for the supply of the fleets. - -When Perry reached Presqu’isle the contractors and carpenters had -on the stocks two brigs, a schooner, and three gunboats. These were -to be launched in May, and to be ready for service in June. Besides -these vessels building at Erie, a number of other craft, including -the prize brig “Caledonia,” were at the Black Rock navy-yard in the -Niagara River, unable to move on account of the British fort opposite -Buffalo and the British fleet on the Lake. Perry’s task was to unite -the two squadrons, to man them, and to fight the British fleet, without -allowing his enemy to interfere at any stage of these difficult -operations. - -The British squadron under Commander Finnis, an experienced officer, -had entire control of the Lake and its shores. No regular garrison -protected the harbor of Presqu’isle; not two hundred men could be -armed to defend it, nor was any military support to be had nearer than -Buffalo, eighty miles away. Proctor or Prevost were likely to risk -everything in trying to destroy the shipyard at Erie; for upon that -point, far more than on Detroit, Fort Meigs, Sandusky, or Buffalo, -their existence depended. If Perry were allowed to control the Lake, -the British must not only evacuate Detroit, but also Malden, must -abandon Tecumthe and the military advantages of three or four thousand -Indian auxiliaries, and must fall back on a difficult defensive at the -Niagara River. That they would make every effort to thwart Perry seemed -certain. - -Superstition survived in nothing more obstinately than in faith in -luck; neither sailors nor soldiers ever doubted the value of this -inscrutable quality in the conduct of war. The “Chesapeake” was an -unlucky ship to the luckiest commanders, even to the British captain -who captured it. The bad luck of the “Chesapeake” was hardly steadier -than the good luck of Oliver Perry. Whatever he touched seemed to -take the direction he wanted. He began with the advantage of having -Proctor for his chief enemy; but Harrison, also a lucky man, had the -same advantage and yet suffered constant disasters. Commander Finnis -was a good seaman, yet Finnis failed repeatedly, and always by a -narrow chance, to injure Perry. Dearborn’s incompetence in 1813 was -not less than it had been in 1812; but the single success which in two -campaigns Dearborn gained on the Niagara obliged the British, May 27, -to evacuate Fort Erie opposite Buffalo, and to release Perry’s vessels -at Black Rock. June 6, at leisure, Perry superintended the removal of -the five small craft from the navy-yard at Black Rock; several hundred -soldiers, seamen, and oxen warped them up stream into the Lake. Loaded -with stores, the little squadron sailed from Buffalo June 13; the wind -was ahead; they were five days making eighty miles; but June 19 they -arrived at Presqu’isle, and as the last vessel crossed the bar, Finnis -and his squadron came in sight. Finnis alone could explain how he, a -first-rate seaman, with a strong force and a fair wind, in such narrow -seas, could have helped finding Perry’s squadron when he knew where it -must be. - -From June 19 to August 1 Perry’s combined fleet lay within the bar at -Presqu’isle, while Proctor, with a sufficient fleet and a military -force superior to anything on the Lake, was planning expeditions from -Malden against every place except the one to which military necessity -and the orders of his Government bade him go. August 4, Perry took -out the armaments of his two brigs and floated both over the bar into -deep water. Had the British fleet been at hand, such a movement would -have been impossible or fatal; but the British fleet appeared just as -Perry’s vessels got into deep water, and when for the first time an -attack could not be made with a fair hope of success. - -These extraordinary advantages were not gained without labor, energy, -courage, and wearing anxieties and disappointments. Of these Perry had -his full share, but no more; and his opponents were no better off than -himself. By great exertions alone could the British maintain themselves -on Lake Ontario, and to this necessity they were forced to sacrifice -Lake Erie. Sir George Prevost could spare only a new commander with -a few officers and some forty men from the lower Lake to meet the -large American reinforcements on the upper. When the commander, R. H. -Barclay, arrived at Malden in June, he found as many difficulties there -as Perry found at Presqu’isle. Barclay was a captain in the British -Royal Navy, thirty-two years old; he had lost an arm in the service, -but he was fairly matched as Perry’s antagonist, and showed the -qualities of an excellent officer. - -Perry’s squadron, once on the Lake, altogether overawed the British -fleet, and Barclay’s only hope lay in completing a vessel called the -“Detroit,” then on the stocks at Amherstburg. Rough and unfinished, -she was launched, and while Perry blockaded the harbor, Barclay, early -in September, got masts and rigging into her, and armed her with guns -of every calibre, taken from the ramparts.[120] Even the two American -twenty-four pound guns, used by Proctor against Fort Meigs, were put -on board the “Detroit.” Thus equipped, she had still to be manned; but -no seamen were near the Lake. Barclay was forced to make up a crew of -soldiers from the hardworked Forty-first regiment and Canadians unused -to service. September 6 the “Detroit” was ready to sail, and Barclay -had then no choice but to fight at any risk. “So perfectly destitute of -provisions was the port that there was not a day’s flour in store, and -the crews of the squadron under my command were on half allowance of -many things; and when that was done, there was no more.”[121] - -Early on the morning of September 9 Barclay’s fleet weighed and sailed -for the enemy, who was then at anchor off the island of Put-in-Bay -near the mouth of Sandusky River. The British squadron consisted of -six vessels,--the “Detroit,” a ship of four hundred and ninety tons, -carrying nineteen guns, commanded by Barclay himself; the “Queen -Charlotte” of seventeen guns, commanded by Finnis; the “Lady Prevost” -of thirteen guns; the “Hunter” of ten; the “Little Belt” carrying -three, and the “Chippeway” carrying one gun,--in all, sixty-three guns, -and probably about four hundred and fifty men. The American squadron -consisted of nine vessels,--the “Lawrence,” Perry’s own brig, nearly -as large as the “Detroit,” and carrying twenty guns; the “Niagara,” -commander Jesse D. Elliott, of the same tonnage, with the same -armament; the “Caledonia,” a three-gun brig; the schooners “Ariel,” -“Scorpion,” “Somers,” “Porcupine,” and “Tigress,” carrying ten guns; -and the sloop “Trippe,” with one gun,--in all, fifty-four guns, with -a nominal crew of five hundred and thirty-two men, and an effective -crew probably not greatly differing from the British. In other respects -Perry’s superiority was decided, as it was meant to be. The Americans -had thirty-nine thirty-two pound carronades; the British had not a gun -of that weight, and only fifteen twenty-four pound carronades. The -lightest guns on the American fleet were eight long twelve-pounders, -while twenty-four of the British guns threw only nine-pound shot, or -less. The American broadside threw at close range about nine hundred -pounds of metal; the British threw about four hundred and sixty. At -long range the Americans threw two hundred and eighty-eight pounds of -metal; the British threw one hundred and ninety-five pounds. In tonnage -the Americans were superior as eight to seven. In short, the Navy -Department had done everything reasonably necessary to insure success; -and if the American crews, like the British, were partly made up of -landsmen, soldiers or volunteers, the reason was in each case the same. -Both governments supplied all the seamen they had. - -Between forces so matched, victory ought not to have been in doubt; -and if it was so, the fault certainly lay not in Perry. When, at -daylight September 10, his look-out discovered the British fleet, Perry -got his own squadron under way, and came down with a light wind from -the southeast against Barclay’s line, striking it obliquely near the -head. Perry must have been anxious to fight at close range, where his -superiority was as two to one, while at long range his ship could use -only two long twelve-pounders against the “Detroit’s” six twelves, -one eighteen, and two twenty-fours,--an inferiority amounting to -helplessness. Both the “Lawrence” and the “Niagara” were armed for -close fighting, and were intended for nothing else. At long range their -combined broadside, even if all their twelve-pounders were worked on -one side, threw but forty-eight pounds of metal; at short range the two -brigs were able to throw six hundred and forty pounds at each broadside. - -Perry could not have meant to fight at a distance, nor could Commander -Elliott have thought it good seamanship. Yet Perry alone acted on this -evident scheme; and though his official account showed that he had -himself fought at close range, and that he ordered the other commanders -to do the same, it gave no sufficient reasons to explain what prevented -the whole fleet from acting together, and made the result doubtful. He -did not even mention that he himself led the line in the “Lawrence,” -with two gunboats, the “Ariel” and the “Scorpion,” supporting him, the -“Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and three gunboats following. The “Lawrence” -came within range of the British line just at noon, the wind being very -light, the Lake calm, and Barclay, in the “Detroit,” opposite. Perry’s -report began at that point:-- - - “At fifteen minutes before twelve the enemy commenced firing; - at five minutes before twelve the action commenced on our part. - Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, - and its being mostly directed to the ‘Lawrence,’ I made sail (at - quarter-past twelve) and directed the other vessels to follow, for - the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline - being shot away, she became unmanageable, notwithstanding the - great exertions of the sailing-master. In this situation she - sustained the action upwards of two hours, within canister-shot - distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and a greater part - of the crew either killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer - annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of Lieutenant Yarnall, who, I - was convinced from the bravery already displayed by him, would do - what would comport with the honor of the flag. At half-past two, - the wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his - vessel, the ‘Niagara,’ gallantly into close action. I immediately - went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by volunteering - to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness - of the wind, into close action.... At forty-five minutes past two - the signal was made for ‘close action.’ The ‘Niagara’ being very - little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy’s line; bore - up, and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking - fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and - sloop, from the larboard side, at half pistol-shot distance. The - smaller vessels at this time having got within grape and canister - distance, under the direction of Captain Elliott, and keeping - up a well-directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner - surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.” - -From this reticent report, any careful reader could see that for some -reason, not so distinctly given as would have been the case if the -wind alone were at fault, the action had been very badly fought on the -American side. The British official account confirmed the impression -given by Perry. Barclay’s story was as well told as his action was -well fought:-- - - “At a quarter before twelve I commenced the action by a few long - guns; about a quarter-past, the American commodore, also supported - by two schooners, ... came to close action with the ‘Detroit.’ The - other brig [the ‘Niagara’] of the enemy, apparently destined to - engage the ‘Queen Charlotte,’ kept so far to windward as to render - the ‘Queen Charlotte’s’ twenty-four pounder carronades useless, - while she was, with the ‘Lady Prevost,’ exposed to the heavy and - destructive fire of the ‘Caledonia’ and four other schooners, armed - with heavy and long guns.... The action continued with great fury - until half-past two, when I perceived my opponent [the ‘Lawrence’] - drop astern, and a boat passing from him to the ‘Niagara,’ which - vessel was at this time perfectly fresh. The American commodore, - seeing that as yet the day was against him, ... made a noble and, - alas! too successful an effort to regain it; for he bore up, and - supported by his small vessels, passed within pistol-shot and took - a raking position on our bow.... The weather-gage gave the enemy a - prodigious advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their - position, but their distance also, which they [the ‘Caledonia,’ - ‘Niagara,’ and the gunboats] did in such a manner as to prevent - the carronades of the ‘Queen Charlotte’ and ‘Lady Prevost’ from - having much effect, while their long ones did great execution, - particularly against the ‘Queen Charlotte.’” - -Barclay’s report, agreeing with Perry’s, made it clear that while -Perry and the head of the American line fought at close quarters, -the “Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and the four gunboats supporting them -preferred fighting at long range,--not because they wanted wind, but -because the “Caledonia” and gunboats were armed with long thirty-two -and twenty-four pounders, while the British vessels opposed to them had -only one or two long twelve-pounders. Certainly the advantage in this -respect on the side of the American brig and gunboats was enormous; -but these tactics threw the “Niagara,” which had not the same excuse, -out of the battle, leaving her, from twelve o’clock till half-past -two, firing only two twelve-pound guns, while her heavy armament was -useless, and might as well have been left ashore. Worse than this, -the persistence of the “Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and their gunboats in -keeping, beyond range of their enemies’ carronades nearly lost the -battle, by allowing the British to concentrate on the “Lawrence” all -their heavy guns, and in the end compelling the “Lawrence” to strike. -On all these points no reasonable doubt could exist. The two reports -were the only official sources of information on which an opinion as to -the merits of the action could properly be founded. No other account, -contemporaneous and authoritative, threw light on the subject, except -a letter by Lieutenant Yarnall, second in command to Perry on the -“Lawrence,” written September 15, and published in the Ohio newspapers -about September 29,--in which Yarnall said that if Elliott had brought -his ship into action when the signal was given, the battle would have -ended in much less time, and with less loss to the “Lawrence.” This -statement agreed with the tenor of the two official reports. - -Furious as the battle was, a more furious dispute raged over it when -in the year 1834 the friends of Perry and of Elliott wrangled over -the action. With their dispute history need not concern itself. The -official reports left no reasonable doubt that Perry’s plan of battle -was correct; that want of wind was not the reason it failed; but that -the “Niagara” was badly managed by Elliott, and that the victory, when -actually forfeited by this mismanagement, was saved by the personal -energy of Perry, who, abandoning his own ship, brought the “Niagara” -through the enemy’s line, and regained the advantage of her heavy -battery. The luck which attended Perry’s career on the Lake saved him -from injury, when every other officer on the two opposing flagships -and four-fifths of his crew were killed or wounded, and enabled him to -perform a feat almost without parallel in naval warfare, giving him a -well-won immortality by means of the disaster unnecessarily incurred. -No process of argument or ingenuity of seamanship could deprive Perry -of the fame justly given him by the public, or detract from the -splendor of his reputation as the hero of the war. More than any other -battle of the time, the victory on Lake Erie was won by the courage and -obstinacy of a single man. - -Between two opponents such as Perry and Barclay, no one doubted that -the ships were fought to their utmost. Of the “Lawrence” not much -was left; ship, officers, and crew were shot to pieces. Such carnage -was not known on the ocean, for even the cockpit where the sick and -wounded lay, being above water, was riddled by shot, and the wounded -were wounded again on the surgeon’s board. Of one hundred and three -effectives on the “Lawrence,” twenty-two were killed and sixty-one -wounded. The brig herself when she struck was a wreck, unmanageable, -her starboard bulwarks beaten in, guns dismounted, and rigging cut to -pieces. The British ships were in hardly better condition. The long -guns of the gunboats had raked them with destructive effect. Barclay -was desperately wounded; Finnis was killed; Barclay’s first lieutenant -was mortally wounded; not one commander or second in command could -keep the deck; the squadron had forty-one men killed and ninety-four -wounded, or nearly one man in three; the “Detroit” and “Queen -Charlotte” were unmanageable and fell foul; the “Lady Prevost” was -crippled, and drifted out of the fight. Perry could console himself -with the thought that if his ship had struck her flag, she had at least -struck to brave men. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -GENERAL HARRISON, waiting at Seneca on the Sandusky River, received, -September 12, Perry’s famous despatch of September 10: “We have met the -enemy, and they are ours.” The navy having done its work, the army was -next to act. - -The force under Harrison’s command was ample for the required purpose, -although it contained fewer regular troops than Armstrong had intended. -The seven regular regiments assigned to Harrison fell short in numbers -of the most moderate expectations. Instead of providing seven thousand -rank-and-file, the recruiting service ended in producing rather -more than twenty-five hundred.[122] Divided into two brigades under -Brigadier-Generals McArthur and Lewis Cass, with a light corps under -Lieutenant-Colonel Ball of the Light Dragoons, they formed only one -wing of Harrison’s army. - -To supply his main force, Harrison had still to depend on Kentucky; -and once more that State made a great effort. Governor Shelby took the -field in person, leading three thousand volunteers,[123] organized -in eleven regiments, five brigades, and two divisions. Besides the -militia, who volunteered for this special purpose, Harrison obtained -the services of another Kentucky corps, which had already proved its -efficiency. - -One of Armstrong’s happiest acts, at the beginning of his service as -War Secretary,[124] was to accept the aid of Richard M. Johnson in -organizing for frontier defence a mounted regiment of a thousand men, -armed with muskets or rifles, tomahawks, and knives.[125] Johnson and -his regiment took the field about June 1, and from that time anxiety -on account of Indians ceased. The regiment patrolled the district from -Fort Wayne to the river Raisin, and whether in marching or fighting -proved to be the most efficient corps in the Western country. Harrison -obtained the assistance of Johnson’s regiment for the movement into -Canada, and thereby increased the efficiency of his army beyond the -proportion of Johnson’s numbers. - -While the mounted regiment moved by the road to Detroit, Harrison’s -main force was embarked in boats September 20, and in the course of a -few days some forty-five hundred infantry were safely conveyed by way -of Bass Island and Put-in-Bay to Middle Sister Island, about twelve -miles from the Canadian shore.[126] Harrison and Perry then selected -a landing place, and the whole force was successfully set ashore, -September 27, about three miles below Malden. - -Although Proctor could not hope to maintain himself at Malden or -Detroit without control of the Lake, he had still the means of -rendering Harrison’s possession insecure. According to the British -account, he commanded at Detroit and Malden a force of nine hundred -and eighty-six regulars, giving about eight hundred effectives.[127] -Not less than thirty-five hundred Indian warriors had flocked to -Amherstburg, and although they greatly increased the British general’s -difficulties by bringing their families with them, they might be -formidable opponents to Harrison’s advance. Every motive dictated to -Proctor the necessity of resisting Harrison’s approach. To Tecumthe and -his Indians the evacuation of Malden and Detroit without a struggle -meant not only the sacrifice of their cause, but also cowardice; and -when Proctor announced to them, September 18, that he meant to retreat, -Tecumthe rose in the council and protested against the flight, likening -Proctor to a fat dog that had carried its tail erect, and now that it -was frightened dropped its tail between its legs and ran.[128] He told -Proctor to go if he liked, but the Indians would remain. - -Proctor insisted upon retiring at least toward the Moravian town, -seventy miles on the road to Lake Ontario, and the Indians yielded. -The troops immediately began to burn or destroy the public property -at Detroit and Malden, or to load on wagons or boats what could not -be carried away. September 24, three days before Harrison’s army -landed, the British evacuated Malden and withdrew to Sandwich, allowing -Harrison to establish himself at Malden without a skirmish, and -neglecting to destroy the bridge over the Canards River. - -Harrison was surprised at Proctor’s tame retreat. - - “Nothing but infatuation,” he reported,[129] “could have governed - General Proctor’s conduct. The day that I landed below Malden he - had at his disposal upward of three thousand Indian warriors; his - regular force reinforced by the militia of the district would have - made his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which on the day of - landing did not exceed forty-five hundred.... His inferior officers - say that his conduct has been a series of continued blunders.” - -This crowning proof of Proctor’s incapacity disorganized his force. -Tecumthe expressed a general sentiment of the British army in his -public denunciation of Proctor’s cowardice. One of the inferior British -officers afterward declared that Proctor’s “marked inefficiency” and -“wanton sacrifice” of the troops raised more than a doubt not only of -his capacity but even of his personal courage, and led to serious -thoughts of taking away his authority.[130] The British at Sandwich -went through the same experience that marked the retreat of Hull and -his army from the same spot, only the year before. - -Harrison on his side made no extreme haste to pursue. His army marched -into Malden at four o’clock on the afternoon of September 27,[131] -and he wrote to Secretary Armstrong that evening: “I will pursue the -enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking -him, as he has upwards of a thousand horses, and we have not one in -the army.”[132] The pursuit was not rapid. Sandwich, opposite Detroit, -was only thirteen miles above Malden, but Harrison required two days -to reach it, arriving at two o’clock on the afternoon of September 29. -From there, September 30, he wrote again to Secretary Armstrong that -he was preparing to pursue the enemy on the following day;[133] but he -waited for R. M. Johnson’s mounted regiment, which arrived at Detroit -September 30, and was obliged to consume a day in crossing the river. -Then the pursuit began with energy, but on the morning of October 2 -Proctor had already a week’s advance and should have been safe. - -Proctor seemed to imagine that the Americans would not venture to -pursue him. Moving, according to his own report,[134] “by easy -marches,” neither obstructing the road in his rear nor leaving -detachments to delay the enemy, he reached Dolson’s October 1, and -there halted his army, fifty miles from Sandwich, while he went to the -Moravian town some twenty-six miles beyond. He then intended to make a -stand at Chatham, three miles behind Dolson’s. - - “I had assured the Indians,” said Proctor’s report of October 23, - “that we would not desert them, and it was my full determination - to have made a stand at the Forks (Chatham), by which our vessels - and stores would be protected; but after my arrival at Dover - [Dolson’s] three miles lower down the river, I was induced to take - post there first, where ovens had been constructed, and where there - was some shelter for the troops, and had accordingly directed that - it should be put into the best possible state of defence that time - and circumstances would admit of; indeed it had been my intention - to have opposed the enemy nearer the mouth of the river, had not - the troops contrary to my intention been moved, during my absence - of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the - country in my rear.” - -The British army, left at Dolson’s October 1, without a general or -orders,[135] saw the American army arrive in its front, October 3, -and retired three miles to Chatham, where the Indians insisted upon -fighting; but when, the next morning, October 4, the Americans advanced -in order of battle,[136] the Indians after a skirmish changed their -minds and retreated. The British were compelled to sacrifice the -supplies they had brought by water to Chatham for establishing their -new base, and their retreat precipitated on the Moravian town the -confusion of flight already resembling rout. - -Six miles on their way they met General Proctor returning from the -Moravian town, and as much dissatisfied with them as they with him. -Pressed closely by the American advance, the British troops made what -haste they could over excessively bad roads until eight o’clock in the -evening, when they halted within six miles of the Moravian town.[137] -The next morning, October 5, the enemy was again reported to be close -at hand, and the British force again retreated. About a mile and a -half from the Moravian town it was halted. Proctor had then retired as -far as he could, and there he must either fight, or abandon women and -children, sick and wounded, baggage, stores, and wagons, desert his -Indian allies, and fly to Lake Ontario. Probably flight would not have -saved his troops. More than a hundred miles of unsettled country lay -between them and their next base. The Americans had in their advance -the mounted regiment of R. M. Johnson, and could outmarch the most -lightly equipped British regulars. Already, according to Proctor’s -report, the rapidity of the Americans had destroyed the efficiency of -the British organization:[138]-- - - “In the attempt to save provisions we became encumbered with boats - not suited to the state of navigation. The Indians and the troops - retreated on different sides of the river, and the boats to which - sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed - to the fire of the enemy who were advancing on the side the Indians - were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into possession of the - enemy, and with them several of the men, provisions, and all the - ammunition that had not been issued to the troops and Indians. This - disastrous circumstance afforded the enemy the means of crossing - and advancing on both sides of the river. Finding the enemy were - advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry, - in a wood below the Moravian town, which last was not cleared of - Indian women and children, or of those of the troops, nor of the - sick.” - -The whole British force was then on the north bank of the river Thames, -retreating eastward by a road near the river bank. Proctor could hardly -claim to have exercised choice in the selection of a battleground, -unless he preferred placing his little force under every disadvantage. -“The troops were formed with their left to the river,” his report -continued, “with a reserve and a six-pounder on the road, near the -river; the Indians on the right.” According to the report of officers -of the Forty-first regiment, two lines of troops were formed in a -thick forest, two hundred yards apart. The first line began where the -six-pound field-piece stood, with a range of some fifty yards along -the road. A few Canadian Light Dragoons were stationed near the gun. -To the left of the road was the river; to the right a forest, free -from underbrush that could stop horsemen, but offering cover to an -approaching enemy within twenty paces of the British line.[139] In the -wood about two hundred men of the British Forty-first took position as -well as they could, behind trees, and there as a first line they waited -some two hours for their enemy to appear. - -The second line, somewhat less numerous, two hundred yards behind the -first, and not within sight, was also formed in the wood; and on the -road, in rear of the second line, Proctor and his staff stationed -themselves. The Indians were collected behind a swamp on the right, -touching and covering effectually the British right flank, while the -river covered the left. - -Such a formation was best fitted for Harrison’s purposes, but the mere -arrangement gave little idea of Proctor’s weakness. The six-pound -field-piece, which as he afterward reported “certainly should have -produced the best effect if properly managed,” had not a round of -ammunition, and could not be fired.[140] The Forty-first regiment -was almost mutinous, but had it been in the best condition it could not -have held against serious attack. The whole strength of the Forty-first -was only three hundred and fifty-six rank-and-file, or four hundred -and eight men all told.[141] The numbers of the regiment actually in -the field were reported as three hundred and fifteen rank-and-file, -or three hundred and sixty-seven men all told.[142] The dragoons were -supposed not to exceed twenty. This petty force was unable to see -either the advancing enemy or its own members. The only efficient -corps in the field was the Indians, who were estimated by the British -sometimes at five hundred, at eight hundred, and twelve hundred in -number, and who were in some degree covered by the swamp. - -[Illustration: - - A. B. Advance Guard on foot at head of 5 Collumns--the 1st - Battalion of the mounted Regiments. - - C. D. Capt. Slecker’s Comp. of 100 men on foot at head of 2 Collumns - - Note: five Brigades & Reserved Corps, Governor Shelbys troops - - G. D. E. represents the whole of the 2d Battalion after I was - wounded & finding it impracticable on account of logs & the - thickness of the woods to break through the Indian line & form - in their rear, I ordered the men to dismount & fight the Indians - in their own way, part of the time the Indians contended for the - ground at the 2d Swamp. - -ACCOMPANYING COL. R. M. JOHNSON’S LETTER OF NOV. 21st 1813, DETAILING -THE AFFAIR OF THE 5th AT THE RIVER THAMES, ETC.--WAR DEPARTMENT -ARCHIVES, MSS.] - -Harrison came upon the British line soon after two o’clock in the -afternoon, and at once formed his army in regular order of battle. As -the order was disregarded, and the battle was fought, as he reported, -in a manner “not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard -of,”[143] the intended arrangement mattered little. In truth, the -battle was planned as well as fought by Richard M. Johnson, whose -energy impressed on the army a new character from the moment he joined -it. While Harrison drew up his infantry in order of battle, Johnson, -whose mounted regiment was close to the British line, asked leave to -charge,[144] and Harrison gave him the order, although he knew no rule -of war that sanctioned it. - -Johnson’s tactics were hazardous, though effective. Giving to his -brother, James Johnson, half the regiment to lead up the road against -the six-pound gun and the British Forty-first regiment, R. M. Johnson -with the other half of his regiment wheeled to the left, at an angle -with the road, and crossed the swamp to attack twice his number of -Indians posted in a thick wood. - -James Johnson, with his five hundred men, galloped directly through -the British first line,[145] receiving a confused fire, and passing -immediately to the rear of the British second line, so rapidly as -almost to capture Proctor himself, who fled at full speed.[146] As the -British soldiers straggled in bands or singly toward the rear, they -found themselves among the American mounted riflemen, and had no choice -but to surrender. About fifty men, with a single lieutenant, contrived -to escape through the woods; all the rest became prisoners. - -R. M. Johnson was less fortunate. Crossing the swamp to his left, he -was received by the Indians in underbrush which the horses could not -penetrate. Under a sharp fire his men were obliged to dismount and -fight at close quarters. At an early moment of the battle, Johnson -was wounded by the rifle of an Indian warrior who sprang forward to -despatch him, but was killed by a ball from Johnson’s pistol. The -fighting at that point was severe, but Johnson’s men broke or turned -the Indian line, which was uncovered after the British defeat, and -driving the Indians toward the American left, brought them under fire -of Shelby’s infantry, when they fled. - -In this contest Johnson maintained that his regiment was alone engaged. -In a letter to Secretary Armstrong, dated six weeks after the battle, -he said:[147]-- - - “I send you an imperfect sketch of the late battle on the river - Thames, fought solely by the mounted regiment; at least, so much - so that not fifty men from any other corps assisted.... Fought the - Indians, twelve hundred or fifteen hundred men, one hour and twenty - minutes, driving them from the extreme right to the extreme left - of my line, at which last point we came near Governor Shelby, who - ordered Colonel Simrall to reinforce me; but the battle was over, - and although the Indians were pursued half a mile, there was no - fighting.” - -Harrison’s official report gave another idea of the relative share -taken by the Kentucky infantry in the action; but the difference in -dispute was trifling. The entire American loss was supposed to be -only about fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The battle lasted, with -sharpness, not more than twenty minutes; and none but the men under -Johnson’s command enjoyed opportunity to share in the first and most -perilous assault. - -The British loss was only twelve men killed and thirty-six wounded. -The total number of British prisoners taken on the field and in the -Moravian town, or elsewhere on the day of battle, was four hundred -and seventy-seven; in the whole campaign, six hundred. All Proctor’s -baggage, artillery, small arms, stores, and hospital were captured in -the Moravian town. The Indians left thirty-three dead on the field, -among them one reported to be Tecumthe. After the battle several -officers of the British Forty-first, well acquainted with the Shawnee -warrior, visited the spot, and identified his body. The Kentuckians -had first recognized it, and had cut long strips of skin from the -thighs, to keep, as was said, for razor-straps, in memory of the river -Raisin.[148] - -After Perry’s victory on Lake Erie, Tecumthe’s life was of no value -to himself or his people, and his death was no subject for regret; -but the manner chosen for producing this result was an expensive mode -of acquiring territory for the United States. The Shawnee warrior -compelled the government to pay for once something like the value -of the lands it took. The precise cost of the Indian war could not -be estimated, being combined in many ways with that of the war with -England; but the British counted for little, within the northwestern -territory, except so far as Tecumthe used them for his purposes. Not -more than seven or eight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the -Detroit River; but the United States raised fully twenty thousand men, -and spent at least five million dollars and many lives in expelling -them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign of -Tippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres at -Fort Dearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the murders along the -frontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian -lands in the Wabash Valley. - -No part of the war more injured British credit on the American -continent than the result of the Indian alliance. Except the capture of -Detroit and Mackinaw at the outset, without fighting, and the qualified -success at the river Raisin, the British suffered only mortifications, -ending with the total loss of their fleet, the abandonment of their -fortress, the flight of their army, and the shameful scene before the -Moravian town, where four hundred British regulars allowed themselves -to be ridden over and captured by five hundred Kentucky horsemen, with -hardly the loss of a man to the assailants. After such a disgrace -the British ceased to be formidable in the northwest. The Indians -recognized the hopelessness of their course, and from that moment -abandoned their dependence on England. - -The battle of the Thames annihilated the right division of the -British army in Upper Canada. When the remnants of Proctor’s force -were mustered, October 17, at Ancaster, a hundred miles from the -battlefield, about two hundred rank-and-file were assembled.[149] -Proctor made a report of the battle blaming his troops, and Prevost -issued a severe reprimand to the unfortunate Forty-first regiment on -the strength of Proctor’s representations. In the end the Prince Regent -disgraced both officers, recognizing by these public acts the loss of -credit the government had suffered; but its recovery was impossible. - -So little anxiety did General Harrison thenceforward feel about the -Eighth Military District which he commanded, that he returned to -Detroit October 7; his army followed him, and arrived at Sandwich, -October 10, without seeing an enemy. Promptly discharged, the Kentucky -Volunteers marched homeward October 14; the mounted regiment and its -wounded colonel followed a few days later, and within a fortnight only -two brigades of the regular army remained north of the Maumee. - -At Detroit the war was closed, and except for two or three distant -expeditions was not again a subject of interest. The Indians were for -the most part obliged to remain within the United States jurisdiction. -The great number of Indian families that had been collected about -Detroit and Malden were rather a cause for confidence than fear, -since they were in effect hostages, and any violence committed by -the warriors would have caused them, their women and children, to be -deprived of food and to perish of starvation. Detroit was full of -savages dependent on army supplies, and living on the refuse and offal -of the slaughter-yard; but their military strength was gone. Some -hundreds of the best warriors followed Proctor to Lake Ontario, but -Tecumthe’s northwestern confederacy was broken up, and most of the -tribes made submission. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -THE new Secretaries of War and Navy who took office in January, 1813, -were able in the following October to show Detroit recovered. Nine -months solved the problem of Lake Erie. The problem of Lake Ontario -remained insoluble. - -In theory nothing was simpler than the conquest of Upper Canada. Six -months before war was declared, Jan. 2, 1812, John Armstrong, then a -private citizen, wrote to Secretary Eustis a letter containing the -remark,-- - - “In invading a neighboring and independent territory like Canada, - having a frontier of immense extent; destitute of means strictly - its own for the purposes of defence; separated from the rest of the - empire by an ocean, and having to this but one outlet,--this outlet - forms your true object or point of attack.” - -The river St. Lawrence was the true object of attack, and the Canadians -hardly dared hope to defend it. - - “From St. Regis to opposite Kingston,” said the Quebec “Gazette” in - 1814, “the southern bank of the river belongs to the United States. - It is well known that this river is the only communication between - Upper and Lower Canada. It is rapid and narrow in many places. - A few cannon judiciously posted, or even musketry, could render the - communication impracticable without powerful escorts, wasting and - parcelling the force applicable to the defence of the provinces. It - is needless to say that no British force can remain in safety or - maintain itself in Upper Canada without a ready communication with - the lower province.” - -Closure of the river anywhere must compel the submission of the whole -country above, which could not provide its supplies. The American, -who saw his own difficulties of transport between New York and the -Lakes, thought well of his energy in surmounting them; but as the war -took larger proportions, and great fleets were built on Lake Ontario, -the difficulties of Canadian transport became insuperable. Toward the -close of the war, Sir George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst[150] that -six thirty-two-pound guns for the fleet, hauled in winter four hundred -miles from Quebec to Kingston, would cost at least £2000 for transport. -Forty twenty-four-pounders hauled on the snow had cost £4,800; a cable -of the largest size hauled from Sorel to Kingston, two hundred and -fifty-five miles, cost £1000 for transport. In summer, when the river -was open, the difficulties were hardly less. The commissary-general -reported that the impediments of navigation were incalculable, and the -scarcity of workmen, laborers, and voyageurs not to be described.[151] - -[Illustration: UPPER CANADA - -NEW YORK - - EAST END OF - LAKE ONTARIO - AND - RIVER ST. LAWRENCE - FROM - Kingston to French Mills - REDUCED FROM AN - ORIGINAL DRAWING IN THE - NAVAL DEPARTMENT - BY JOHN MELISH. - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y. -] - -If these reasons for attacking and closing the river St. Lawrence had -not been decisive with the United States government, other reasons -were sufficient. The political motive was as strong as the military. -Americans, especially in New England, denied that treasonable -intercourse existed with Canada; but intercourse needed not to be -technically treasonable in order to have the effects of treason. Sir -George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814,[152] when the war -had lasted two years,-- - - “Two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef - provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States - of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as that of the - introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being - notorious in the United States, it is to be expected Congress - will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and under that - apprehension, large droves are daily crossing the lines coming into - Lower Canada.” - -This state of things had then lasted during three campaigns, from -the beginning of the war. The Indians at Malden, the British army at -Niagara, the naval station at Kingston were largely fed by the United -States. If these supplies could be stopped, Upper Canada must probably -fall; and they could be easily stopped by interrupting the British line -of transport anywhere on the St. Lawrence. - -The task was not difficult. Indeed, early in the war an enterprising -officer of irregulars, Major Benjamin Forsyth, carried on a troublesome -system of annoyance from Ogdensburg, which Sir George Prevost treated -with extreme timidity.[153] The British commandant at Prescott, Major -Macdonnell, was not so cautious as the governor-general, but crossed -the river on the ice with about five hundred men, drove Forsyth from -the town, destroyed the public property, and retired in safety with -a loss of eight killed and fifty-two wounded.[154] This affair, Feb. -23, 1813, closed hostilities in that region, and Major Forsyth was -soon ordered to Sackett’s Harbor. His experience, and that of Major -Macdonnell, proved how easy the closure of such a river must be, -exposed as it was for two hundred miles to the fire of cannon and -musketry. - -The St. Lawrence was therefore the proper point of approach and attack -against Upper Canada. Armstrong came to the Department of War with that -idea fixed in his mind. The next subject for his consideration was the -means at his disposal. - -During Monroe’s control of the War Department for two months, between -Dec. 3, 1812, and Feb. 5, 1813, much effort had been made to increase -the army. Monroe wrote to the chairman of the Military Committee Dec. -22, 1812, a sketch of his ideas.[155] He proposed to provide for the -general defence by dividing the United States into military districts, -and apportioning ninety-three hundred and fifty men among them as -garrisons. For offensive operations he required a force competent to -overpower the British defence, and in estimating his wants, he assumed -that Canada contained about twelve thousand British regulars, besides -militia, and three thousand men at Halifax. - - “To demolish the British force from Niagara to Quebec,” said - Monroe, “would require, to make the thing secure, an efficient - regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of - ten thousand.... If the government could raise and keep in the - field thirty-five thousand regular troops, ... the deficiency to - be supplied even to authorize an expedition against Halifax would - be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient; - but there is danger of not being able to raise that force, and to - keep it at that standard.... My idea is that provision ought to be - made for raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present - establishment.” - -Congress voted about fifty-eight thousand men, and after deducting ten -thousand for garrisons, counted on forty-eight thousand for service -in Canada. When Armstrong took control, Feb. 5, 1813, he began at -once to devise a plan of operation for the army which by law numbered -fifty-eight thousand men, and in fact numbered, including the staff and -regimental officers, eighteen thousand nine hundred and forty-five -men, according to the returns in the adjutant-general’s office February -16, 1813. Before he had been a week in the War Department, he wrote, -February 10, to Major-General Dearborn announcing that four thousand -men were to be immediately collected at Sackett’s Harbor, and three -thousand at Buffalo. April 1, or as soon as navigation opened, the four -thousand troops at Sackett’s Harbor were to be embarked and transported -in boats under convoy of the fleet across the Lake at the mouth of -the St. Lawrence, thirty-five miles, to Kingston. After capturing -Kingston, with its magazines, navy-yards, and ships, the expedition -was to proceed up the Lake to York (Toronto) and capture two vessels -building there. Thence it was to join the corps of three thousand men -at Buffalo, and attack the British on the Niagara River.[156] - -In explaining his plan to the Cabinet, Armstrong pointed out that the -attack from Lake Champlain on Montreal could not begin before May 1; -that Kingston, between April 1 and May 15, was shut from support by -ice; that not more than two thousand men could be gathered to defend -it; and that by beginning the campaign against Kingston rather than -against Montreal, six weeks’ time would be gained before reinforcements -could arrive from England.[157] - -Whatever defects the plan might have, Kingston, and Kingston alone, -possessed so much military importance as warranted the movement. -Evidently Armstrong had in mind no result short of the capture of -Kingston. - -Dearborn received these instructions at Albany, and replied, February -18, that nothing should be omitted on his part in endeavoring to -carry into effect the expedition proposed.[158] Orders were given -for concentrating the intended force at Sackett’s Harbor. During the -month of March the preparations were stimulated by a panic due to the -appearance of Sir George Prevost at Prescott and Kingston. Dearborn -hurried to Sackett’s Harbor in person, under the belief that the -governor-general was about to attack it. - -Armstrong estimated the British force at Kingston as nine hundred -regulars, or two thousand men all told; and his estimate was probably -correct. The usual garrison at Kingston and Prescott was about eight -hundred rank-and-file. In both the British and American services, the -returns of rank-and-file were the ordinary gauge of numerical force. -Rank-and-file included corporals, but not sergeants or commissioned -officers; and an allowance of at least ten sergeants and officers was -always to be made for every hundred rank-and-file, in order to estimate -the true numerical strength of an army or garrison. Unless otherwise -mentioned, the return excluded also the sick and disabled. The -relative force of every army was given in effectives, or rank-and-file -actually present for duty. - -In the distribution of British forces in Canada for 1812–1813, the -garrison at Prescott was allowed three hundred and seventy-six -rank-and-file, with fifty-two officers including sergeants. To Kingston -three hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file were allotted, with sixty -officers including sergeants. To Montreal and the positions between -Prescott and the St. John’s River about five thousand rank-and-file -were allotted.[159] At Prescott and Kingston, besides the regular -troops, the men employed in ship-building or other labor, the sailors, -and the local militia were to be reckoned as part of the garrison, and -Armstrong included them all in his estimate of two thousand men. - -The British force should have been known to Dearborn nearly as well -as his own. No considerable movement of troops between Lower and -Upper Canada could occur without his knowledge. Yet Dearborn wrote to -Armstrong, March 9, 1813, from Sackett’s Harbor,[160]-- - - “I have not yet had the honor of a visit from Sir George Prevost. - His whole force is concentrated at Kingston, probably amounting - to six or seven thousand,--about three thousand of them regular - troops. The ice is good, and we expect him every day.... As soon - as the fall [fate?] of this place [Sackett’s Harbor] shall be - decided, we shall be able to determine on other measures. If we - hold this place, we will command the Lake, and be able to act in - concert with the troops at Niagara.” - -A few days later, March 14, Dearborn wrote again.[161] - - “Sir George,” he said, had “concluded that it is too late to - attack this place.... We are probably just strong enough on each - side to defend, but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive - movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it - regards the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett’s Harbor, - cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, - arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the - defensive.” - -Clearly Dearborn did not approve Armstrong’s plan, and wished to -change it. In this idea he was supported, or instigated, by the naval -commander on the Lake, Isaac Chauncey, a native of Connecticut, forty -years of age, who entered the service in 1798 and became captain in -1806. Chauncey and Dearborn consulted together, and devised a new -scheme, which Dearborn explained to Armstrong about March 20:[162]-- - - “To take or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the - complete command of the Lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him - ten or twelve hundred troops to be commanded by Pike; take York; - from thence proceed to Niagara and attack Fort George by land - and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry Forts - Erie and Chippewa, and join those at Fort George; and then collect - our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature - deliberation the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and - myself as the most certain of ultimate success.” - -Thus Dearborn and Chauncey inverted Armstrong’s plan. Instead of -attacking on the St. Lawrence, they proposed to attack on the -Niagara. Armstrong acquiesced. “Taking for granted,” as he did[163] -on Dearborn’s assertion, “that General Prevost ... has assembled at -Kingston a force of six or eight thousand men, as stated by you,” he -could not require that his own plan should be pursued. “The alteration -in the plan of campaign so as to make Kingston the last object instead -of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least -proper,” he wrote to Dearborn, March 29.[164] - -The scheme proposed by Dearborn and Chauncey was carried into effect by -them. The contractors furnished new vessels, which gave to Chauncey for -a time the control of the Lake. April 22 the troops, numbering sixteen -hundred men, embarked. Armstrong insisted on only one change in the -expedition, which betrayed perhaps a shade of malice, for he required -Dearborn himself to command it, and Dearborn was suspected of shunning -service in the field. - -From the moment Dearborn turned away from the St. Lawrence and -carried the war westward, the naval and military movements on Lake -Ontario became valuable chiefly as a record of failure. The fleet -and army arrived at York early in the morning of April 27. York, a -village numbering in 1806, according to British account, more than -three thousand inhabitants, was the capital of Upper Canada, and -contained the residence of the lieutenant-governor and the two brick -buildings where the Legislature met. For military purposes the place -was valueless, but it had been used for the construction of a few -war-vessels, and Chauncey represented, through Dearborn, that “to take -or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the complete command -of the Lake.” The military force at York, according to British account, -did not exceed six hundred men, regulars and militia; and of these, -one hundred and eighty men, or two companies of the Eighth or King’s -regiment, happened to be there only in passing.[165] - -Under the fire of the fleet and riflemen, Pike’s brigade was set -ashore; the British garrison, after a sharp resistance, was driven -away, and the town capitulated. The ship on the stocks was burned; -the ten-gun brig “Gloucester” was made prize; the stores were -destroyed or shipped; some three hundred prisoners were taken; and -the public buildings, including the houses of Assembly, were burned. -The destruction of the Assembly houses, afterward alleged as ground -for retaliation against the capitol at Washington, was probably the -unauthorized act of private soldiers. Dearborn protested that it was -done without his knowledge and against his orders.[166] - -The success cost far more than it was worth. The explosion of a powder -magazine, near which the American advance halted, injured a large -number of men on both sides. Not less than three hundred and twenty -Americans were killed or wounded in the battle or explosion,[167] or -about one fifth of the entire force. General Pike, the best brigadier -then in the service, was killed. Only two or three battles in the -entire war were equally bloody.[168] “Unfortunately the enemy’s armed -ship the ‘Prince Regent,’” reported Dearborn,[169] “left this place for -Kingston four days before we arrived.” - -Chauncey and Dearborn crossed to Niagara, while the troops remained -some ten days at York, and were then disembarked at Niagara, May -8, according to Dearborn’s report, “in a very sickly and depressed -state; a large proportion of the officers and men were sickly and -debilitated.”[170] Nothing was ready for the movement which was to -drive the British from Fort George, and before active operations -could begin, Dearborn fell ill. The details of command fell to his -chief-of-staff, Colonel Winfield Scott. - -The military organization at Niagara was at best unfortunate. One of -Secretary Armstrong’s earliest measures was to issue the military -order previously arranged by Monroe, dividing the Union into military -districts. Vermont and the State of New York north of the highlands -formed the Ninth Military District, under Major-General Dearborn. In -the Ninth District were three points of activity,--Plattsburg on Lake -Champlain, Sackett’s Harbor on Lake Ontario, and the Niagara River. -Each point required a large force and a commander of the highest -ability; but in May, 1813, Plattsburg and Sackett’s Harbor were denuded -of troops and officers, who were all drawn to Niagara, where they -formed three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals John P. Boyd, -who succeeded Pike, John Chandler, and W. H. Winder. Niagara and the -troops in its neighborhood were under the command of Major-General -Morgan Lewis, a man of ability, but possessing neither the youth nor -the energy to lead an army in the field, while Boyd, Chandler, and -Winder were competent only to command regiments. - -Winfield Scott in effect assumed control of the army, and undertook to -carry out Van Rensselaer’s plan of the year before for attacking Fort -George in the rear, from the Lake. The task was not very difficult. -Chauncey controlled the Lake, and his fleet was at hand to transfer the -troops. Dearborn’s force numbered certainly not less than four thousand -rank-and-file present for duty. The entire British regular force on the -Niagara River did not exceed eighteen hundred rank-and-file, and about -five hundred militia.[171] At Fort George about one thousand regulars -and three hundred militia were stationed, and the military object to -be gained by the Americans was not so much the capture of Fort George, -which was then not defensible, as that of its garrison. - -Early on the morning of May 27, when the mist cleared away, the British -General Vincent saw Chauncey’s fleet, “in an extended line of more than -two miles,” standing toward the shore. When the ships took position, -“the fire from the shipping so completely enfiladed and scoured the -plains, that it became impossible to approach the beach,” and Vincent -could only concentrate his force between the Fort and the enemy, -waiting attack. Winfield Scott at the head of an advance division first -landed, followed by the brigades of Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, and -after a sharp skirmish drove the British back along the Lake shore, -advancing under cover of the fleet. Vincent’s report continued:[172]-- - - “After awaiting the approach of the enemy for about half an hour - I received authentic information that his force, consisting of - from four to five thousand men, had reformed his columns and was - making an effort to turn my right flank. Having given orders for - the fort to be evacuated, the guns to be spiked, and the ammunition - destroyed, the troops under my command were put in motion, and - marched across the country in a line parallel to the Niagara - River, toward the position near the Beaver Dam beyond Queenston - mountain.... Having assembled my whole force the following morning, - which did not exceed sixteen hundred men, I continued my march - toward the head of the Lake.” - -Vincent lost severely in proportion to his numbers, for fifty-one -men were killed, and three hundred and five were wounded or missing, -chiefly in the Eighth or King’s regiment.[173] Several hundred militia -were captured in his retreat. The American loss was about forty killed -and one hundred and twenty wounded. According to General Morgan Lewis, -Col. Winfield Scott “fought nine-tenths of the battle.”[174] Dearborn -watched the movements from the fleet. - -For a time this success made a deep impression on the military -administration of Canada, and the abandonment of the whole country west -of Kingston was thought inevitable.[175] The opportunity for achieving -a decided advantage was the best that occurred for the Americans -during the entire war; but whatever might be said in public, the -battle of Fort George was a disappointment to the War Department[176] -as well as to the officers in command of the American army, who had -hoped to destroy the British force. The chief advantage gained was the -liberation of Perry’s vessels at Black Rock above the Falls, which -enabled Perry to complete his fleet on Lake Erie. - -On Lake Ontario, May 31, Chauncey insisted, not without cause, on -returning to Sackett’s Harbor. Dearborn, instead of moving with his -whole force, ordered Brigadier-General Winder, June 1, to pursue -Vincent. Winder, with eight hundred or a thousand men marched twenty -miles, and then sent for reinforcements. He was joined, June 5, by -General Chandler with another brigade. Chandler then took command, and -advanced with a force supposed to number in the aggregate two thousand -men[177] to Stony Creek, within ten miles of Vincent’s position at -Hamilton, where sixteen hundred British regulars were encamped. There -Chandler and Winder posted themselves for the night, much as Winchester -and his Kentuckians had camped at the river Raisin four months -earlier.[178] - -Vincent was not to be treated with such freedom. Taking only seven -hundred rank-and-file,[179] he led them himself against Chandler’s -camp. The attack began, in intense darkness, at two o’clock in the -morning of June 6. The British quickly broke the American centre and -carried the guns. The lines became mixed, and extreme confusion lasted -till dawn. In the darkness both American generals, Chandler and Winder, -walked into the British force in the centre, and were captured.[180] -With difficulty the two armies succeeded in recovering their order, and -then retired in opposite directions. The British suffered severely, -reporting twenty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, -and fifty-five missing, or two hundred and twelve men in all; but they -safely regained Burlington Heights at dawn.[181] The American loss -was less in casualties, for it amounted only to fifty-five killed and -wounded, and one hundred missing; but in results the battle at Stony -Creek was equally disgraceful and decisive. The whole American force, -leaving the dead unburied, fell back ten miles, where Major-General -Lewis took command in the afternoon of June 7. An hour later the -British fleet under Sir James Yeo made its appearance, threatening to -cut off Lewis’s retreat. Indians hovered about. Boats and baggage were -lost. Dearborn sent pressing orders to Lewis directing him to return, -and on the morning of June 8 the division reached Fort George.[182] - -These mortifications prostrated Dearborn, whose strength had been -steadily failing. June 8 he wrote to Armstrong: “My ill state of health -renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and -unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire -to some place where my mind may be more at ease for a short time.”[183] -June 10, his adjutant-general, Winfield Scott, issued orders devolving -on Major-General Morgan Lewis the temporary command not only of -the Niagara army but also of the Ninth Military district.[184] “In -addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with,” wrote -Dearborn’s aid, S. S. Connor, to Secretary Armstrong, June 12,[185] -“he has, within the last twenty-four hours, experienced a violent -spasmodic attack on his breast, which has obliged him to relinquish -business altogether.” “I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit -for service,” wrote Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14;[186] “he has -been repeatedly in a state of convalescence, but relapses on the least -agitation of mind.” June 20 Dearborn himself wrote in a very despondent -spirit both in regard to his health and to the military situation: “I -have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. -Brigadier-General Boyd is the only general officer present.”[187] - -The sudden departure of Morgan Lewis, ordered to Sackett’s Harbor, -left General Boyd for a few days to act as the general in command at -Niagara. Boyd, though well known for his success at Tippecanoe, was -not a favorite in the army. “A compound of ignorance, vanity, and -petulance,” wrote his late superior, Morgan Lewis,[188] “with nothing -to recommend him but that species of bravery in the field which is -vaporing, boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation, and -better adapted to the bully than the soldier.” - -Galled by complaints of the imbecility of the army, Boyd, with -Dearborn’s approval,[189] June 23, detached Colonel Boerstler of the -Fourteenth Infantry with some four hundred men and two field-pieces, -to batter a stone house at Beaver Dam, some seventeen miles from Fort -George.[190] Early in the morning of June 24 Boerstler marched to -Beaver Dam. There he found himself surrounded in the woods by hostile -Indians, numbering according to British authority about two hundred. -The Indians, annoying both front and rear, caused Boerstler to attempt -retreat, but his retreat was stopped by a few militia-men, said to -number fifteen.[191] A small detachment of one hundred and fifty men -came to reinforce Boerstler, and Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the British -Forty-ninth regiment, with forty-seven men, reinforced the Indians. -Unable to extricate himself, and dreading dispersion and massacre, -Boerstler decided to surrender; and his five hundred and forty men -accordingly capitulated to a British lieutenant with two hundred and -sixty Indians, militia, and regulars. - -Dearborn reported the disaster as “an unfortunate and unaccountable -event;”[192] but of such events the list seemed endless. A worse -disaster, equally due to Dearborn and Chauncey, occurred at the -other end of the Lake. Had they attacked Kingston, as Armstrong -intended, their movement would have covered Sackett’s Harbor; but -when they placed themselves a hundred and fifty miles to the westward -of Sackett’s Harbor, they could do nothing to protect it. Sackett’s -Harbor was an easy morning’s sail from Kingston, and the capture of the -American naval station was an object of infinite desire on the part of -Sir George Prevost, since it would probably decide the result of the -war. - -Prevost, though not remarkable for audacity, could not throw away such -an opportunity without ruining his reputation. He came to Kingston, and -while Dearborn was preparing to capture Fort George in the night of -May 26–27, Prevost embarked his whole regular force, eight hundred men -all told,[193] on Yeo’s fleet at Kingston, set sail in the night, and -at dawn of May 27 was in sight of Sackett’s Harbor.[194] - -Had Yeo and Prevost acted with energy, they must have captured the -Harbor without serious resistance. According to Sir George’s official -report, “light and adverse winds” prevented the ships from nearing the -Fort until evening.[195] Probably constitutional vacillation on the -part of Sir James Yeo caused delay, for Prevost left the control wholly -to him and Colonel Baynes.[196] - -At Sackett’s Harbor about four hundred men of different regular -regiments, and about two hundred and fifty Albany volunteers were in -garrison; and a general alarm, given on appearance of the British fleet -in the distance, brought some hundreds of militia into the place; but -the most important reinforcement was Jacob Brown, a brigadier-general -of State militia who lived in the neighborhood, and had been requested -by Dearborn to take command in case of an emergency. Brown arrived at -the Harbor in time to post the men in order of battle. Five hundred -militia were placed at the point where the British were expected to -land; the regulars were arranged in a second line; the forts were in -the rear. - -[Illustration: - - EAST END - OF - LAKE ONTARIO - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S., N.Y. -] - -At dawn of May 28, under command of Colonel Baynes, the British -grenadiers of the One Hundredth regiment landed gallantly under “so -heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as -to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up.”[197] -Pressing rapidly forward, without stopping to fire, the British -regulars routed the militia and forced the second line back until they -reached a block-house at the edge of the village, where a thirty-two -pound gun was in position, flanked by log barracks and fallen timber. -While Brown with difficulty held his own at the military barracks, the -naval lieutenant in charge of the ship-yard, being told that the battle -was lost, set fire to the naval barracks, shipping, and store-houses. -Brown’s indignation at this act was intense. - - “The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction - as ever occurred among military men,” he wrote to Dearborn.[198] - “The fire was set as our regulars met the enemy upon the main line; - and if anything could have appalled these gallant men it would have - been the flames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered - in the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful - burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled to much - higher praise than though it had not occurred. The navy are alone - responsible for what happened on Navy Point, and it is fortunate - for them that they have reputations sufficient to sustain the - shock.” - -Brown’s second line stood firm at the barracks, and the British attack -found advance impossible. Sir George Prevost’s report admitted his -inability to go farther:[199]-- - - “A heavier fire than that of musketry having become necessary - in order to force their last position, I had the mortification - to learn that the continuation of light and adverse winds had - prevented the co-operation of the ships, and that the gunboats - were unequal to silence the enemy’s elevated batteries, or to - produce any effect on their block houses. Considering it therefore - impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by - which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the troops to - leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven before them for upwards - of three hours, and who did not venture to offer the slightest - opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper - deliberation and in perfect order.” - -If Sir George was correct in regarding the Americans as “a beaten -enemy,” his order of retreat to his own troops seemed improper; but -his language showed that he used the words in a sense of his own, and -Colonel Baynes’s report gave no warrant for the British claim of a -victory.[200] - - “At this point,” said Baynes,[201] “the further energies of the - troops became unavailing. Their [American] block-houses and - stockaded battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by - field-pieces had we been provided with them.... Seeing no object - within our reach to attain that could compensate for the loss we - were momentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy’s - cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position we had - charged from. From this position we were ordered to re-embark, - which was performed at our leisure and in perfect order, the enemy - not presuming to show a single soldier without the limits of his - fortress.” - -Another and confidential report was written by E. B. Brenton of -Prevost’s staff to the governor’s military secretary, Noah Freer.[202] -After describing the progress of the battle until the British advance -was stopped, Brenton said that Colonel Baynes came to Sir George to -tell him that the men could not approach nearer the works with any -prospect of success:-- - - “It was however determined to collect all the troops at a point, - to form the line, and to make an attack immediately upon the - battery and barracks in front. For this purpose the men in advance - were called in, the line formed a little without the reach of the - enemy’s musketry, and though evidently much fagged, was, after - being supplied with fresh ammunition, again led in line. At this - time I do not think the whole force collected in the lines exceeded - five hundred men.” - -The attack was made, and part of the Hundred-and-fourth regiment -succeeded in getting shelter behind one of the American barracks, -preparing for a farther advance. Sir George Prevost, under a fire which -his aid described as tremendous,--“I do not exaggerate when I tell you -that the shot, both of musketry and grape, was falling about us like -hail,”--watched the American position through a glass, when, “at this -time those who were left of the troops behind the barracks made a dash -out to charge the enemy; but the fire was so destructive that they -were instantly turned by it, and the retreat was sounded. Sir George, -fearless of danger and disdaining to run or to suffer his men to run, -repeatedly called out to them to retire in order; many however made off -as fast as they could.” - -These reports agreed that the British attack was totally defeated, with -severe loss, before the retreat was sounded. Such authorities should -have silenced dispute; but Prevost had many enemies in Canada, and -at that period of the war the British troops were unused to defeat. -Both Canadians and English attacked the governor-general privately and -publicly, freely charging him with having disgraced the service, and -offering evidence of his want of courage in the action.[203] Americans, -though not interested in the defence of Prevost, could not fail to -remark that the British and Canadian authorities who condemned him, -assumed a condition of affairs altogether different from that accepted -by American authorities. The official American reports not only -supported the views taken by Prevost and Baynes of the hopelessness of -the British attack, but added particulars which made Prevost’s retreat -necessary. General Brown’s opinion was emphatic: “Had not General -Prevost retired _most rapidly_ under the guns of his vessels, he would -never have returned to Kingston.”[204] These words were a part of -Brown’s official report. Writing to Dearborn he spoke with the same -confidence:[205]-- - - “The militia were all rallied before the enemy gave way, and were - marching perfectly in his view towards the rear of his right flank; - and I am confident that even then, if Sir George had not retired - with the utmost precipitation to his boats, he would have been cut - off.” - -Unlike the Canadians, Brown thought Prevost’s conduct correct and -necessary, but was by no means equally complimentary to Sir James Yeo, -whom he blamed greatly for failing to join in the battle. The want of -wind which Yeo alleged in excuse, Brown flatly denied. From that time -Brown entertained and freely expressed contempt for Yeo, as he seemed -also to feel little respect for Chauncey. His experience with naval -administration on both sides led him to expect nothing but inefficiency -from either. - -Whatever were the true causes of Prevost’s failure, Americans could -not admit that an expedition which cost the United States so much, -and which so nearly succeeded, was discreditable to the British -governor-general, or was abandoned without sufficient reason. The -British return of killed and wounded proved the correctness of Prevost, -Baynes, and Brown in their opinion of the necessity of retreat. -According to the report of Prevost’s severest critics, he carried less -than seven hundred and fifty rank-and-file to Sackett’s Harbor.[206] -The returns showed forty-four rank-and-file killed; one hundred and -seventy-two wounded, and thirteen missing,--in all, two hundred and -twenty-nine men, or nearly one man in three. The loss in officers was -relatively even more severe; and the total loss in an aggregate which -could hardly have numbered much more than eight hundred and fifty men -all told, amounted to two hundred and fifty-nine killed, wounded, and -missing, leaving Prevost less than six hundred men to escape,[207] in -the face of twice their numbers and under the fire of heavy guns.[208] - -The British attack was repulsed, and Jacob Brown received much credit -as well as a commission of brigadier-general in the United States -army for his success; but the injury inflicted by the premature -destruction at the navy-yard was very great, and was sensibly felt. -Such a succession of ill news could not but affect the Government. -The repeated failures to destroy the British force at Niagara; the -disasters of Chandler, Winder, and Boerstler; the narrow and partial -escape of Sackett’s Harbor; the total incapacity of Dearborn caused -by fever and mortification,--all these evils were not the only or the -greatest subjects for complaint. The two commanders, Dearborn and -Chauncey, had set aside the secretary’s plan of campaign, and had -substituted one of their own, on the express ground of their superior -information. While affirming that the garrison at Kingston had been -reinforced to a strength three or four times as great as was humanly -possible, they had asserted that the capture of York would answer their -purpose as well as the capture of Kingston, to “give us the complete -command of the Lake.” They captured York, April 27, but the British -fleet appeared June 6, and took from them the command of the Lake. -These miscalculations or misstatements, and the disasters resulting -from them, warranted the removal of Chauncey as well as Dearborn from -command; but the brunt of dissatisfaction fell on Dearborn alone. Both -Cabinet and Congress agreed in insisting on Dearborn’s retirement, -and the President was obliged to consent. July 6, Secretary Armstrong -wrote,-- - - “I have the President’s orders to express to you the decision that - you retire from the command of District No. 9, and of the troops - within the same, until your health be re-established and until - further orders.” - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -ARMSTRONG’S embarrassment was great in getting rid of the generals -whom Madison and Eustis left on his hands. Dearborn was one example of -what he was obliged to endure, but Wilkinson was a worse. According -to Armstrong’s account,[209] New Orleans was not believed to be safe -in Wilkinson’s keeping. The senators from Louisiana, Tennessee, and -Kentucky remonstrated to the President, and the President ordered his -removal. Armstrong and Wilkinson had been companions in arms, and -had served with Gates at Saratoga. For many reasons Armstrong wished -not unnecessarily to mortify Wilkinson, and in conveying to him, -March 10, the abrupt order[210] to proceed with the least possible -delay to the headquarters of Major-General Dearborn at Sackett’s -Harbor, the Secretary of War added, March 12, a friendly letter of -advice:[211]-- - - “Why should you remain in your land of cypress when patriotism and - ambition equally invite to one where grows the laurel? Again, the - men of the North and East want you; those of the South and West are - less sensible of your merits and less anxious to have you among - them. I speak to you with a frankness due to you and to myself, and - again advise, Come to the North, and come quickly! If our cards be - well played, we may renew the scene of Saratoga.” - -The phrase was curious. Saratoga suggested defeated invasion rather -than conquest; the surrender of a British army in the heart of New York -rather than the capture of Montreal. The request for Wilkinson’s aid -was disheartening. No one knew better than Armstrong the feebleness -of Wilkinson’s true character. “The selection of this unprincipled -imbecile was not the blunder of Secretary Armstrong,” said Winfield -Scott long afterward;[212] but the idea that Wilkinson could be -chief-of-staff to Dearborn,--that one weak man could give strength to -another,--was almost as surprising as the selection of Wilkinson to -chief command would have been. Armstrong did not intend that Wilkinson -should command more than a division under Dearborn;[213] but he must -have foreseen that in the event of Dearborn’s illness or incapacity, -Wilkinson would become by seniority general-in-chief. - -[Illustration: _REMARKS_ - - Cedars: _A small Village, a place of business, built pretty - compact, several stone houses: Settlers, Scottish and 9 or 10 - French_. - - River d l’Isle _The course of this River is S. and E. till within 4 - or 5 miles of the St. Lawrence thence it runs almost parallel with - that river to its mouth at the Coteau. It is about 4 rods wide at - its mouth and is shoal. One mile above the confluence the distance - is only ¾ mile between the two rivers: The banks of both are low - and flat._ - - _There is a settlement of 60 French Families or upwards 4 miles - above Coteau. No road thence to Point Bodet distant 7½ miles._ - - _The road is excellent from Pt. Bodet to Raisin R._ - - _McPherson keeps Tavern at Pt. Mouille and a Ferry to Pt. Bodet._ - - _McGee keeps Tavern at Pt. Bodet and a Ferry down the Lake._ - - _There is a Ferry from Coteau to Pt. Bodet._ - - MAP OF THE - RIVER ST. LAWRENCE - AND ADJACENT COUNTRY - From Williamsburg to Montreal. - FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING - IN THE - WAR DEPARTMENT. - - MILITARY AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ATLAS - - BY JOHN MELISH, 1815. - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y. -] - -Wilkinson at New Orleans received Armstrong’s letter of March 10 only -May 19,[214] and started, June 10, for Washington, where he arrived -July 31, having consumed the greater part of the summer in the journey. -On arriving at Washington, he found that Dearborn had been removed, -and that he was himself by seniority in command of the Ninth Military -District.[215] This result of Dearborn’s removal was incalculably -mischievous, for if its effect on Wilkinson’s vanity was unfortunate, -its influence on the army was fatal. Almost every respectable officer -of the old service regarded Wilkinson with antipathy or contempt. - -Armstrong’s ill-fortune obliged him also to place in the position -of next importance Wilkinson’s pronounced enemy, Wade Hampton. A -major-general was required to take command on Lake Champlain, and but -one officer of that rank claimed employment or could be employed; and -Wade Hampton was accordingly ordered to Plattsburg.[216] Of all the -major-generals Hampton was probably the best; but his faults were -serious. Proud and sensitive even for a South Carolinian; irritable, -often harsh, sometimes unjust, but the soul of honor,[217] Hampton -was rendered wholly intractable wherever Wilkinson was concerned, by -the long-standing feud which had made the two generals for years the -heads of hostile sections in the army.[218] Hampton loathed Wilkinson. -At the time of his appointment to command on Lake Champlain he had -no reason to expect that Wilkinson would be his superior; but though -willing and even wishing to serve under Dearborn, he accepted only -on the express understanding that his was a distinct and separate -command,[219] and that his orders were to come directly from the War -Department. Only in case of a combined movement uniting different -armies, was he to yield to the rule of seniority. With that agreement -he left Washington, June 15, and assumed command, July 3, on Lake -Champlain. - -Nearly a month afterward Wilkinson arrived in Washington, and reported -at the War Department. By that time Armstrong had lost whatever chance -he previously possessed of drawing the army at Niagara back to a -position on the enemy’s line of supply. Three insuperable difficulties -stood in his way,--the season was too late; the army was too weak; and -the generals were incompetent. Armstrong found his generals the chief -immediate obstacle, and struggled perseveringly and good-humoredly to -overcome it. Wilkinson began, on arriving at Washington, by showing -a fancy for continuing the campaign at Niagara.[220] Armstrong was -obliged to give an emphatic order, dated August 8, that Kingston -should be the primary object of the campaign, but he left Wilkinson at -liberty to go there by almost any route, even by way of Montreal.[221] -Disappointed at the outset by finding Wilkinson slow to accept -responsibility or decided views,[222] he was not better pleased when -the new general began his duties in Military District No. 9. - -Wilkinson left Washington August 11, and no sooner did he reach Albany -than he hastened to write, August 16, two letters to General Hampton, -assuming that every movement of that general was directly dependent -on Wilkinson’s orders.[223] Considering the relations between the two -men, these letters warranted the inference that Wilkinson intended -to drive Hampton out of his Military District, and if possible from -the service. Hampton instantly leaped to that conclusion, and wrote -to Armstrong, August 23, offering his resignation in case Wilkinson’s -course was authorized by government.[224] Wilkinson also wrote to -the secretary August 30, substantially avowing his object to be what -Hampton supposed:[225]-- - - “You have copies of my letters to Major-General Hampton, which I - know he has received, yet I have no answer. The reflection which - naturally occurs is that if I am authorized to command he is bound - to obey; and if he will not respect the obligation, he should be - turned out of the service.” - -Armstrong pacified Hampton by promising once more that all his orders -and reports should pass through the Department. Hampton promised to -serve cordially and vigorously through the campaign, but he believed -himself intended for a sacrifice, and declared his intention of -resigning as soon as the campaign was ended.[226] Wilkinson, after -having at Albany provoked this outburst, started for Sackett’s Harbor, -where he arrived August 20. - -At Sackett’s Harbor Wilkinson found several general officers. Morgan -Lewis was there in command, Commodore Chauncey was there with his -fleet. Jacob Brown was also present by virtue of his recent appointment -as brigadier-general. The quartermaster-general, Robert Swartwout, a -brother of Burr’s friend who went to New Orleans, was posted there. -Wilkinson summoned these officers to a council of war August 26, which -deliberated on the different plans of campaign proposed to it, and -unanimously decided in favor of one called by Armstrong “No. 3 of the -plans proposed by the government.”[227] As defined in Wilkinson’s -language[228] the scheme was-- - - “To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in this - vicinity, and in co-operation with our squadron to make a bold - feint upon Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy - in our rear to starve or surrender, or oblige him to follow us - without artillery, baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay - down his arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in - concert with the division under Major-General Hampton to take - Montreal.” - -Orders were given, August 25, for providing river transport for seven -thousand men, forty field-pieces, and twenty heavy guns, to be in -readiness by September 15.[229] - -The proposed expedition closely imitated General Amherst’s expedition -against Montreal in 1760, with serious differences of relative -situation. After Wolfe had captured Quebec and hardly twenty-five -hundred French troops remained to defend Montreal, in the month of -July Amherst descended the river from Lake Ontario with more than ten -thousand men, chiefly British veterans, capturing every fortified -position as he went. Wilkinson’s council of war proposed to descend -the river in October or November with seven thousand men, leaving a -hostile fleet and fortresses in their rear, and running past every -fortified position to arrive in the heart of a comparatively well -populated country, held by a force greater than their own, with -Quebec to support it, while Wilkinson would have no certain base of -supplies, reinforcements, or path of escape. Knowledge of Wilkinson’s -favorite Quintus Curtius or of Armstrong’s familiar Jomini was not -required to satisfy any intelligent private, however newly recruited, -that under such circumstances the army would be fortunate to escape -destruction.[230] - -Wilkinson next went to Niagara, where he arrived September 4, and where -he found the army in a bad condition, with Boyd still in command, -but restrained by the President’s orders within a strict defensive. -Wilkinson remained nearly a month at Fort George making the necessary -preparations for a movement. He fell ill of fever, but returned October -2 to Sackett’s Harbor, taking with him all the regular troops at -Niagara. At that time Chauncey again controlled the Lake. - -Secretary Armstrong also came to Sackett’s Harbor, September 5, -and established the War Department at that remote point for nearly -two months.[231] When Wilkinson arrived, October 2, Armstrong’s -difficulties began. Wilkinson, then fifty-six years old, was broken -by the Lake fever. “He was so much indisposed in mind and body,” -according to Brigadier-General Boyd,[232] “that in any other service -he would have perhaps been superseded in his command.” According to -Wilkinson’s story, he told Secretary Armstrong that he was incapable of -commanding the army, and offered to retire from it; but the secretary -said there was no one to take his place, and he could not be spared. -In private Armstrong was believed to express himself more bluntly, -and Wilkinson was told that the secretary said: “I would feed the -old man with pap sooner than leave him behind.”[233] Wilkinson’s -debility did not prevent him from giving orders, or from becoming -jealous and suspicious of every one, but chiefly of Armstrong.[234] -Whatever was suggested by Armstrong was opposed by Wilkinson. Before -returning to Sackett’s Harbor, October 4, Wilkinson favored an -attack on Kingston.[235] On reaching Sackett’s Harbor, finding that -Armstrong also favored attacking Kingston, Wilkinson argued “against -my own judgment” in favor of passing Kingston and descending upon -Montreal.[236] Ten days afterward Armstrong changed his mind. Yeo had -succeeded in returning to Kingston, bringing reinforcements. - - “He will bring with him about fifteen hundred effectives,” wrote - Armstrong;[237] “and thanks to the storm and our snail-like - movements down the Lake, they will be there before we can reach it. - The manœuvre intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we - now do against that place must be done by hard blows, at some risk.” - -Accordingly, October 19, Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson a letter advising -abandonment of the attack on Kingston, and an effort at “grasping the -safer and the greater object below.”[238] - - “I call it the safer and greater object, because at Montreal you - find the weaker place and the smaller force to encounter; at - Montreal you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of - four thousand men; at Montreal you approach your own resources, - and establish between you and them an easy and an expeditious - intercourse; at Montreal you occupy a point which must be gained - in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and - which, if seized now, will save one campaign; at Montreal you hold - a position which completely severs the enemy’s line of operations, - which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him, - and which while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all - above itself.” - -As Armstrong veered toward Montreal Wilkinson turned decidedly toward -Kingston, and wrote the same day to the secretary a letter[239] of -remonstrance, closing by a significant remark:-- - - “Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal - to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which - by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is necessary to my - justification that you should by the authority of the President - direct the operations of the army under my command particularly - against Montreal.” - -The hint was strong that Wilkinson believed Armstrong to be trying to -evade responsibility, as Armstrong believed Wilkinson to be trying -to shirk it. Both insinuations were probably well-founded; neither -Armstrong nor Wilkinson expected to capture Kingston, and still -less Montreal. Wilkinson plainly said as much at the time. “I speak -conjecturally,” he wrote; “but should we surmount every obstacle in -descending the river we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the -force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, -the army must surrender at discretion.” Armstrong’s conduct was more -extraordinary than Wilkinson’s, and could not be believed except on his -own evidence. He not only looked for no capture of Montreal, but before -writing his letter of October 19 to Wilkinson, he had given orders for -preparing winter quarters for the army sixty or eighty miles above -Montreal, and did this without informing Wilkinson. In later years he -wrote:[240]-- - - “Suspecting early in October, from the lateness of the season, - the inclemency of the weather, and the continued indisposition of - the commanding general, that the campaign then in progress would - terminate as it did,--‘with the disgrace of doing nothing, but - without any material diminution of physical power,’--the Secretary - of War, then at Sackett’s Harbor, hastened to direct Major-General - Hampton to employ a brigade of militia attached to his command, in - constructing as many huts as would be sufficient to cover an army - of ten thousand men during the winter.” - -The order dated October 16 and addressed to the -quartermaster-general,[241] prescribed the cantonment of ten thousand -men within the limits of Canada, and plainly indicated the secretary’s -expectation that the army could not reach Montreal. In other ways -Armstrong showed the same belief more openly. - -All the available troops on or near Lake Ontario were concentrated at -Sackett’s Harbor about the middle of October, and did not exceed seven -thousand effectives, or eight thousand men.[242] “I calculate on six -thousand combatants,” wrote Wilkinson after starting,[243] “exclusive -of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season.” -The army was divided into four brigades under Generals Boyd, Swartwout, -Jacob Brown, and Covington,--the latter a Maryland man, forty-five -years old, who entered the service in 1809 as lieutenant-colonel -of dragoons. The brigades of Boyd and Covington formed a division -commanded by Major-General Morgan Lewis. The second division was -intended for Major-General Hampton; a reserve under Colonel Macomb, and -a park of artillery under Brigadier-General Moses Porter, completed the -organization.[244] - -The men were embarked in bateaux, October 17, at Henderson’s Bay, to -the westward of Sackett’s Harbor. The weather had been excessively -stormy, and continued so. The first resting-point to be reached was -Grenadier Island at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, only sixteen -or eighteen miles from the starting-point; but the bateaux were -dispersed by heavy gales of wind, October 18, 19, and 20, and the last -detachments did not reach Grenadier Island until November 3. “All our -hopes have been nearly blasted,” wrote Wilkinson October 24; but at -length, November 5, the expedition, numbering nearly three hundred -boats, having safely entered the river, began the descent from French -Creek. That day they moved forty miles, and halted about midnight -six miles above Ogdensburg. The next day was consumed in running -the flotilla past Ogdensburg under the fire of the British guns at -Prescott. The boats floated down by night and the troops marched by -land. November 7 the army halted at the White House, about twenty miles -below Ogdensburg. There Wilkinson called a council of war, November 8, -to consider whether the expedition should proceed. Lewis, Boyd, Brown, -and Swartwout voted simply in favor of attacking Montreal. Covington -and Porter were of the opinion “that we proceed from this place under -great danger, ... but ... we know of no other alternative.”[245] - -More than any other cause, Armstrong’s conduct warranted Wilkinson -in considering the campaign at an end. If the attack on Montreal was -seriously intended, every motive required Armstrong to join Hampton -at once in advance of Wilkinson’s expedition. No one knew so well as -he the necessity of some authority to interpose between the tempers -and pretensions of these two men in case a joint campaign were to be -attempted, or to enforce co-operation on either side. Good faith toward -Hampton, even more than toward Wilkinson, required that the secretary -who had led them into such a situation should not desert them. Yet -Armstrong, after waiting till Wilkinson was fairly at Grenadier -Island, began to prepare for return to Washington. From the village -of Antwerp, half way between Sackett’s Harbor and Ogdensburg, the -secretary wrote to Wilkinson, October 27, “Should my fever continue I -shall not be able to approach you as I intended.”[246] Three days later -he wrote again from Denmark on the road to Albany,-- - - “I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to - enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I - should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a - considerable degree of illness admonished me against receding - farther from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st - proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at - Antwerp.”[247] - -From Albany Armstrong wrote, November 12, for the last time, “in the -fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal,”[248] that he had sent -orders to Hampton to effect a junction with the river expedition. Such -letters and orders, whatever Armstrong meant by them, were certain to -impress both Wilkinson and Hampton with a conviction that the secretary -intended to throw upon them the whole responsibility for the failure of -an expedition which he as well as they knew to be hopeless. - -Doubtless a vigorous general might still have found means if not to -take Montreal, at least to compel the British to evacuate Upper Canada; -but Wilkinson was naturally a weak man, and during the descent of the -river he was excessively ill, never able to make a great exertion. -Every day his difficulties increased. Hardly had his flotilla begun -its descent, when a number of British gunboats commanded by Captain -Mulcaster, the most energetic officer in the British naval service -on the Lake, slipping through Chauncey’s blockade, appeared in -Wilkinson’s rear, and caused him much annoyance. Eight hundred British -rank-and-file from Kingston and Prescott were with Mulcaster, and at -every narrow pass of the river, musketry and artillery began to open -on Wilkinson from the British bank. Progress became slow. November 7, -Macomb was landed on the north bank with twelve hundred men to clear -away these obstructions.[249] The day and night of November 8 were -consumed at the White House in passing troops across the river. Brown’s -brigade was landed on the north shore to reinforce Macomb. The boats -were delayed to keep pace with Brown’s march on shore, and made but -eleven miles November 9, and the next day, November 10, fell down only -to the Long Saut, a continuous rapid eight miles in length. The enemy -pressed close, and while Brown marched in advance to clear the bank -along the rapid, Boyd was ordered to take all the other troops and -protect the rear. - -The flotilla stopped on the night of November 10 near a farm called -Chrystler’s on the British bank; and the next morning, November 11, -at half-past ten o’clock Brown having announced that all was clear -below, Wilkinson was about to order the flotilla to run the rapids when -General Boyd sent word that the enemy in the rear were advancing in -column. Wilkinson was on his boat, unable to leave his bed;[250] Morgan -Lewis was in no better condition; and Boyd was left to fight a battle -as he best could. Boyd never had the confidence of the army; Brown was -said to have threatened to resign rather than serve under him,[251] and -Winfield Scott, who was that day with Macomb and Brown in the advance, -described[252] Boyd as amiable and respectable in a subordinate -position, but “vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief -under high responsibilities.” - -The opportunity to capture or destroy Mulcaster and his eight hundred -men was brilliant, and warranted Wilkinson in turning back his whole -force to accomplish it. Boyd actually employed three brigades, and -made an obstinate but not united or well-supported attempt to crush -the enemy. Colonel Ripley with the Twenty-first regiment drove in the -British skirmishers, and at half-past two o’clock the battle became -general. At half-past four, after a stubborn engagement, General -Covington was killed; his brigade gave way, and the whole American line -fell back, beaten and almost routed. - -This defeat was the least creditable of the disasters suffered by -American arms during the war. No excuse or palliation was ever offered -for it.[253] The American army consisted wholly of regulars, and all -the generals belonged to the regular service. Wilkinson could hardly -have had less than three thousand men with him, after allowing for -his detachments, and was alone to blame if he had not more. Boyd, -according to his own account, had more than twelve hundred men and two -field-pieces under his immediate command on shore.[254] The reserve, -under Colonel Upham of the Eleventh regiment, contained six hundred -rank-and-file,[255] with four field-pieces. Wilkinson’s official report -admitted that eighteen hundred rank-and-file were engaged; Colonel -Walbach, his adjutant-general, admitted two thousand,[256] while -Swartwout thought that twenty-one hundred were in action. The American -force was certainly not less than two thousand, with six field-pieces. - -The British force officially reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison -of the Eighty-ninth regiment, who was in command, consisted of eight -hundred rank-and-file, and thirty Indians. The rank-and-file consisted -of three hundred and forty-two men of the Forty-ninth regiment, about -as many more of the Eighty-ninth, and some Canadian troops. They had -three six-pound field-pieces, and were supported on their right flank -by gunboats.[257] - -On the American side the battle was ill fought both by the generals -and by the men. Wilkinson and Morgan Lewis, the two major-generals, -who were ill on their boats, never gave an order. Boyd, who -commanded, brought his troops into action by detachments, and the -men, on meeting unexpected resistance, broke and fled. The defeat -was bloody as well as mortifying. Wilkinson reported one hundred and -two killed, and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, but strangely -reported no missing,[258] although the British occupied the field of -battle, and claimed upward of one hundred prisoners.[259] Morrison -reported twenty-two killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and -twelve missing. The American loss was twice that of the British, -and Wilkinson’s reports were so little to be trusted that the loss -might well have been greater than he represented it. The story had no -redeeming incident. - -If three brigades, numbering two thousand men, were beaten at -Chrystler’s farm by eight hundred British and Canadians, the chance -that Wilkinson could capture Montreal, even with ten thousand men, was -small. The conduct of the army showed its want of self-confidence. Late -as it was, in the dusk of the evening Boyd hastened to escape across -the river. “The troops being much exhausted,” reported Wilkinson,[260] -“it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that -the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation -took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the -flotilla made a harbor near the head of the Saut on the opposite -shore.” In truth, neither Wilkinson nor his adjutant gave the order -of embarkation,[261] nor was Boyd willing to admit it as his.[262] -Apparently the army by common consent embarked without orders. - -Early the next morning, November 12, the flotilla ran the rapids and -rejoined Brown and Macomb near Cornwall, where Wilkinson learned that -General Hampton had taken the responsibility of putting an end to an -undertaking which had not yet entered upon its serious difficulties. - -Four months had passed since Hampton took command on Lake Champlain. -When he first reached Burlington, July 3, neither men nor material -were ready, nor was even a naval force present to cover his weakness. -While he was camped at Burlington, a British fleet, with about a -thousand regulars, entered the Lake from the Isle aux Noix and the -Richelieu River, and plundered the American magazines at Plattsburg, -July 31, sweeping the Lake clear of American shipping.[263] Neither -Hampton’s army nor McDonough’s small fleet ventured to offer -resistance. Six weeks afterward, in the middle of September, Hampton -had but about four thousand men, in bad condition and poor discipline. - -Wilkinson, though unable to begin his own movement, was earnest that -Hampton should advance on Montreal.[264] Apparently in order to assist -Wilkinson’s plans, Hampton moved his force, September 19, to the Canada -line. Finding that a drought had caused want of water on the direct -road to Montreal, Hampton decided to march his army westward to the -Chateaugay River, forty or fifty miles, and established himself there, -September 26, in a position equally threatening to Montreal and to the -British line of communication up the St. Lawrence. Armstrong approved -the movement,[265] and Hampton remained three weeks at Chateaugay, -building roads and opening lines of communication while waiting for -Wilkinson to move. - -October 16 Armstrong ordered Hampton, in view of Wilkinson’s probable -descent of the river, to “approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or -other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy -in check.”[266] Hampton instantly obeyed, and moved down the Chateaugay -to a point about fifteen miles from its mouth. There he established -his army, October 22, and employed the next two days in completing his -road, and getting up his artillery and stores. - -Hampton’s movements annoyed the British authorities at Montreal. Even -while he was still within American territory, before he advanced from -Chateaugay Four Corners, Sir George Prevost reported, October 8, to his -government,[267]-- - - “The position of Major-General Hampton at the Four Corners on the - Chateaugay River, and which he continued to occupy, either with the - whole or a part of his force, from the latest information I have - been able to obtain from thence, is highly judicious,--as at the - same time that he threatens Montreal and obliges me to concentrate - a considerable body of troops in this vicinity to protect it, he - has it in his power to molest the communication with the Upper - Province, and impede the progress of the supplies required there - for the Navy and Army.” - -If this was the case, October 8, when Hampton was still at Chateaugay, -fifty miles from its mouth, the annoyance must have been much greater -when he advanced, October 21, to Spear’s, within ten miles of the St. -Lawrence on his left, and fifteen from the mouth of the Chateaugay. -Hampton accomplished more than was expected. He held a position equally -well adapted to threaten Montreal, to disturb British communication -with Upper Canada, and to succor Wilkinson. - -That Hampton, with only four thousand men, should do more than this, -could not fairly be required. The defences of Montreal were such as -required ten times his force to overcome. The regular troops defending -Montreal were not stationed in the town itself, which was sufficiently -protected by a broad river and rapids. They were chiefly at Chambly, -St. John’s, Isle aux Noix, or other points on the Richelieu River, -guarding the most dangerous line of approach from Lake Champlain; or -they were at Coteau du Lac on the St. Lawrence about twenty miles -northwest of Hampton’s position. According to the general weekly return -of British forces serving in the Montreal District under command -of Major-General Sir R. H. Sheaffe, Sept. 15, 1813, the aggregate -rank-and-file present for duty was five thousand seven hundred and -fifty-two. At Montreal were none but sick, with the general staff. -At Chambly were nearly thirteen hundred effectives; at St. John’s -nearly eight hundred; at Isle aux Noix about nine hundred. Excluding -the garrison at Prescott, and including the force at Coteau du Lac, -Major-General Sheaffe commanded just five thousand effectives.[268] - -Besides the enrolled troops, Prevost could muster a considerable number -of sailors and marines for the defence of Montreal; and his resources -in artillery, boats, fortifications, and supplies of all sorts were -ample. In addition to the embodied troops, Prevost could count upon -the militia, a force almost as good as regulars for the defence of -a forest-clad country where axes were as effective as musketry in -stopping an invading army. In Prevost’s letter to Bathurst of October -8, announcing Hampton’s invasion, the governor-general said:-- - - “Measures had been in the mean time taken by Major-General Sir - Roger Sheaffe commanding in this district, to resist the advance - of the enemy by moving the whole of the troops under his command - nearer to the frontier line, and by calling out about three - thousand of the sedentary militia. I thought it necessary to - increase this latter force to nearly eight thousand by embodying - the whole of the sedentary militia upon the frontier, this being in - addition to the six battalions of incorporated militia amounting to - five thousand men; and it is with peculiar satisfaction I have to - report to your Lordship that his Majesty’s Canadian subjects have a - second time answered the call to arms in defence of their country - with a zeal and alacrity beyond all praise.” - -Thus the most moderate estimate of the British force about Montreal -gave at least fifteen thousand rank-and-file under arms.[269] Besides -this large array of men, Prevost was amply protected by natural -defences. If Hampton had reached the St. Lawrence at Caughnawaga, he -would still have been obliged to cross the St. Lawrence, more than -two miles wide, under the fire of British batteries and gunboats. -Hampton had no transports. Prevost had bateaux and vessels of every -description, armed and unarmed, above and below the rapids, besides two -river steamers constantly plying to Quebec. - -Hampton’s command consisted of four thousand infantry new to service, -two hundred dragoons, and artillery.[270] With such a force, his chance -of suffering a fatal reverse was much greater than that of his reaching -the St. Lawrence. His position at the Chateaugay was not less perilous -than that of Harrison on the Maumee, and far more so than that which -cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara. - -The British force in Hampton’s immediate front consisted at first of -only three hundred militia, who could make no resistance, and retired -as Hampton advanced. When Hampton made his movement to Spear’s, -Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry in his front commanded about eight -hundred men, and immediately entrenched himself and obstructed the -road with abattis.[271] Hampton felt the necessity of dislodging -Salaberry, who might at any moment be reinforced; and accordingly, -in the night of October 25, sent a strong force to flank Salaberry’s -position, while he should himself attack it in front. - -The flanking party failed to find its way, and the attack in front -was not pressed.[272] The American loss did not exceed fifty men. -The British loss was reported as twenty-five. Sir George Prevost and -his officers were greatly pleased by their success;[273] but Prevost -did not attempt to molest Hampton, who fell back by slow marches to -Chateaugay, where he waited to hear from the Government. The British -generals at Montreal showed little energy in thus allowing Hampton to -escape; and the timidity of their attitude before Hampton’s little army -was the best proof of the incompetence alleged against Prevost by many -of his contemporaries. - -Hampton’s retreat was due more to the conduct of Armstrong than to the -check at Spear’s or to the movements of Prevost. At the moment when he -moved against Salaberry, October 25, a messenger arrived from Sackett’s -Harbor, bringing instructions from the quartermaster-general for -building huts for ten thousand men for winter quarters. These orders -naturally roused Hampton’s suspicions that no serious movement against -Montreal was intended. - - “The papers sunk my hopes,” he wrote to Armstrong, November 1,[274] - “and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support - that had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, - but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it - impracticable.” - -In a separate letter of the same date[275] which Hampton sent to -Armstrong by Colonel King, assuming that the campaign was at an end, -he carried out his declared purpose of resigning. “Events,” he said, -“have had no tendency to change my opinion of the destiny intended for -me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can neither -feel security nor expect honor. The campaign I consider substantially -at an end.” The implication that Armstrong meant to sacrifice him was -certainly disrespectful, and deserved punishment; but when Colonel -King, bearing these letters, arrived in the neighborhood of Ogdensburg, -he found that Armstrong had already done what Hampton reproached him -for intending to do. He had retired to Albany, “suspecting ... that the -campaign ... would terminate as it did.” - -A week afterward, November 8, Hampton received a letter from -Wilkinson, written from Ogdensburg, asking him to forward supplies and -march his troops to some point of junction on the river below St. -Regis.[276] Hampton replied from Chateaugay that he had no supplies -to forward; and as, under such circumstances, his army could not -throw itself on Wilkinson’s scanty means, he should fall back on -Plattsburg, and attempt to act against the enemy on some other road -to be indicated.[277] Wilkinson received the letter on his arrival at -Cornwall, November 12, the day after his defeat at Chrystler’s farm; -and with extraordinary energy moved the whole expedition the next day -to French Mills, six or seven miles up the Salmon River, within the -United States lines, where it went into winter quarters. - -Armstrong and Wilkinson made common cause in throwing upon Hampton -the blame of failure. Wilkinson at first ordered Hampton under -arrest, but after reflection decided to throw the responsibility upon -Armstrong.[278] The secretary declined to accept it, but consented -after some delay to accept Hampton’s resignation when renewed in -March, 1814. Wilkinson declared that Hampton’s conduct had blasted his -dawning hopes and the honor of the army.[279] Armstrong sneered at -Wilkinson for seizing the pretext for abandoning his campaign.[280] -Both the generals believed that Armstrong had deliberately led them -into an impossible undertaking, and deserted them, in order to shift -the blame of failure from himself.[281] Hampton behaved with dignity, -and allowed his opinion to be seen only in his contemptuous silence; -nor did Armstrong publicly blame Hampton’s conduct until Hampton was -dead. The only happy result of the campaign was to remove all the older -generals--Wilkinson, Hampton, and Morgan Lewis--from active service. - -The bloodless failure of an enterprise which might have ended in -extreme disaster was not the whole cost of Armstrong’s and Wilkinson’s -friendship and quarrels. In November nearly all the regular forces, -both British and American, had been drawn toward the St. Lawrence. Even -Harrison and his troops, who reached Buffalo October 24, were sent to -Sackett’s Harbor, November 16, to protect the navy. Not a regiment of -the United States army was to be seen between Sackett’s Harbor and -Detroit. The village of Niagara and Fort George on the British side -were held by a few hundred volunteers commanded by Brigadier-General -McClure of the New York militia. As long as Wilkinson and Hampton -threatened Montreal, Niagara was safe, and needed no further attention. - -After November 13, when Wilkinson and Hampton withdrew from Canada, -while the American army forgot its enemy in the bitterness of its own -personal feuds, the British generals naturally thought of recovering -their lost posts on the Niagara River. McClure, who occupied Fort -George and the small town of Newark under its guns, saw his garrison -constantly diminishing. Volunteers refused to serve longer on any -conditions.[282] The War Department ordered no reinforcements, -although ten or twelve thousand soldiers were lying idle at French -Mills and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about sixty men of the -Twenty-fourth infantry, and some forty volunteers, at Fort George, -while the number of United States troops present for duty at Fort -George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village, Black Rock, and Buffalo, to -protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or -three hundred and twenty-four men. - -As early as October 4, Armstrong authorized McClure to warn the -inhabitants of Newark that their town might suffer destruction in case -the defence of Fort George should render such a measure proper.[283] -No other orders were given, but Wilkinson repeatedly advised that Fort -George should be evacuated,[284] and Armstrong did nothing to protect -it, further than to issue a requisition from Albany, November 25, upon -the Governor of New York for one thousand militia.[285] - -The British, though not rapid in their movements, were not so slow as -the Americans. Early in December Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond -came from Kingston to York, and from York to the head of the Lake where -the British had maintained themselves since losing the Niagara posts -in May. Meanwhile General Vincent had sent Colonel Murray with five -hundred men to retake Fort George. McClure at Fort George, December -10, hearing that Murray had approached within ten miles, evacuated the -post and crossed the river to Fort Niagara; but before doing so he -burned the town of Newark and as much as he could of Queenston, turning -the inhabitants, in extreme cold, into the open air. He alleged as -his motive the wish to deprive the enemy of winter quarters;[286] yet -he did not destroy the tents or military barracks,[287] and he acted -without authority, for Armstrong Had authorized him to burn Newark only -in case he meant to defend Fort George. - - “The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a descent on this - frontier if possible,” wrote McClure from the village of Niagara, - December 13; “but I shall watch them close with my handful of men - until a reinforcement of militia and volunteers arrives.... I am - not a little apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of - the exposed condition of Buffalo and our shipping there. My whole - effective force on this extensive frontier does not exceed two - hundred and fifty men.” - -Five days passed, and still no reinforcements arrived, and no regular -troops were even ordered to start for Niagara. “I apprehended an -attack,” wrote McClure;[288] and he retired thirty miles to Buffalo, -“with a view of providing for the defence.” On the night of December -18 Colonel Murray, with five hundred and fifty regular rank-and-file, -crossed the river from Fort George unperceived; surprised the sentinels -on the glacis and at the gates of Fort Niagara; rushed through the main -gate; and, with a loss of eight men killed and wounded, captured the -fortress with some three hundred and fifty prisoners. - -Nothing could be said on the American side in defence or excuse -of this disgrace. From Armstrong at the War Department to Captain -Leonard who commanded the fort, every one concerned in the transaction -deserved whatever punishment the law or army regulations could -inflict. The unfortunate people of Niagara and Buffalo were victims -to official misconduct. The British, thinking themselves released -from ordinary rules of war by the burning of Newark and Queenston, -showed unusual ferocity. In the assault on Fort Niagara they killed -sixty-seven Americans, all by the bayonet, while they wounded only -eleven. Immediately afterward they “let loose”[289] their auxiliary -Indians on Lewiston and the country around. On the night of December -29, Lieutenant-General Drummond sent a force of fifteen hundred men -including Indians[290] across the river above the falls, and driving -away the militia, burned Black Rock and Buffalo with all their public -stores and three small war-schooners.[291] - -These acts of retaliation were justified by Sir George Prevost in a -long proclamation[292] dated Jan. 12, 1814, which promised that he -would not “pursue further a system of warfare so revolting to his own -feelings and so little congenial to the British character unless the -future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to -it.” The Americans themselves bore Drummond’s excessive severity with -less complaint than usual. They partly suspected that the destruction -effected on the Thames, at York and at Newark, by American troops, -though unauthorized by orders, had warranted some retaliation; but they -felt more strongly that their anger should properly be vented on their -own government and themselves, who had allowed a handful of British -troops to capture a strong fortress and to ravage thirty miles of -frontier, after repeated warning, without losing two hundred men on -either side, while thousands of regular troops were idle elsewhere, and -the neighborhood ought without an effort to have supplied five thousand -militia. - -Fort Niagara, which thus fell into British hands, remained, like -Mackinaw, in the enemy’s possession until the peace. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -MILITARY movements in the Southern department attracted little notice, -but were not the less important. The Southern people entered into -the war in the hope of obtaining the Floridas. President Madison, -like President Jefferson, gave all the support in his power to the -scheme. Throughout the year 1812 United States troops still occupied -Amelia Island and the St. Mary’s River, notwithstanding the refusal of -Congress to authorize the occupation. The President expected Congress -at the session of 1812–1813 to approve the seizure of both Floridas, -and took measures in advance for that purpose. - -October 12, 1812, Secretary Eustis wrote to the Governor of Tennessee -calling out fifteen hundred militia for the defence of the “lower -country.” The force was not intended for defence but for conquest; it -was to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine by -the regular troops. For that object every man in Tennessee was ready -to serve; and of all Tennesseeans, Andrew Jackson was the most ardent. -Governor Blount immediately authorized Jackson, as major-general of -the State militia, to call out two thousand volunteers. The call was -issued November 14; the volunteers collected at Nashville December 10; -and Jan. 7, 1813, the infantry embarked in boats to descend the river, -while the mounted men rode through the Indian country to Natchez. - - “I have the pleasure to inform you,” wrote Jackson to Eustis in - departing,[293] “that I am now at the head of two thousand and - seventy volunteers, the choicest of our citizens, who go at the - call of their country to execute the will of the Government; who - have no Constitutional scruples, and if the Government orders, will - rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the - ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine.” - -The Tennessee army reached Natchez, February 15, and went into camp to -wait orders from Washington, which were expected to direct an advance -on Mobile and Pensacola. - -While Jackson descended the Mississippi, Monroe, then acting Secretary -of War, wrote, January 13, to Major-General Pinckney,[294] whose -military department included Georgia: “It is intended to place under -your command an adequate force for the reduction of St. Augustine -should it be decided on by Congress, before whom the subject will be -in a few days.” A fortnight later, January 30, Monroe wrote also to -Wilkinson,[295] then commanding at New Orleans: “The subject of taking -possession of West Florida is now before Congress, and will probably -pass. You will be prepared to carry into effect this measure should it -be decided on.” - -Neither Madison nor Monroe raised objection to the seizure of territory -belonging to a friendly power; but Congress showed no such readiness -to act. Senator Anderson of Tennessee, as early as Dec. 10, 1812, -moved,[296] in secret session of the Senate, that a committee be -appointed to consider the expediency of authorizing the President -“to occupy and hold the whole or any part of East Florida, including -Amelia Island, and also those parts of West Florida which are not now -in the possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States.” -After much debate the Senate, December 22, adopted the resolution by -eighteen votes to twelve, and the committee, consisting of Anderson, -Samuel Smith, Tait of Georgia, Varnum of Massachusetts, and Goodrich -of Connecticut, reported a bill,[297] January 19, authorizing the -President to occupy both Floridas, and to exercise government there, -“provided ... that the section of country herein designated that is -situated to the eastward of the river Perdido may be the subject of -future negotiation.” - -The bill met opposition from the President’s personal enemies, Giles, -Leib, and Samuel Smith, as well as from the Federalists and some of -the Northern Democrats. January 26, Samuel Smith moved to strike -out the second section, which authorized the seizure of Florida east -of the Perdido; and the Senate, February 2, by a vote of nineteen -to sixteen, adopted Smith’s motion. The vote was sectional. North -and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana supported the -bill; Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and -Rhode Island opposed it; Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Massachusetts, New -Hampshire, and Vermont were divided; New Jersey threw one vote in its -favor, the second senator being absent. Had Leib not changed sides the -next day, the whole bill would have been indefinitely postponed; but -the majority rallied, February 5, and by a vote of twenty-one to eleven -authorized the President to seize Florida west of the Perdido, or, in -other words, to occupy Mobile. The House passed the bill in secret -session February 9, and the President signed it February 12.[298] - -In refusing to seize East Florida, the Senate greatly disarranged -Madison’s plans. Three days afterward, February 5, Armstrong took -charge of the War Department, and his first orders were sent to Andrew -Jackson directing him to dismiss his force, “the causes of embodying -and marching to New Orleans the corps under your command having ceased -to exist.”[299] Jackson, ignorant that the Administration was not to -blame, and indignant at his curt dismissal, marched his men back to -Tennessee, making himself responsible for their pay and rations. On -learning these circumstances, Armstrong wrote, March 22, a friendly -letter thanking him for the important services his corps would have -rendered “had the Executive policy of occupying the two Floridas been -adopted by the national legislature.”[300] - -After the Senate had so persistently refused to support Madison’s -occupation of East Florida, he could hardly maintain longer the illegal -possession he had held during the past year of Amelia Island. February -15, Armstrong wrote to Major-General Pinckney,[301] “The late private -proceedings of Congress have resulted in a decision not to invade -East Florida at present;” but not until March 7, did the secretary -order Pinckney to withdraw the troops from Amelia Island and Spanish -territory.[302] - -The troops were accordingly withdrawn from Amelia Island, May 16; -but nothing could restore East Florida to its former repose, and the -anarchy which had been introduced from the United States could never -be mastered except by the power that created it. Perhaps Madison -would have retained possession, as the least of evils, in spite of -the Senate’s vote of February 3, had not another cause, independent -of legislative will, overcome his repugnance to the evacuation. The -Russian offer of mediation arrived while the President was still in -doubt. The occupation of Florida, being an act of war against Spain, -could not fail to excite the anger of England, and in that feeling of -displeasure the Czar must inevitably share. From the moment their cause -against Napoleon was common, Russia, England, and Spain were more than -likely to act together in resistance to any territorial aggression upon -any member of their alliance, the evacuation of East Florida by the -United States evaded a serious diplomatic difficulty; and probably not -by mere coincidence, Armstrong’s order to evacuate Amelia Island was -dated March 7, while Daschkoff’s letter offering the Czar’s mediation -was dated March 8. - -The Cabinet was so little united in support of the Executive policy -that Madison and Monroe ordered the seizure of Mobile without -consulting Gallatin, whose persistent hostility to the Florida -intrigues was notorious. When Monroe in April gave to Gallatin and -Bayard the President’s instructions[303] for the peace negotiations, -among the rest he directed them to assert “a right to West Florida -by cession from France, and a claim to East Florida as an indemnity -for spoliations.” On receiving these instructions, Gallatin wrote to -Monroe, May 2, asking,[304]-- - - “Where is the importance of taking possession of Mobile this - summer? We may do this whenever we please, and is it not better to - delay every operation of minor importance which may have a tendency - to impede our negotiations with Great Britain and Russia? You know - that to take by force any place in possession of another nation, - whatever our claim to that place may be, is war; and you must be - aware that both Russia and Great Britain will feel disposed, if not - to support the pretensions of Spain against us, at least to take - part against the aggressor.” - -Monroe quickly replied:[305] “With respect to West Florida, possession -will be taken of it before you get far on your voyage. That is a -question settled.” In fact, possession had been taken of it three weeks -before he wrote, in pursuance of orders sent in February, apparently -without Gallatin’s knowledge. Monroe added views of his own, singularly -opposed to Gallatin’s convictions. - - “On the subject of East Florida,” wrote Monroe to Gallatin, May - 6,[306] “I think I intimated to you in my last that Colonel - Lear was under the most perfect conviction, on the authority of - information from respectable sources at Cadiz, that the Spanish - regency had sold that and the other province to the British - government, and that it had done so under a belief that we had, - or should soon get, possession of it. My firm belief is that if - we were possessed of both, it would facilitate your negotiations - in favor of impressment and every other object, especially if it - was distinctly seen by the British ministers or minister that, - instead of yielding them or any part of either, we would push our - fortunes in that direction, and in Canada, if they did not hasten - to accommodate.” - -Gallatin, on the eve of sailing for Russia, replied with good temper, -expressing opinions contrary to those of the President and Secretary of -State. - - “On the subject of Florida,” Gallatin said,[307] “I have always - differed in opinion with you, and am rejoiced to have it in our - power to announce the evacuation of the province. Let it alone - until you shall, by the introduction of British troops, have a - proof of the supposed cession. In this I do not believe. It can be - nothing more than a permission to occupy it in order to defend it - for Spain. By withdrawing our troops, we withdraw the pretence; - but the impolitic occupancy of Mobile will, I fear, renew our - difficulties. The object is at present of very minor importance, - swelled into consequence by the representations from that quarter, - and which I would not at this moment have attempted, among other - reasons, because it was a Southern one, and will, should it involve - us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of Washington. You - will pardon the freedom with which, on the eve of parting with you, - I speak on this subject. It is intended as a general caution, which - I think important, because I know and see every day the extent of - geographical feeling, and the necessity of prudence if we mean to - preserve and invigorate the Union.” - -No sooner did the Act of February 12 become law than Armstrong wrote, -February 16, to Wilkinson at New Orleans, enclosing a copy of the -Act, and ordering him immediately to take possession of Mobile and the -country as far as the Perdido.[308] Wilkinson, who had for years looked -forward to that step, hastened to obey the instruction. When Gallatin -remonstrated, the measure had been already taken and could not be -recalled. - -Since July 9, 1812, Wilkinson had again commanded at New Orleans. No -immediate attack was to be feared, nor could a competent British force -be collected there without warning; but in case such an attack should -be made, Wilkinson had reason to fear the result, for his regular -force consisted of only sixteen hundred effectives, ill equipped -and without defences.[309] The War Department ordered him to depend -on movable ordnance and temporary works rather than on permanent -fortifications;[310] but with his usual disregard of orders he began -the construction or the completion of extensive works at various points -on the river and coast, at a cost which the government could ill afford. - -While engaged in this task Wilkinson received, March 14, Armstrong’s -order of February 16 for the invasion of West Florida. When the -government’s orders were agreeable to Wilkinson, they reached him -promptly and were executed with rapidity. Within three weeks he -collected at Pass Christian a force of about six hundred men, supported -by gunboats, and entered the Bay of Mobile on the night of April 10, -while at the same time the garrison at Fort Stoddert descended the -Tensaw River, and cut the communication by land between Mobile and -Pensacola. At that time Mobile Point was undefended. The only Spanish -fortress was Fort Charlotte at Mobile, garrisoned by one hundred and -fifty combatants. Wilkinson summoned the fort to surrender, and the -commandant had no choice but to obey, for the place was untenable and -without supplies. The surrender took place April 15. Wilkinson then -took possession of the country as far as the Perdido, and began the -construction of a fort, to be called Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point at -the entrance of the Bay, some sixty miles below the town.[311] - -This conquest, the only permanent gain of territory made during the -war, being effected without bloodshed, attracted less attention than it -deserved. Wilkinson committed no errors, and won the President’s warm -approval.[312] Wilkinson was greatly pleased by his own success, and -wished to remain at New Orleans to carry out his projected defences; -but Armstrong had written as early as March 10, ordering him to the -Lakes. As so often happened with orders that displeased the general, -Armstrong’s letter, though dated March 10, and doubtless arriving -in New Orleans before April 10, was received by Wilkinson only on -his return, May 19. After another delay of three weeks, he started -northward, and travelled by way of Mobile through the Creek country to -Washington. - -Wilkinson’s departure, June 10, and the evacuation of Amelia Island -by General Pinckney May 16, closed the first chapter of the war in -the South. Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson, May 27:[313] “The mission -to Petersburg and the instructions to our envoys will put a barrier -between you and Pensacola for some time to come at least, and -permanently in case of peace.” The sudden stop thus put by the Senate -and the Russian mediation to the campaign against Pensacola and St. -Augustine deranged the plans of Georgia and Tennessee, arrested the -career of Andrew Jackson, and caused the transfer of Wilkinson from New -Orleans to the Lakes. The government expected no other difficulties in -the Southern country, and had no reason to fear them. If new perils -suddenly arose, they were due less to England, Spain, or the United -States than to the chance that gave energy and influence to Tecumthe. - -[Illustration: - - MAP OF THE - - Seat of War among the - Creek Indians. - - _From the Original Drawing_ - IN THE - WAR DEPARTMENT. - - PUBLISHED BY JOHN MELISH, - 1815. -] - -The Southern Indians were more docile and less warlike than the Indians -of the Lakes. The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who occupied the whole -extent of country on the east bank of the Mississippi River from -the Ohio to the Gulf, gave little trouble or anxiety; and even the -great confederacy of Muskogees, or Creeks, who occupied the territory -afterward called the State of Alabama and part of Georgia, fell in some -degree into a mode of life which seemed likely to make them tillers -of the soil. In 1800 the Creeks held, or claimed, about three hundred -miles square from the Tennessee River to the Gulf, and from the middle -of Georgia nearly to the line which afterward marked the State of -Mississippi. The Seminoles, or wild men, of Florida were a branch of -the Muskogees, and the Creek warriors themselves were in the habit of -visiting Pensacola and Mobile, where they expected to receive presents -from the Spanish governor. - -Two thirds of the Creek towns were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers -in the heart of Alabama. Their inhabitants were called Upper Creeks. -The Lower Creeks lived in towns on the Chattahooche River, the modern -boundary between Alabama and Georgia. The United States government, -following a different policy in 1799 from that of Jefferson toward -the Northwestern Indians, induced the Creeks to adopt a national -organization for police purposes; it also helped them to introduce -ploughs, to learn cotton-spinning, and to raise crops. The success of -these experiments was not at first great, for the larger number of -Indians saw no advantage in becoming laborers, and preferred sitting -in the squares of the towns, or hunting; but here and there chiefs or -half-breeds had farms, slaves, stock, orchards, and spinning-wheels. - -Large as the Creek country was, and wild as it had ever been, it did -not abound in game. A good hunter, passing in any direction through -the three hundred miles of Alabama and Georgia, found difficulty -in obtaining game enough for his support.[314] For that reason the -Seminoles left their old towns and became wild people, as their name -implied, making irregular settlements in Florida, where game and food -were more plenty. The mass of the Creek nation, fixed in the villages -in the interior, clung to their habits of hunting even when obliged to -cultivate the soil, and their semi-civilization rendered them a more -perplexing obstacle to the whites than though they had obstinately -resisted white influence. - -Had the Indian problem been left to the people of Georgia and -Tennessee, the Indians would soon have disappeared; but the national -government established under President Washington in 1789 put a sharp -curb on Georgia, and interposed decisively between the Georgians and -the Creeks.[315] President Washington in 1796 appointed Benjamin -Hawkins of North Carolina as Indian agent among the Creeks, and Hawkins -protected and governed them with devotion; but the result of his -friendliness was the same as that of others’ greed. The Indians slowly -lost ground. - -The Creeks complained of grievances similar to those of the -Northwestern Indians, and their position was even more helpless. -They had no other outlet than Pensacola and Mobile. Except from the -Spaniards they could expect no aid in case of trouble, and the Spanish -governors of Florida, after the abdication of Carlos IV. in 1807, could -scarcely maintain their own position, much less supply the Creeks with -arms or gunpowder. While the Northwestern Indians could buy at Malden -all the weapons and ammunition they wanted, the Creeks possessed few -firearms, and these in bad condition; nor were they skilful in using -guns. - -The United States government prevented the Georgians from compelling -the Indians to sell their lands, but nothing could prevent them from -trespass; and the Indian woods along the frontier were filled with -cattle, horses, and hogs belonging to the whites, while white men -destroyed the game, hunting the deer by firelight, and scaring the -Indian hunters from their hunting-grounds. “Every cane-swamp where they -go to look for a bear--which is part of their support--is near eat out -by the stocks put over by the citizens of Georgia.”[316] This complaint -was made in 1796, and as time went on the Indian hunting-grounds were -more rapidly narrowed. Not only from Georgia but also from Fort -Stoddert, along the course of the Tombigbee River, above Mobile, -intruders pressed into the Creek country. The Indians had no choice but -to sell their lands for annuities, and under this pressure the Creeks, -in 1802 and 1803, were induced to part with the district between the -Oconee and Ocmulgee in the centre of Georgia. They retained their towns -on the Chattahoochee, where Hawkins’s agency was established in the -town of Coweta, on the edge of the Creek country. - -Hawkins was satisfied with their behavior, and believed the chiefs -to be well disposed. They showed none of the restlessness which -characterized the Northwestern Indians, until Tecumthe conceived -the idea of bringing them into his general league to check the -encroachments of the whites. After Tecumthe’s interview with Governor -Harrison at Vincennes, in July, 1811, he made a long journey through -the Chickasaw and Choctaw country, and arrived among the Creeks in -October, bringing with him a score of Indian warriors. The annual -council of the Creeks was held in that month at the village of -Tuckaubatchee,--an ancient town of the Upper Creeks on the Tallapoosa. -The rumor that Tecumthe would be present brought great numbers of -Indians, even Cherokees and Choctaws, to the place, while Hawkins -attended the council in his character as agent. - -Tecumthe and his warriors marched into the centre of the square and -took their places in silence. That night “they danced the dance of the -Indians of the Lakes,” which became thenceforward a political symbol of -their party among the Creeks. Some nights afterward Tecumthe addressed -the council. Versions more or less untrustworthy have been given of the -speech;[317] but the only official allusion to it by a person entitled -to credit seemed to show that it was in substance the address made by -Tecumthe at Vincennes. Hawkins, recalling to the Creek chiefs in 1814 -the course of events which had caused their troubles, reminded them -how “Tecumseh, in the square of Tuckaubatchee, ... told the Creeks -not to do any injury to the Americans; to be in peace and friendship -with them; not to steal even a bell from any one of any color. Let the -white people on this continent manage their affairs their own way. Let -the red people manage their affairs their own way.”[318] Hawkins and -the old chiefs would have certainly interfered had Tecumthe incited -the Creeks to war or violence; but according to Hawkins the speech was -a pacific “talk,” delivered by Tecumthe in the name of the British. -Indian tradition preserved another form of Tecumthe’s rhetoric, which -seemed to complete the identity with the Vincennes address. Unable -to express himself in the Muskogee language, Tecumthe used pantomime -familiar to Indians. Holding his war-club with outstretched arm, he -opened first the little finger, then the next and the next, till the -club fell from his hand. - -Indian union was unquestionably the chief theme of all Tecumthe’s -public addresses. Whether in private he taught other doctrines must -be matter of surmise; but he certainly brought into the Creek nation -a religious fanaticism of a peculiar and dangerous kind. Prophets -soon appeared, chiefly among the Alabamas, a remnant of an ancient -race, not of Creek blood, but members of the Creek confederacy.[319] -The prophets, with the usual phenomena of hysteria, claimed powers -of magic, and promised to bring earthquakes to destroy an invading -army. They preached the total destruction of everything, animate and -inanimate, that pertained to civilization. As the nation generally was -badly armed, and relied chiefly on their bows, arrows, and war-clubs -for battle,[320] the moral support of magic was needed to give them -confidence. - -So secret was the influence of Tecumthe’s friends that no suspicion of -the excitement reached Hawkins even when the war with England began; -and the old chiefs of the nation--known to be devoted to peace and -to the white alliance--were kept in ignorance of all that was done -among the young warriors. The Alabamas, or Coosadas, lived below the -junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, on the west bank of the Alabama -River, about eight miles above the modern town of Montgomery; they -were considered by Hawkins the most industrious and best behaved of -all the Creeks, whose fields were the granaries of the upper towns and -furnished supplies even to Mobile. Their town was the last place in -which Hawkins expected to see conspiracy, violence, or fanaticism. The -young men “sang the song of the Indians of the Lakes, and danced the -dance” in secret for eighteen months after Tecumthe’s visit, without -public alarm, and probably would have continued to do so except for an -outbreak committed by some of their nation three hundred miles away. - -In 1812 a band of six Indians led by the Little Warrior of Wewocau, a -Creek town on the Coosa, was sent by the nation on a public mission to -the Chickasaws.[321] Instead of delivering their “talks” and returning, -they continued their journey to the northern Lakes and joined Tecumthe -at Malden. They took part in the massacre at the river Raisin, Jan. 22, -1813, and soon afterward began their return, bringing talks from the -Shawanese and British and also a letter from some British officer at -Malden to the Spanish officials at Pensacola, from whom they hoped to -obtain weapons and powder. According to common report, Tecumthe told -the Little Warrior that he was about to aid the British in capturing -Fort Meigs, and as soon as the fort was taken he would come to join the -Creeks.[322] Until then his friends were to increase their party by the -secret means and magic that had proved so successful, but were not to -begin open war.[323] - -The Little Warrior and his party, including a warrior from Tuskegee, -a Creek town at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, after crossing -Indiana in the month of February reached the north bank of the Ohio -River about seven miles above its mouth, where were two cabins occupied -by white families.[324] Unable to resist the temptation to spill blood, -the band murdered the two families with the usual Indian horrors. This -outrage was committed February 9; and the band, crossing the Ohio, -passed southward through the Chickasaw country, avowing the deed and -its motive.[325] - -The Little Warrior arrived at home about the middle of March, and -reported that he brought talks from the Shawanese and British. The -old chiefs of the Upper Creeks immediately held a council March 25, -and after listening to the talks, reprimanded the Little Warrior and -ordered him to leave the Council House.[326] On the same day Hawkins -wrote to them from Coweta, demanding delivery of the Little Warrior -and his six companions to answer for the murders they had committed. -On hearing this demand, the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee under the lead -of the Big Warrior held another council, while the Little Warrior, the -Tuskegee Warrior, and the murderers took to the woods. The old chiefs -in council decided to execute the murderers, and sent out parties to -do it. The Little Warrior was found in the swamp, well armed, but was -decoyed out and killed by treachery; “the first and second man’s gun -snapped at him, but the third man’s gun fired and killed; ... four men -that had on pouches kept them shaking following after him, so that he -could not hear the gun snap; if he had found out that, he would have -wounded a good many with his arrows.”[327] - -The Tuskegee warrior and four others were found in a house on the -Hickory Ground at the fork of the rivers. As long as they had -ammunition, they held the attack at a distance, but at last the house -was fired. The Tuskegee Warrior being wounded, was burned in the house, -while his two young brothers were taken out and tomahawked. One warrior -broke away, but was caught and killed; two more were killed elsewhere. -One escaped, and “set out the morning after to kill white people.” -Warriors were sent after him. - - “He made battle, firing at the warriors, and was near killing - one; the bullet passed near his ear. He then drew his knife and - tomahawk, defended himself, and the warriors shot three balls - through him. He fell, retained the power of speech till next day, - and died. He said he had been to the Shawanese helping of them, and - had got fat eating white people’s flesh. Every one to the very last - called on the Shawanese general, Tecumseh.”[328] - -Such political executions, in the stifled excitement of the moment, -could not but rouse violent emotion throughout the Creek nation. The -old chiefs, having given life for life, felt the stronger for their -assertion of authority; but they knew nothing of the true situation. -For several weeks no open outbreak occurred, but the prophets were more -active than ever. About June 4 the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee, hearing -that the prophets “kept as usual their fooleries,” sent a runner to the -Alabamas with a message:[329]-- - - “You are but a few Alabama people. You say that the Great Spirit - visits you frequently; that he comes in the sun and speaks to you; - that the sun comes down just above your heads. Now we want to see - and hear what you say you have seen and heard. Let us have the - same proof you have had, and we will believe what we see and hear. - You have nothing to fear; the people who committed murders have - suffered for their crimes, and there is an end of it.” - -The runner who carried this message was one of the warriors who had -aided in killing the seven murderers. The Alabamas instantly put him to -death, and sent his scalp to their friends at the forks of the river. -Then began a general uprising, and every warrior who had aided in -killing the murderers was himself killed or hunted from the Upper Creek -country. The chiefs of Tuckaubatchee with difficulty escaped to the -agency at Coweta, where they were under the protection of Georgia. - -The Lower Creek towns did not join the outbreak; but of the Upper -Creek towns twenty-nine declared for war, and only five for peace. At -least two thousand warriors were believed to have taken the war-club -by August 1, and got the name of Red Clubs, or Red Sticks, for that -reason. Everywhere they destroyed farms, stock, and all objects of -white civilization, and killed or drove away their opponents.[330] - -With all this the Spaniards had nothing to do. The outbreak was caused -by the Indian War in the Northwest, and immediately by the incompetence -of General Winchester and by the massacre at the river Raisin. The -Creeks were totally unprepared for war, except so far as they trusted -to magic; they had neither guns, powder, nor balls. For that reason -they turned to the Spaniards, who could alone supply them. When the -Little Warrior was put to death, the British letter which he carried -from Malden for the Spanish officials at Pensacola came into the -charge of another Creek warrior, Peter McQueen, a half-breed. In July, -McQueen, with a large party of warriors started for Pensacola, with the -letter and four hundred dollars, to get powder.[331] On arriving there -they saw the Spanish governor, who treated them civilly, and in fear -of violence gave them, according to McQueen’s account,[332] “a small -bag of powder each for ten towns, and five bullets to each man.” With -this supply, which the governor represented as a friendly present for -hunting purposes, they were obliged to content themselves, and started -on their return journey. - -News that McQueen’s party was at Pensacola instantly reached the -American settlements above Mobile, where the inhabitants were already -taking refuge in stockades.[333] A large number of Americans, without -military organization, under several leaders, one of whom was a -half-breed named Dixon Bailey, started July 26 to intercept McQueen, -and succeeded in surprising the Indians July 27 at a place called -Burnt Corn, about eighty miles north of Pensacola. The whites at first -routed the Indians, and captured the pack-mules with the ammunition; -but the Indians quickly rallied, and in their turn routed the whites, -with a loss of two killed and fifteen wounded,--although they failed to -recover the greater part of the pack-animals. With the small amount of -powder left to him, McQueen then returned to his people. - -Angry at the attack and eager to revenge the death of his warriors, -McQueen summoned the warriors of thirteen towns, some eight hundred -in number, and about August 20 started in search of his enemies. -The Creek war differed from that on the Lakes in being partly a war -of half-breeds. McQueen’s strongest ally was William Weatherford, a -half-breed, well known throughout the country as a man of property and -ability, as nearly civilized as Indian blood permitted, and equally at -home among Indians and whites. McQueen and Weatherford were bitterly -hostile to the half-breeds Bailey and Beasley, who were engaged in -the affair of Burnt Corn.[334] Both Beasley and Bailey were at a -stockade called Fort Mims, some thirty-five miles above Mobile, on -the eastern side of the Alabama River, where about five hundred and -fifty persons were collected,--a motley crowd of whites, half-breeds, -Indians, and negroes, old and young, women and children, protected -only by a picket wall, pierced by five hundred loop-holes three and a -half feet from the ground, and two rude gates.[335] Beasley commanded, -and wrote, August 80, that he could “maintain the post against any -number of Indians.”[336] To Fort Mims the Creek warriors turned, for -the reason that Beasley and Bailey were there, and they arrived in the -neighborhood, August 29, without giving alarm. Twice, negroes tending -cattle outside rushed back to the fort reporting that painted warriors -were hovering about; but the horsemen when sent out discovered no sign -of an enemy, and Beasley tied up and flogged the second negro for -giving a false alarm. - -At noon, August 30, when the drum beat for dinner no patrols were out, -the gates were open, and sand had drifted against that on the eastern -side so that it could not quickly be closed. Suddenly a swarm of -Indians raising the warwhoop rushed toward the fort. Beasley had time -to reach the gate, but could not close it, and was tomahawked on the -spot. The Indians got possession of the loop-holes outside, and of one -inclosure. The whites, under Dixon Bailey, held the inner inclosure and -fought with desperation; but at last the Indians succeeded in setting -fire to the house in the centre, and the fire spread to the whole -stockade. The Indians then effected an entrance, and massacred most -of the inmates. Fifteen persons escaped, and among these was Dixon -Bailey mortally wounded. Most of the negroes were spared to be slaves. -Two hundred and fifty scalps became trophies of the Creek warriors,--a -number such as had been seldom taken by Indians from the white people -on a single day. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - -THE battle at Burnt Corn was regarded by the Indians as a declaration -of war by the whites. Till then they seemed to consider themselves -engaged in a domestic quarrel, or civil war;[337] but after the -massacre at Fort Mims they could not retreat, and yet knew that they -must perish except for supernatural aid. Their destiny was controlled -by that of Tecumthe. Ten days after the massacre at Fort Mims, Perry -won his victory on Lake Erie, which settled the result of the Indian -wars both in the North and in the South. Tecumthe had expected to -capture Fort Meigs, and with it Fort Wayne and the line of the Maumee -and Wabash. On the impulse of this success he probably hoped to raise -the war-spirit among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, and then in person to -call the Creeks into the field. Proctor’s successive defeats blasted -Indian hopes, and the Creeks had hardly struck their first blow in -his support when Tecumthe himself fell, and the Indians of the Lakes -submitted or fled to Canada. - -At best, the Creek outbreak would have been hopeless. Although the -number of hostile Creek warriors was matter of conjecture, nothing -showed that they could exceed four thousand. At Pensacola, Peter -McQueen was said to have claimed forty-eight hundred “gun-men” on -his side.[338] At such a moment he probably exaggerated his numbers. -The Big Warrior, who led the peace party, estimated the hostile -Creeks, early in August, as numbering at least twenty-five hundred -warriors.[339] If the number of gun-men was four thousand, the number -of guns in their possession could scarcely be more than one thousand. -Not only had the Creeks few guns, and those in poor condition, but they -had little powder or lead, and no means of repairing their weapons. -Their guns commonly missed fire, and even after discharging them, -the Creeks seldom reloaded, but resorted to the bow-and-arrows which -they always carried. As warriors they felt their inferiority to the -Shawanese and Indians of the Lakes, while their position was more -desperate, for the Choctaws and Cherokees behind them refused to join -in their war. - -Four thousand warriors who had never seen a serious war even with -their Indian neighbors, and armed for the most part with clubs, or -bows-and-arrows, were not able to resist long the impact of three or -four armies, each nearly equal to their whole force, coming from every -quarter of the compass. On the other hand, the military difficulties -of conquering the Creeks were not trifling. The same obstacles that -stopped Harrison in Ohio, stopped Pinckney in Georgia. Pinckney, -like Harrison, could set in motion three columns of troops on three -converging lines, but he could not feed them or make roads for them. -The focus of Indian fanaticism was the Hickory Ground at the fork of -the Coosa and Tallapoosa, about one hundred and fifty miles distant -from the nearest point that would furnish supplies for an American army -coming from Georgia, Tennessee, or Mobile. Pinckney’s natural line of -attack was through Georgia to the Lower Creek towns and the American -forts on the Chattahoochee, whence he could move along a good road -about eighty miles to the Upper Creek towns, near the Hickory Ground. -The next convenient line was from Mobile up the Alabama River about one -hundred and fifty miles to the same point. The least convenient was the -pathless, mountainous, and barren region of Upper Alabama and Georgia, -through which an army from Tennessee must toil for at least a hundred -miles in order to reach an enemy. - -The State of Georgia was most interested in the Creek war, and was -chiefly to profit by it. Georgia in 1813 had a white population of -about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and a militia probably -numbering thirty thousand. Military District No. 6, embracing the two -Carolinas and Georgia, was supposed to contain two thousand regular -troops, and was commanded by Major-General Pinckney. Under Pinckney’s -command, a thousand regulars and three thousand militia, advancing from -Georgia by a good road eighty miles into the Indian country, should -have been able to end the Creek war within six months from the massacre -at Fort Mims; but for some reason the attempts on that side were not -so successful as they should have been, and were neither rapid nor -vigorous. Tennessee took the lead. - -In respect of white population, the State of Tennessee was more than -double the size of Georgia; but it possessed a greater advantage in -Andrew Jackson, whose extreme energy was equivalent to the addition of -an army. When news of the Mims massacre reached Nashville about the -middle of September, Jackson was confined to his bed by a pistol-shot, -which had broken his arm and nearly cost his life ten days before in -a street brawl with Thomas H. Benton. From his bed he issued an order -calling back into service his two thousand volunteers of 1812; and -as early as October 12, little more than a month after the affair at -Fort Mims, he and his army of twenty-five hundred men were already -camped on the Tennessee River south of Huntsville in Alabama. There was -his necessary base of operations, but one hundred and sixty miles of -wilderness lay between him and the Hickory Ground. - -On the Tennessee River Jackson’s position bore some resemblance to -that of Harrison on the Maumee a year before. Energy could not save him -from failure. Indeed, the greater his energy the more serious were his -difficulties. He depended on supplies from east Tennessee descending -the river; but the river was low, and the supplies could not be moved. -He had taken no measures to procure supplies from Nashville. Without -food and forage he could not safely advance, or even remain where he -was. Under such conditions, twenty-five hundred men with half as many -horses could not be kept together. Harrison under the same difficulties -held back his main force near its magazines till it disbanded, without -approaching within a hundred miles of its object. Jackson suffered -nearly the same fate. He sent away his mounted men under General Coffee -to forage on the banks of the Black Warrior River, fifty miles to the -southwest, where no Creeks were to be feared. He forced his infantry -forward through rough country some twenty miles, to a point where -the river made its most southern bend, and there, in the mountainous -defile, he established, October 23, a camp which he called Deposit, -where his supplies were to be brought when the river should permit. - -Coffee’s mounted men returned October 24. Then, October 25, in the -hope of finding food as he went, Jackson plunged into the mountains -beyond the river, intending to make a raid, as far as he could, into -the Creek country. Except fatigue and famine, he had nothing to fear. -The larger Creek towns were a hundred miles to the southward, and -were busy with threatened attacks nearer home. After a week’s march -Jackson reached the upper waters of the Coosa. Within a short distance -were two or three small Creek villages. Against one of these Jackson -sent his mounted force, numbering nine hundred men, under General -Coffee. Early in the morning of November 3, Coffee surrounded and -destroyed Talishatchee. His report represented that the Indians made -an obstinate resistance.[340] “Not one of the warriors escaped to tell -the news,--a circumstance unknown heretofore.” According to Coffee’s -estimate, Talishatchee contained two hundred and eighty-four Indians of -both sexes and all ages. If one in three could be reckoned as capable -of bearing arms, the number of warriors was less than one hundred. -Coffee’s men after the battle counted one hundred and eighty-six dead -Indians, and estimated the total loss at two hundred. In every attack -on an Indian village a certain number of women and children were -necessarily victims, but the proportion at Talishatchee seemed large. - - “I lost five men killed, and forty-one wounded,” reported - Coffee,--“none mortally, the greater part slightly, a number with - arrows. Two of the men killed was with arrows; this appears to form - a very principal part of the enemy’s arms for warfare, every man - having a bow with a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first - fire with the gun until a leisure time for loading offers.” - -Meanwhile Jackson fortified a point on the Coosa, about thirty-five -miles from his base on the Tennessee, and named it Fort Strother. -There he expected to be joined by a division of east Tennessee militia -under General Cocke, approaching from Chattanooga, as he hoped, with -supplies; but while waiting, he received, November 7, a message from -Talladega, a Creek village thirty miles to the southward, reporting -that the town, which had refused to join the war-party, was besieged -and in danger of capture by a large body of hostile warriors. Jackson -instantly started to save Talladega, and marched twenty-four miles -November 8, surrounding and attacking the besieging Creeks the next -morning. - - “The victory was very decisive,” reported Jackson to Governor - Blount,[341] November 11; “two hundred and ninety of the enemy were - left dead, and there can be no doubt but many more were killed who - were not found.... In the engagement we lost fifteen killed, and - eighty-five wounded.” - -Coffee estimated the number of Indians, on their own report,[342] at -about one thousand. Jackson mentioned no wounded Indians, nor the -number of hostile Creeks engaged. Male Indians, except infants, were -invariably killed, and probably not more than five or six hundred were -in the battle, for Coffee thought very few escaped unhurt. - -At Talladega Jackson was sixty miles from the Hickory Ground, and -still nearer to several large Indian towns, but he had already passed -the limit of his powers. News arrived that the army of eastern -Tennessee had turned eastward toward the Tallapoosa, and that his -expected supplies were as remote as ever. Returning to Fort Strother -November 10, Jackson waited there in forced inactivity, as Harrison had -waited at Fort Meigs, anxious only to avoid the disgrace of retreat. -For two weeks the army had lived on the Indians. A month more passed -in idle starvation, until after great efforts a supply train was -organized, and difficulties on that account ceased; but at the same -moment the army claimed discharge. - -The claim was reasonable. Enlisted Dec. 10, 1812, for one year, the -men were entitled to their discharge Dec. 10, 1813. Had Jackson been -provided with fresh levies he would doubtless have dismissed the old; -but in his actual situation their departure would have left him at Fort -Strother to pass the winter alone. To prevent this, he insisted that -the men had no right to count as service, within the twelve months for -which they had enlisted, the months between May and October when they -were dismissed to their homes. The men, unanimous in their own view -of the contract, started to march home December 10; and Jackson, in a -paroxysm of anger, planted two small pieces of artillery in their path -and threatened to fire on them. The men, with good-temper, yielded for -the moment; and Jackson, quickly recognizing his helplessness, gave -way, and allowed them to depart December 12, with a vehement appeal -for volunteers who made no response. - -Fort Strother was then held for a short time by east Tennessee militia, -about fourteen hundred in number, whose term of service was a few weeks -longer than that of the west Tennesseeans. Jackson could do nothing -with them, and remained idle. The Governor of Tennessee advised him to -withdraw to the State frontier; but Jackson, while admitting that his -campaign had failed, declared that he would perish before withdrawing -from the ground he considered himself to have gained.[343] Fortunately -he stood in no danger. The Creeks did not molest him, and he saw no -enemy within fifty miles. - -While Jackson was thus brought to a stand-still, Major-General Cocke of -east Tennessee, under greater disadvantages, accomplished only results -annoying to Jackson. Cocke with twenty-five hundred three-months -militia took the field at Knoxville October 12, and moving by way -of Chattanooga reached the Coosa sixty or seventy miles above Camp -Strother. The nearest Creek Indians were the Hillabees, on a branch of -the Tallapoosa about sixty miles from Cocke’s position, and the same -distance from Jackson. The Hillabees, a group of four small villages, -numbered in 1800 one hundred and seventy warriors.[344] Unaware that -the Hillabees were making their submission to Jackson, and were to -receive his promise of protection, Cocke sent a large detachment, which -started November 12 into the Indian country, and surprised one of the -Hillabee villages November 18, massacring sixty-one warriors, and -capturing the other inmates, two hundred and fifty in number, without -losing a drop of blood or meeting any resistance.[345] - -Jackson was already displeased with General Cocke’s conduct, and the -Hillabee massacre increased his anger. Cocke had intentionally kept -himself and his army at a distance in order to maintain an independent -command.[346] Not until Jackson’s troops disbanded and marched home, -December 12, did Cocke come to Fort Strother. There his troops remained -a month, guarding Jackson’s camp, until January 12, 1814, when their -three months’ term expired. - -While five thousand men under Jackson and Cocke wandered about northern -Alabama, able to reach only small and remote villages, none of which -were actively concerned in the outbreak, the Georgians organized a -force to enter the heart of the Creek country. Brigadier-General -John Floyd commanded the Georgia army, and neither Major-General -Pinckney nor any United States troops belonged to it. Jackson’s battle -of Talladega was fought November 9; Cocke’s expedition against the -Hillabees started November 12, and surprised the Hillabee village -November 18. Floyd entered the hostile country November 24. The -Georgians though nearest were last to move, and moved with the weakest -force. Floyd had but nine hundred and forty militia, and three or four -hundred friendly warriors of the Lower Creek villages. - -Floyd had heard that large numbers of hostile Indians were assembled -at Autossee,--a town on the Tallapoosa River near Tuckaubatchee, in -the centre of the Upper Creek country. He crossed the Chattahoochee -November 24 with five days rations, and marched directly against -Autossee, arriving within nine or ten miles without meeting resistance. -At half-past six on the morning of November 29 he formed his troops for -action in front of the town.[347] - -The difference between the Northwestern Indians and the Creeks was -shown in the battle of Autossee compared with Tippecanoe. Floyd was -weaker than Harrison, having only militia and Indians, while Harrison -had a regular regiment composing one third of his rank-and-file. -The Creeks were probably more numerous than the Tippecanoe Indians, -although in both cases the numbers were quite unknown. Probably the -Creeks were less well armed, but they occupied a strong position and -stood on the defensive. Floyd reported that by nine o’clock he drove -the Indians from their towns and burned their houses,--supposed to be -four hundred in number. He estimated their loss at two hundred killed. -His own loss was eleven killed and fifty-four wounded. That of Harrison -at Tippecanoe was sixty-one killed or mortally wounded, and one hundred -and twenty-seven not fatally injured. The Creeks hardly inflicted one -fourth the loss caused by the followers of the Shawnee Prophet. - -General Floyd,--himself among the severely wounded,--immediately after -the battle ordered the troops to begin their return march to the -Chattahoochee. The Georgia raid into the Indian country was bolder, -less costly, and more effective than the Tennessee campaign; but at -best it was only a raid, like the Indian assault on Fort Mims, and -offered no immediate prospect of regular military occupation. Another -attempt, from a third quarter, had the same unsatisfactory result. - -The successor of General Wilkinson at New Orleans and Mobile, and in -Military District No. 7, was Brigadier-General Thomas Flournoy. Under -his direction an expedition was organized from Fort Stoddert, commanded -by Brigadier-General Claiborne of the Mississippi volunteers. Claiborne -was given the Third United States Infantry, with a number of militia, -volunteers, and Choctaw Indians,--in all about a thousand men. He -first marched to a point on the Alabama River, about eighty-five miles -above Fort Stoddert, where he constructed a military post, called Fort -Claiborne. Having established his base there, he marched, December 13, -up the river till he reached, December 23, the Holy Ground, where the -half-breed Weatherford lived. There Claiborne approached within about -fifty miles of the point which Floyd reached a month before, but for -want of co-operation he could not maintain his advantage. He attacked -and captured Weatherford’s town, killing thirty Indians, with a loss of -one man; but after destroying the place he retreated, arriving unharmed -at Fort Claiborne, on the last day of the year. - -Thus the year 1813 ended without closing the Creek war. More than seven -thousand men had entered the Indian country from four directions; and -with a loss of thirty or forty lives had killed, according to their -reports, about eight hundred Indians, or one fifth of the hostile Creek -warriors; but this carnage had fallen chiefly on towns and villages -not responsible for the revolt. The true fanatics were little harmed, -and could offer nearly as much resistance as ever. The failure and -excessive expense of the campaign were the more annoying, because they -seemed beyond proportion to the military strength of the fanatics. -Major-General Pinckney wrote to the War Department at the close of the -year:[348]-- - - “The force of the hostile Creeks was estimated by the best judges - to have consisted of three thousand five hundred warriors; of these - it is apprehended that about one thousand have been put _hors de - combat_.” - -To Andrew Jackson, Pinckney wrote, Jan. 19, 1814,[349] - - “Your letter, dated December 26, did not reach me until the last - evening. Your preceding dispatches of December 14 had led me to - conclude what would probably soon be the diminished state of your - force. I therefore immediately ordered to your support Colonel - Williams’s regiment of twelve-months men, and wrote to the Governor - of Tennessee urging him to complete the requisition of fifteen - hundred for the time authorized by law. I learn from the person who - brought your letter that Colonel Williams’s regiment is marching - to join you; if the fifteen hundred of the quota should also be - furnished by Governor Blount, you will in my opinion have force - sufficient for the object to be attained. The largest computation - that I have heard of the hostile Creek warriors, made by any - competent judge, is four thousand. At least one thousand of them - have been killed or disabled; they are badly armed and supplied - with ammunition; little doubt can exist that two thousand of our - men would be infinitely superior to any number they can collect.” - -Jackson at Fort Strother on the departure of the east Tennesseeans, -January 14, received a reinforcement of sixty-day militia, barely -nine hundred in number.[350] Determined to use them to the utmost, -Jackson started three days afterward to co-operate with General Floyd -in an attack on the Tallapoosa villages, aiming at a town called -Emuckfaw, some forty miles north of Tuckaubatchee. The movement was -much more dangerous than any he had yet attempted. His own force -was fresh, motley, and weak, numbering only nine hundred and thirty -militia, including “a company of volunteer officers headed by General -Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men,” and assisted by two or -three hundred friendly Creeks and Cherokees. The sixty-day militia -were insubordinate and unsteady, the march was long, and the Creek -towns at which he aimed were relatively large. Emuckfaw was one -of seven villages belonging to Ocfuskee, the largest town in the -Creek nation,--in 1800 supposed to contain four hundred and fifty -warriors.[351] - -As far as Enotachopco Creek, twelve miles from Emuckfaw, Jackson had no -great danger to fear; but beyond that point he marched with caution. -At daylight, January 22, the Indians, who were strongly encamped at -about three miles distance, made an attack on Jackson’s camp, which -was repulsed after half an hour’s fighting. Jackson then sent Coffee -with four hundred men to burn the Indian camp, but Coffee returned -without attempting it. “On viewing the encampment and its strength the -General thought it most prudent to return to my encampment,” reported -Jackson.[352] Immediately after Coffee’s return the Indians again -attacked, and Coffee sallied out to turn their flank, followed by not -more than fifty-four men. The Indians were again repulsed with a loss -of forty-five killed, but Coffee was severely wounded, and Jackson -“determined to commence a return march to Fort Strother the following -day.” - -At that moment Jackson’s situation was not unlike that of Harrison -after the battle of Tippecanoe, and he escaped less happily. -Fortifying his camp, he remained during the night of January 22 -undisturbed. At half-past ten, January 23, he began his return march, -“and was fortunate enough to reach Enotachopco before night, having -passed without interruption a dangerous defile occasioned by a -hurricane.”[353] Enotachopco Creek was twelve or fifteen miles from -Emuckfaw Creek, and the Hillabee towns were about the same distance -beyond. - -At Enotachopco Jackson again fortified his camp. His position was such -as required the utmost caution in remaining or moving. So hazardous was -the passage of the deep creek and the defile beyond, through which the -army had marched in its advance, that Jackson did not venture to return -by the same path, but on the morning of January 24 began cautiously -crossing the creek at a safer point:-- - - “The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, - the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering - the creek, when an alarm-gun was heard in the woods.... To my - astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by Colonel - Carrol to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld - the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately give - way. This shameful retreat was disastrous in the extreme; it drew - along with it the greater part of the centre column, leaving not - more than twenty-five men, who being formed by Colonel Carrol - maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain - it, and it brought consternation and confusion into the centre of - the army,--a consternation which was not easily removed, and a - confusion which could not soon be restored to order.”[354] - -The Indians were either weak or ignorant of warfare, for they failed to -take advantage of the panic, and allowed themselves to be driven away -by a handful of men. Jackson’s troops escaped unharmed, or but little -injured, their loss in the engagements of January 22 and 24 being -twenty-four men killed and seventy-one wounded. Probably the Creek -force consisted of the Ocfuskee warriors, and numbered about half that -of Jackson.[355] Coffee supposed them to be eight hundred or a thousand -in number, but the exaggeration in estimating Indian forces was always -greater than in estimating white enemies in battle. An allowance of -one third was commonly needed for exaggeration in reported numbers of -European combatants; an allowance of one half was not unreasonable in -estimates of Indian forces. - -In letting Jackson escape from Emuckfaw the Creeks lost their single -opportunity. Jackson never repeated the experiment. He arrived at -Fort Strother in safety January 29, and did not again leave his -intrenchment until the middle of March, under much better conditions. - -General Floyd was no more successful. Jackson started from Fort -Strother for Emuckfaw January 17; Floyd left Fort Mitchell, on the -Chattahoochee, January 18, for Tuckaubatchee, only forty miles south -of Emuckfaw.[356] Floyd’s army, like Jackson’s, was partly composed -of militia and partly of Lower Creek warriors, in all about seventeen -hundred men, including four hundred friendly Creeks. From the best -information to be obtained at the time, the effective strength of -the hostile Indians did not then exceed two thousand warriors,[357] -scattered along the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers; while experience -proved the difficulty of concentrating large bodies of Indians, even -when supplies were furnished them. The British commissariat in Canada -constantly issued from five to ten thousand rations for Indians and -their families, but Proctor never brought more than fifteen hundred -warriors into battle. The Creeks, as far as was known, never numbered a -thousand warriors in any battle during the war. Floyd, with seventeen -hundred men well armed, was able to face the whole Creek nation, and -meant to move forward, fortifying military posts at each day’s march, -until he should establish himself on the Tallapoosa in the centre of -the Creek towns, and wait for a junction with Jackson. - -When Jackson was repulsed at Emuckfaw January 22, Floyd was about forty -miles to the southward, expecting to draw the chief attack of the -Indians. Having advanced forty-eight miles from the Chattahoochee he -arrived at a point about seven or eight miles south of Tuckaubatchee, -where he fortified, on Calibee Creek, a camp called Defiance. There, -before daybreak on the morning of January 27, he was sharply attacked, -as Harrison was attacked at Tippecanoe, and with the same result. The -attack was repulsed, but Floyd lost twenty-two killed and one hundred -and forty-seven wounded,--the largest number of casualties that had -yet occurred in the Indian war. The Indians “left thirty-seven dead on -the field; from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses -and war-clubs found in various directions, their loss must have been -considerable independent of their wounded.”[358] - -The battle of Calibee Creek, January 27, was in substance a defeat -to Floyd. So decided were his militia in their determination to go -home, that he abandoned all his fortified posts and fell back to -the Chattahoochee, where he arrived February 1, four days after the -battle.[359] - -Six months had then elapsed since the outbreak of hostilities at Burnt -Corn; a year since the Little Warrior murders on the Ohio River, yet -not a post had been permanently occupied within eighty miles of the -fanatical centre at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa. - -Pinckney was obliged to apply to the governors of North and South -Carolina to furnish him with men and equipments. The Governor of -Georgia also exerted himself to supply the deficiencies of the national -magazines.[360] By their aid Pinckney was able to collect an army with -which to make another and a decisive movement into the Creek country: -but before he could act, Jackson succeeded in striking a final blow. - -Jackson’s success in overcoming the obstacles in his path was due to -his obstinacy in insisting on maintaining himself at Fort Strother, -which obliged Governor Blount to order out four thousand more militia -in January for six months. Perhaps this force alone would have been -no more effectual in 1814 than in 1813, but another reinforcement was -decisive. The Thirty-ninth regiment of the regular army, authorized -by the Act of January 29, 1813, had been officered and recruited -in Tennessee, and was still in the State. Major-General Pinckney -sent orders, Dec. 23, 1813, to its colonel, John Williams, to join -Jackson.[361] The arrival of the Thirty-ninth regiment February 6, -1814, gave Jackson the means of coping with his militia. February 21 -he wrote to his quartermaster, Major Lewis, that he meant to use his -regulars first to discipline his own army.[362] “I am truly happy in -having the Colonel [Williams] with me. His regiment will give strength -to my arm, and quell mutiny.” His patience with militia-men had been -long exhausted, and he meant to make a warning of the next mutineer. - -The first victim was no less a person than Major-General Cocke of the -east Tennessee militia. Cocke’s division of two thousand men, mustered -for six months, began January 17 its march from Knoxville to Fort -Strother.[363] Learning on the march that the west Tennessee division, -mustered at the same time for the same service, had been accepted to -serve only three months, Cocke’s men mutinied, and Cocke tried to -pacify them by a friendly speech. Jackson, learning what had passed, -despatched a sharp order to one of Cocke’s brigadiers to arrest and -send under guard to Fort Strother every officer of whatever rank who -should be found exciting the men to mutiny. Cocke was put under arrest -when almost in sight of the enemy’s country; his sword was taken from -him, and he was sent to Nashville for trial.[364] His division came to -Fort Strother, and said no more about its term of service. - -Having dealt thus with the officers, Jackson selected at leisure a test -of strength with the men. The conduct of the Fayetteville company of -the Twenty-eighth regiment of west Tennessee light infantry gave him -ground for displeasure. Not only had they refused to obey the call -for six months’ service and insisted on serving for three months or -not at all, but they had halted on their march, and had sent their -commanding officer to bargain with Jackson for his express adhesion -to their terms. Learning that Jackson made difficulties, they marched -home without waiting for an official reply. Jackson ordered the whole -body to be arrested as deserters, accompanying his order by an offer of -pardon to such as returned to duty on their own understanding of the -term of service. The company was again mustered, and arrived at Fort -Strother not long after the arrival of the Thirty-ninth United States -Infantry. - -A few weeks later an unfortunate private of the same company, named -Woods, refused to obey the officer of the day, and threatened to shoot -any man who arrested him. Jackson instantly called a court-martial, -tried and sentenced Woods, and March 14 caused him to be shot. The -execution was a harsh measure; but Jackson gave to it a peculiar -character by issuing a general order in which he misstated facts -that made Wood’s case exceptional,[365] in order to let the company -understand that their comrade was suffering the penalty which they all -deserved. - -Without giving his army time to brood over this severity, Jackson -ordered a general movement, and within forty-eight hours after Woods’s -execution, all were well on their way toward the enemy. Jackson had -with him about five thousand men, four fifths of whom expected their -discharge in a month. He left them not a day’s repose. - -Two lines of advance were open to him in approaching the fork of the -Coosa and Tallapoosa, which was always the objective point. He might -descend the Coosa, or cross to the Tallapoosa by the way he had taken -in January. He descended the Coosa thirty miles, and then struck a -sudden blow at the Tallapoosa towns. - -The Ocfuskee Indians, elated by their success in January, collected -their whole force, with that of some neighboring towns, in a bend of -the Tallapoosa, where they built a sort of fortress by constructing -across the neck of the Horse-shoe a breastwork composed of five large -logs, one above the other, with two ranges of port-holes.[366] The -interior was covered with trees and fallen timber along the river side, -and caves were dug in the bank. Seven or eight hundred Indian warriors -together with many women and children were within the enclosure of -eighty or a hundred acres. - -Jackson, after leaving a garrison at a new fort which he constructed -on the Coosa, about half way to the Horse-shoe, had somewhat less -than three thousand effectives.[367] With these he camped, on the -evening of March 28, about six miles northwest of the bend, and the -next morning advanced to attack it. “Determined to exterminate them,” -he reported,[368] he detached Coffee with the mounted force of seven -hundred men and six hundred friendly Indians[369] to surround the bend, -along the river bank, while Jackson himself with all his infantry took -position before the breastwork. At half-past ten o’clock he planted his -cannon about two hundred yards[370] from the centre of the work, and -began a rapid fire of artillery and musketry, which continued for two -hours without producing apparent effect. Meanwhile the Cherokee allies -swam the river in the rear of the Creek warriors, who were all at the -breastwork, and seizing canoes, brought some two hundred Indians and -whites into the Horse-shoe, where they climbed the high ground in the -rear of the breastwork and fired on the Creeks, who were occupied in -defending their front. - -Jackson then ordered an assault on the breastwork, which was carried, -with considerable loss, by the Thirty-ninth regiment, in the centre. -The Creeks sought shelter in the thickets and under the bluffs, where -they were hunted or burned out, and killed. “The slaughter was greater -than all we had done before,” wrote Coffee; it was continued all day -and the next morning. When the Horse-shoe had been thoroughly cleared, -five hundred and fifty-seven dead bodies were counted within the bend; -many were killed in the river, and about twenty were supposed to have -escaped. According to Coffee, “we killed not less than eight hundred -and fifty or nine hundred of them, and took about five hundred squaws -and children prisoners.” The proportion of squaws and children to the -whole number of Indians showed the probable proportion of warriors -among the dead. “I lament that two or three women and children were -killed by accident,” reported Jackson.[371] - -Jackson’s loss was chiefly confined to the Thirty-ninth regiment and -the friendly Indians, who were most actively engaged in the storm. -The Thirty-ninth lost twenty killed and fifty-two wounded. Among the -severely wounded was Ensign Samuel Houston, struck by an arrow in the -thigh. The major and two lieutenants were killed. The Cherokees lost -eighteen killed and thirty-five wounded. The friendly Creeks lost five -killed and eleven wounded. The Tennessee militia, comprising two thirds -of the army, lost only eight killed and fifty-two wounded. The total -loss was fifty-one killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded. - -Jackson’s policy of extermination shocked many humane Americans, and -would perhaps have seemed less repulsive had the Creeks shown more -capacity for resistance. The proportion between two hundred casualties -on one side and seven or eight hundred killed on the other would have -been striking in any case, but was especially so where the advantages -of position were on the side of the defence. A more serious criticism -was that the towns thus exterminated were not the towns chiefly -responsible for the outbreak. The Alabamas and the main body of -fanatical Creeks escaped. - -Jackson was obliged to return to his new fort on the Coosa, a march of -five days; and was delayed five days more by preparations to descend -the river. When at length he moved southward, scouring the country as -he went, he could find no more enemies. He effected his junction with -the Georgia troops April 15, and the united armies reached the fork of -the Coosa and Tallapoosa April 18, where Major-General Pinckney joined -them, April 20, and took command;[372] but the Red Sticks had then fled -southward. A few of the hostile leaders, including Weatherford, made -submission, but McQueen and the chief prophets escaped to continue the -war from Florida. The friendly Creeks did not consider the war to be -finished; they reported to Hawkins[373]-- - - “They did not believe the hostile Indians were ready for peace, - although a part of them had suffered so severely in battle against - our armies. They were proud, haughty, brave, and mad by fanaticism. - Those of the towns of Tallapoosa below Tuckaubatchee and Alabama - had suffered the least, although they were the most culpable; and - it was probable they would mistake our object in offering terms of - peace to them.” - -The number of refugees was never precisely known, but Hawkins reported -that eight of the Tallapoosa towns had migrated in a body to Spanish -territory,[374] and probably a larger proportion of the Coosa and -Alabama towns accompanied them. The Indians themselves gave out that a -few more than a thousand Red Stick warriors survived, who meant to die -fighting. In May the British admiral Cochrane sent Captain Pigot of the -“Orpheus” to the Appalachicola to communicate with the refugee Creek -Indians and supply them with arms. Pigot received ten of the principal -chiefs on board his vessel May 20, and reported[375] on their authority -that “the number of the warriors of the Creek Nation friendly to the -English and ready to take up arms was about twenty-eight hundred, -exclusive of one thousand unarmed warriors who had been driven by the -Americans from their towns into the marshes near Pensacola, and who -were expected to rejoin the main body.” The Creek warriors friendly to -the Americans were estimated at about twelve hundred, and the fugitive -Red Sticks at one thousand. Whatever their number, they included the -most fanatical followers of Tecumthe, and their obstinate outlawry -caused long and costly difficulties to the United States government. - -Meanwhile the whites were conquerors and could take as much of the -Creek lands as suited them; but an irregularity of form could not -be avoided. Secretary Armstrong first authorized General Pinckney -to conclude a treaty of peace with the hostile Creeks, containing a -cession of land and other provisions.[376] A few days later Armstrong -saw reason to prefer that the proposed treaty with the Creeks -should take a form altogether military, and be in the nature of a -capitulation.[377] His idea required a treaty with the hostile Creek -chiefs;[378] but the hostile Creeks were not a separate organization -capable of making a treaty or granting lands of the Creek nation; and -besides that difficulty the hostile chiefs had fled, and refused either -to submit or negotiate. No chiefs remained except among the friendly -Creeks, who could not capitulate because they had never been at war. -They had fought in the United States service and were entitled to -reward as allies, not to punishment as enemies. - -The solution of this legal problem was entrusted to Andrew Jackson, -whose services in the war earned for him the appointment of -major-general in the regular army, and the command of Military District -No. 7, with headquarters at Mobile. Jackson met the Creek chiefs in -July. The Indians, parties to the negotiation, were friendly chiefs, -deputies, and warriors, representing perhaps one third of the entire -Creek nation. To these allies and friends Jackson presented a paper, -originally intended for the hostile Indians, entitled “Articles of -Agreement and Capitulation,” requiring as indemnity for war expenses -a surrender of two thirds of their territory. They were required to -withdraw from the southern and western half of Alabama, within the -Chattahoochee on the east and the Coosa on the west. The military -object of this policy was to isolate them from the Seminoles and -Spaniards on one side, and from the Choctaws and Chickasaws on -the other. The political object was to surround them with a white -population. - -Unanimously the Creeks refused to accept the sacrifice. Jackson told -them in reply that their refusal would show them to be enemies of the -United States; that they might retain their own part of the country, -but that the part which belonged to the hostile Indians would be taken -by the government; and that the chiefs who would not consent to sign -the paper might join the Red Sticks at Pensacola,--although, added -Jackson, he should probably overtake and destroy them before they could -get there. Such arguments could not be answered. A number of the Creeks -at last, after long resistance, signed the capitulation or agreement, -although they continued to protest against it, and refused their aid to -carry it out. - -Jackson’s capitulation of Aug. 9, 1814,[379] which, without closing -the Creek war, appropriated to the government the larger part of the -Creek lands, was nearly simultaneous with a treaty[380] signed July 22 -by William Henry Harrison and Lewis Cass, at Greenville in Ohio, with -chiefs of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Senecas, and Miamis. This -treaty contained no land-cession, but established peace between the -parties, and obliged the Indian signers to declare war on the British. -Neither Harrison’s nor Jackson’s treaty embraced the chief body of -hostile Indians; but Harrison’s treaty served another purpose of no -small value in appearing to remove an obstacle to negotiation with -England. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - -BADLY as the United States fared in the campaign of 1813, their -situation would have been easy had they not suffered under the -annoyances of a blockade continually becoming more stringent. The -doctrine that coasts could be blockaded was enforced against America -with an energy that fell little short of demonstration. The summer was -well advanced before the whole naval force to be used for the purpose -could be posted at the proper stations. Not until May 26 did Admiral -Warren issue at Bermuda his proclamation of “a strict and rigorous -blockade of the ports and harbors of New York, Charleston, Port Royal, -Savannah, and of the river Mississippi,” which completed the blockade -of the coast, leaving only the ports of New England open to neutrals. -From that time nothing entered or left the blockaded coast except swift -privateers, or occasional fast-sailing vessels which risked capture -in the attempt. Toward the close of the year Admiral Warren extended -his blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given at Halifax -November 16, and by the blockading squadron off New London December 2, -thus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of every description.[381] - -The pressure of the blockade was immediately felt. In August[382] -superfine flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for -$6.00, and at Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston for -twenty cents a pound; at Charleston for nine cents. Rice sold at -Philadelphia for $12.00 a hundred weight; in Charleston and Savannah -for $3.00. Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75 a hundred weight; in -Baltimore for $26.50. Already the American staples were unsalable at -the places of their production. No rate of profit could cause cotton, -rice, or wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to -Boston. Soon speculation began. The price of imported articles rose to -extravagant points. At the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight -cents a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August. Tea which -could be bought for $1.70 per pound in August, sold for three and four -dollars in December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred -weight in New Orleans, and in August sold for twenty-one or twenty-two -dollars in New York and Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in -December. - -More sweeping in its effects on exports than on imports, the blockade -rapidly reduced the means of the people. After the summer of 1813, -Georgia alone, owing to its contiguity with Florida, succeeded in -continuing to send out cotton. The exports of New York, which exceeded -$12,250,000 in 1811, fell to $209,000 for the year ending in 1814. The -domestic exports of Virginia diminished in four years from $4,800,000 -to $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,819,000 for 1813, and $17,581 for the year -ending Sept. 30, 1814. At the close of 1813 exports, except from -Georgia and New England, ceased.[383] - -On the revenue the blockade acted with equal effect. Owing to the -increase of duties and to open ports, the New England States rather -increased than diminished their customs receipts. Until the summer of -1813, when the blockade began in earnest, New York showed the same -result; but after that time the receipts fell, until they averaged -less than $50,000 a month instead of $500,000, which would have been -a normal average if peace had been preserved. Philadelphia suffered -sooner. In 1810 the State of Pennsylvania contributed more than -$200,000 a month to the Treasury; in 1813 it contributed about $25,000 -a month. Maryland, where was collected in 1812 no less than $1,780,000 -of net revenue, paid only $182,000 in 1813, and showed an actual excess -of expenditures in 1814. After the summer, the total net revenue -collected in every port of the United States outside of New England did -not exceed $150,000 a month, or at the rate of $1,800,000 a year.[384] - -No ordinary operations of war could affect the United States so -severely as this inexorable blockade. Every citizen felt it in every -action of his life. The farmer grew crops which he could not sell, -while he paid tenfold prices for every necessity. While the country -was bursting with wealth, it was ruined. The blockade was but a part -of the evil. The whole coast was systematically swept of the means of -industry. Especially the Virginians and Marylanders felt the heavy hand -of England as it was felt nowhere else except on the Niagara River. A -large British squadron occupied Chesapeake Bay, and converted it into -a British naval station. After the month of February, 1813, the coasts -of Virginia and Maryland enjoyed not a moment’s repose. Considering the -immense naval power wielded by England, the Americans were fortunate -that their chief losses were confined to the farm-yards and poultry of -a few islands in Chesapeake Bay, but the constant annoyance and terror -were not the less painful to the people who apprehended attack. - -Fortunately the British naval officers showed little disposition to -distinguish themselves, and their huge line-of-battle ships were not -adapted to river service. The squadron under the general command of -Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren seemed contented for the most part to -close the bay to commerce. The only officer in the fleet who proved -the energy and capacity to use a part of the great force lying idle at -Lynnhaven Bay was Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, whose efficiency -was attested by the execration in which his name was held for fifty -years in the United States. His duties were not of a nature to make -him popular, and he was an admiral of the old school, whose boisterous -energy seemed to take needless pleasure in the work. - -Early in April, 1813, Admiral Warren sent Cockburn with a light -flotilla to the head of Chesapeake Bay to destroy everything that -could serve a warlike purpose, and to interrupt, as far as possible, -communication along the shore.[385] The squadron consisted of only -one light frigate, the “Maidstone,” thirty-six guns; two brigs, the -“Fantome” and “Mohawk;” and three or four prize schooners, with four -or five hundred seamen, marines, and soldiers. With this petty force -Cockburn stationed himself at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, -and soon threw Maryland into paroxysms of alarm and anger. Taking -possession of the islands in his neighborhood, he obtained supplies -of fresh food for the whole British force in Chesapeake Bay. He then -scoured every creek and inlet above his anchorage. He first moved into -the Elk River, and sent his boats, April 28, with one hundred and -fifty marines, to Frenchtown,--a village of a dozen buildings, which -had acquired a certain importance for the traffic between Baltimore -and Philadelphia since the stoppage of transit by sea. Without losing -a man, the expedition drove away the few Americans who made a show -of resistance, and burned whatever property was found, “consisting of -much flour, a large quantity of army clothing, of saddles, bridles, and -other equipments for cavalry, etc., together with various articles of -merchandise,” besides five vessels lying near the place.[386] - -Cockburn next sent the same force to destroy a battery lately erected -at Havre de Grace. The attack was made on the morning of May 3, and -like the attack on Frenchtown, met with only resistance enough to -offer an excuse for pillage. The militia took refuge in the woods; -Cockburn’s troops destroyed or carried away the arms and cannon, and -set fire to the town of some sixty houses, “to cause the proprietors -(who had deserted them and formed part of the militia who had fled -to the woods) to understand and feel what they were liable to bring -upon themselves by building batteries and acting toward us with so -much useless rancor.”[387] While engaged in this work Cockburn was -told that an extensive cannon-foundry existed about four miles up the -Susquehanna River; and he immediately started for it in his boats. -He met no resistance, and destroyed the foundry with several small -vessels. His handful of men passed the day undisturbed on the banks of -the Susquehanna, capturing fifty-one cannon, mostly heavy pieces, with -one hundred and thirty stand of small arms. The party then returned to -their ships, “where we arrived at ten o’clock, after being twenty-two -hours in constant exertion, without nourishment of any kind; and I -have much pleasure in being able to add that, excepting Lieutenant -Westphall’s wound, we have not suffered any casualty whatever.” - -These expeditions cleared every inlet in the Upper Chesapeake except -the Sassafras River on the eastern shore. During the night of May 5 -Cockburn sent his boats into the Sassafras. Militia in considerable -numbers assembled on both banks and opened a fire which Cockburn -described as “most heavy,” aided by one long gun. Cockburn landed, -dispersed the militia, and destroyed Fredericktown and Georgetown, with -the vessels and stores he found there. This expedition cost him five -men wounded, one severely. The next day, May 6, he reported to Admiral -Warren,-- - - “I had a deputation from Charleston in the Northeast River to - assure me that that place is considered by them at your mercy, and - that neither guns nor militia-men shall be suffered there; and as - I am assured that all the places in the upper part of Chesapeake - Bay have adopted similar resolutions, and as there is now neither - public property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in this - neighborhood, I propose returning to you with the light squadron - to-morrow morning.” - -Thus in the course of a week, and without loss of life on either side, -Cockburn with a few boats and one hundred and fifty men terrorized -the shores of the Upper Chesapeake, and by his loud talk and random -threats threw even Baltimore into a panic, causing every one to suspend -other pursuits in order to garrison the city against an imaginary -attack. The people, harassed by this warfare, remembered with extreme -bitterness the marauding of Cockburn and his sailors; but where he met -no resistance he paid in part for what private property he took, and as -far as was recorded, his predatory excursions cost the Marylanders not -a wound. - -For six weeks after Cockburn’s return to Warren’s station at Lynnhaven -Bay, the British fleet remained inactive. Apparently the British -government aimed at no greater object than that of clearing from -Chesapeake Bay every vessel not engaged in British interests under -British protection. The small craft and privateers were quickly -taken or destroyed; but the three chief depots of commerce and -armaments--Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington--required a greater -effort. Of these three places Norfolk seemed most open to approach, and -Admiral Warren determined to attack it. - -The British navy wished nothing more ardently than to capture or -destroy the American frigates. One of these, the “Constellation,” lay -at Norfolk, where it remained blockaded throughout the war. Admiral -Warren could earn no distinction so great as the credit of capturing -this frigate, which not only threatened to annoy British commerce -should she escape to sea, but even when blockaded in port required a -considerable squadron to watch her, and neutralized several times her -force. - -Another annoyance drew Warren’s attention to Norfolk. June 20, fifteen -gunboats issued from the harbor before daylight, and under cover of -darkness approached within easy range of a becalmed British frigate, -the “Junon” of forty-six guns. For half an hour, from four o’clock till -half-past four, the gunboats maintained, according to the official -report of Commodore Cassin who commanded them, “a heavy, galling fire -at about three quarters of a mile distance.”[388] Their armament was -not mentioned, but probably they, like the gunboats on the Lakes, -carried in part long thirty-two and twenty-four-pound guns. The attack -was intended to test the offensive value of gunboats, and the result -was not satisfactory. The fire of fifteen heavy guns for half an hour -on a defenceless frigate within easy range should have caused great -injury, but did not. When a breeze rose and enabled the “Junon” and a -neighboring frigate, the “Barrosa,” to get under weigh, the gunboats -were obliged to retire with the loss of one man killed and two wounded. -The “Junon” also had one man killed, but received only one or two shots -in her hull.[389] - -The “Constellation” lay, under the guns of two forts and with every -possible precaution, five miles up the Elizabeth River, at the -Portsmouth navy-yard. The utmost pains had been taken to provide -against approach by water. Whatever incompetence or neglect was shown -elsewhere, Norfolk was under the command of able officers in both -services, who neglected no means of defence. General Wade Hampton had -fortified the interior line immediately below the town, where two -strong forts were constructed under the direction of Captain Walker -Keith Armistead of the Engineers, the first graduate of the West -Point Academy in 1803. Five miles below these forts, where the river -widened into Hampton Roads, Brigadier-General Robert Taylor of the -Virginia militia, and Captain John Cassin commanding at the navy-yard, -established a second line of defence, resting on Craney Island on -the left, supported by fifteen or twenty gunboats moored across the -channel. A battery of seven guns was established on the island covering -the approach to the gunboats, so that the capture of the island was -necessary to the approach by water. The force on the island consisted -of about seven hundred men, of whom less than a hundred were State -troops. The rest were infantry of the line, riflemen, seamen, and -marines.[390] The town and forts were strongly garrisoned, and a large -body of State militia was constantly on service. - -To deal with the defences of Norfolk, Admiral Warren brought from -Bermuda, according to newspaper account, a detachment of battalion -marines eighteen hundred strong; three hundred men of the One -Hundred-and-second regiment of the line, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel -Charles James Napier, afterward a very distinguished officer; two -hundred and fifty chasseurs, or French prisoners of war who had -entered the British service; and three hundred men of the royal -marine artillery,[391]--in all, two thousand six hundred and fifty -rank-and-file, or about three thousand men all told, besides the -sailors of the fleet. At that time no less than thirteen sail of -British ships, including three ships-of-the-line and five frigates, lay -at anchor within thirteen miles of Craney Island. - -The attack was planned for June 22. The land forces were commanded by -Sir Sydney Beckwith, but the general movement was directed by Admiral -Warren.[392] The main attack, led by Major-General Beckwith in person, -was to land and approach Craney Island from the rear, or mainland; the -second division, under command of Captain Pechell of the flag-ship “San -Domingo,” 74, was to approach the island in boats directly under fire -of the American guns on the island, but not exposed to those in the -gunboats. - -The plan should have succeeded. The island was held by less than seven -hundred men in an open earthwork easily assaulted from the rear. The -water was so shallow as to offer little protection against energetic -attack. The British force was more than twice the American, and -the plan of attack took from the gunboats the chance of assisting the -land-battery. - -[Illustration: - - MAP - OF THE - BATTLE - OF - CRANEY ISLAND - FROM MAPS IN - OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS -] - -At daylight on the morning of June 22 Beckwith, with about eight -hundred men, landed on the main shore outside of Craney Island, and -pushed forward to take the island in the rear. Soon afterward Captain -Pechell, with about seven hundred men in fifteen boats, approached the -island from the northwest along the shore, far out of the reach of the -gunboats. Toward eleven o’clock the British boats came within range of -the American battery on the island. Contrary to the opinions of several -officers, Captain Pechell insisted on making the attack independently -of Beckwith’s approach, and pushed on. Two or three hundred yards from -land the leading boats grounded in shoal water. Apparently the men -might have waded ashore; but “one of the seamen, having plunged his -boat-hook over the side, found three or four feet of slimy mud at the -bottom;”[393] the leading officer’s boat being aground was soon struck -by a six-pound shot, the boat sunk, and himself and his crew, with -those of two other launches, were left in the water. The other boats -took a part of them in, and then quickly retired. - -The affair was not improved by the fortunes of Sir Sydney Beckwith, -who advanced to the rear of Craney Island, where he was stopped by -creeks which he reported too deep to ford, and accordingly re-embarked -his troops without further effort; but the true causes of the failure -seemed not to be understood. Napier thought it due to the division -of command between three heads, Warren, Cockburn, and Beckwith;[394] -but incompetence was as obvious as the division of command. -Admiral Warren’s official report seemed to admit that he was also -overmatched:[395]-- - - “Upon approaching the island, from the extreme shoalness of the - water on the seaside and the difficulty of getting across from the - land, as well as the island itself being fortified with a number of - guns and men from the frigate [‘Constellation’] and the militia, - and flanked by fifteen gunboats, I considered, in consequence - of the representation of the officer commanding the troops of - the difficulty of their passing over from the land, that the - persevering in the attempt would cost more men than the number with - us would permit, as the other forts must have been stormed before - the frigate and dock-yard could be destroyed. I therefore directed - the troops to be re-embarked.” - -On neither side were the losses serious. The American battery inflicted -less injury than was to be expected. Fifteen British boats containing -at least eight hundred men, all told, remained some two hours under -the fire of two twenty-four-pound and four six-pound guns, at a range -differently estimated from one hundred to three hundred yards, but -certainly beyond musketry fire, for the American troops had to wade -out before firing. Three boats were sunk; three men were killed, -and sixteen were wounded.[396] Sixty-two men were reported missing, -twenty-two of whom came ashore from the boats, while forty deserted -from Beckwith’s land force.[397] The Americans suffered no loss. - -To compensate his men for their check at Craney Island, Admiral Warren -immediately afterward devised another movement, which proved, what -the Craney Island affair suggested, that the large British force in -the Chesapeake was either ill constructed or ill led. Opposite Craney -Island, ten miles away on the north shore of James River, stood the -village of Hampton, a place of no importance either military or -commercial. Four or five hundred Virginia militia were camped there, -covering a heavy battery on the water’s edge. The battery and its -defenders invited attack, but Admiral Warren could have no military -object to gain by attacking them. His official report[398] said “that -the enemy having a post at Hampton defended by a considerable corps -commanding the communication between the upper part of the country and -Norfolk, I considered it advisable, and with a view to cut off their -resources, to direct it to be attacked.” Hampton could not fairly be -said to “command” communication with Norfolk, a place which lay beyond -ten miles of water wholly commanded by the British fleet; but Warren -was not obliged to excuse himself for attacking wherever he pleased, -and Hampton served his object best. - -At dawn of June 25, Beckwith’s troops were set ashore about two miles -above the village, and moved forward to the road, taking Hampton in -the rear, while Cockburn’s launches made a feint from the front. The -militia, after resistance costing Beckwith a total loss of nearly -fifty men, escaped, and the British troops entered the town, where -they were allowed to do what they pleased with property and persons. -Lieutenant-Colonel Napier of the One Hundred-and-second regiment, -who commanded Beckwith’s advance, wrote in his diary that Sir Sydney -Beckwith “ought to have hanged several villains at Little Hampton; had -he so done, the Americans would not have complained; but every horror -was perpetrated with impunity,--rape, murder, pillage,--and not a man -was punished.” The British officers in general shared Napier’s disgust, -but alleged that the English troops took no part in the outrages, which -were wholly the work of the French chasseurs. - -Warren made no attempt to hold the town; the troops returned two days -afterward to their ships, and the Virginia militia resumed their -station; but when the details of the Hampton affair became known, the -story roused natural exasperation throughout the country, and gave in -its turn incitement to more violence in Canada. Admiral Warren and Sir -Sydney Beckwith did not deny the wrong; they dismissed their Frenchmen -from the service, and the United States had no further reason to -complain of that corps; but the double mortification seemed to lower -the British officers even in their own eyes to the level of marauders. - -After the failure to destroy the “Constellation,” Admiral Warren -could still indulge a hope of destroying the twenty-eight-gun frigate -“Adams,” and the navy-yard at Washington; for the defence of the -Potomac had been totally neglected, and only one indifferent fort, -about twelve miles below the Federal city, needed to be captured. July -1 the British squadron entered the Potomac; but beyond rousing a panic -at Washington it accomplished nothing, except to gain some knowledge of -the shoals and windings that impeded the ascent of the river. Leaving -the Potomac, Warren turned up Chesapeake Bay toward Annapolis and -Baltimore, but made no attempt on either place. During the rest of the -year he cruised about the bay, meeting little resistance, and keeping -the States of Virginia and Maryland in constant alarm. - -Cockburn was more active. In the month of July he was detached with -a squadron carrying Napier’s One Hundred-and-second regiment, and -arrived, July 12, off Ocracoke Inlet, where he captured two fine -privateers,--the “Atlas” and “Anaconda.” Thence he sailed southward, -and established himself for the winter on Cumberland Island, near the -Florida boundary, where he vexed the Georgians. Besides the property -consumed or wasted, he gave refuge to many fugitive slaves, whom he -assisted to the West Indies or Florida. “Strong is my dislike,” wrote -Napier, “to what is perhaps a necessary part of our job: namely, -plundering and ruining the peasantry. We drive all their cattle, and of -course ruin them. _My_ hands are clean; but it is hateful to see the -poor Yankees robbed, and to be the robber.” - -Compared with the widespread destruction which war brought on these -regions half a century afterward, the injury inflicted by the British -navy in 1813 was trifling, but it served to annoy the Southern -people, who could offer no resistance, and were harassed by incessant -militia-calls. To some extent the same system of vexation was pursued -on the Northern coast. The Delaware River was blockaded and its -shores much annoyed. New York was also blockaded, and Nantucket with -the adjacent Sounds became a British naval station. There Sir Thomas -Hardy, Nelson’s favorite, officer, commanded, in his flag-ship the -“Ramillies.” Hardy did not encourage marauding such as Cockburn -practised, but his blockade was still stringent, and its efficiency was -proved by the failure of Decatur’s efforts to evade it. - -Decatur commanded a squadron composed of the “United States,” its prize -frigate the “Macedonian,” and the sloop-of-war “Hornet,” which lay in -the harbor of New York, waiting for a chance to slip out. Impatient -at the steady watch kept by the British fleet off Sandy Hook, Decatur -brought his three ships through the East River into Long Island Sound. -He reached Montauk Point, May 29, only to find Hardy’s squadron waiting -for him. June 1 he made an attempt to run out, but was chased back, -and took refuge in the harbor of New London. A large British squadron -immediately closed upon the harbor, and Decatur not only lost hope -of getting to sea but became anxious for the safety of his ships. He -withdrew them as far as he could into the river, five miles above the -town, and took every precaution to repel attack. The British officers -were said to have declared that they would get the “Macedonian” back -“even if they followed her into a cornfield.” They did not make the -attempt, but their vigilance never relaxed, and Decatur was obliged to -remain all summer idle in port. He clung to the hope that when winter -approached he might still escape; but in the month of December the -country was scandalized by the publication of an official letter from -Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy, charging the people of New London -with the responsibility for his failure. - - “Some few nights since,” he wrote,[399] Dec. 20, 1813, “the weather - promised an opportunity for this squadron to get to sea, and it was - said on shore that we intended to make the attempt. In the course - of the evening two blue lights were burned on both the points at - the harbor’s mouth as signals to the enemy; and there is not a - doubt but that they have, by signals and otherwise, instantaneous - information of our movements. Great but unsuccessful exertions - have been made to detect those who communicated with the enemy - by signal.... Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated, - and have been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, - there are men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to - disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow their disbelief.” - -Decatur’s charge roused much ill feeling, and remained a subject of -extreme delicacy with the people of New London. Perhaps Decatur would -have done better not to make such an assertion until he could prove -its truth. That blue lights, as well as other lights, were often seen, -no one denied; but whether they came from British or from American -hands, or were burned on sea or on shore, were points much disputed. -The town of New London was three miles from the river’s mouth, and -Decatur’s squadron then lay at the town. At that distance the precise -position of a light in line with the British fleet might be mistaken. -Decatur’s report, if it proved anything, proved that the signals were -concerted, and were burnt from “both the points at the river’s mouth.” -If the British admiral wanted information, he could have found little -difficulty in obtaining it; but he would hardly have arranged a system -of signals as visible to Decatur as to himself. Even had he done so, he -might have employed men in his own service as well as Americans for the -purpose. Decatur’s letter admitted that he had made great exertions to -detect the culprits, but without success. - -The rigor of the British blockade extended no farther north than -the Vineyard and Nantucket. Captain Broke in the “Shannon,” with a -companion frigate, cruised off Boston harbor rather to watch for -ships-of-war than to interfere with neutral commerce. Along the coast -of Maine an illicit trade with the British provinces was so actively -pursued that one of the few American sloops-of-war, the “Enterprise,” -cruised there, holding smugglers, privateers, and petty marauders in -check. On no other portion of the coast would an armed national vessel -have been allowed to show itself, but the “Enterprise,” protected -by the bays and inlets of Maine, and favored by the absence of a -blockade, performed a useful service as a revenue cutter. She was -not a first-rate vessel. Originally a schooner, carrying twelve guns -and sixty men, she had taken part in the war with Tripoli. She was -afterward altered into a brig, and crowded with sixteen guns and a -hundred men. In 1813 she was commanded by Lieutenant William Burrows, -a Pennsylvanian, who entered the navy in 1799, and, like all the naval -heroes, was young,--not yet twenty-eight years old. - -On the morning of September 5, as the “Enterprise” was cruising -eastward, Burrows discovered in a bay near Portland a strange brig, -and gave chase. The stranger hoisted three English ensigns, fired -several guns, and stood for the “Enterprise.” Perhaps escape would -have been impossible; but the British captain might, without disgrace, -have declined to fight, for he was no match for the American. The -“Enterprise” measured about ninety-seven feet in length; the “Boxer,” -as the British brig was named, measured about eighty-four. The -“Enterprise” was nearly twenty-four feet in extreme width; the “Boxer” -slightly exceeded twenty-two feet. The “Enterprise” carried fourteen -eighteen-pound carronades and two long-nines; the “Boxer” carried -twelve eighteen-pound carronades and two long-sixes. The “Enterprise” -had a crew of one hundred and two men; the “Boxer” had only sixty-six -men on board. With such odds against him, the British captain might -have entertained some desperate hope of success, but could not have -expected it. - -The behavior of Captain Blyth of the “Boxer” showed consciousness of -his position, for he nailed his colors to the mast, and told his men -that they were not to be struck while he lived. The day was calm, -and the two brigs manœuvred for a time before coming together; but -at quarter-past three in the afternoon they exchanged their first -broadside within a stone’s throw of one another. The effect on both -vessels was destructive. Captain Blyth fell dead, struck full in the -body by an eighteen-pound shot. Lieutenant Burrows fell, mortally -wounded, struck by a canister shot. After another broadside, at -half-past three the “Enterprise” ranged ahead, crossed the “Boxer’s” -bow, and fired one or two more broadsides, until the “Boxer” hailed and -surrendered, her colors still nailed to the mast. - -Considering the disparity of force, the two brigs suffered nearly -in equal proportion. The “Boxer” lost seven men killed or mortally -wounded; the “Enterprise” lost four. The “Boxer” had thirteen wounded, -not fatally; the “Enterprise” had eight. The “Boxer’s” injuries were -not so severe as to prevent her captors from bringing her as a prize -to Portland; and no incident in this quasi-civil war touched the -sensibilities of the people more deeply than the common funeral of -the two commanders,--both well known and favorites in the service, -buried, with the same honors and mourners, in the graveyard at Portland -overlooking the scene of their battle. - -Neither the battle between the “Enterprise” and “Boxer,” nor any -measures that could be taken by sea or land, prevented a constant -traffic between Halifax and the New England ports not blockaded. The -United States government seemed afraid to interfere with it. The -newspapers asserted that hundreds of Americans were actually in Halifax -carrying on a direct trade, and that thousands of barrels of flour were -constantly arriving there from the United States in vessels carrying -the Swedish or other neutral flag. In truth the government could do -little to enforce its non-intercourse, and even that little might prove -mischievous. Nothing could be worse than the spirit of the people on -the frontier. Engaged in a profitable illicit commerce, they could only -be controlled by force, and any force not overwhelming merely provoked -violence or treason. The Navy Department had no vessels to send there, -and could not have prevented their capture if vessels in any number had -been sent. The Secretary of War had abandoned to the State governments -the defence of the coast. When Armstrong allotted garrisons to the -various military districts, he stationed one regiment, numbering three -hundred and fifty-two effectives, besides two hundred and sixty-three -artillerists, in Military District No. 1, which included the whole -coast north of Cape Cod, with the towns of Boston, Marblehead, Salem, -Gloucester, Portsmouth, Portland, and Eastport. Such a provision was -hardly sufficient for garrisoning the fort at Boston. The government -doubtless could spare no more of its small army, but for any military -or revenue purpose might almost as well have maintained in New England -no force whatever. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - -DURING the month of April, 1813, four American frigates lay in Boston -Harbor fitting for sea. The “President” and “Congress” returned to -that port Dec. 31, 1812. The “Constitution,” after her battle with the -“Java,” arrived at Boston February 27, 1813. The “Chesapeake” entered -in safety April 9, after an unprofitable cruise of four months. The -presence of these four frigates at Boston offered a chance for great -distinction to the British officer stationed off the port, and one -of the best captains in the service was there to seize it. In order -to tempt the American frigates to come out boldly, only two British -frigates, the “Shannon” and “Tenedos,” remained off the harbor. They -were commanded by Captain P. B. V. Broke of the “Shannon.” Broke -expected Rodgers with his ships, the “President” and “Congress,” to -seize the opportunity for a battle with two ships of no greater force -than the “Shannon” and “Tenedos;” but either Rodgers did not understand -the challenge or did not trust it, or took a different view of his -duties, for he went to sea on the night of April 30, leaving Broke -greatly chagrined and inclined to be somewhat indignant with him for -escaping.[400] - -After May 1, Broke on the watch outside, as he ran in toward Nahant, -could see the masts of only the “Constitution” and “Chesapeake” at -the Charlestown navy-yard, and his anxiety became the greater as he -noticed that the “Chesapeake” was apparently ready for sea.[401] May 25 -Broke sent away his consort, the “Tenedos,” to cruise from Cape Sable -southward, ostensibly because the two frigates cruising separately -would have a better chance of intercepting the “Chesapeake” than if -they kept together.[402] His stronger reason was to leave a fair field -for the “Chesapeake” and “Shannon,” as he had before kept all force at -a distance except the “Shannon” and “Tenedos” in order to tempt Rodgers -to fight.[403] That there might be no second misunderstanding, he sent -several messages to Captain Lawrence commanding the “Chesapeake,” -inviting a combat. - -Nothing showed so clearly that at least one object of the war had been -gained by the Americans as the habit adopted by both navies in 1813 of -challenging ship-duels. War took an unusual character when officers -like Hardy and Broke countenanced such a practice, discussing and -arranging duels between matched ships, on terms which implied that -England admitted half-a-dozen American frigates to be equal in value -to the whole British navy. The loss of a British frigate mattered -little to a government which had more than a hundred such frigates -actually at sea, not to speak of heavier ships; but the loss of the -“Chesapeake” was equivalent to destroying nearly one fourth of the -disposable American navy. Already the “Constellation” was imprisoned at -Norfolk; the “United States” and “Macedonian” were blockaded for the -war; the “Congress” though at sea was unseaworthy and never cruised -again; the “Adams” was shut in the Potomac; the “Essex” was in the -Pacific. The United States Navy consisted, for active service on the -Atlantic, of only the “President,” 44, at sea; the “Constitution,” 44, -replacing her masts at the Charlestown navy-yard; the “Chesapeake,” -38, ready for sea; and a few sloops-of-war. Under such circumstances, -British officers who like Broke considered every American frigate bound -to offer them equal terms in a duel, seemed to admit that the American -service had acquired the credit it claimed. - -The first duty of a British officer was to take risks; the first -duty of an American officer was to avoid them, and to fight only at -his own time, on his own terms. Rodgers properly declined to seek a -battle with Broke’s ships. Captain James Lawrence of the “Chesapeake” -was less cautious, for his experience in the war led him to think -worse of the British navy than it deserved. Lawrence commanded the -“Hornet” in Bainbridge’s squadron at the time of the “Java’s” capture. -Bainbridge and Lawrence blockaded the “Bonne Citoyenne,” a twenty-gun -sloop-of-war at San Salvador in Brazil. Lawrence sent a message to -the captain of the “Bonne Citoyenne” inviting him to come out and -meet the “Hornet.” The British captain declined, doubtless for proper -reasons; but the reason he gave seemed to Lawrence insufficient, for -it was merely that Commodore Bainbridge, in spite of his pledged -word, might interfere.[404] Bainbridge sailed about Christmas, and -was absent till January 3, capturing the “Java” in the interval. -January 6 he sailed for Boston, leaving Lawrence in the “Hornet” still -blockading the “Bonne Citoyenne,” which showed no more disposition to -fight the “Hornet” in Bainbridge’s absence than before, although the -British captain’s letter had said that “nothing could give me greater -satisfaction than complying with the wishes of Captain Lawrence” if the -single alleged objection were removed. - -The conduct of the “Bonne Citoyenne”--a vessel at least the equal of -the “Hornet”[405]--gave Lawrence a low opinion of the British service, -and his respect was not increased by his next experience. A British -seventy-four arrived at San Salvador, January 24, and obliged the -“Hornet” to abandon the “Bonne Citoyenne.” During the next month the -little vessel cruised northward along the Brazil coast, making a few -prizes, until February 24 off the mouth of Demerara River, at half-past -three o’clock in the afternoon, Captain Lawrence discovered a sail -approaching him. Within the bar at the mouth of the river, seven or -eight miles distant, he saw another vessel at anchor. Both were British -sloops-of-war. The one at anchor was the “Espiègle,” carrying eighteen -thirty-two-pound carronades. The other, approaching on the “Hornet’s” -weather-quarter, was the “Peacock,” carrying eighteen twenty-four-pound -carronades, two long-sixes, and one or two lighter pieces. - -The “Peacock,” according to British report,[406] had long been “the -admiration of her numerous visitors,” and was remarkable for the -elegance of her fittings; but in size she was inferior to the “Hornet.” -Lawrence reported his ship to be four feet the longer, but the British -believed the “Hornet” to measure one hundred and twelve feet in length, -while the “Peacock” measured one hundred.[407] Their breadth was the -same. The “Hornet” carried eighteen thirty-two-pounders, while the -British captain, thinking his sloop too light for thirty-twos, had -exchanged them for twenty-fours, and carried only sixteen. The American -crew numbered one hundred and thirty-five men fit for duty; the British -numbered one hundred and twenty-two men and boys. - -At ten minutes past five, Lawrence tacked and stood for the brig. -Fifteen minutes afterward the two vessels, sailing in opposite -directions, passed each other and exchanged broadsides within a -stone’s-throw. The British fire, even at point-blank range of forty -or fifty feet, did no harm, while the “Hornet’s” broadside must have -decided the battle; for although both vessels instantly wore, and -Lawrence at thirty-five minutes past five ran his enemy close aboard, -the “Peacock” almost immediately struck at thirty-nine minutes past -five in a sinking condition, and actually went down immediately -afterward, carrying with her nine of the “Peacock’s” wounded and three -of the “Hornet’s” crew. - -The ease of this victory was beyond proportion to the odds. The British -captain and four men were killed outright, thirty-three officers -and men were wounded, and the brig was sunk in an action of less -than fifteen minutes; while the “Hornet” lost one man killed and two -wounded, all aloft, and not a shot penetrated her hull. If the facility -of this triumph satisfied Lawrence of his easy superiority in battle, -the conduct of the “Espiègle” convinced him that the British service -was worse than incompetent. Lawrence, expecting every moment to see the -“Espiègle” get under weigh, made great exertions to put his ship in -readiness for a new battle, but to his astonishment the British brig -took no notice of the action.[408] Subsequent investigation showed that -the “Espiègle” knew nothing of the battle until the next day; but -Lawrence, assuming that the British captain must have seen or heard, -or at least ought to have suspected what was happening, conceived that -cowardice was a trait of the British navy. - -When Lawrence reached New York he became famous for his victory, and -received at once promotion. The “Hornet,” given to Captain Biddle, -was attached to Decatur’s squadron and blockaded at New London, while -Lawrence received command of the “Chesapeake.” Lawrence was then -thirty-two years old; he was born in New Jersey in 1781, entered -the navy in 1798, and served in the war with Tripoli. He was first -lieutenant on the “Constitution,” and passed to the grade of commander -in 1810, commanding successively the “Vixen,” the “Wasp,” the “Argus,” -and the “Hornet.” His appointment to the “Chesapeake” was an accident, -owing to the ill health of Captain Evans, who commanded her on her -recent cruise. The “Chesapeake’s” reputation for ill luck clung to her -so persistently that neither officers nor men cared greatly to sail in -her, and Lawrence would have preferred to remain in the “Hornet;”[409] -but his instructions were positive, and he took command of the -“Chesapeake” about the middle of May. Most of the officers and crew -were new. The old crew on reaching port, April 9, had been discharged, -and left the ship, dissatisfied with their share of prize-money, and -preferring to try the privateer service. The new crew was unequal in -quality and required training; they neither knew their officers nor -each other. - -Lawrence’s opponent, Captain Broke of the “Shannon,” was an officer -whose courage could as little be questioned as his energy or skill. -Among all the commanders in the British service Broke had profited -most by the lessons of the war. More than seven years’ experience of -his ship and crew gave him every advantage of discipline and system. -Nearly every day the officers at the Charlestown navy-yard could -see the “Shannon” outside, practising her guns at floating targets -as she sailed about the bay. Broke’s most anxious wish was to fight -the “Chesapeake,” which he considered to be of the same size with -the “Shannon.”[410] The two frigates were the same length within -a few inches,--between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and -fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within a few inches. -The “Chesapeake” carried eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades -on the spar-deck; the “Shannon” carried sixteen. Each carried -twenty-eight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The “Chesapeake” -carried also two long twelve-pounders and a long eighteen-pounder, -besides a twelve-pound carronade. The “Shannon” carried four long -nine-pounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound carronades. -The “Chesapeake’s” only decided advantage was in the number of her -crew, which consisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, while the -“Shannon” carried three hundred and thirty all told. - -Broke sent the “Tenedos” away May 25, but Lawrence was not aware of -it, and wrote, May 27, to Captain Biddle of the “Hornet” a letter, -showing that till the last moment he hoped not to sail in the -“Chesapeake:”[411]-- - - “In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart, I neglected writing - to you according to promise; but as I have given over all hopes - of seeing him, and the ‘Chesapeake’ is almost ready, I shall sail - on Sunday, provided I have a chance of getting out clear of the - ‘Shannon’ and ‘Tenedos,’ who are on the look-out.” - -Sunday, May 30, the ship was ready, though the crew was not as good or -as well disciplined as it should have been, and showed some discontent -owing to difficulties about prize-money. On the morning of June 1 -the frigate was lying in President’s Roads, when between eight and -nine o’clock the second lieutenant, George Budd, reported a sail in -sight. Captain Lawrence went up the main rigging, and having made out -the sail to be a large frigate, ordered the crew to be mustered, and -told them he meant to fight. At midday he stood down the harbor and -out to sea. The “Shannon,” outside, stood off under easy sail, and -led the way until five o’clock, when she luffed and waited till the -“Chesapeake” came up. As the wind was westerly, Lawrence had the -choice of position, but he made no attempt to profit by his advantage, -although it might have been decisive. Bringing the “Chesapeake” with -a fresh breeze directly down on the “Shannon’s” quarter, at half-past -five he luffed, at about fifty yards distance, and ranged up abeam on -the “Shannon’s” starboard side. - -The “Shannon” opened fire as her guns began to bear, but discharged -only her two sternmost guns when the “Chesapeake” replied. The -two ships ran on about seven minutes, or about the length of time -necessary for two discharges of the first guns fired, when, some of the -“Shannon’s” shot having cut away the “Chesapeake’s” foretopsail tie and -jib-sheet, the ship came up into the wind and was taken aback. Lying -with her larboard quarter toward the “Shannon’s” side, at some forty -or fifty yards distance, she began to drift toward her enemy. None of -the “Chesapeake’s” guns then bore on the “Shannon,” and the American -frigate wholly ceased firing. - -From the moment the “Chesapeake” was taken aback she was a beaten ship, -and the crew felt it. She could be saved only by giving her headway, -or by boarding the “Shannon;” but neither expedient was possible. The -effort to make sail forward was tried, and proved futile. The idea -of boarding was also in Lawrence’s mind, but the situation made it -impracticable. As the “Chesapeake” drifted stern-foremost toward the -“Shannon,” every gun in the British broadside swept the American deck -diagonally from stern to stem, clearing the quarter-deck and beating -in the stern-ports, while the musketry from the “Shannon’s” tops killed -the men at the “Chesapeake’s” wheel, and picked off every officer, -sailor, or marine in the after-part of the ship. Boarders could not be -rallied under a fire which obliged them to seek cover. The men on the -spar-deck left their stations, crowding forward or going below. - -[Illustration: _Chesapeake_ _Shannon_] - -Nevertheless, Lawrence ordered up his boarders,--he could do nothing -else; but the affair hurried with such rapidity to its close that -almost at the same instant the “Chesapeake’s” quarter touched the -“Shannon” amidships. From the moment when the “Chesapeake” was taken -aback until the moment when she fell foul, only four minutes were given -for Lawrence to act. Before these four minutes were at an end, he was -struck and mortally wounded by a musket-ball from the “Shannon.” His -first lieutenant, Ludlow, had already been carried below, wounded. His -second lieutenant, Budd, was stationed below. His third lieutenant, -Cox, improperly assisted Lawrence to reach the gun-deck. Not an officer -remained on the spar-deck, and neither an officer nor a living man was -on the quarter-deck when the “Chesapeake’s” quarter came against the -“Shannon’s” gangway, as though inviting the British captain to take -possession. - -As the ships fouled, Broke ran forward and called for boarders. With -about twenty men he stepped on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, and -was followed by thirty more before the ships parted. The error should -have cost him his life and the lives of all who were with him, for the -Americans might easily have killed every man of the boarding-party in -spite of the fire from the “Shannon.” For several moments Broke was in -the utmost peril, not only from the American crew but from his own. His -first lieutenant, Watt, hastening to haul down the American ensign, -was killed by the discharge of a cannon from the “Shannon;” and when -Broke, leaving the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, went forward to clear -the forecastle, enough of the American crew were there to make a sharp -resistance. Broke himself was obliged to take part in the scuffle. -According to his report, he “received a severe sabre-wound at the first -onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy who had rallied on their -forecastle.” According to another British account he was first knocked -down with the butt-end of a musket, and then was cut by a broadsword. -Of his fifty boarders, not less than thirty-seven were killed or -wounded.[412] - -Had the American crew been in a proper state of discipline, the -struggle would have taken an extraordinary character, and the two -ships might have renewed the combat, without officers, and in a more -or less unmanageable condition. Fortunately for Broke, his fifty men -outnumbered the Americans on the spar-deck, while the men below, for -the most part, would not come up. About a score of sailors and marines -were on the forecastle, and about a dozen more rushed up from below, -led by the second lieutenant, George Budd, as soon as he, at his -station on the main-deck, learned what was happening above; but so -rapidly did the whole affair pass, that in two minutes the scuffle was -over, the Americans were killed or thrown down the hatchway, and the -ship was helpless, with its spar-deck in the hands of Broke’s boarders. -The guns ceased firing, and the crew below surrendered after some -musket-shots up and down the hatchways. - -The disgrace to the Americans did not consist so much in the loss of a -ship to one of equal force, as in the shame of suffering capture by a -boarding-party of fifty men. As Lawrence lay wounded in the cockpit, he -saw the rush of his men from the spar-deck down the after-ladders, and -cried out repeatedly and loudly, “Don’t give up the ship! blow her up!” -He was said to have added afterward: “I could have stood the wreck if -it had not been for the boarding.” - -Doubtless the “Shannon” was the better ship, and deserved to win. -Her crew could under no circumstances have behaved like the crew of -the “Chesapeake.” In discipline she was admittedly superior; but -the question of superiority in other respects was not decided. The -accident that cut the “Chesapeake’s” jib-sheet and brought her into the -wind was the only decisive part of the battle, and was mere ill luck, -such as pursued the “Chesapeake” from the beginning. As far as could be -seen, in the favorite American work of gunnery the “Shannon” showed no -superiority. - -On that point the reports agreed. The action began at half-past -five o’clock in the afternoon at close range. In seven minutes the -“Chesapeake” forged ahead, came into the wind and ceased firing, as -none of her guns could be made to bear. Seven minutes allowed time at -the utmost for two discharges of some of her guns. No more guns were -fired from the “Chesapeake” till she drifted close to the “Shannon.” -Then her two sternmost guns, the thirteenth and fourteenth on the -main deck, again bore on the enemy, and were depressed and fired by -Lieutenant Cox while the boarders were fighting on the spar-deck.[413] -Thus the number of discharges from the “Chesapeake’s” guns could be -known within reasonable certainty. She carried in her broadside nine -thirty-two-pounders and fourteen or fifteen eighteen-pounders, besides -one twelve-pounder,--twenty-five guns. Assuming them to have been -all discharged twice, although the forward guns could scarcely have -been discharged more than once, the “Chesapeake” could have fired -only fifty-two shot, including the two eighteen-pounders fired by -Lieutenant Cox at the close. - -According to the official report nearly every shot must have taken -effect. The “Shannon” was struck by thirteen thirty-two-pound shot; -the “Chesapeake” fired only eighteen, if she discharged every gun -twice. The “Shannon” was struck by twelve eighteen-pound shot, fourteen -bar-shot, and one hundred and nineteen grape-shot; the “Chesapeake’s” -fifteen eighteen-pounders could hardly have done more in the space of -seven minutes. In truth, every shot that was fired probably took effect. - -The casualties showed equal efficiency of fire, and when compared -with other battles were severe. When the “Guerriere” struck to the -“Constitution” in the previous year, she had lost in half an hour of -close action twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and fifty-six more -or less injured. The “Shannon” seems to have lost in eleven minutes, -before boarding, twenty-seven men killed or mortally wounded and -nineteen more or less injured.[414] - -The relative efficiency of the “Shannon’s” gunnery was not so -clear, because the “Shannon’s” battery continued to fire after the -“Chesapeake” ceased. As the “Chesapeake” drifted down on the “Shannon” -she was exposed to the broadside of the British frigate, while herself -unable to fire a gun. - - “The shot from the ‘Shannon’s’ aftermost guns now had a fair - range along the ‘Chesapeake’s’ decks,” said the British - account,[415] “beating in the stern-ports and sweeping the men - from their quarters. The shots from the foremost guns at the same - time entering the ports from the mainmast aft did considerable - execution.” - -Broke’s biographer[416] said that the “Chesapeake” fired but one -broadside, and then coming into the wind drifted down, “exposed while -making this crippled and helpless movement to the ‘Shannon’s’ second -and most deliberate broadside.” The “Chesapeake” was very near, almost -touching the British frigate during the four or five minutes of this -fire, and every shot must have taken effect. Broke ordered the firing -to cease when he boarded, but one gun was afterward discharged, and -killed the British first lieutenant as he was lowering the American -flag on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck. - -The “Shannon’s” fire lasted eleven or twelve minutes. She -carried twenty-five guns in broadside.[417] Eight of these were -thirty-two-pound carronades, and the official report showed that the -“Chesapeake” was struck by twenty-five thirty-two-pound shot, showing -that three full broadsides were fired from the “Shannon,” and at least -one gun was discharged four times. The “Shannon’s” broadside also -carried fourteen eighteen-pounders, which threw twenty-nine shot into -the “Chesapeake,” besides much canister and grape. Considering that -at least half the “Shannon’s” shot were fired at so close a range -that they could not fail to take effect, nothing proved that her guns -were better served than those of the “Chesapeake.” The “Shannon,” -according to the British account, fired twice as many shot under twice -as favorable conditions, but the injury she inflicted was not twice -the injury inflicted in return. Setting aside the grape-shot, the -“Chesapeake” struck the “Shannon” thirty-nine times; the “Shannon” -struck the “Chesapeake” fifty-seven times. Including the grape-shot, -which Broke used freely, the “Shannon” probably did better, but even -with a liberal allowance for grape and canister, nothing proved her -superiority at the guns. - -The loss in men corresponded with the injury to the ships. The -“Shannon” lost eighty-three killed and wounded; the “Chesapeake” lost -one hundred and forty-six. Thirty-three of the “Shannon’s” men were -killed or died of their wounds; sixty-one of the “Chesapeake’s” number -were killed or mortally wounded. - -The injuries suffered by the “Chesapeake” told the same story, for -they were chiefly in the stern, and were inflicted by the “Shannon’s” -second and third broadsides, after the “Chesapeake” ceased firing. The -“Chesapeake’s” bowsprit received no injury, and not a spar of any kind -was shot away. The “Shannon” carried her prize into Halifax with all -its masts standing, and without anxiety for its safety. - -The news of Broke’s victory was received in England and by the British -navy with an outburst of pleasure that proved the smart of the -wound inflicted by Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge. The two official -expressions of Broke’s naval and civil superiors probably reflected the -unexaggerated emotion of the service. - - “At this critical moment,” wrote Admiral Warren[418] by a curious - coincidence the day before his own somewhat less creditable defeat - at Craney Island, “you could not have restored to the British naval - service the pre-eminence it has always preserved, or contradicted - in a more forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies of - a conceited, boasting enemy, than by the brilliant act you have - performed.” - -A few days later he wrote again:[419]-- - - “The relation of such an event restores the history of ancient - times, and will do more good to the service than it is possible to - conceive.” - -In Parliament, July 8, John Wilson Croker said:[420] - - “The action which he [Broke] fought with the ‘Chesapeake’ was in - every respect unexampled. It was not--and he knew it was a bold - assertion which he made--to be surpassed by any engagement which - graced the naval annals of Great Britain.” - -The Government made Broke a baronet, but gave him few other rewards, -and his wound was too serious to permit future hard service. Lawrence -died June 5, before the ships reached Halifax. His first lieutenant, -Ludlow, also died. Their bodies were brought to New York and buried -September 16, with formal services at Trinity Church. - -By the Americans the defeat was received at first with incredulity and -boundless anxiety, followed by extreme discouragement. The news came at -a dark moment, when every hope had been disappointed and the outlook -was gloomy beyond all that had been thought possible. - - “I remember,” wrote Richard Rush in later life,--“what American - does not!--the first rumor of it. I remember the startling - sensation. I remember at first the universal incredulity. I - remember how the post-offices were thronged for successive days - by anxious thousands; how collections of citizens rode out for - miles on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something by - anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known, I remember the - public gloom; funeral orations and badges of mourning bespoke it. - ‘Don’t give up the ship!’--the dying words of Lawrence--were on - every tongue.” - -Six weeks afterward another American naval captain lost another -American vessel-of-war by reason of the same over-confidence which -caused Lawrence’s mistakes, and in a manner equally discreditable to -the crew. The “Argus” was a small brig, built in 1803, rating sixteen -guns. In the summer of 1813 she was commanded by Captain W. H. Allen, -of Rhode Island, who had been third officer to Barron when he was -attacked in the “Chesapeake” by the “Leopard.” Allen was the officer -who snatched a coal from the galley and discharged the only gun that -was fired that day. On leaving the “Chesapeake,” Allen was promoted to -be first officer in the “United States.” To his exertions in training -the men to the guns, Decatur attributed his superiority in gunnery over -the “Macedonian.” To him fell one of the most distinguished honors -that ever came to the share of an American naval officer,--that of -successfully bringing the “Macedonian” to port. Promoted to the rank -of captain, he was put in command of the “Argus,” and ordered to take -William Henry Crawford to his post as Minister to France. - -On that errand the “Argus” sailed, June 18, and after safely landing -Crawford, July 11, at Lorient in Brittany, Captain Allen put to sea -again, three days afterward, and in pursuance of his instructions -cruised off the mouth of the British Channel. During an entire -month he remained between the coast of Brittany and the coast of -Ireland, destroying a score of vessels and creating a panic among the -ship-owners and underwriters of London. Allen performed his task with -as much forbearance as the duty permitted, making no attempt to save -his prizes for the sake of prize-money, and permitting all passengers -to take what they claimed as their own without inspection or restraint. -The English whose property he destroyed spoke of him without personal -ill-feeling. - -The anxiety and labor of such a service falling on a brig of three -hundred tons and a crew of a hundred men, and the impunity with which -he defied danger, seemed to make Allen reckless. On the night of August -13 he captured a brig laden with wine from Oporto. Within sight of -the Welsh coast and within easy reach of Milford Haven, he burned his -prize, not before part of his crew got drunk on the wine. The British -brig “Pelican,” then cruising in search of the “Argus,” guided by the -light of the burning prize, at five o’clock on the morning of August -14 came down on the American brig; and Captain Allen, who had often -declared that he would run from no two-masted vessel, waited for his -enemy. - -According to British measurements, the “Argus” was ninety-five and -one-half feet long; the “Pelican,” one hundred. The “Argus” was -twenty-seven feet, seven and five-eighths inches in extreme breadth; -the “Pelican” was thirty feet, nine inches. The “Argus” carried -eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, and two long twelve-pounders; -the “Pelican” carried sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, four long -six-pounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The number of the “Argus’s” -crew was disputed. According to British authority, it was one hundred -and twenty-seven,[421] while the “Pelican” carried one hundred and -sixteen men and boys.[422] - -At six o’clock in the morning, according to American -reckoning,[423]--at half-past five according to the British -report,--the “Argus” wore, and fired a broadside within grape-distance, -which was returned with cannon and musketry. Within five minutes -Captain Allen was struck by a shot which carried away his left leg, -mortally wounding him; and five minutes afterward the first lieutenant -was wounded on the head by a grape-shot. Although the second lieutenant -fought the brig well, the guns were surprisingly inefficient. During -the first fifteen minutes the “Argus” had the advantage of position, -and at eighteen minutes after six raked the “Pelican” at close range, -but inflicted no great injury on the enemy’s hull or rigging, and -killed at the utmost but one man, wounding only five. According to an -English account,[424] “the ‘Argus’ fought well while the cannonading -continued, but her guns were not levelled with precision, and many -shots passed through the ‘Pelican’s’ royals.” The “Pelican,” at the -end of twenty-five minutes, succeeded in cutting up her opponent’s -rigging so that the “Argus” lay helpless under her guns. The “Pelican” -then took a position on her enemy’s starboard quarter, and raked her -with eight thirty-two-pound carronades for nearly twenty minutes at -close range, without receiving a shot in return except from musketry. -According to the report of the British captain, the action “was kept -up with great spirit on both sides forty-three minutes, when we lay -her alongside, and were in the act of boarding when she struck her -colors.”[425] - -The “Argus” repeated the story of the “Chesapeake,” except that the -action lasted three quarters of an hour instead of fifteen minutes. -During that time, the “Pelican” should have fired all her broadside -eight or ten times into the “Argus” at a range so close that no shot -should have missed. Sixty thirty-two-pound shot fired into a small brig -less than one hundred feet long should have shivered it to atoms. Nine -thirty-two-pound shot from the “Hornet” seemed to reduce the “Peacock” -to a sinking condition in fifteen minutes; yet the “Argus” was neither -sunk nor dismasted. The British account of her condition after the -battle showed no more injury than was suffered by the “Peacock,” even -in killed and wounded, by one or at the utmost two broadsides of the -“Hornet.” - - “The ‘Argus’ was tolerably cut up in her hull. Both her lower masts - were wounded, although not badly, and her fore-shrouds on one side - nearly all destroyed; but like the ‘Chesapeake,’ the ‘Argus’ had no - spar shot away. Of her carronades several were disabled. She lost - in the action six seamen killed; her commander, two midshipmen, - the carpenter, and three seamen mortally, her first lieutenant and - five seamen severely, and eight others slightly wounded,--total - twenty-four; chiefly, if not wholly by the cannon-shot of the - ‘Pelican.’”[426] - -The “Pelican” lost seven men killed or wounded, chiefly by musketry. On -both sides the battle showed little skill with the guns; but perhaps -the “Pelican,” considering her undisputed superiority during half the -combat, showed even less than the “Argus.” As in the “Chesapeake’s” -battle, the discredit of the defeated ship lay in surrender to boarders. - -Two such defeats were calculated to shake confidence in the American -navy. That Allen should have been beaten in gunnery was the more -strange, because his training with the guns gave him his chief credit -with Decatur. Watson, the second lieutenant of the “Argus,” attributed -the defeat to the fatigue of his crew. Whatever was the immediate -cause, no one could doubt that both the “Chesapeake” and “Argus” were -sacrificed to the over-confidence of their commanders. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - - -THE people of the Atlantic coast felt the loss of the “Chesapeake” none -too keenly. Other nations had a history to support them in moments of -mortification, or had learned by centuries of experience to accept -turns of fortune as the fate of war. The American of the sea-coast -was not only sensitive and anxious, but he also saw with singular -clearness the bearing of every disaster, and did not see with equal -distinctness the general drift of success. The loss of the “Chesapeake” -was a terrible disaster, not merely because it announced the quick -recovery of England’s pride and power from a momentary shock, but -also because it threatened to take away the single object of American -enthusiasm which redeemed shortcomings elsewhere. After the loss of -the “Chesapeake,” no American frigate was allowed the opportunity to -fight with an equal enemy. The British frigates, ordered to cruise in -company, gave the Americans no chance to renew their triumphs of 1812. - -Indeed, the experience of 1813 tended to show that the frigate was no -longer the class of vessel best suited to American wants. Excessively -expensive compared with their efficiency, the “Constitution,” -“President,” and “United States” could only with difficulty obtain -crews; and when after much delay they were ready for sea, they could -not easily evade a blockading squadron. The original cost of a frigate -varied from two hundred thousand dollars to three hundred thousand; -that of a sloop-of-war, like the “Hornet,” “Wasp,” or “Argus,” varied -between forty and fifty thousand dollars. The frigate required a crew -of about four hundred men; the sloop carried about one hundred and -fifty. The annual expense of a frigate in active service was about -one hundred and thirty-four thousand dollars; that of the brig was -sixty thousand. The frigate required much time and heavy timber in -her construction; the sloop could be built quickly and of ordinary -material. The loss of a frigate was a severe national disaster; the -loss of a sloop was not a serious event. - -For defensive purposes neither the frigate nor the brig counted -heavily against a nation which employed ships-of-the-line by dozens; -but even for offensive objects the frigate was hardly so useful as -the sloop-of-war. The record of the frigates for 1813 showed no -results equivalent to their cost. Their cruises were soon told. The -“President,” leaving Boston April 30, ran across to the Azores, -thence to the North Sea, and during June and July haunted the shores -of Norway, Scotland, and Ireland, returning to Newport September 27, -having taken thirteen prizes. The “Congress,” which left Boston with -the “President,” cruised nearly eight months in the Atlantic, and -returned to Boston December 14, having captured but four merchantmen. -The “Chesapeake,” which sailed from Boston Dec. 13, 1812, cruised -four months in the track of British commerce, past Madeira and Cape -de Verde, across the equator, and round through the West Indies, -returning to Boston April 9, having taken six prizes; at the beginning -of her next cruise, June 1, the “Chesapeake” was herself captured. -The adventures of the “Essex” in the Pacific were such as might have -been equally well performed by a sloop-of-war, and belonged rather to -the comparative freedom with which the frigates moved in 1812 than to -the difficult situation that followed. No other frigates succeeded in -getting to sea till December 4, when the “President” sailed again. -The injury inflicted by the frigates on the Atlantic was therefore -the capture of twenty-three merchantmen in a year. At the close of -1813, the “President” and the “Essex” were the only frigates at -sea; the “Constitution” sailed from Boston only Jan. 1, 1814; the -“United States” and “Macedonian” were blockaded at New London; the -“Constellation” was still at Norfolk; the “Adams” was at Washington, -and the “Congress” at Boston. - -When this record was compared with that of the sloops-of-war the -frigates were seen to be luxuries. The sloop-of-war was a single-decked -vessel, rigged sometimes as a ship, sometimes as a brig, but never as -a sloop, measuring about one hundred and ten feet in length by thirty -in breadth, and carrying usually eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades -and two long twelve-pounders. Of this class the American navy possessed -in 1812 only four examples,--the “Hornet,” the “Wasp,” the “Argus,” -and the “Syren.” The “Wasp” was lost Oct. 18, 1812, after capturing -the “Frolic.” The “Syren” remained at New Orleans during the first -year of the war, and then came to Boston, but saw no ocean service of -importance during 1813. The “Hornet” made three prizes, including the -sloop-of-war “Peacock,” and was then blockaded with the “United States” -and “Macedonian;” but the smaller vessel could do what the frigates -could not, and in November the “Hornet” slipped out of New London and -made her way to New York, where she waited an opportunity to escape to -sea. The story will show her success. Finally, the “Argus” cruised for -a month in the British Channel, and made twenty-one prizes before she -was captured by the “Pelican.” - -The three frigates, “President,” “Congress,” and “Chesapeake,” -captured twenty-three prizes in the course of the year, and lost the -“Chesapeake.” The two sloops, the “Hornet” and “Argus,” captured -twenty-four prizes, including the sloop-of-war “Peacock,” and lost the -“Argus.” - -The government at the beginning of the war owned four smaller -vessels,--the “Nautilus” and “Vixen” of fourteen guns, and the -“Enterprise” and “Viper” of twelve. Another brig, the “Rattlesnake,” -sixteen, was bought. Experience seemed to prove that these were of -little use. The “Nautilus” fell into the hands of Broke’s squadron July -16, 1812, within a month after the declaration of war. The “Vixen” was -captured Nov. 22, 1812, by Sir James Yeo. The “Viper,” Jan. 17, 1813, -became prize to Captain Lumley in the British frigate “Narcissus.” The -“Enterprise” distinguished itself by capturing the “Boxer,” and was -regarded as a lucky vessel, but was never a good or fast one.[427] The -“Rattlesnake,” though fast, was at last caught on a lee shore by the -frigate “Leander,” July 11, 1814, and carried into Halifax.[428] - -In the enthusiasm over the frigates in 1812, Congress voted that six -forty-fours should be built, besides four ships-of-the-line. The Act -was approved Jan. 2, 1813. Not until March 3 did Congress pass an Act -for building six new sloops-of-war. The loss of two months was not -the only misfortune in this legislation. Had the sloops been begun in -January, they might have gone to sea by the close of the year. The -six sloops were all launched within eleven months from the passage of -the bill, and the first of them, the “Frolic,” got to sea within that -time, while none of the frigates or line-of-battle ships could get -to sea within two years of the passage of the law. A more remarkable -oversight was the building of only six sloops, when an equal number of -forty-fours and four seventy-fours were ordered. Had Congress voted -twenty-four sloops, the proportion would not have been improper; but -perhaps the best policy would have been to build fifty such sloops, and -to prohibit privateering. The reasons for such a course were best seen -in the experiences of the privateers. - -The history of the privateers was never satisfactorily written. Neither -their number, their measurements, their force, their captures, nor -their losses were accurately known. Little ground could be given for -an opinion in regard to their economy. Only with grave doubt could -any judgment be reached even in regard to their relative efficiency -compared with government vessels of the same class. Yet their -experience was valuable, and their services were very great. - -In the summer of 1812 any craft that could keep the sea in fine weather -set out as a privateer to intercept vessels approaching the coast. -The typical privateer of the first few months was the pilot-boat, -armed with one or two long-nine or twelve-pound guns. Of twenty-six -privateers sent from New York in the first four months of war, fifteen -carried crews of eighty men or less. These small vessels especially -infested the West Indies, where fine weather and light breezes suited -their qualities. After the seas had been cleared of such prey as these -petty marauders could manage, they were found to be unprofitable,--too -small to fight and too light to escape. The typical privateer of 1813 -was a larger vessel,--a brig or schooner of two or three hundred -tons, armed with one long pivot-gun, and six or eight lighter guns in -broadside; carrying crews which varied in number from one hundred and -twenty to one hundred and sixty men; swift enough to escape under most -circumstances even a frigate, and strong enough to capture any armed -merchantman. - -After the war was fairly begun, the British mercantile shipping always -sailed either under convoy or as armed “running ships” that did not -wait for the slow and comparatively rare opportunities of convoy, but -trusted to their guns for defence. The new American privateer was -adapted to meet both chances. Two or three such craft hanging about a -convoy could commonly cut off some merchantman, no matter how careful -the convoying man-of-war might be. By night they could run directly -into the fleet and cut out vessels without even giving an alarm, and -by day they could pick up any craft that lagged behind or happened to -stray too far away. Yet the “running ships” were the chief objects of -their search, for these were the richest prizes; and the capture of a -single such vessel, if it reached an American port in safety, insured -success to the cruise. The loss of these vessels caused peculiar -annoyance to the British, for they sometimes carried considerable -amounts of specie, and usually were charged with a mail which was -always sunk and lost in case of capture. - -As the war continued, experience taught the owners of privateers the -same lesson that was taught to the government. The most efficient -vessel of war corresponded in size with the “Hornet” or the new -sloops-of-war building in 1813. Tonnage was so arbitrary a mode of -measurement that little could be learned from the dimensions of five -hundred tons commonly given for these vessels; but in a general way -they might be regarded as about one hundred and fifteen or one hundred -and twenty feet long on the spar-deck and thirty-one feet in extreme -breadth. Unless such vessels were swift sailers, particularly handy in -working to windward, they were worse than useless; and for that reason -the utmost effort was made both by the public and private constructors -to obtain speed. At the close of the war the most efficient vessel -afloat was probably the American sloop-of-war, or privateer, of four -or five hundred tons, rigged as a ship or brig, and carrying one -hundred and fifty or sixty men, with a battery varying according to the -ideas of the captain and owners, but in the case of privateers almost -invariably including one “long Tom,” or pivot-gun. - -Yet for privateering purposes the smaller craft competed closely with -the larger. For ordinary service no vessel could do more effective work -in a more economical way than was done by Joshua Barney’s “Rossie” of -Baltimore, or Boyle’s “Comet” of the same port, or Champlin’s “General -Armstrong” of New York,--schooners or brigs of two or three hundred -tons, uncomfortable to their officers and crews, but most dangerous -enemies to merchantmen. Vessels of this class came into favor long -before the war, because of their speed, quickness in handling, and -economy during the experience of twenty years in blockade-running and -evasion of cruisers. Such schooners could be built in any Northern -sea-port in six weeks or two months at half the cost of a government -cruiser. - -The government sloop-of-war was not built for privateering purposes. -Every government vessel was intended chiefly to fight, and required -strength in every part and solidity throughout. The frame needed to be -heavy to support the heavier structure; the quarters needed to be thick -to protect the men at the guns from grape and musketry; the armament -was as weighty as the frame would bear. So strong were the sides of -American frigates that even thirty-two-pound shot fired at forty or -fifty feet distance sometimes failed to penetrate, and the British -complained as a grievance that the sides of an American forty-four -were thicker than those of a British seventy-four.[429] The American -ship-builders spared no pains to make all their vessels in every -respect--in size, strength, and speed--superior to the vessels with -which they were to compete; but the government ship-carpenter had a -harder task than the private ship-builder, for he was obliged to obtain -greater speed at the same time that he used heavier material than the -British constructors. As far as the navy carpenters succeeded in their -double object, they did so by improving the model and increasing the -proportions of the spars. - -The privateer was built for no such object. The last purpose of a -privateer was to fight at close range, and owners much preferred that -their vessels, being built to make money, should not fight at all -unless much money could be made. The private armed vessel was built -rather to fly than to fight, and its value depended far more on its -ability to escape than on its capacity to attack. If the privateer -could sail close to the wind, and wear or tack in the twinkling of an -eye; if she could spread an immense amount of canvas and run off as -fast as a frigate before the wind; if she had sweeps to use in a calm, -and one long-range gun pivoted amidships, with plenty of men in case -boarding became necessary,--she was perfect. To obtain these results -the builders and sailors ran excessive risks. Too lightly built and -too heavily sparred, the privateer was never a comfortable or a safe -vessel. Beautiful beyond anything then known in naval construction, -such vessels roused boundless admiration, but defied imitators. British -constructors could not build them, even when they had the models; -British captains could not sail them; and when British admirals, -fascinated by their beauty and tempted by the marvellous qualities of -their model, ordered such a prize to be taken into the service, the -first act of the carpenters in the British navy-yards was to reduce -to their own standard the long masts, and to strengthen the hull and -sides till the vessel should be safe in a battle or a gale. Perhaps an -American navy-carpenter must have done the same; but though not a line -in the model might be altered, she never sailed again as she sailed -before. She could not bear conventional restraints. - -Americans were proud of their privateers, as they well might be; for -this was the first time when in competition with the world, on an -element open to all, they proved their capacity to excel, and produced -a creation as beautiful as it was practical. The British navy took a -new tone in regard to these vessels. Deeply as the American frigates -and sloops-of-war had wounded the pride of the British navy, they -never had reduced that fine service to admitted inferiority. Under one -pretext or another, every defeat was excused. Even the superiority of -American gunnery was met by the proud explanation that the British -navy, since Trafalgar, had enjoyed no opportunity to use their -guns. Nothing could convince a British admiral that Americans were -better fighters than Englishmen; but when he looked at the American -schooner he frankly said that England could show no such models, and -could not sail them if she had them. In truth, the schooner was a -wonderful invention. Not her battles, but her escapes won for her the -open-mouthed admiration of the British captains, who saw their prize -double like a hare and slip through their fingers at the moment when -capture was sure. Under any ordinary condition of wind and weather, -with an open sea, the schooner, if only she could get to windward, -laughed at a frigate. - -As the sailing rather than the fighting qualities of the privateer -were the chief object of her construction, those were the points best -worth recording; but the newspapers of the time were so much absorbed -in proving that Americans could fight, as to cause almost total neglect -of the more important question whether Americans could sail better than -their rivals. All great nations had fought, and at one time or another -every great nation in Europe had been victorious over every other; but -no people, in the course of a thousand years of rivalry on the ocean, -had invented or had known how to sail a Yankee schooner. Whether ship, -brig, schooner, or sloop, the American vessel was believed to outsail -any other craft on the ocean, and the proof of this superiority was -incumbent on the Americans to furnish. They neglected to do so. No -clear evidence was ever recorded of the precise capacities of their -favorite vessels. Neither the lines of the hull, the dimensions of the -spars, the rates of sailing by the log in different weather, the points -of sailing,--nothing precise was ever set down. - -Of the superiority no doubts could be entertained. The best proof of -the American claim was the British admission. Hardly an English writer -on marine affairs--whether in newspapers, histories, or novels--failed -to make some allusion to the beauty and speed of American vessels. The -naval literature of Great Britain from 1812 to 1860 was full of such -material. The praise of the invention was still commonly accompanied -by some expression of dislike for the inventor, but even in that -respect a marked change followed the experiences of 1812–1814. Among -the Englishmen living on the island of Jamaica, and familiar with the -course of events in the West Indies from 1806 to 1817, was one Michael -Scott, born in Glasgow in 1789, and in the prime of his youth at the -time of the American war. In the year 1829, at the age of forty, he -began the publication in “Blackwood’s Magazine” of a series of sketches -which rapidly became popular as “Tom Cringle’s Log.” Scott was the -best narrator and probably the best informed man who wrote on the West -Indies at that period; and his frequent allusions to the United States -and the war threw more light on the social side of history than could -be obtained from all official sources ever printed. - - “I don’t like Americans,” Scott said; “I never did and never shall - like them. I have seldom met an American gentleman in the large and - complete sense of the term. I have no wish to eat with them, drink - with them, deal with or consort with them in any way; but let me - tell the whole truth,--_nor fight_ with them, were it not for the - laurels to be acquired by overcoming an enemy so brave, determined, - and alert, and every way so worthy of one’s steel as they have - always proved.” - -The Americans did not fight the War of 1812 in order to make themselves -loved. According to Scott’s testimony they gained the object for -which they did fight. “In gunnery and small-arm practice we were -as thoroughly weathered on by the Americans during the war as we -overtopped them in the bull-dog courage with which our boarders handled -those genuine English weapons,--the cutlass and the pike.” Superiority -in the intellectual branches of warfare was conceded to the Americans; -but even in regard to physical qualities, the British were not inclined -to boast. - - “In the field,” said Scott, “or grappling in mortal combat on the - blood-slippery quarter-deck of an enemy’s vessel, a British soldier - or sailor is the bravest of the brave. No soldier or sailor of any - other country, saving and excepting those damned Yankees, can stand - against them.” - -Had English society known so much of Americans in 1807, war would have -been unnecessary. - -Yet neither equality in physical courage nor superiority in the higher -branches of gunnery and small-arms was the chief success of Americans -in the war. Beyond question the schooner was the most conclusive -triumph. Readers of Michael Scott could not forget the best of his -sketches,--the escape of the little American schooner “Wave” from two -British cruisers, by running to windward under the broadside of a -man-of-war. With keen appreciation Scott detailed every motion of the -vessels, and dwelt with peculiar emphasis on the apparent desperation -of the attempt. Again and again the thirty-two-pound shot, as he -described the scene, tore through the slight vessel as the two crafts -raced through the heavy seas within musket-shot of one another, until -at last the firing from the corvette ceased. “The breeze had taken -off, and the ‘Wave,’ resuming her superiority in light winds, had -escaped.” Yet this was not the most significant part of “Tom Cringle’s” -experience. The “Wave,” being afterward captured at anchor, was taken -into the royal service and fitted as a ship-of-war. Cringle was ordered -by the vice-admiral to command her, and as she came to report he took a -look at her:-- - - “When I had last seen her she was a most beautiful little craft, - both in hull and rigging, as ever delighted the eye of a sailor; - but the dock-yard riggers and carpenters had fairly bedevilled her, - at least so far as appearances went. First they had replaced the - light rail on her gunwale by heavy solid bulwarks four feet high, - surmounted by hammock nettings at least another foot; so that the - symmetrical little vessel that formerly floated on the foam light - as a sea-gull now looked like a clumsy, dish-shaped Dutch dogger. - Her long, slender wands of masts which used to swing about as if - there were neither shrouds nor stays to support them were now as - taut and stiff as church-steeples, with four heavy shrouds of a - side, and stays and back-stays, and the Devil knows what all.” - -“If them heave-‘emtaughts at the yard have not taken the speed out of -the little beauty I am a Dutchman” was the natural comment,--as obvious -as it was sound. - -The reports of privateer captains to their owners were rarely -published, and the logs were never printed or deposited in any public -office. Occasionally, in the case of a battle or the loss of guns or -spars or cargo in a close pursuit, the privateer captain described the -causes of his loss in a letter which found its way into print; and -from such letters some idea could be drawn of the qualities held in -highest regard, both in their vessels and in themselves. The first and -commonest remark was that privateers of any merit never seemed to feel -anxious for their own safety so long as they could get to windward a -couple of gunshots from their enemy. They would risk a broadside in -the process without very great anxiety. They chiefly feared lest they -might be obliged to run before the wind in heavy weather. The little -craft which could turn on itself like a flash and dart away under a -frigate’s guns into the wind’s eye long before the heavy ship could -come about, had little to fear on that point of sailing; but when she -was obliged to run to leeward, the chances were more nearly equal. -Sometimes, especially in light breezes or in a stronger wind, by -throwing guns and weighty articles overboard privateers could escape; -but in heavy weather the ship-of-war could commonly outcarry them, and -more often could drive them on a coast or into the clutches of some -other man-of-war. - -Of being forced to fly to leeward almost every privateer could tell -interesting stories. A fair example of such tales was an adventure -of Captain George Coggeshall, who afterward compiled, chiefly from -newspapers, an account of the privateers, among which he preserved -a few stories that would otherwise have been lost.[430] Coggeshall -commanded a two-hundred-ton schooner, the “David Porter,” in which -he made the run to France with a cargo and a letter-of-marque. The -schooner was at Bordeaux in March, 1814, when Wellington’s army -approached. Afraid of seizure by the British if he remained at -Bordeaux, Coggeshall sailed from Bordeaux for La Rochelle with a light -wind from the eastward, when at daylight March 15, 1814, he found -a large ship about two miles to windward. Coggeshall tried to draw -his enemy down to leeward, but only lost ground until the ship was -not more than two gunshots away. The schooner could then not run to -windward without taking the enemy’s fire within pistol-shot, and dared -not return to Bordeaux. Nothing remained but to run before the wind. -Coggeshall got out his square-sail and studding-sails ready to set, -and when everything was prepared he changed his course and bore off -suddenly, gaining a mile in the six or eight minutes lost by the ship -in spreading her studding-sails. He then started his water-casks, threw -out ballast, and drew away from his pursuer, till in a few hours the -ship became a speck on the horizon. - -Apparently a similar but narrower escape was made by Captain Champlin -of the “Warrior,” a famous privateer-brig of four hundred and thirty -tons, mounting twenty-one guns and carrying one hundred and fifty -men.[431] Standing for the harbor of Fayal, Dec. 15, 1814, he was seen -by a British man-of-war lying there at anchor. The enemy slipped her -cables and made sail in chase. The weather was very fresh and squally, -and at eight o’clock in the evening the ship was only three miles -distant. After a run of about sixty miles, the man-of-war came within -grape-shot distance and opened fire from her two bow-guns. Champlin -luffed a little, got his long pivot-gun to bear, and ran out his -starboard guns as though to fight, which caused the ship to shorten -sail for battle. Then Champlin at two o’clock in the morning threw -overboard eleven guns, and escaped. The British ship was in sight the -next morning, but did not pursue farther. - -Often the privateers were obliged to throw everything overboard at the -risk of capsizing, or escaped capture only by means of their sweeps. In -1813 Champlin commanded the “General Armstrong,” a brig of two hundred -and forty-six tons and one hundred and forty men. Off Surinam, March -11, 1813, he fell in with the British sloop-of-war “Coquette,” which -he mistook for a letter-of-marque, and approached with the intention -of boarding. Having come within pistol-shot and fired his broadsides, -he discovered his error. The wind was light, the two vessels had no -headway, and for three quarters of an hour, if Champlin’s account -could be believed, he lay within pistol-shot of the man-of-war. He -was struck by a musket-ball in the left shoulder; six of his crew -were killed and fourteen wounded; his rigging was cut to pieces; his -foremast and bowsprit injured, and several shots entered the brig -between wind and water, causing her to leak; but at last he succeeded -in making sail forward, and with the aid of his sweeps crept out of -range. The sloop-of-war was unable to cripple or follow him.[432] - -Sometimes the very perfection of the privateer led to dangers as great -as though perfection were a fault. Captain Shaler of the “Governor -Tompkins,” a schooner, companion to the “General Armstrong,” chased -three sail Dec. 25, 1812, and on near approach found them to be two -ships and a brig. The larger ship had the appearance of a government -transport; she had boarding-nettings almost up to her tops, but her -ports appeared to be painted, and she seemed prepared for running -away as she fought. Shaler drew nearer, and came to the conclusion -that the ship was too heavy for him; but while his first officer went -forward with the glass to take another look, a sudden squall struck -the schooner without reaching the ship, and in a moment, before the -light sails could be taken in, “and almost before I could turn round, -I was under the guns, not of a transport, but of a large frigate, -and not more than a quarter of a mile from her.” With impudence that -warranted punishment, Shaler fired his little broadside of nine -or twelve pounders into the enemy, who replied with a broadside of -twenty-four-pounders, killing three men, wounding five, and causing an -explosion on deck that threw confusion into the crew; but the broadside -did no serious injury to the rigging. The schooner was then just abaft -the ship’s beam, a quarter of a mile away, holding the same course -and to windward. She could not tack without exposing her stern to a -raking fire, and any failure to come about would have been certain -destruction. Shaler stood on, taking the ship’s fire, on the chance of -outsailing his enemy before a shot could disable the schooner. Side by -side the two vessels raced for half an hour, while twenty-four-pound -shot fell in foam about the schooner, but never struck her, and at -last she drew ahead beyond range. Even then her dangers were not at -an end. A calm followed; the ship put out boats; and only by throwing -deck-lumber and shot overboard, and putting all hands at the sweeps, -did Shaler “get clear of one of the most quarrelsome companions that I -ever met with.”[433] - -The capacities of the American privateer could to some extent be -inferred from its mishaps. Notwithstanding speed, skill, and caution, -the privateer was frequently and perhaps usually captured in the end. -The modes of capture were numerous. April 3, 1813, Admiral Warren’s -squadron in the Chesapeake captured by boats, after a sharp action, -the privateer “Dolphin” of Baltimore, which had taken refuge in the -Rappahannock River. April 27 the “Tom” of Baltimore, a schooner of -nearly three hundred tons, carrying fourteen guns, was captured by his -Majesty’s ships “Surveillante” and “Lyra” after a smart chase. Captain -Collier of the “Surveillante” reported: “She is a remarkably fine -vessel of her class, and from her superior sailing has already escaped -from eighteen of his Majesty’s cruisers.” May 11, the “Holkar” of New -York was driven ashore off Rhode Island and destroyed by the “Orpheus” -frigate. May 19, Captain Gordon of the British man-of-war “Ratler,” -in company with the schooner “Bream,” drove ashore and captured the -“Alexander” of Salem, off Kennebunk, “considered the fastest sailing -privateer out of the United States,” according to Captain Gordon’s -report.[434] May 21, Captain Hyde Parker of the frigate “Tenedos,” in -company with the brig “Curlew,” captured the “Enterprise” of Salem, -pierced for eighteen guns. May 23, the “Paul Jones,” of sixteen guns -and one hundred and twenty men, fell in with a frigate in a thick fog -off the coast of Ireland, and being crippled by her fire surrendered. -July 13, Admiral Cockburn captured by boats at Ocracoke Inlet the fine -privateer-brig “Anaconda” of New York, with a smaller letter-of-marque. -July 17, at sea, three British men-of-war, after a chase of four hours, -captured the “Yorktown” of twenty guns and one hundred and forty men. -The schooner “Orders in Council” of New York, carrying sixteen guns -and one hundred and twenty men, was captured during the summer, after a -long chase of five days, by three British cutters that drove her under -the guns of a frigate. The “Matilda,” privateer of eleven guns and one -hundred and four men, was captured off San Salvador by attempting to -board the British letter-of-marque “Lyon” under the impression that she -was the weaker ship. - -In these ten instances of large privateers captured or destroyed in -1813, the mode of capture happened to be recorded; and in none of them -was the privateer declared to have been outsailed and caught by any -single British vessel on the open seas. Modes of disaster were many, -and doubtless among the rest a privateer might occasionally be fairly -beaten in speed, but few such cases were recorded, although British -naval officers were quick to mention these unusual victories. Unless -the weather gave to the heavier British vessel-of-war the advantage of -carrying more sail in a rough sea, the privateer was rarely outsailed. - -The number of privateers at sea in 1813 was not recorded. The list -of all private armed vessels during the entire war included somewhat -more than five hundred names.[435] Most of these were small craft, -withdrawn after a single cruise. Not two hundred were so large as to -carry crews of fifty men. Nearly two hundred and fifty, or nearly half -the whole number of privateers, fell into British hands. Probably at -no single moment were more than fifty seagoing vessels on the ocean -as privateers, and the number was usually very much less; while the -large privateer-brigs or ships that rivalled sloops-of-war in size were -hardly more numerous than the sloops themselves. - -The total number of prizes captured from the British in 1813 -exceeded four hundred, four fifths of which were probably captured -by privateers, national cruisers taking only seventy-nine. If the -privateers succeeded in taking three hundred and fifty prizes, the -whole number of privateers could scarcely have exceeded one hundred. -The government cruisers “President,” “Congress,” “Chesapeake,” -“Hornet,” and “Argus” averaged nearly ten prizes apiece. Privateers -averaged much less; but they were ten times as numerous as the -government cruisers, and inflicted four times as much injury. - -Such an addition to the naval force of the United States was very -important. Doubtless the privateers contributed more than the regular -navy to bring about a disposition for peace in the British classes most -responsible for the war. The colonial and shipping interests, whose -influence produced the Orders in Council, suffered the chief penalty. -The West India colonies were kept in constant discomfort and starvation -by swarms of semi-piratical craft darting in and out of every channel -among their islands; but the people of England could have borne with -patience the punishment of the West Indies had not the American -cruisers inflicted equally severe retribution nearer home. - -Great Britain was blockaded. No one could deny that manifest danger -existed to any merchant-vessel that entered or left British waters. -During the summer the blockade was continuous. Toward the close of -1812 an American named Preble, living in Paris, bought a small vessel, -said to have belonged in turn to the British and French navy, which -he fitted as a privateer-brig, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred -and sixty men. The “True-Blooded Yankee,” commanded by Captain Hailey, -sailed from Brest March 1, 1813, and cruised thirty-seven days on -the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, capturing twenty-seven valuable -vessels; sinking coasters in the very bay of Dublin; landing and taking -possession of an island off the coast of Ireland, and of a town in -Scotland, where she burned seven vessels in the harbor. She returned -safely to Brest, and soon made another cruise. At the same time the -schooner “Fox” of Portsmouth burned or sunk vessel after vessel in -the Irish Sea, as they plied between Liverpool and Cork. In May, the -schooner “Paul Jones” of New York, carrying sixteen guns and one -hundred and twenty men, took or destroyed a dozen vessels off the Irish -coast, until she was herself caught in a fog by the frigate “Leonidas,” -and captured May 23 after a chase in which five of her crew were -wounded. - -While these vessels were thus engaged, the brig “Rattlesnake” of -Philadelphia, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and -the brig “Scourge” of New York, carrying nine guns and one hundred and -ten men, crossed the ocean and cruised all the year in the northern -seas off the coasts of Scotland and Norway, capturing some forty -British vessels, and costing the British merchants and ship-owners -losses to the amount of at least two million dollars. In July the -“Scourge” fell in with Commodore Rodgers in the “President,” and the -two vessels remained several days in company off the North Cape, while -the British admiralty sent three or four squadrons in search of them -without success. July 19, after Rodgers had been nearly a month in -British waters, one of these squadrons drove him away, and he then made -a circuit round Ireland before he turned homeward. At the same time, -from July 14 to August 14, the “Argus” was destroying vessels in the -British Channel at the rate of nearly one a day. After the capture of -the “Argus,” August 14, the “Grand Turk” of Salem, a brig carrying -sixteen guns and one hundred and five men, cruised for twenty days -in the mouth of the British Channel without being disturbed. Besides -these vessels, others dashed into British waters from time to time as -they sailed forward and back across the ocean in the track of British -commerce. - -No one disputed that the privateers were a very important branch of -the American navy; but they suffered under serious drawbacks, which -left doubtful the balance of merits and defects. Perhaps their chief -advantage compared with government vessels was their lightness,--a -quality which no government would have carried to the same extent. The -long-range pivot-gun was another invention of the privateer, peculiarly -successful and easily adapted for government vessels. In other -respects, the same number or even half the number of sloops-of-war -would have probably inflicted greater injury at less cost. The “Argus” -showed how this result could have been attained. The privateer’s first -object was to save prizes; and in the effort to send captured vessels -into port the privateer lost a large proportion by recapture. Down to -the moment when Admiral Warren established his blockade of the American -coast from New York southward, most of the prizes got to port. After -that time the New England ports alone offered reasonable chance of -safety, and privateering received a check.[436] During the war about -twenty-five hundred vessels all told were captured from the British. -Many were destroyed; many released as cartels; and of the remainder not -less than seven hundred and fifty, probably one half the number sent -to port, were recaptured by the British navy. Most of these were the -prizes of privateers, and would have been destroyed had they been taken -by government vessels. They were usually the most valuable prizes, so -that the injury that might have been inflicted on British commerce was -diminished nearly one half by the system which encouraged private war -as a money-making speculation. - -Another objection was equally serious. Like all gambling ventures, -privateering was not profitable. In the list of five hundred privateers -furnished by the Navy Department,[437] three hundred were recorded as -having never made a prize. Of the remainder, few made their expenses. -One of the most successful cruises of the war was that of Joshua Barney -on the Baltimore schooner “Rossie” at the outbreak of hostilities, when -every prize reached port. Barney sent in prizes supposed to be worth -fifteen hundred thousand dollars; but after paying charges and duties -and selling the goods, he found that the profits were not sufficient -to counterbalance the discomforts, and he refused to repeat the -experiment. His experience was common. As early as November, 1812, the -owners of twenty-four New York privateers sent to Congress a memorial -declaring that the profits of private naval war were by no means equal -to the hazards, and that the spirit of privateering stood in danger of -extinction unless the government would consent in some manner to grant -a bounty for the capture or destruction of the enemy’s property. - -If private enterprise was to fail at the critical moment, and if the -government must supply the deficiency, the government would have done -better to undertake the whole task. In effect, the government in the -end did so. The merchants asked chiefly for a reduction of duties -on prize-goods. Gallatin pointed out the serious objections to such -legislation, and the little probability that the measure would increase -the profits of privateering or the number of privateers. The actual -privateers, he said, were more than enough for the food offered by the -enemy’s trade, and privateering, like every other form of gambling, -would always continue to attract more adventurers than it could -support.[438] - -Congress for the time followed Gallatin’s advice, and did nothing; but -in the summer session of 1813, after Gallatin’s departure for Europe, -the privateer owners renewed their appeal, and the acting Secretary of -the Treasury, Jones, wrote to the chairman of the Naval Committee July -21, 1813,[439]-- - - “The fact is that ... privateering is nearly at an end; and from - the best observation I have been enabled to make, it is more from - the deficiency of remuneration in the net proceeds of their prizes - than from the vigilance and success of the enemy in recapturing.” - -In deference to Jones’s opinion, Congress passed an Act, approved Aug. -2, 1813, reducing one third the duties on prize-goods. Another Act, -approved August 3, granted a bounty of twenty-five dollars for every -prisoner captured and delivered to a United States agent by a private -armed vessel. A third Act, approved August 2, authorized the Secretary -of the Navy to place on the pension list any privateersman who should -be wounded or disabled in the line of his duty. - -These complaints and palliations tended to show that the privateer cost -the public more than the equivalent government vessel would have cost. -If instead of five hundred privateers of all sizes and efficiency, the -government had kept twenty sloops-of-war constantly at sea destroying -the enemy’s commerce, the result would have been about the same as -far as concerned injury to the enemy, while in another respect the -government would have escaped one of its chief difficulties. Nothing -injured the navy so much as privateering. Seamen commonly preferred -the harder but more profitable and shorter cruise in a privateer, -where fighting was not expected or wished, to the strict discipline -and murderous battles of government ships, where wages were low and -prize-money scarce. Of all towns in the United States, Marblehead was -probably the most devoted to the sea; but of nine hundred men from -Marblehead who took part in the war, fifty-seven served as soldiers, -one hundred and twenty entered the navy, while seven hundred and -twenty-six went as privateersmen.[440] Only after much delay and -difficulty could the frigates obtain crews. The “Constitution” was -nearly lost by this cause at the beginning of the war; and the loss of -the “Chesapeake” was supposed to be chiefly due to the determination -of the old crew to quit the government service for that of the -privateers. - -Such drawbacks raised reasonable doubts as to the balance of advantages -and disadvantages offered by the privateer system. Perhaps more -careful inquiry might show that, valuable as the privateers were, the -government would have done better to retain all military and naval -functions in its own hands, and to cover the seas with small cruisers -capable of pursuing a system of thorough destruction against the -shipping and colonial interests of England. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - - -GALLATIN and Bayard, having sailed from the Delaware May 9, arrived -at St. Petersburg July 21, only to find that during the six months -since the Czar offered to mediate, Russia had advanced rapidly in -every direction except that of the proposed mediation. Napoleon -after being driven from Russia in December, 1812, passed the winter -in Paris organizing a new army of three hundred thousand men on the -Elbe, between Dresden and Magdeburg, while a second army of more than -one hundred thousand was to hold Hamburg and Bremen. Russia could not -prevent Napoleon from reconstructing a force almost as powerful as that -with which he had marched to Moscow, for the Russian army had suffered -very severely and was unfit for active service; but the Czar succeeded -in revolutionizing Prussia, and in forcing the French to retire from -the Vistula to the Elbe, while he gained a reinforcement of more than -one hundred thousand men from the fresh and vigorous Prussian army. -Even with that assistance the Czar could not cope with Napoleon, who, -leaving Paris April 17, during the month of May fought furious battles -at Lützen and Bautzen, which forced the allied Russian and Prussian -armies back from the Elbe to the Oder. - -At that point Austria interfered so energetically as to oblige Napoleon -to accept an armistice for the purpose of collecting new forces. During -the armistice the Czar stationed himself at Gitschin in Bohemia, nine -hundred miles from St. Petersburg, and about the same distance from -London by the path that couriers were obliged to take. When Gallatin -and Bayard reached St. Petersburg, July 21, the armistice, which had -been prolonged until August 10, was about to expire, and the Czar could -not be anxious to decide subordinate questions until the issue of the -coming campaign should be known. - -Meanwhile the government of England had in May, with many friendly -expressions, declined the Russian mediation.[441] Castlereagh probably -hoped that this quiet notification to Lieven, the Russian envoy in -London, would end the matter; but toward the month of July news reached -London that the American commissioners, Gallatin and Bayard, had -arrived at Gothenburg on their way to Russia, and Castlereagh then -saw that he must be more explicit in his refusal. Accordingly he took -measures for making the matter clear not only to the Russian government -but also to the American commissioners. - -With the Russian government he was obliged by the nature of their -common relations to communicate officially, and he wrote instructions -to Lord Cathcart, dated July 5, directing communication to be made. - - “I am afraid,” said Castlereagh’s letter,[442] “this tender of - mediation which on a question of maritime right cannot be listened - to by Great Britain, however kindly and liberally intended, will - have had the unfortunate effect of protracting the war with the - United States. It is to be lamented that the formal offer was made - to America before the disposition of the British government was - previously sounded as to its acceptance of a mediation. It has - enabled the President to hold out to the people of America a vague - expectation of peace, under which he may reconcile them with less - repugnance to submit to the measures of the Government. This evil, - however, cannot now be avoided, and it only remains to prevent this - question from producing any embarrassment between Great Britain and - Russia.” - -Embarrassment between Great Britain and Russia was no new thing in -European politics, and commonly involved maritime objects for which -the United States were then fighting. Castlereagh had much reason -for wishing to avoid the danger. The most fortunate result he could -reasonably expect from the coming campaign was a defeat of Bonaparte -that should drive him back to the Rhine. Then Russia and Austria would -probably offer terms to Napoleon; England would be obliged to join in -a European Congress; Napoleon would raise the question of maritime -rights, and on that point he would be supported by Russian sympathies. -Napoleon and Russia might insist that the United States should take -part in the Congress, and in that case England might be obliged to -retire from it. Castlereagh felt uneasy at the prospect, and ordered -Cathcart to “press the Emperor of Russia in the strongest manner not -to push his personal interference on this point further.” Cathcart -was to use his utmost endeavors to persuade the Czar “pointedly to -discountenance a design so mischievously calculated to promote the -views of France.” - -Another week of reflection only increased Castlereagh’s anxieties, and -caused the British government to take a step intended to leave the Czar -no opening for interference. July 13 Castlereagh wrote Cathcart new -instructions,[443] directing him to present a formal note acquainting -the Czar that the Prince Regent was “ready immediately to name -plenipotentiaries to meet and treat with the American plenipotentiaries -in the earnest desire” of peace, either in London or at Gothenburg; -although he could “not consent that these discussions should be carried -on in any place which might be supposed to imply that they were in -any way connected with any other negotiations.” He wrote privately to -Cathcart that the mere knowledge of the intervention of a third power -in any arrangement with the United States would probably decide the -British people against it.[444] - -Thus in July, 1813, when the war was barely a year old, Castlereagh -reached the point of offering to negotiate directly with the United -States. This advantage was gained by the Russian offer of mediation, -and was intended not to pacify America but to silence Alexander and -Roumanzoff. Castlereagh was frank and prompt in his declarations. -His offer of direct negotiation was dated July 13, at a time when -Alexander Baring received a letter from Gallatin announcing his arrival -at Gothenburg and inviting assistance for the proposed mediation. -Baring consulted Castlereagh, and wrote, July 22, a long letter to -Gallatin, to inform the American commissioners what the British -government had done and was willing to do. “Before this reaches you,” -said Baring,[445] “you will have been informed that this mediation -has been refused, with expressions of our desire to treat separately -and directly here; or, if more agreeable to you, at Gothenburg.” -To leave no room for misunderstanding, Baring added that if the -American commissioners were obliged by their instructions to adhere -pertinaciously to the American demands in respect to impressments, he -should think negotiation useless. - -In regular succession all these expressions of British policy were -received at St. Petersburg in the Czar’s absence, and in the doubtful -state of mind which followed the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. -Alexander had left Count Roumanzoff at St. Petersburg, continuing to -act as Chancellor of the Empire and Foreign Secretary; but in truth -the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as far as the Czar then required such -an officer, was Count Nesselrode, who attended Alexander in person and -received his orders orally. Nesselrode at that time was rather an agent -than an adviser; but in general he represented the English alliance and -hostility to Napoleon, while Roumanzoff represented the French alliance -and hostility to England. - -Of English diplomacy Americans knew something, and could by similarity -of mind divine what was not avowed. Of French diplomacy they had long -experience, and their study was rendered from time to time more easy -by Napoleon’s abrupt methods. Of Russian diplomacy they knew little -or nothing. Thus far Minister Adams had been given his own way. He -had been allowed to seem to kindle the greatest war of modern times, -and had been invited to make use of Russia against England; but the -Czar’s reasons for granting such favor were mysterious even to Adams, -for while Napoleon occasionally avowed motives, Alexander never did. -Russian diplomacy moved wholly in the dark. - -Only one point was certain. For reasons of his own, the Czar chose -to leave Roumanzoff nominally in office until the result of the war -should be decided, although Roumanzoff was opposed to the Czar’s -policy. The chancellor did not stand alone in his hostility to the war; -probably a majority of the Russian people shared the feeling. Even the -army and its old General Koutousoff, though elated with an immense -triumph, grumbled at being obliged to fight the battles of Germany, -and would gladly have returned to their own soil. The Czar himself -could not afford to break his last tie with the French interest, but -was wise to leave a path open by which he could still retreat in case -his war in Germany failed. If Napoleon should succeed once more in -throwing the Russian army back upon Russian soil, Alexander might still -be obliged to use Roumanzoff’s services if not to resume his policy. -Such a suspicion might not wholly explain Alexander’s course toward -Roumanzoff and Koutousoff, but no one could doubt that it explained -the chancellor’s course toward the Czar. Indeed, Roumanzoff made -little concealment of his situation or his hopes. Adams could without -much difficulty divine that the failure of the Czar in Germany would -alone save Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg, and that the restoration of -Roumanzoff to power was necessary to reinvigorate the mediation. - -Castlereagh’s first positive refusal to accept the mediation was -notified to Count Lieven in May, and was known to Roumanzoff in St. -Petersburg about the middle of June. Early in July the Czar received -it, and by his order Nesselrode, in a despatch to Lieven dated July -9, expressed “the perfect satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt -in the reasons which actuated the conduct of this [British] government -on a point of so much delicacy and importance.”[446] The Czar was then -in the midst of difficulties. The result of the war was doubtful, and -depended on Austria. - -Just as news of the armistice arrived in St. Petersburg, Minister Adams -went to Roumanzoff, June 22, to inform him of Gallatin’s and Bayard’s -appointment. Roumanzoff in return gave Adams explicit information -of England’s refusal to accept the Czar’s offer. Adams immediately -recorded it in his Diary:[447]-- - - “He [Roumanzoff] said that he was very sorry to say he had - received since he had seen me [June 15] further despatches from - Count Lieven, stating that the British government, with many - very friendly and polite assurances that there was no mediation - which they should so readily and cheerfully accept as that of the - Emperor of Russia, had however stated that their differences with - the United States of America involving certain principles of the - internal government of England were of a nature which they did not - think suitable to be settled by a mediation.” - -Adams expected this answer, and at once assumed it to be final; -but Roumanzoff checked him. “It would now be for consideration,” -he continued, “whether, after the step thus taken by the American -government [in sending commissioners to St. Petersburg], it would not -be advisable to renew the proposition to Great Britain; upon which he -should write to the Emperor.” Not because of any American request, but -wholly of his own motion, Roumanzoff proposed to keep the mediation -alive. His motives were for Adams to fathom. The chancellor did not -avow them, but he hinted to Adams that the chances of war were many. -“Perhaps it might be proper not to be discouraged by the ill success -of his first advances. After considerations might produce more pacific -dispositions in the British government. Unexpected things were -happening every day; ‘and in our own affairs,’ said the count, ‘a very -general report prevails that an armistice has taken place.’” A Congress -had been proposed, and the United States were expressly named among the -Powers to be invited to it. - -Adams reported this conversation to his Government in a despatch dated -June 26,[448] and waited for his two new colleagues, who arrived July -21. Personally the colleagues were agreeable to Adams, and the proposed -negotiation was still more so, for the President sent him official -notice that in case the negotiations were successful, Adams’s services -would be required as minister in London; but with the strongest -inducements to press the mediation, Adams could not but see that he and -his colleagues depended on Roumanzoff, and that Roumanzoff depended -not on Alexander, but on Napoleon. Roumanzoff’s only chance of aiding -them was by clinging to office until the Czar should be weary of war. - -Unwilling as Gallatin was to be thus made the sport of imperial policy, -he was obliged, like his colleagues, to submit. Two days after their -arrival, Roumanzoff told them that he meant, if possible, to begin the -whole transaction anew. - - “The count said he regretted much that there was such reason - to believe the British would decline the mediation; but on - transmitting the copy of the credential letter to the Emperor, he - would determine whether to renew the proposal, as the opposition in - England might make it an embarrassing charge against the Ministry - if they should under such circumstances reject it.”[449] - -Roumanzoff had written soon after June 22 to ask the Czar whether, -on the arrival of the American commissioners, the offer of mediation -should be renewed. The Czar, overwhelmed with business, wrote back, -about July 20, approving Roumanzoff’s suggestion, and authorizing him -to send a despatch directly to Count Lieven in London renewing the -offer. The Czar’s letter was communicated to Adams August 10[450] by -Roumanzoff, who was evidently much pleased and perhaps somewhat excited -by it. - -Such a letter warranted some excitement, for Roumanzoff could regard it -only as a sign of hesitation and anxiety. Alexander was in a degree -pledged to England to press the mediation no further. While he assured -England through Nesselrode, July 9, that he was perfectly satisfied -with the British reasons for refusing his offer of mediation “on a -point of so much delicacy and importance,” he authorized Roumanzoff -only ten days afterward to annoy England a second time with an offer -which he had every reason to know must be rejected; and he did this -without informing Nesselrode. - -Gallatin and Bayard found themselves, August 10, condemned to -wait two or three months for the British answer, which they knew -must be unfavorable, because Gallatin received August 17 Baring’s -letter announcing the determination of Castlereagh to negotiate -separately. Roumanzoff’s conduct became more and more mysterious to -the commissioners. He did not notify them of Castlereagh’s official -offer to negotiate directly. He confounded Adams, August 19, by flatly -denying his own information, given two months before, that England -rejected mediation in principle because it involved doctrines of -her internal government. Roumanzoff insisted that England had never -refused to accept the mediation, although he held in his hands at least -two despatches from Lieven, written as late as July 13, officially -communicating England’s determination to negotiate directly or not -at all. Castlereagh, foreseeing the possibility of misunderstanding, -had read to Lieven the instructions of July 13 for communication to -Roumanzoff, besides authorizing Cathcart to show them _in extenso_ -to the Czar.[451] In denying that such instructions had been given, -Roumanzoff could not have expected the American commissioners to -believe him. - -The motive of Roumanzoff’s persistence might be open to the simple -explanation that the chancellor hoped to recover power, and within -a few months to re-establish his policy of antagonism to England. -Alexander’s conduct could be explained by no such obvious interest. -When Castlereagh’s letters of July 13 and 14 reached Cathcart at the -Czar’s headquarters in Bohemia about August 10, they arrived at the -most critical moment of the war. On that day the armistice expired. -The next day Austria declared war on Napoleon. The combined armies -of Russia, Prussia, and Austria concentrated behind the mountains, -and then marched into Saxony. While starting on that campaign, August -20, the Czar was told by Lord Cathcart the reasons why his offer of -mediation was rejected, and answered at once that in this case he could -do nothing more.[452] Cathcart wrote to Nesselrode a formal note on -the subject August 23 or 24, but did not at once communicate it,[453] -because the campaign had then begun; the great battle of Dresden was -fought August 26 and 27, and the allies, again beaten, retired into -Bohemia August 28. The Czar saw his best military adviser Moreau -killed by his side at Dresden, and he returned to Töplitz in no happy -frame of mind. - -At Töplitz, September 1, Cathcart delivered to Nesselrode his formal -note,[454] refusing Russian mediation and communicating the offer of -England to negotiate directly. In an ordinary condition of government -Nesselrode should have taken care that the British note should be made -known without delay to the American commissioners at St. Petersburg, -but the Czar kept in his own hands the correspondence with Roumanzoff -and the Americans, and neither he nor Nesselrode communicated -Cathcart’s act to Roumanzoff.[455] Possibly their silence was due to -the new military movements. August 29 the French marshal Vandamme -with forty thousand men, pursuing the allies into Bohemia, was caught -between the Prussians and Austrians August 30 and crushed. During the -month of September severe fighting, favorable to the allies, occurred, -but no general advance was made by the allied sovereigns. - -Alexander next received at Töplitz toward September 20 a letter from -Roumanzoff enclosing a renewal of the offer of mediation, to be -proposed in a despatch to Lieven, read by Roumanzoff to the American -commissioners August 24, and sent to London August 28. The Czar must -have known the futility of this new step, as well as the mistake -into which Roumanzoff had been led, and the awkward attitude of the -American commissioners. Only a fortnight before, he had received -Cathcart’s official note, and a few days earlier he had assured -Cathcart that he should do no more in the matter. Yet, September 20, -Alexander wrote with his own hand a note of four lines to Roumanzoff, -approving his despatch to Lieven, and begging him to follow up the -affair as he had begun it.[456] - -The Czar’s letter of September 20 completed the embroglio, which -remained unintelligible to every one except himself. Cathcart was the -most mystified of all the victims to the Czar’s double attitude. At the -time when Alexander thus for the second time authorized Roumanzoff to -disregard the express entreaties of the British government, Cathcart -was making an effort to explain to Castlereagh the Czar’s first -interference. If Castlereagh understood his minister’s ideas, he was -gifted with more than common penetration. - - “I believe the not communicating the rescript of the Emperor - concerning the American plenipotentiaries to have been the effect - of accident,” wrote Cathcart[457] from Töplitz September 25; “but - what is singular is that notwithstanding his [Nesselrode’s] letter - of the ninth [July], by the Emperor’s command, to Count Lieven, - this communication from and instruction to Roumanzoff was not known - to Count Nesselrode till this day, when I mentioned it to him, - having received no caution to do otherwise, and he was not at all - pleased with it. It was during the advance to Dresden. But I cannot - help thinking that there must have been some policy of Roumanzoff’s - stated in regard to keeping hold of the mediation, which, - whether it was detailed or not, would not escape the Emperor’s - penetration, and upon which he may have been induced to act as far - as sanctioning the proposal of treating at _London_ under Russia’s - mediation, which the Prince Regent’s government might accept or - reject as they pleased; and that not wishing to go at that time - into a discussion of maritime rights with either Nesselrode or me, - he afterward forgot it.” - -Cathcart’s style was involved, but his perplexity was evident. His -remarks related only to the Czar’s first letter to Roumanzoff, written -about July 20, not “during the advance to Dresden.” He knew nothing of -the Czar’s second letter to Roumanzoff, dated September 20, renewing -the same authority, only five days before Cathcart’s labored attempt -to explain the first. Of the second letter, as of the first, neither -Nesselrode nor Cathcart was informed. - -The Czar’s motive in thus ordering each of his two ministers to act -in ignorance and contradiction of the other’s instructions perplexed -Roumanzoff as it did Cathcart. Lieven first revealed to Roumanzoff -the strange misunderstanding by positively refusing to present to -Castlereagh the chancellor’s note of August 28 renewing the offer of -mediation. Roumanzoff was greatly mortified. He told Gallatin that -the mediation had been originally the Czar’s own idea; that it had -been the subject of repeated discussions at his own motion, and had -been adopted notwithstanding Roumanzoff’s hints at the possibility -of English reluctance.[458] The chancellor sent Lieven’s despatch -immediately to the Czar without comment, requesting the Czar to read -it and give his orders. The British officials, unwilling to blame -Alexander, attacked Roumanzoff. Lord Walpole, who came directly from -Bohemia to St. Petersburg to act as British ambassador, said “he was -as sure as he was of his own existence, and he believed he could prove -it, that Roumanzoff had been cheating us all.”[459] Cathcart wrote, -December 12, to Castlereagh,-- - - “I think Nesselrode knows nothing of the delay of communicating - with the American mission; that it was an intrigue of the - chancellor’s, if it is one; and that during the operations of - war the Emperor lost the clew to it, so that something has been - unanswered.”[460] - -Perhaps the Czar’s conduct admitted of several interpretations. He -might wish to keep the mediation alive in order to occupy Roumanzoff -until the campaign should be decided; or he might in his good nature -prefer to gratify his old favorite by allowing him to do what he -wished; or he took this method of signifying to Roumanzoff his disgrace -and the propriety of immediate retirement. Apparently Roumanzoff took -the last view, for he sent his resignation to the Czar, and at the -close of the year quitted his official residence at the Department of -Foreign Affairs, telling Gallatin that he remained in office only till -he should receive authority to close the American mission. - -The American commissioners in private resented Alexander’s treatment, -but were unable to leave Russia without authority. Gallatin learned, -October 19, that the Senate had refused to confirm his appointment, but -he remained at St. Petersburg, chiefly in deference to Roumanzoff’s -opinion, and probably with ideas of assisting the direct negotiation at -London or elsewhere. Meanwhile the campaign was decided, October 18, by -Napoleon’s decisive overthrow at Leipzig, which forced him to retreat -behind the Rhine. Still the Czar wrote nothing to Roumanzoff, and the -American commissioners remained month after month at St. Petersburg. -Not until Jan. 25, 1814, did Gallatin and Bayard begin their winter -journey to Amsterdam, where they arrived March 4 and remained a month. -Then Gallatin received, through Baring, permission to enter England, -and crossed the Channel to hasten if he could the direct negotiation -which Castlereagh had offered and Madison accepted. - -The diplomatic outlook had changed since March, 1813, when the -President accepted the offer of Russian mediation; but the change was -wholly for the worse. England’s triumphs girdled the world, and found -no check except where Perry’s squadron blocked the way to Detroit. -The allied armies crossed the Rhine in December and entered France -on the east. At the same time Wellington after a long campaign drove -Joseph from Spain, and entering France from the south pressed against -Bordeaux. The government and people of England, in their excitement and -exultation at daily conquests, thought as little as they could of the -American war. Society rarely mentioned it. Newspapers alone preserved -a record of British feelings toward the United States during the year -1813. The expressions of newspapers, like those of orators, could not -be accepted without allowance, for they aimed at producing some desired -effect, and said either more or less than the truth; as a rule, they -represented the cool opinion neither of the person who uttered nor -of the audience who heard them; but in the absence of other records, -public opinion was given only in the press, and the London newspapers -alone furnished evidence of its character. - -The “Morning Chronicle”--the only friend of the United States in the -daily press of England--showed its friendship by silence. Whatever the -liberal opposition thought in private, no one but Cobbett ventured -in public to oppose the war. Cobbett having become a radical at the -time of life when most men become conservative, published in his -“Weekly Register” many columns of vigorous criticism on the American -war without apparent effect, although in truth he expressed opinions -commonly held by intelligent people. Even Lord Castlereagh, Cobbett’s -antipathy, shared some of Cobbett’s least popular opinions in the -matter of the American war. - -English society, whatever shades of diversity might exist, was frank -and free in expressing indifference or contempt. Of the newspapers -which made a duty of reflecting what was believed to be the prevailing -public opinion, the “Times,” supposed to favor the interests of -Wellesley and Canning, was probably the ablest. During the early part -of the war, the “Times” showed a disposition to criticise the Ministry -rather than the Americans. From the “Times” came most of the bitter -complaints, widely copied by the American press, of the naval defeats -suffered by the “Guerriere,” the “Java,” and the “Macedonian.” British -successes were belittled, and abuse of Americans was exaggerated, in -order to deprive ministers of credit. “The world has seen President -Madison plunge into a war from the basest motives, and conduct it -with the most entire want of ability,” said the “Times” of February -9, 1813. “The American government has sounded the lowest depth of -military disgrace, insomuch that the official records of the campaign -take from us all possibility of exulting in our victories over such an -enemy.” The “Times” found in such reflections a reason for not exulting -in ministerial victories, but it bewailed defeats the more loudly, -and annoyed the Ministry by the violence of its attacks on naval -administration. - -As the year passed, and England’s triumph in Europe seemed to -overshadow the world, the “Times,” probably recognizing the uselessness -of attacking the Ministry, showed worse temper toward the United -States. The Americans were rarely mentioned, and always with language -of increasing ill humor. “Despicable in the cabinet, ridiculous in the -field,”[461] the Americans disappeared from sight in the splendor of -victory at Vittoria and Leipzig. No wish for peace was suggested, and -if the “Times” expressed the true feelings of the respectable middle -class, as it was supposed to aim at doing, no wish for peace could be -supposed to exist. - -Of the ministerial papers the “Courier” was the best, and of course was -emphatic in support of the American war. The Ministry were known to -be lukewarm about the United States, and for that reason they thought -themselves obliged to talk in public as strongly as the strongest -against a peace. When the Russian mediation called for notice, May 13, -the “Courier” at once declared against it:-- - - “Before the war commenced, concession might have been proper; we - always thought it unwise. But the hour of concession and compromise - is passed. America has rushed unnecessarily and unnaturally - into war, and she must be made to feel the effects of her folly - and injustice; peace must be the consequence of punishment, and - retraction of her insolent demands must precede negotiation. The - thunders of our cannon must first strike terror into the American - shores.” - -The “Courier” felt that Americans were not Englishmen, and could not -forgive it, but was unable to admit that they might still exercise a -considerable influence on human affairs:-- - - “They have added nothing to literature, nothing to any of - the sciences; they have not produced one good poet, not one - celebrated historian! Their statesmen are of a mixed breed,--half - metaphysicians, half politicians; all the coldness of the one with - all the cunning of the other. Hence we never see anything enlarged - in their conceptions or grand in their measures.”[462] - -These reasons were hardly sufficient to prove the right of impressing -American seamen. The literary, metaphysical, or social qualities -of Americans, their “enlarged conceptions,” and the grandeur or -littleness of their measures, had by common consent ceased to enter -into discussion, pending a settlement of the simpler issue, whether -Americans could fight. For a long time the English press encouraged the -belief that Americans were as incapable of fighting as of producing -poets and historians. Their naval victories were attributed to British -seamen. Perhaps the first turn of the tide was in November, 1813, -when news of Perry’s victory on Lake Erie crossed in London the news -of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. Perry’s victory, like those of Hull, -Decatur, and Bainbridge, was too complete for dispute: “It may, -however, serve to diminish our vexation at this occurrence to learn -that the flotilla in question was not any branch of the British navy, -... but a local force, a kind of mercantile military.”[463] - -By a curious coincidence, Castlereagh’s official letter to Monroe, -offering direct negotiation, was dated the same day, November 4, -when news of the victory at Leipzig met in London news of the defeat -on Lake Erie, and Castlereagh probably meant to allow no newspaper -prejudices to obstruct a peace; but public opinion was slow to recover -its balance. When news arrived that the Americans had captured Malden, -recovered Detroit, and destroyed Proctor’s army on the Thames, the -“Courier” showed the first symptom of change in opinion by expressing a -somewhat simple-minded wish to hear no more about the Americans:-- - - “The intelligence is unpleasant, but we confess that we do not - view, and have never from the beginning of the war viewed, the - events in America with any very powerful interest. The occurrences - in Europe will no doubt produce a very decisive effect upon the - American government; and unless it is more obstinate and stupid - in its hostility than even _we_ think it, it will do as the other - allies of Bonaparte have done,--abandon him.” - -If the national extravagance could be expected to show its full force -in one direction rather than in another, naturalized Americans taken -in arms were certain to produce it. The issue was regularly raised -after Van Rensselaer’s defeat at Queenston in 1812. When the American -prisoners arrived at Quebec, they were mustered, and twenty-three -native-born subjects of Great Britain, belonging to the First, Sixth, -and Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, were taken from the ranks and shipped to -England to be put on trial as British subjects for bearing arms against -their king. The American agent in London reported to the President that -the men had arrived there for the reason given. Secretary Armstrong, -May 15, 1813, then ordered twenty-three British soldiers into close -confinement as hostages. The British government directed Sir George -Prevost to put double the number of Americans in close confinement, -and Sir George, in giving notice of this measure to General Wilkinson, -October 17, 1813,[464] added:-- - - “I have been further instructed by his Majesty’s government to - notify to you for the information of the government of the United - States that the commanders of his Majesty’s armies and fleets on - the coasts of America have received instructions to prosecute - the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, - and villages belonging to the United States, and against the - inhabitants thereof, if, after this communication shall have been - made to you, and a reasonable time given for its being transmitted - to the American government, that government shall unhappily not be - deterred from putting to death any of the soldiers who now are or - who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in - the letter from Major-General Dearborn.” - -The limit of retaliation was soon reached, for the number of prisoners -was small on both sides. The British government somewhat carefully -refrained from committing itself too far; but the press treated the -matter as though it were vital. - - “If Mr. Madison,” said the “Courier” of July 24, “dare to retaliate - by taking away the life of one English prisoner in revenge for a - British subject fully proved to be such being taken in the act of - voluntarily bearing arms against his country, America puts herself - out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated - as an outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then be - absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and laws of war. - Hostilities may be carried on against her in any mode until she is - brought to a proper sense of her conduct.” - -The “Morning Post” of December 28 called for the execution of British -subjects taken in arms, and for retaliation on retaliation in defiance -of “the brutal wretches who, after betraying, are still suffered -to govern America.” The “Times” of May 24 spoke with hardly less -vehemence. Probably such talk was not shared by the government, for -the government never tested its sincerity by bringing the men to -trial; but at the close of 1813 public opinion in England was supposed -to be tending toward extreme measures against the United States. The -approaching fall of Napoleon threatened to throw America outside the -pale of civilization. Englishmen seemed ready to accept the idea that -Madison and Napoleon should be coupled together, and that no peace -should be made which did not include the removal of both from office -and power. Of all periods in American history this was probably the -least adapted to negotiation, but while England was at the moment of -her most extravagant sense of power, President Madison received and -accepted Castlereagh’s offer to negotiate, and Gallatin went with -Bayard to London to hasten the approach of peace. - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - - -CONGRESS assembled Dec. 6, 1813, at a time of general perplexity. -The victories of Perry and Harrison, September 10 and October 5, had -recovered Detroit and even conquered a part of West Canada, but their -successes were already dimmed by the failures of Wilkinson and Hampton -before Montreal, and the retreat of both generals November 13 within -United States territory. In the Creek country the Georgians had failed -to advance from the east, and Jackson was stopped at Fort Strother -by want of supplies and men. At sea the navy was doing little, while -the British blockade from New London southward was becoming more and -more ruinous to the Southern and Middle States, and through them to -the government. Abroad the situation was not yet desperate. The latest -news from Europe left Napoleon at Dresden, victorious for the moment, -before the great battles of October. From the American commissioners -at St. Petersburg no news had arrived, but England’s refusal to accept -mediation was unofficially known. With this material the President was -obliged to content himself in framing his Annual Message. - -The Message sent to Congress December 7 began by expressing regret that -the British government had disappointed the reasonable anticipation -of discussing and, if possible, adjusting the rights and pretensions -in dispute. From France nothing had been received on the subjects of -negotiation. Madison congratulated Congress on the success of the navy -upon the ocean and the Lakes, and the victory won by Harrison and R. M. -Johnson in Canada. He mentioned briefly the failure of the armies on -the St. Lawrence, and at greater length the success of Jackson on -the Coosa; and he entered in detail into the retaliatory measures -taken on either side in regard to naturalized soldiers. The finances -were treated with more show of confidence than was warranted by the -prospects of the Treasury; and the Message closed by a succession of -paragraphs which seemed written in a spirit of panegyric upon war:-- - - “The war has proved moreover that our free government like other - free governments, though slow in its early movements, acquires in - its progress a force proportioned to its freedom; and that the - Union of these States, the guardian of the freedom and safety of - all and of each, is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to - the test. In fine, the war with its vicissitudes is illustrating - the capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a - flourishing, and a powerful nation.” - -The rule that feeble and incompetent governments acquire strength by -exercise, and especially in war, had been as well understood in 1798 as -it was in 1813, and had been the chief cause of Republican antipathy -to war; but had Madison publicly expressed the same sentiment in 1798 -as in 1813, he would have found himself in a better position to enforce -the rights for which he was struggling when the extreme discontent of -nearly one third of the States contradicted his congratulations on “the -daily testimony of increasing harmony throughout the Union.” Whatever -the ultimate result of the war might be, it had certainly not thus far -strengthened the Union. On the contrary, public opinion seemed to be -rapidly taking the shape that usually preceded a rupture of friendly -relations between political societies. Elections in the Middle States -showed that the war, if not actually popular, had obliged the people -there to support the government for fear of worse evils. New Jersey by -a small majority returned to its allegiance, and the city of New York -elected a Republican to represent it in Congress; but the steady drift -of opinion in the Middle States toward the war was simultaneous with an -equally steady drift in the Eastern States against it. - -The evidences of chronic discontent in the Eastern States were -notorious. Less than a month before Madison wrote his Annual Message, -Governor Chittenden of Vermont, by proclamation November 10, recalled -the State militia from national service:[465] - - “He cannot conscientiously discharge the trust reposed in him by - the voice of his fellow-citizens, and by the Constitution of - this and the United States, without an unequivocal declaration - that in his opinion the military strength and resources of - this State must be reserved for its own defence and protection - exclusively, excepting in cases provided for by the Constitution - of the United States, and then under orders derived only from the - commander-in-chief.” - -The intercourse between the Eastern States and the enemy was notorious. -The Federalist press of Massachusetts, encouraged by Russian and -English success in Europe, discussed the idea of withdrawing the State -from all share in the war, and making a separate arrangement with -England. The President’s first act, after sending to Congress his -Annual Message, was to send a special Message incidentally calling -attention to the want of harmony that paralyzed the energy of the -government. - -The special and secret Message of December 9 asked Congress once more -to impose an embargo. Considering the notorious antipathy of the -Eastern States to the system of embargo, the new experiment was so -hazardous as to require proof of its necessity. That it was directed -against the commerce of the New England States was evident, for the -blockade answered the purposes of embargo elsewhere. The Message -seemed to propose that all commerce should cease because any commerce -must favor the enemy; in effect, it urged that New England should -be forbidden to sell or buy so long as the rest of the country was -prevented from doing so. - - “The tendency of our commercial and navigation laws in their - present state to favor the enemy,” said Madison,[466] “and thereby - prolong the war, is more and more developed by experience. Supplies - of the most essential kinds find their way not only to British - ports and British armies at a distance, but the armies in our - neighborhood with which our own are contending derive from our - ports and outlets a subsistence attainable with difficulty if at - all from other sources. Even the fleets and troops infesting our - coasts and waters are by like supplies accommodated and encouraged - in their predatory and incursive warfare. Abuses having a like - tendency take place in our import trade. British fabrics and - products find their way into our ports under the name and from the - ports of other countries, and often in British vessels disguised - as neutrals by false colors and papers.... To shorten as much as - possible the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the - enemy should feel all the pressure that can be given to it.” - -Although Madison pointed to the notorious supply of food for the -British forces in Canada as one of the motives for imposing an embargo, -no one supposed that motive to be decisive. Other laws already forbade -and punished such communication with the enemy; and experience proved -that a general embargo would be no more effective than any special -prohibition. The idea that England could be distressed by an embargo -seemed still less likely to influence Government. Congress knew that -Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Spain, and South America -were already open to English commerce, and that a few days must decide -whether Napoleon could much longer prevent Great Britain from trading -with France. The possibility of distressing England by closing Boston -and Salem, New Bedford and Newport to neutral ships was not to be -seriously treated. - -Whatever was the true motive of the President’s recommendation, -Congress instantly approved it. The next day, December 10, the House -went into secret session, and after two days of debate passed an -Embargo Act by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-seven, which quickly -passed the Senate by a vote of twenty to fourteen, and received the -President’s approval December 17, being the first legislation adopted -at the second session of the Thirteenth Congress.[467] The Act was at -once enforced with so much severity that within a month Congress was -obliged to consider and quickly adopted another Act[468] relieving -from its operation the people of Nantucket, who were in a state of -starvation, all communication with the main land having been forbidden -by the law; but nothing proved that the illicit communication with -Canada ceased. - -This beginning of legislation at a time when the crisis of the war -could be plainly seen approaching suggested much besides want of -harmony. The embargo strengthened the antipathy of New England to -the war,--a result sufficiently unfortunate; but it also led to a -number of other consequences that were doubtless foreseen by the -Administration, since they were prophesied by the Federalists. The Act -was approved December 17. Hardly had it gone into operation when the -British schooner “Bramble” arrived at Annapolis, December 30, bringing -a letter from Castlereagh to Monroe offering to negotiate directly, -though declining mediation. Important as this news was, it did not -compare with that in the newspapers brought by the “Bramble.” These -contained official reports from Germany of great battles fought at -Leipzig October 16, 18, and 19, in which the allies had overwhelmed -Napoleon in defeat so disastrous that any hope of his continuing to -make head against them in Germany was at an end. Except France, the -whole continent of Europe already was open to British commerce, or soon -must admit it. From that moment the New England Federalists no longer -doubted their own power. Their tone rose; their opposition to the war -became more threatening; their schemes ceased to be negative, and began -to include plans for positive interference; and the embargo added -strength to their hatred of Madison and the Union. - -Madison was seldom quick in changing his views, but the battle of -Leipzig was an event so portentous that optimism could not face it. -Other depressing news poured in. Fort George was evacuated; Fort -Niagara was disgracefully lost; Lewiston, Black Rock, and Buffalo were -burned, and the region about Niagara was laid waste; blue lights were -seen at New London. Every prospect was dark, but the battle of Leipzig -was fatal to the last glimmer of hope that England could be brought to -reason, or that New England could be kept quiet. A change of policy -could not safely be delayed. - -Castlereagh’s offer was instantly accepted. January 5 Monroe replied, -with some complaint at the refusal of mediation, that the President -acceded to the offer of negotiating at Gothenburg. The next day Madison -sent the correspondence to Congress, with a warning not to relax -“vigorous preparations for carrying on the war.” A week afterward, -January 14, he nominated J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and -Jonathan Russell as commissioners to negotiate directly with Great -Britain, and the Senate confirmed the nominations, January 18, with -little opposition except to Jonathan Russell’s further nomination as -Minister to Sweden, which was confirmed by the narrow vote of sixteen -to fourteen. Three weeks later, February 8, Albert Gallatin was added -to the commission, George W. Campbell being nominated to the Treasury. - -The prompt acceptance of Castlereagh’s offer, the addition of Henry -Clay to the negotiators, and the removal of Gallatin from the Treasury -showed that diplomacy had resumed more than its old importance. The -hope of peace might serve to quiet New England for a time, but mere -hope with so little to nourish it could not long pacify any one, if -the embargo was to remain in force. Several signs indicated there -also a change of policy. Besides the embargo, and in support of its -restrictions, Madison had recommended the passage of bills prohibiting -collusive captures, ransoming vessels captured by the enemy, and -interference by the courts, as well as the introduction of British -woollens, cottons, and spirits. The bill prohibiting woollens and other -articles was reported to the Senate December 30, the day when the -“Bramble” reached Annapolis. The Senate waited nearly a month, till -January 27, and then passed the bill, January 31, by a vote of sixteen -to twelve. The House referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations -February 3, where it remained. On the other hand, the bill prohibiting -ransoms was introduced in the House December 30, and passed January 26 -by a vote of eighty to fifty-seven. The Senate referred it January 28 -to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which never reported it. The -fate of these measures foreshadowed the destiny of the embargo. - -Yet the President clung to his favorite measure with a degree -of obstinacy that resembled desperation. Congress showed by its -indifference to the two supplementary bills that it had abandoned the -President’s system as early as January, but the embargo continued -throughout the winter, and the month of March passed without its -removal. The news from Europe at the close of that month left no doubt -that Napoleon could offer little effectual resistance even in France -to the allies, whose armies were known to have crossed the Rhine, -while Wellington advanced on Bordeaux. Holland was restored to her -ancient independence, and Napoleon was understood to have accepted in -principle, for a proposed Congress at Mannheim, the old boundaries of -France as a basis of negotiation. In theory, the overthrow of Napoleon -should have not essentially affected the embargo or the Non-importation -Acts, which were expected to press upon England independently of -Napoleon’s Continental system; but in practice the embargo having -produced no apparent effect on Europe during the war, could not be -expected to produce an effect after England had succeeded in conquering -France, and had abandoned her blockades as France had abandoned her -decrees. For that reason avowedly Madison at last yielded, and sent -a Message to Congress March 31, recommending that the system of -commercial restriction should cease:-- - - “Taking into view the mutual interests which the United States and - the foreign nations in amity with her have in a liberal commercial - intercourse, and the extensive changes favorable thereto which - have recently taken place; taking into view also the important - advantages which may otherwise result from adapting the state of - our commercial laws to the circumstances now existing,”-- - -Taking into view only these influences, Madison seemed to ignore the -supposed chief motive of the embargo in stopping supplies for Canada, -and to admit that embargo was an adjunct of Napoleon’s Continental -system; but in truth Madison’s motives, both political and financial, -were deeper and more decisive than any he alleged. His retreat was -absolute. He recommended that Congress should throw open the ports, and -should abandon all restriction on commerce beyond a guaranty of war -duties for two years after peace as a measure of protection to American -manufactures. The failure of the restrictive system was not disguised. - -The House received the Message with a mixed sense of relief and -consternation, and referred it to Calhoun’s committee, which reported -April 4 a bill for repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts, -together with the reasons which led the committee to unite with the -Executive in abandoning the restrictive system. - -Calhoun had always opposed the commercial policy of Jefferson and -Madison. For him the sudden Executive change was a conspicuous triumph; -but he showed remarkable caution in dealing with the House. Instead of -attempting to coerce the majority, according to his habit, by the force -of abstract principles, he adopted Madison’s reasoning and softened his -own tone, seeming disposed to coax his Southern and Western friends -from making a display of useless ill-temper. “Men cannot go straight -forward,” he said, “but must regard the obstacles which impede their -course. Inconsistency consists in a change of conduct when there is no -change of circumstances which justify it.” The changes in the world’s -circumstances required a return to free trade; but the manufactures -would not be left unprotected,--on the contrary, “he hoped at all times -and under every policy they would be protected with due care.”[469] - -As an example of political inconsistency, as Calhoun defined it, his -pledge to protect American manufactures deserved to be remembered; -but hardly had Calhoun’s words died on the echoes of the House when -another distinguished statesman offered a prospective example even -more striking of what Calhoun excused. Daniel Webster rose, and in -the measured and sonorous tones which impressed above all the idea of -steadfastness in character, he pronounced a funeral oration over the -restrictive system:-- - - “It was originally offered to the people of this country as a kind - of political faith; it was to be believed, not examined; ... it was - to be our political salvation, nobody knew exactly how; and any - departure from it would lead to political ruin, nobody could tell - exactly why.” - -Its opponents had uniformly contended that it was auxiliary to -Napoleon’s Continental system, in co-operation with Napoleon’s -government; and its abandonment with the fall of Napoleon showed the -truth. While thus exulting in the overthrow of the first “American -system,” Webster qualified his triumph by adding that he was, -“generally speaking,” not the enemy of manufactures; he disliked only -the rearing them in hot-beds:-- - - “I am not in haste to see Sheffields and Birminghams in America.... - I am not anxious to accelerate the approach of the period when - the great mass of American labor shall not find its employment in - the field; when the young men of the country shall be obliged to - shut their eyes upon external Nature,--upon the heavens and the - earth,--and immerse themselves in close and unwholesome workshops; - when they shall be obliged to shut their ears to the bleatings of - their own flocks upon their own hills, and to the voice of the lark - that cheers them at the plough, that they may open them in dust and - smoke and steam, to the perpetual whirl of spools and spindles and - the grating of rasps and saws.” - -Potter of Rhode Island, where the new manufactures centred, spoke hotly -against the change. Much Federalist capital had been drawn into the -manufacturing business as well as into speculation in all articles of -necessity which the blockade and the embargo made scarce. At heart -the Federalists were not unanimous in wishing for a repeal of the -restrictive system, and Potter represented a considerable class whose -interests were involved in maintaining high prices. He admitted that -the average duties would still give American manufactures an advantage -of thirty-six per cent, without including freight and marine risks, but -he insisted that the bill was intended to encourage importations of -British goods “that we do not want and can do very well without, in -order to raise a revenue from the people in an indirect way.” - -Probably Potter’s explanation of the change in system was correct. -The necessities of the Treasury were doubtless a decisive cause of -Madison’s step; but these necessities were foreseen by the Federalists -when Madison recommended the embargo, and the neglect to give them due -weight exposed the Administration to grave reproach. “A government -which cannot administer the affairs of a nation,” said Webster, -“without producing so frequent and such violent alterations in the -ordinary occupations and pursuits of private life, has in my opinion -little claim to the regard of the community.” - -The Republicans made no attempt to defend themselves from such -criticisms. Among the small number who refused to follow Calhoun was -Macon, who sat in his seat during the debate writing to his friend -Judge Nicholson. - - “Those who voted the embargo so very lately,” he said,[470] “and - those or him who recommended it must, I think, feel a little sore - under Webster’s rubs.... I have not for a long time seen the Feds - look in so good humor. They have all a smile on their countenances, - and look at each other as if they were the men which had brought - this great and good work about.... The Republicans have not the - most pleasing countenances. Those who support the bill do not look - gay or very much delighted with their majority, and those who - expect to be in the minority have a melancholy gloom over their - faces.” - -That the system of commercial restrictions had failed was admitted, but -the failure carried no conviction of error to its friends. Physical -force had also apparently failed. The Southern Republicans had no -choice but to adopt strong measures, giving to the government powers -which in their opinion they had no constitutional right to confer; but -they remained unshaken in their opinions. - - “I confess to you,” wrote Macon, “that the parties seem by their - acts to be approaching each other, and I fear that tough times is - a strong argument with many of us to stretch the Constitution; and - the difference between expediency and constitutionality becomes - every day less. Notwithstanding this, I do not despair of the - republic, because my dependence has always been on the people; and - their influence was felt in laying the embargo, and probably that - of the Executive in repealing it.” - -No one understood or represented so well as Macon the instincts and -ideas of the Southern people at that time, and he never represented -them more truly than in the matter of the embargo. Virginia and the -Carolinas were with him at heart. Macon’s hopes for the republic -depended on his confidence in the people; and that confidence in its -turn depended on his belief that the people were still true to a dogma -which the Government had abandoned as impracticable. The belief was -well founded, as the course of events proved. The House, April 7, by -a vote of one hundred and fifteen to thirty-seven, passed the bill -repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts; the Senate also passed -it, April 12, by a vote of twenty-six to four; the President, April -14, approved it; and from that day the restrictive system, which had -been the cardinal point of Jefferson’s and Madison’s statesmanship, -seemed to vanish from the public mind and the party politics of the -country. Yet so deeply riveted was the idea of its efficacy among the -Southern people, that at the next great crisis of their history they -staked their lives and fortunes on the same belief of their necessity -to Europe which had led them into the experiment of coercing Napoleon -and Canning by commercial deprivations; and their second experiment had -results still more striking than those which attended their first. - -The explanation of this curious popular trait certainly lay in the -nature of Southern society; but the experience was common to the whole -Union. When the restrictive system was abandoned of necessity in -April, 1814, it had brought the country to the verge of dissolution. -The Government could neither make war nor peace; the public seemed -indifferent or hostile; and the same traits which characterized the -restrictive system continued to paralyze the efforts of Congress to -adopt more energetic methods. - - “I will yet hope we may have no more war,” wrote Mrs. Madison to - Mrs. Gallatin Jan. 7, 1814.[471] “If we do, alas! alas! we are not - making ready as we ought to do. Congress trifle away the most - precious of their days,--days that ought to be devoted to the - defence of their divided country.” - -Mrs. Madison doubtless echoed the language she heard used at the White -House; yet the leaders of Congress were neither triflers nor idlers, -and they did all that public opinion permitted. Within a week after -Mrs. Madison’s complaint, the military committee of the House reported -a bill for encouraging enlistments. Viewed as a means of embodying the -whole military strength of the republic to resist the whole military -strength of Great Britain, about to be released from service in Europe, -Troup’s bill[472] was not an efficient measure; but it terrified -Congress. - -During the campaign of 1813, as the story has shown, the Government -never succeeded in placing more than ten or eleven thousand effective -rank-and-file in the field in a single body. About as many more were -in garrison, and the sick-list was always large. Armstrong reported to -the Ways and Means Committee that the aggregate strength of the army -in February, 1813, was 18,945; in June, 27,609; in December, 34,325; -and Jan. 17, 1814, it was 33,822.[473] Discouraging as this report was, -it concealed the worst part of the situation. In truth, the abstract -furnished by the adjutant-general’s office gave the number of regular -troops in service for January, 1814, not as 33,822, but as 23,614; -and to the return a note was appended, explaining that “although the -numerical force in January, 1814, was 23,614, the actual strength of -the army at that time was less than half that number, arising from the -expiration of the term of service of the troops raised in 1809 and -enlisted for five years, and of the twelve and eighteen-months men -enlisted in 1812–1813.”[474] The establishment consisted of 58,254 men -authorized by law; but the legal establishment was not half filled. -The European news showed that England would soon be able to reinforce -her army in Canada and take the offensive. Instead of sixty thousand -men, Armstrong needed twice that number for a moderately safe defence, -since every part of the sea-coast stood at the enemy’s mercy, and no -adequate defence was possible which did not include an offensive return -somewhere on the Canadian frontier. Needing more than one hundred -thousand,--authorized by law to enlist sixty thousand,--he could -depend on less than thirty thousand men. Yet so far from attempting to -increase the establishment, Armstrong hoped only to fill the ranks. - -Troup’s bill aimed at that object, purporting to be “A Bill making -further provision for filling of the ranks of the regular army.” No -system of draft was suggested. Troup’s committee proposed to treble the -bounty rather than raise the pay,--a system which might be economical -in a long war; but if the war should last only one year, the soldier -must gain four fifths of his bounty without return. Troup first -suggested one hundred dollars as bounty, which Congress raised to one -hundred and twenty-four dollars, together with three hundred and twenty -acres of land as already fixed. The pay of privates remained at ten -dollars. Twenty-four dollars of the bounty was to be paid only on the -soldier’s discharge. Recruiting-agents were to receive eight dollars -for each recruit. - -Such a provision for filling the ranks could not be called excessive. -Even if the whole bounty were added to the pay, and the soldier were to -serve but twelve months, he would receive only twenty dollars a month -and his land-certificate. If he served his whole term of five years, -he received little more than twelve dollars a month. The inducement -was not great in such a community as the United States. The chance -that such a measure would fill the ranks was small; yet the measure -seemed extravagant to a party that had formerly pledged itself against -mercenary armies. - -If the bill showed the timidity of the Republicans, it called out -worse qualities in the Federalists. The speeches of the opposition -were for the most part general in their criticisms and denunciations, -and deserved little attention; but that of Daniel Webster was doubly -interesting, because Webster was not only the ablest but among the -most cautious of his party. His speech[475] suggested much of the -famous eloquence of his later oratory, but dwelt on ideas to which his -later life was opposed, and followed lines of argument surprising in -a statesman of his great intellectual powers. His chief theme was the -duty of government to wage only a defensive war, except on the ocean. -“Give up your futile projects of invasion. Extinguish the fires that -blaze on your inland frontiers.” He wished the government to use its -forces only to repel invasion. - - “The enemy, as we have seen, can make no permanent stand in any - populous part of the country. Its citizens will drive back his - forces to the line; but at that line where defence ceases and - invasion begins, they stop. They do not pass it because they do not - choose to pass it. Offering no serious obstacle to their actual - power, it rises like a Chinese wall against their sentiments and - their feelings.” - -This advice, which echoed a Federalist idea reasonable or excusable -in 1812, was out of place in January, 1814. The battles of Leipzig -and Vittoria had settled the question of offensive and defensive in -Canada. The offensive had passed into British hands, and a successful -defence was all that the United States could hope. The interests of New -England as well as of New York and of the whole Union required that -the defensive campaign should, if possible, be fought on Canadian soil -rather than at Plattsburg, Washington, or New Orleans; and even the -most extreme Federalist could scarcely be believed blind to an idea so -obvious. - -Moderate as the bill was, fifty-eight members voted against it, while -ninety-seven voted in its favor. In the Senate the bill passed without -a division, and received, January 27, the President’s approval. -Meanwhile the Senate passed bills for converting the twelve-months -regiments into regiments enlisted for the war, as well as for raising -three rifle regiments for the same term, and any number of volunteers -that in the President’s opinion the public service required, offering -to all recruits for these corps the same inducements as to the regular -regiments. These bills produced another and a longer debate, but were -passed without serious opposition. No further addition was made to the -regular army, and no other effort to obtain recruits. - -Thus organized, the army consisted of forty-six regiments of infantry -enlisted for five years,--four rifle regiments; an artillery corps and -a regiment of light artillery; a regiment of dragoons; the engineer -corps, the rangers, and sea-fencibles,--an aggregate of 62,773 men -authorized by law, an increase of only five thousand men over that of -the previous year. - -The appropriations for the military establishment amounted to nearly -twenty-five million dollars, the Federalists alone voting against them. -The naval appropriations amounted to seven millions, and were voted -without opposition. The Secretary of the Navy discouraged the building -of more cruisers, owing to want of timber and seamen; but Congress -showed more than ordinary sagacity by appropriating half a million -dollars for the construction of floating batteries with steam-power. - -Such provision for the coming campaign offered little evidence of -increasing energy to make head against the vastly increased military -and naval power of England; but the financial outlook was much worse -than the military, and Congress dared not face it. The acting Secretary -of the Treasury, William Jones, sent his annual report to the House -January 8, and so far as his balance-sheet went, no difficulties were -apparent. He had disbursed thirty million dollars during the past -fiscal year, and needed nearly forty millions for the current year. -These sums were not excessive when compared with the wealth of the -country or its exertions at other periods of national danger. Half a -century afterward the people of the Southern States, not much more -numerous than the people of the Union in 1812, and with a far larger -proportion of slaves, supported during four years the burden of an -army numbering nearly five hundred thousand men. For the same period -the Northern people, not much exceeding twenty millions in number, -lent their government more than five hundred million dollars a year. -The efforts of 1864, proportioned to the population, were nearly ten -times as great as those of 1814, when Secretary Jones looked with -well-founded alarm at the prospect of borrowing thirty millions for the -year, and of maintaining an army which could scarcely be expected to -number forty thousand rank-and-file. - -The United States, with a proper currency and untouched resources, -should have found no serious difficulty in borrowing thirty or even -fifty millions a year in 1814; but they were in reality on the verge -of bankruptcy, although the national resources were probably ample. -The amount of private capital available for loans was uncertain, and -the amount of circulating medium was equally doubtful. Timothy Pitkin -of Connecticut, perhaps the best authority in Congress, thought that -the paid bank capital of the United States did not much exceed sixty -millions,[476] and that the notes of these banks in circulation did not -reach thirty millions. His estimate of paid bank capital was probably -liberal, but his estimate of the circulation was eight or ten millions -too small. Had the Treasury been able to count on the use of these -resources, they might have answered all necessary purposes; but between -the mistakes of the government and the divisions of the people, the -Treasury was left with no sound resources whatever. - -The first and fatal blow to the Treasury was the loss of the Bank -of the United States, which left the government without financial -machinery or a sound bank-note circulation. The next blow, almost -equally severe, was the loss of the Massachusetts and Connecticut -banks, which were the strongest in the Union. Whether the -responsibility for the loss rested on the Executive, Congress, or the -two States might be a subject for dispute; but whoever was responsible, -the effect was ruinous. The New England banks were financial agents -of the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including Maine was -about twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut -exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached -eighteen millions,[477] or nearly one third of the paid bank capital -of the whole country, if Pitkin’s estimate was correct. That nearly -one third of the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid -of government was serious enough; but in reality the loss was much -greater, for New England held a still larger proportion of the specie -on which the bank circulation of other States depended. - -The system of commercial restrictions was responsible for thus, at -the most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of the -national finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against -the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon -them by national legislation until New England supplied the Union -with articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own -manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward -Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after -the war was declared. The British blockade stimulated the movement, -and the embargo of December, 1813, which lasted till April, 1814, cut -off every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable -longer to send their crops even to New England for a market, they were -obliged to send specie, and they soon came to the end of their supply. -The Massachusetts banks, which reported about $820,000 in specie in -1809, returned more than $3,680,000 in June, 1812; which rose to -$5,780,000 in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in June, 1814. -In five years the Massachusetts banks alone drew more than six million -dollars in specie from the Southern and Middle States,[478] besides -what they sent to Canada in payment for British bills. - -No one knew how much specie the country contained. Gallatin afterward -estimated it at seventeen million dollars,[479] and of that amount the -banks of New England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions. The -Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in specie, had a bank-note -circulation of less than three millions. The Middle, Southern, and -Western States must have had a bank-note circulation approaching forty -millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in specie to support -it,[480] while the paper was constantly increasing in quantity and the -specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not -with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dollars to every -specie dollar in the bank vaults; but the banks in 1814 beyond New -England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver -or gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper without specie in -their possession. - -Already the banks of New England were pressing their demands on those -of New York, which in their turn called on Philadelphia and Baltimore. -The specie drained to New England could find its way back only by means -of government loans, which New England refused to make in any large -amount. On the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury notes -at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in payment of them.[481] -Probably New England lent to the British government during the war more -money than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New -England to the United States loans was less than three millions. - -This situation was well understood by Congress. In the debate of -February, 1814, the approaching dangers were repeatedly pointed out. -The alarm was then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means -reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank with a capital of -thirty million dollars, while Macon openly advocated the issue of -government paper,[482] declaring that “paper money never was beat.” -Congress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill for twenty-five -millions, and an Act for the issue of five million interest-bearing -Treasury notes, leaving with the President the option to issue five -millions more in case he could not borrow it. The legislation was -evidently insufficient, and satisfied no one. “You have authorized a -loan for twenty-five millions,” said Grundy in the debate of April 2, -“and have provided for the expenditure of so much money. Where is the -money?” - -Without attempting to answer this question, April 18 Congress -adjourned. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - - -WHILE Congress was thus employed, much occurred behind the scenes that -bore directly on the movements of war. The French minister, Serurier, -alone made official reports, and his letters became less interesting -as his importance diminished; but occasionally he still threw a ray -of light on Madison’s troubles. At midsummer in 1813 he was in high -spirits. - - “Within the past week,” Serurier wrote, July 21, 1813,[483] “we - have received, one after another, news of the fresh successes at - the beginning of the campaign,--the battle of Lützen, the offer of - armistice, and the battle of Bautzen. These events, so glorious for - France, have been so many thunder-strokes for the enemy in America. - Their consternation is equal to their previous confidence, which - had no bounds. The Republicans of Congress, on the other hand, have - received these news in triumph. All have come to congratulate me, - and have told me that they, not less than we, had been victorious - at Lützen. The ascendency, henceforward irresistible, which his - Majesty is acquiring over his enemies, will, I hope, supply a - little tone and vigor to this Government, which had need of them.” - -When the President returned to Washington, Oct. 25, 1813, Serurier -reported with less enthusiasm, but still with confidence, that Madison -remained firm: - - “He expressed himself in very proper, though very measured, - terms on the monstrous coalition that has been renewed against - his Majesty. I remarked to him that among our advantages we must - doubtless count the fact that the coalition had ten heads, while - France had but one. ‘And what a powerful head!’ replied the - President, instantly, with less grace than conviction in his whole - countenance.” - -The vigor of Napoleon postponed for a few months the total downfall of -Serurier’s influence, but it slowly waned, and he became more and more -grateful for consideration shown him. The President’s Annual Message, -December 7, met his approval. “All agree that nothing more energetic or -more warlike has yet come from Mr. Madison’s Cabinet.”[484] The secret -Message of December 9 and the embargo pleased him more. - - “Mr. Monroe assured me three days ago,” continued Serurier, writing - December 10, “that the Government had been informed of supplies to - the extent of nearly thirty thousand barrels of flour furnished - to Canada from ports of the United States. A rigorous embargo - can alone prevent such criminal speculations, and give the war a - decisive character which will shorten its duration and assure its - success.... In this affair is seen a new proof of Mr. Madison’s - obstinacy (_roideur_) which prevents him from abandoning a measure - he has once put forward, and judges to be for the public interest.” - -The arrival of the “Bramble” with news of the battle of Leipzig, and -with Castlereagh’s offer to negotiate, left Serurier helpless. “In -this state of things,” he wrote,[485] January 14, “it would have been -difficult for the Executive to refuse to negotiate; and I cannot but -think that he accedes to it only with regret and without illusions.” -In deference to Serurier’s opinion, the President appointed Henry -Clay as commissioner to treat for peace rather than Crawford, then -American envoy to Napoleon; but in the last week of March news arrived -from Bordeaux to February 10, announcing that the allies had reached -Troyes and were advancing on Paris, while Napoleon had accepted their -conditions of negotiation. - - “For the moment the public believed everything to be lost,” - reported Serurier, April 15.[486] “I ought in justice to say that - the President and his Cabinet showed more coolness and did not - share the universal alarm, and that they continued to show me great - confidence in the Emperor’s genius. I did not find them excessively - disturbed by the march of the allies, or doubtful of our power - to repulse them; but I know that his Majesty’s adhesion to the - preliminary conditions of the allies, and yet more the Congress of - Chatillon, and the irresistible influence necessarily acquired for - the British minister, greatly (_vivement_) alarmed Mr. Madison. - He thought he saw, in the announcement of our adoption of those - conditions, our renunciation of every kind of power and control - over Spain and Germany, where England was to rule. He believed - that a peace, dictated by Lord Castlereagh, must already have been - signed, and that the United States were to remain alone on the - field of battle. It was then that Mr. Madison, abruptly and without - having in any way prepared the public for it, addressed to Congress - the Message recommending an immediate repeal of the embargo and a - partial repeal of the non-importation.” - -While Serurier explained the suddenness of Madison’s action by the need -of conciliating the Continental powers and the manufacturing cities of -England, he added that domestic difficulties had a large share in the -decision. Contraband trade had become general in the Eastern States. -A sort of civil war, he said, was beginning between the officers of -customs and the smugglers; the Government also felt serious anxiety for -the success of its loan, and began to doubt its ability to maintain -payments for the army and navy. Revenue had become necessary. Such -was the terror caused by the French news that the capitalists who had -offered to contract for the loan began to withdraw their offers and to -say that it was no longer practicable. “Analyze it as you please,” -said Serurier, “you will still find that it was the passage of the -Rhine and the progress of the allies in France which, in spite of all -I could say, decided this retrograde movement of a Government which I -have hitherto always found firm, wise, and consequent. But fear does -not reason.” - -Serurier failed even to obtain permission for French letters-of-marque -to be received with their prizes in American ports. The President -recommended it to Congress, but Monroe told Serurier that the committee -of Congress had not dared to make a report, being persuaded that it -would be rejected.[487] “Mr. Monroe agreed to all I said; granted -that Congress was in the wrong, and I entirely in the right; but -nevertheless Congress has adjourned without considering the question.” -Serurier was disposed to advise the withdrawal by France of the -liberties granted to American privateers,--a measure which, he might -almost have foreseen, was likely in any case soon to be taken. - -With the repeal of the embargo ended the early period of United -States history, when diplomatists played a part at Washington equal -in importance to that of the Legislature or the Executive. The -statecraft of Jefferson and Madison was never renewed. Thenceforward -the government ceased to balance between great foreign Powers, and -depended on its own resources. As far as diplomacy had still a part to -play in the year 1814, its field of action was in Europe; and there the -ablest men in civil life were sent. Gallatin, Bayard, J. Q. Adams, and -Crawford were already on the spot; and Henry Clay, after, resigning the -Speaker’s chair, Jan. 19, 1814, sailed for Gothenburg to take part in -the negotiation. - -President Madison sought in vain for men of equal ability to supply -the gaps made by transferring so many of his strongest supporters to -Europe. The House of Representatives, January 19, elected Langdon -Cheves Speaker; but the choice was a defeat for Madison, whose friends -supported Felix Grundy. The Federalists, joining those Republicans who -were hostile to commercial restrictions, numbered ninety-four against -fifty-nine votes for Grundy,--and the success of Cheves foreshadowed -the overthrow of the embargo. In providing for other vacancies the -President fared worse. Cheves was a man of ability, and in general -policy was a friend of the Administration; but most of the other -material upon which the President must depend was greatly inferior to -Cheves. The Cabinet needed partial reconstruction, and Madison was at a -loss for choice. - -The President’s favorite candidate for the Treasury, after Gallatin -showed his determination to remain abroad, was Alexander James Dallas -of Pennsylvania. Dallas was one of Gallatin’s strongest personal -friends, an old Republican, and a lawyer of undoubted ability. Born in -Jamaica in 1759, like Gallatin and Hamilton he had become a citizen -of the United States before the Constitution or the confederation was -adopted. He had been a leader of the Republican party in Federalist -times, and was made district-attorney of Pennsylvania by Jefferson; but -Duane and the “Aurora” destroyed his influence and left him isolated. -In Pennsylvania Dallas commanded no support. Both the senators, Leib -and Lacock, opposed his appointment to the Treasury, and were able to -procure his rejection had Madison ventured to make it.[488] - -Obliged to abandon Dallas, the President offered the appointment -to Richard Rush, the comptroller, who declined it. At last Madison -pitched upon G. W. Campbell, of Tennessee. Since Crawford’s departure -Campbell had represented the Administration in the Senate, but neither -as senator nor as representative had he won great distinction. Best -known for his duel with Barent Gardenier, his physical courage was -more apparent than his financial fitness. Campbell brought no strength -to the Administration, and rather weakened its character among -capitalists; but Madison could think of no one better qualified for the -place. The Republicans were at a loss for leaders. “I do not complain -that Campbell is unfit,” wrote Macon to Nicholson;[489] “indeed, if the -choice of secretary must be made out of Congress, I do not know that a -better could be made.” Yet the selection was unfortunate. - -Madison was also obliged to select a new attorney-general in place of -William Pinkney. Till then the attorney-general had not been regarded -as standing on the same footing with other members of the Cabinet. -The Secretaries of State and Treasury were paid five thousand dollars -a year; those of the War and Navy were paid forty-five hundred; but -the attorney-general was paid only three thousand. He had neither -office-room nor clerks, and was not required to reside permanently at -Washington, but pursued the private business of his profession where -he liked, attending to the business of government rather as a counsel -under general retainer than as a head of Department. Pinkney lived -in Baltimore, and his abilities were so valuable that the President -was glad to employ them on any terms, and was not inclined to impose -conditions of residence which Pinkney could not accept without a -greater sacrifice than he was ready to make.[490] Congress was not -so forbearing as the President. John W. Taylor, a member from New -York, moved a resolution January 5, directing the Judiciary Committee -to inquire into the expediency of requiring the attorney-general to -reside in Washington during the session of Congress. The committee -reported a bill, January 22, requiring permanent residence from the -attorney-general, with an increase of salary. The bill failed to become -law, but Pinkney at once resigned. - -Madison offered the post to Richard Rush, who accepted it. Rush’s -abilities were more than respectable, and caused regret that he had not -accepted the Treasury, for which he was better fitted than Campbell; -but these changes did not improve the Cabinet. “His predecessor, -Pinkney, I believe considered him the best lawyer in the nation,” -wrote Macon;[491] “but that Campbell and Rush are equal to Gallatin -and Pinkney is not, I imagine, believed by any one who knows them.” In -the case of Pinkney and Rush, the advantages of permanent residence -balanced in part the loss of ability; but no such consideration -affected the change of Campbell for Gallatin. - -Fortunately Madison lost enemies as well as friends. Time worked -steadily in his favor. The old Smith faction, the Clinton party, -and the “Aurora” were already broken. Senators who claimed too much -independence of action found public opinion setting strongly against -them. Samuel Smith and Giles were near the end of their terms, and -had no chance of re-election. The legislature of North Carolina, in -December, 1813, censured so severely the conduct of Senator Stone that -the senator resigned his seat.[492] At the same time, Pennsylvania -succeeded in ridding herself of Senator Leib, and Madison was able to -punish the postmaster-general, Gideon Granger, whose friendship for -Leib made him obnoxious to his party. - -Granger was not a member of the Cabinet, but his patronage was the -more important because at that time, by some anomaly in the law, -it was not subject to approval by the Senate. Early in January one -of his best post-offices, that of Philadelphia, became vacant. One -senator of the United States had already resigned his seat to become -postmaster of New York; and the Pennsylvanians had reason to fear -that Leib, whose term was about to expire, would resign to become -postmaster of Philadelphia, and that Granger wished to gratify him. -Immediately all the Administration Republicans, including members of -Congress and of the State legislature, joined in recommending another -man, and warned Granger in private that his own removal from office -would follow the appointment of Leib.[493] C. J. Ingersoll--a young -member from Pennsylvania, among the warmest supporters of Madison and -the war--reinforced the threat by moving the House, January 7, for a -committee to amend the laws with a view to making postmasters subject -to the usual rule of confirmation. The committee was appointed. - -Irritated by this treatment, Granger in defiance of President and party -appointed Michael Leib to the office, and Leib instantly resigned -his seat and hastened to assume the duties of his new post. In this -transaction Madison was the chief gainer. Not only did he rid himself -of Leib, but he gained a warm ally in the person of Leib’s successor; -for the Pennsylvania legislature, February 28, transferred Jonathan -Roberts from the House to take Leib’s place in the Senate. Madison’s -advantage was not limited by Leib’s departure or Roberts’s accession. -He was able also to punish Granger in a manner at that time almost -or quite without parallel. Executive offices ran, as a rule, during -good behavior; and although Jefferson made removals of party enemies, -neither he nor Madison had ventured to remove party friends, except in -cases of misbehavior. Granger’s conduct exasperated the Pennsylvanians -to a point where no rules were regarded. Eighty-six members of the -Pennsylvania legislature joined in addressing a memorial to the -President demanding the removal of Granger as the only means of getting -rid of Leib, who had not only opposed Madison’s election, but who, -“when entrusted with one of the highest offices in the gift of the -State, ... acted in direct hostility to her wishes and interests, and -aided as far as possible her political enemies.” Madison needed little -urging. February 25 he nominated to the Senate as postmaster-general -the governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs. After some little delay, -the Senate confirmed the appointment, March 17, without a division. - -Scarcely was this matter settled, when Congress yielded to Madison’s -opinion in another instance where for ten years the House had -obstinately resisted his wishes. The Yazoo bill became law. For this -concession several reasons combined. The Supreme Court, through -Chief-Justice Marshall, by an elaborate decision in February, 1810, -settled the law in favor of the claimants. John Randolph’s defeat -removed from Congress the chief obstacle to the proposed agreement. The -threatening attitude of New England made every palliative necessary. -Under these inducements, the Senate passed the bill, February 28, by a -vote of twenty-four to eight, and the House passed it, March 26, by a -vote of eighty-four to seventy-six. - -Little by little the pressure of necessity compelled Congress and -the country to follow Madison’s lead. Whether for good or for evil, -he had his way. His enemies were overcome and driven from the field; -his friends were rewarded, and his advice followed. Of revolt within -the party he stood no longer in fear. Already political intrigue and -factiousness began to take a direction which concerned him only so far -as he felt an interest in the choice of his successor. Three years -more would complete Madison’s public career, and in all probability if -another President of the United States were ever elected, he would be -one of Madison’s friends; but many persons doubted whether the country -would reach another Presidential election, and the jealousy which -actuated New England against the South was not the only ground for -that opinion. In Madison’s immediate circle of friends, the jealousy -between Virginia and New York threatened to tear the government in -pieces. These States did not, like Massachusetts, threaten to leave -the Union, but their struggles for power promised to bring government -to a standstill. - -The antipathy of New York for Virginia was not lessened by the success -of Virginia in overthrowing Aaron Burr and DeWitt Clinton. The -Republican party in New York quickly produced two new aspirants to the -Presidency, whose hopes were founded on public weariness of Virginian -supremacy. One of the two candidates was Governor Daniel D. Tompkins, -whose services as war-governor of New York were great, and were -rewarded by great popularity. Governor Tompkins was too remote from the -capital to annoy Madison by direct contact with factions or activity -in intrigue; but the other rival stood at the centre of Executive -patronage. John Armstrong was a man capable of using power for personal -objects, and not easily to be prevented from using it as he pleased. - -Armstrong was an unusual character. The local influences which shaped -Americans were illustrated by the leaders whom New York produced, and -by none better than by Armstrong. Virginians could not understand, -and could still less trust, such a combination of keenness and will, -with absence of conventional morals as the Secretary of War displayed. -The Virginians were simple in everything; even their casuistry was -old-fashioned. Armstrong’s mind belonged to modern New York. The -Virginians were a knot of country gentlemen, inspired by faith in -rural virtues, and sustained by dislike for the city tendencies of -Northern society. Among themselves they were genial, reluctant to -offend, and eager to remove causes of offence. The domestic history of -the government at Washington repeated the Virginian traits. Jefferson -and his friends passed much time in making quarrels, and more in making -peace. Unlike Pennsylvania, New York, and New England, Virginia stood -stoutly by her own leaders; and however harsh Virginians might be in -their judgment of others, they carried delicacy to an extreme in their -treatment of each other. Even John Randolph and W. B. Giles, who seemed -to put themselves beyond the social pale, were treated with tenderness -and regarded with admiration. - -The appearance of a rough and harshly speaking friend in such a society -was no slight shock, and for that reason William Henry Crawford was -regarded with some alarm; but Crawford was socially one of themselves, -while Armstrong belonged to a different type and class. The faculty of -doing a harsh act in a harsh way, and of expressing rough opinions in a -caustic tone, was not what the Virginians most disliked in Armstrong. -His chief fault in their eyes, and one which they could not be blamed -for resenting, was his avowed want of admiration for the Virginians -themselves. Armstrong’s opinion on that subject, which was but the -universal opinion of New York politicians, became notorious long before -he entered the Cabinet, and even then annoyed Madison.[494] The -newspapers gossiped about the mean estimate which Armstrong expressed -for the capacities of the Virginia statesmen. So old and fixed was -the feud, that from the first the Virginians lost no opportunity to -express their opinion of Armstrong, especially in the Senate, whenever -he was nominated for office. Madison unwillingly selected him for -the post of secretary after Crawford refused it, but neither of the -Virginia senators voted on the question of confirmation. In appointing -Armstrong, Madison bestowed on him neither respect nor confidence. He -afterward declared the reasons that caused him to invite a person whom -he distrusted into a position of the highest importance. - - “Should it be asked,” wrote Madison ten years after the war,[495] - “why the individual in question was placed, and after such - developments of his career continued, at the head of the War - Department, the answer will readily occur to those best acquainted - with the circumstances of the period. Others may be referred for - an explanation to the difficulty, which had been felt in its - fullest pressure, of obtaining services which would have been - preferred, several eminent citizens to whom the station had been - offered having successively declined it. It was not unknown at the - time that objections existed to the person finally appointed, as - appeared when his nomination went to the Senate, where it received - the reluctant sanction of a scanty majority [eighteen to fifteen]. - Nor was the President unaware or unwarned of the temper and turn of - mind ascribed to him, which might be uncongenial with the official - relations in which he was to stand. But these considerations were - sacrificed to recommendations from esteemed friends; a belief - that he possessed, with known talents, a degree of military - information which might be useful; and a hope that a proper mixture - of conciliating confidence and interposing control would render - objectionable peculiarities less in practice than in prospect.” - -Possibly Armstrong took a different view of Madison’s conduct, and -regarded his own acceptance of the War Department in January, 1813, -as proof both of courage and disinterestedness. He knew that he could -expect no confidence from Virginians; but apparently he cared little -for Virginian enmity, and was chiefly fretted by what he thought -Virginian incompetence. No one could fail to see that he came into the -Government rather as a master than a servant. According to General -Wilkinson, he was quite as much feared as hated. “I am indeed shocked,” -wrote Wilkinson in his Memoirs,[496] “when I take a retrospect of -the evidence of the terror in which that minister kept more than one -great man at Washington.” Wilkinson, who hated Madison even more than -he hated Armstrong, evidently believed that the President was afraid -of his secretary. Madison himself explained that he thought it better -to bear with Armstrong’s faults than to risk another change in the -Department of War. - -In that decision Madison was doubtless right. Whatever were -Armstrong’s faults, he was the strongest Secretary of War the -government had yet seen. Hampered by an inheritance of mistakes not -easily corrected, and by a chief whose methods were unmilitary in the -extreme, Armstrong still introduced into the army an energy wholly new. -Before he had been a year in office he swept away the old generals -with whom Madison and Eustis had encumbered the service, and in their -place substituted new men. While Major-Generals Dearborn, Pinckney, -and Morgan Lewis were set over military districts where active service -was unnecessary, and while Major-General Wilkinson was summoned to the -last of his many courts of inquiry, the President sent to the Senate, -January 21 and February 21, the names of two new major-generals and -six brigadiers of a totally different character from the earlier -appointments. - -The first major-general was George Izard of South Carolina, born at -Paris in 1777, his father Ralph Izard being then American commissioner -with Franklin and Deane. Returning to America only for a few years -after the peace, George Izard at the age of fifteen was sent abroad to -receive a military education in England, Germany, and France in the -great school of the French Revolution. As far as education could make -generals, Izard was the most promising officer in the United States -service. Appointed in March, 1812, colonel of the Second Artillery, -promoted to brigadier in March, 1813, he served with credit under -Hampton at Chateaugay, and received his promotion over the heads of -Chandler, Boyd, and one or two other brigadiers his seniors. He was -intended to succeed Hampton on Lake Champlain. - -The second new major-general was Jacob Brown, who after receiving -the appointment of brigadier, July 19, 1813, was suddenly promoted -to major-general at the same time with Izard. The selection was the -more remarkable because Brown had no military education, and was taken -directly from the militia. Born in Pennsylvania in 1775 of Quaker -parentage, Brown began life as a schoolmaster. At the instance of the -Society of Friends, he taught their public school in New York city -for several years with credit.[497] He then bought a large tract of -land near Sackett’s Harbor, and in 1799 undertook to found a town of -Brownville. He soon became a leading citizen in that part of New York, -and in 1809 was appointed to the command of a militia regiment. In -1811 he was made a brigadier of militia, and at the beginning of the -war distinguished himself by activity and success at Ogdensburg. His -defence of Sackett’s Harbor in 1813 won him a brigade in the regular -service, and his share in Wilkinson’s descent of the St. Lawrence led -to his further promotion. - -Wilkinson, who regarded Brown as one of his enemies, declared that -he knew not enough of military duty to post the guards of his -camp,[498] and that he compelled his battery to form in a hollow -for the advantage of elevating the pieces to fire at the opposite -heights.[499] Winfield Scott, who was one of Brown’s warmest friends, -described him as full of zeal and vigor, but not a technical soldier, -and but little acquainted with organization, tactics, police, -and camp-duties in general.[500] The promotion of an officer so -inexperienced to the most important command on the frontier, gave a -measure of Armstrong’s boldness and judgment. - -The six new brigadiers were also well chosen. They were Alexander -Macomb, T. A. Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, -and Eleazer W. Ripley, all colonels of the regular army, selected for -their merits. Armstrong supplied Brown’s defects of education by giving -him the aid of Winfield Scott and Ripley, who were sent to organize -brigades at Niagara. - -The energy thus infused by Armstrong into the regular army lasted -for half a century; but perhaps his abrupt methods were better shown -in another instance, which brought upon him the displeasure of the -President. Against Harrison, Armstrong from the first entertained a -prejudice. Believing him to be weak and pretentious, the Secretary -of War showed the opinion by leaving him in nominal command in the -northwest, but sending all his troops in different directions, without -consulting him even in regard to movements within his own military -department. Harrison, taking just offence, sent his resignation as -major-general, May 11, 1814, but at the same time wrote to Governor -Shelby of Kentucky a letter which caused the governor to address to the -President a remonstrance against accepting the resignation.[501] - -At that moment Armstrong and Madison were discussing the means of -promoting Andrew Jackson in the regular service for his success in -the Creek campaigns. No commission higher than that of brigadier was -then at their disposal, and a commission as brigadier was accordingly -prepared for Jackson May 22, with a brevet of major-general.[502] -Harrison’s resignation had been received by Armstrong two days before -issuing Jackson’s brevet, and had been notified to the President, who -was then at Montpelier.[503] The President replied May 25, suggesting -that in view of Harrison’s resignation, the better way would be to send -a commission as major-general directly to Jackson: “I suspend a final -decision, however, till I see you, which will be in two or three days -after the arrival of this.”[504] No sooner did Armstrong receive the -letter, than without waiting for the President’s return he wrote to -Jackson, May 28: “Since the date of my letter of the 24th Major-General -Harrison has resigned his commission in the army, and thus is created -a vacancy in that grade, which I hasten to fill with your name.”[505] - -Armstrong’s course was irregular, and his account to Jackson of the -circumstances was incorrect; for Harrison’s resignation had been -received before, not after, Armstrong’s letter of the 24th. Madison -believed that Armstrong wished to appear as the source of favor to the -army. Armstrong attributed Madison’s hesitation to the wish of Madison -and Monroe that Harrison, rather than Jackson, should take command of -Mobile and New Orleans.[506] Both suspicions might be wrong or right; -but Armstrong’s conduct, while betraying the first motive, suggested -the fear that the President might change his mind; and Harrison -believed that the President would have done so, had not Armstrong’s -abrupt action made it impossible. “The President expressed his great -regret,” said Harrison’s biographer,[507] “that the letter of Governor -Shelby had not been received earlier, as in that case the valuable -services of General Harrison would have been preserved to the nation in -the ensuing campaign.” - -Little as the President liked his Secretary of War, his antipathy was -mild when compared with that of Monroe. The failure of the Canada -campaign gave a serious blow to Armstrong; but he had still recovered -Detroit, and was about to finish the Creek war. His hold upon the -army was becoming strong. His enemies charged him with ambition; they -said he was systematically engaged in strengthening his influence by -seducing the young officers of talents into his personal support, -teaching them to look for appreciation not to the President but to -himself, and appointing to office only his own tools, or the sons of -influential men. He was believed to favor a conscription, and to aim -at the position of lieutenant-general. These stories were constantly -brought to Monroe, and drove him to a condition of mind only to be -described as rabid. He took the unusual step of communicating them -to the President,[508] with confidential comments that, if known to -Armstrong, could hardly have failed to break up the Cabinet. - - “It is painful to me to make this communication to you,” wrote the - Secretary of State Dec. 27, 1813;[509] “nor should I do it if I - did not most conscientiously believe that this man, if continued - in office, will ruin not you and the Administration only, but the - whole Republican party and cause. He has already gone far to do - it, and it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will - soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections to him, if - the above facts are true, ... he wants a head fit for his station. - Indolent except to improper purposes, he is incapable of that - combination and activity which the times require. My advice to - you, therefore, is to remove him at once. The near prospect of a - conscription, adopted and acted on without your approbation or - knowledge, is a sufficient reason. The burning of Newark, if done - by his orders, is another. The failure to place troops at Fort - George is another. In short there are abundant reasons for it. - His removal for either of the three would revive the hopes of our - party now desponding, and give a stimulus to measures. I do not - however wish you to act on my advice,--consult any in whom you have - confidence. Mr. A. has, as you may see, few friends, and some of - them cling to him rather as I suspect from improper motives, or on - a presumption that you support him.” - -Armstrong’s faults were beyond dispute, but his abilities were very -considerable; and the President justly thought that nothing would be -gained by dismissing him, even to restore Monroe to the War Department. -Armstrong, struggling with the load of incapable officers and -insufficient means, for which Madison and Congress were responsible, -required the firm support of his chief and his colleagues, as well as -of the army and of Congress, to carry the burden of the war; but he had -not a friend to depend upon. Secretary Jones was as hostile as Monroe. -Pennsylvania and Virginia equally distrusted him, and the fate of any -public man distrusted by Pennsylvania and Virginia was commonly fixed -in advance. Armstrong was allowed to continue his preparations for -the next campaign, but Monroe remained actively hostile. In a private -letter to Crawford, written probably about the month of May, 1814, and -preserved with a memorandum that it was not sent, Monroe said:[510]-- - - “There is now no officer free to command to whom the public looks - with any sort of confidence or even hope. Izard stands next, but - he is as you see otherwise engaged [on a court of inquiry on - Wilkinson]. Thus the door is left open for some new pretender, and - Mr. Armstrong is that pretender. This has been his object from the - beginning.... The whole affair is beyond my control.” - -Thus the elements of confusion surrounding Armstrong were many. A -suspicious and hesitating President; a powerful and jealous Secretary -of State; a South Carolinian major-general, educated in the French -engineers, commanding on Lake Champlain; a Pennsylvania schoolmaster, -of Quaker parentage, without military knowledge, commanding at -Sackett’s Harbor and Niagara; a few young brigadiers eager to -distinguish themselves, and an army of some thirty thousand men,--these -were the elements with which Armstrong was to face the whole military -power of England; for Paris capitulated March 31, and the war in Europe -was ended. - -In one respect, Armstrong’s conduct seemed inconsistent with the idea -of selfishness or intrigue. The duty of organizing a court martial for -the trial of William Hull fell necessarily upon him. Hull’s defence -must inevitably impeach Hull’s superiors; his acquittal was possible -only on the ground that the Government had been criminally negligent -in supporting him. As far as Armstrong was interested in the result, -he was concerned in proving the incapacity of his predecessor Eustis, -and of the President, in their management of the war. He could have had -no personal object to gain in procuring the conviction of Hull, but he -might defend his own course by proving the imbecility of Dearborn. - -The President ordered a court martial on Hull before Armstrong entered -the War Department. A. J. Dallas drew up the specifications, and -inserted, contrary to his own judgment, a charge of treason made by -the Department. The other charges were cowardice, neglect of duty, and -unofficer-like conduct. Monroe, while temporarily at the head of the -Department, organized the first court to meet at Philadelphia Feb. 25, -1813. Major-General Wade Hampton was to preside. - -Before the trial could be held, Armstrong came into office, and was -obliged to order the members of the court to active service. Hampton -was sent to Lake Champlain, and when his campaign ended in November, -1813, he returned under charges resembling those against Hull.[511] -Finding that neither Wilkinson nor Armstrong cared to press them, and -satisfied that no inquiry could be impartial, Hampton determined to -settle the question by once more sending in his resignation,[512] -which he did in March, 1814, when it was accepted. Armstrong in effect -acquitted Hampton by accepting his resignation, and never publicly -affirmed any charge against him until after Hampton’s death, when he -attributed to the major-general “much professional error and great -moral depravity.”[513] Hampton’s opinion of Armstrong could be gathered -only from his conduct and his letters to the Secretary of War, but was -not materially different from Armstrong’s opinion of Hampton. - -Meanwhile Hull waited for trial. During the summer of 1813 he saw -nearly all his possible judges disgraced and demanding courts martial -like himself. Hampton was one; Wilkinson another; Dearborn a third. -Dearborn had been removed from command of his army in face of the -enemy, and loudly called for a court of inquiry. Instead of granting -the request, the President again assigned him to duty in command of -Military District No. 3, comprising the city of New York, and also made -him President of the court martial upon General Hull. - -The impropriety of such a selection could not be denied. Of all men in -the United States, Dearborn was most deeply interested in the result of -Hull’s trial, and the President, next to Dearborn, would be most deeply -injured by Hull’s acquittal. The judgment of Dearborn, or of any court -over which Dearborn presided, in a matter which affected both court and -government so closely could not command respect. That Armstrong lent -himself to such a measure was a new trait of character never explained; -but that Madison either ordered or permitted it showed that he must -have been unconscious either of Dearborn’s responsibility for Hull’s -disaster, or of his own. - -Hull offered no objection to his court, and the trial began at Albany, -Jan. 3, 1814, Dearborn presiding, and Martin Van Buren acting as -special judge-advocate. March 26 the court sentenced Hull to be shot to -death for cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-like conduct. April -25 President Madison approved the sentence, but remitted the execution, -and Hull’s name was ordered to be struck from the army roll. - -That some one should be punished for the loss of Detroit was evident, -and few persons were likely to complain because Hull was a selected -victim; but many thought that if Hull deserved to be shot, other men, -much higher than he in office and responsibility, merited punishment; -and the character of the court-martial added no credit to the -Government, which in effect it acquitted of blame. - - -END OF VOL. I. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Madison to Wheaton, Feb. 26, 1827; Works, iii. 553. - -[2] Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; State Papers, iii. 589. - -[3] Russell to Monroe, Sept. 17, 1812; State Papers, iii. 593. - -[4] Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; State Papers, iii. 592. - -[5] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 463; Feb. 18, 1813. - -[6] James, App. No. 77. - -[7] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 34; Nov. 30, 1812. - -[8] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 47, 48; Nov. 30. 1812. - -[9] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 72; Nov. 30, 1812. - -[10] The Times, Jan. 2, 1813. - -[11] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 625; Feb. 13, 1813. - -[12] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 582. - -[13] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 586. - -[14] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 21, 1812; ii. 401. - -[15] VETUS, in the “Times,” Oct. 26, 1812. - -[16] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Oct. 21, 1812; ii. 414. - -[17] Diary of J. Q. Adams, ii. 433. Adams to Monroe, Dec. 11, 1812; -State Papers, iii. 626. - -[18] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Feb. 1, 1813; ii. 440. - -[19] State Papers, iii. 608. - -[20] Foster to Monroe, July 2, 1811; State Papers, iii. 542. - -[21] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 488. - -[22] Serurier to Bassano, Jan. 13, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[23] Monroe to Jefferson, June 7, 1813; Jefferson MSS. - -[24] Monroe to Madison, Feb. 25, 1813; Monroe MSS. State Department -Archives; Gilman’s Monroe, p. 108. - -[25] Armstrong’s Notices of the War, i. 113–116. - -[26] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 408. - -[27] Gallatin to Nicholson, May 5, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 482. - -[28] State Papers, iii. 624. - -[29] Monroe to Jefferson, June 7, 1813; Jefferson MSS. - -[30] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 483. - -[31] Gallatin’s Writings, i. 535. - -[32] Monroe to the Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; State Papers, -iii. 695. - -[33] Niles, iv. 168. - -[34] Gallatin to William Few, May 9, 1813; Gallatin MSS. - -[35] Pickering to Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 404. - -[36] Ingersoll’s History, i. 120. - -[37] Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[38] National Intelligencer, July 17, 20, 22, 1813. - -[39] Madison to Gallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Works, ii. 566. - -[40] Executive Journal, ii. 388. - -[41] Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 484. - -[42] Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 484. Cf. -Madison to the Senate, July 6, 1813; Executive Journal, ii. 381. - -[43] Hanson to Pickering, Oct. 16, 1813; Pickering MSS. - -[44] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 10, 1812; Dawson, p. 273. - -[45] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812; Dawson, p. 283. - -[46] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812; Dawson, p. 283. - -[47] Dawson, p. 296. - -[48] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Sept. 16, 1816. - -[49] Eustis to Harrison, Sept. 17, 1812; Dawson, p. 299. Eustis to -Governor Shelby, Sept. 17, 1812. McAffee, p. 117. - -[50] Dawson, p. 312. - -[51] McAffee, p. 184. - -[52] Armstrong to Harrison, April 4, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 245. - -[53] Harrison to Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 337. - -[54] Dawson, p. 333. Armstrong’s Notices, i. 63, 86. - -[55] Dawson, p. 454. - -[56] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[57] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[58] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[59] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 8, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[60] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Sept. 16, 1817; Major -Eves’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 203. Cf. Dawson, p. 443. - -[61] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 197. - -[62] McAffee, p. 230. - -[63] McAffee, p. 237. - -[64] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 199. - -[65] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 13, 1817. - -[66] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 13, 1817. - -[67] James, i. 185; Richardson, p. 74. - -[68] Richardson, p. 75. - -[69] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 198. - -[70] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 17, 1817. - -[71] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 26, 1813; Official Letters, -p. 125. - -[72] Harrison to Governor Meigs, Jan. 19, 1813; “National -Intelligencer,” Feb. 11, 1813. - -[73] McAffee, p. 210; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 200. - -[74] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Feb. [Jan.] 20, 1813; MSS. War -Department Archives. - -[75] McAffee, p. 233. - -[76] Dawson, p. 364. - -[77] Life of Sir George Prevost; App. xxv. p 74. Christie, ii. 115. - -[78] Return of the whole of the troops engaged at Frenchtown, Jan. 22, -1813; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 678, p. 18. - -[79] Christie, ii. 69; James, i. 186; Richardson, p. 75. - -[80] Proctor’s Report of Jan. 25, 1813; James, i. 418. - -[81] James, i. 185, 186. - -[82] Return, etc.; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 648, p. 18. - -[83] Richardson, p. 76. - -[84] Statement of Madison, March 13, 1813; Niles, iv. 83. - -[85] Richardson’s War of 1812, p. 79. - -[86] Dawson, p. 362. - -[87] Dawson, p. 356. - -[88] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 85. - -[89] Dawson, p. 370. - -[90] McAffee, p. 240. - -[91] Dawson, p. 375. - -[92] Dawson, p. 373. - -[93] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 242. - -[94] Dawson, p. 337. - -[95] Proctor’s Report of May 4, 1813; Richardson, p. 94; James, i. 196, -429. - -[96] Lossing, p. 486, _note_. - -[97] Richardson, p. 86; James, i. 198. - -[98] Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[99] Richardson, pp. 87, 88. Harrison to Armstrong, May 9, 1813; MSS. -War Department Archives. - -[100] Richardson, p. 88. - -[101] Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[102] Proctor’s Report of May 14, 1813; James, i. 428; Richardson, pp. -93, 94. - -[103] Prevost to Proctor, July 11, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices i. 228. - -[104] Richardson, p. 111. - -[105] James, i. 264, 265; Richardson, p. 104; Christie, p. 117. - -[106] Dawson, p. 408. - -[107] McAffee, p. 322. - -[108] McAffee, p. 323. - -[109] Governor Duncan’s Report, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 230. - -[110] Dawson, p. 408. - -[111] Richardson, p. 105. - -[112] Proctor to Prevost, Aug. 9, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives. - -[113] Life of Prevost, p. 106, _note_. - -[114] Governor Duncan’s Report, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 230. - -[115] Richardson, p. 104. - -[116] James, ii. 264. - -[117] Dawson, p. 407; McAffee, p. 302. - -[118] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 166, _note_. - -[119] Harrison to Armstrong, March 17, 1813; Notices, i. 242. - -[120] Richardson, p. 110; James, Naval Occurrences, p. 285. - -[121] Barclay’s Report of Sept. 12, 1813; James, Naval Occurrences. -Appendix, no. 54. - -[122] McAffee, p. 334. - -[123] Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239. - -[124] Armstrong, i. 171, _note_; McAffee, p. 286. - -[125] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1834; Armstrong, i. 232. - -[126] Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 24, 1813; Official Letters, p. -215. - -[127] James, i. 269. - -[128] Richardson, p. 119. - -[129] Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239. - -[130] Richardson, pp. 126, 133, 134. - -[131] Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 27, 1813; Official Letters, p. -220. - -[132] Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 27, 1813; Dawson, p. 421. - -[133] Harrison to Armstrong, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 233. - -[134] Report of Oct. 23, 1813; MSS. British Archives. Lower Canada, -vol. cxxiii. - -[135] Richardson, pp. 133, 134. - -[136] Harrison’s Report, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 234. - -[137] Narrative of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 137. - -[138] Proctor’s Report of Oct. 23, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[139] Richardson, pp. 122, 139. - -[140] Richardson, p. 136. - -[141] James, i. 278. - -[142] Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 140. - -[143] Harrison’s Report of Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 233. - -[144] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, -i. 232. - -[145] Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 140. - -[146] Richardson, p. 136. - -[147] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Nov. 21, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[148] Richardson, p. 125. Lewis Cass to Armstrong, Oct. 28, 1813; MSS. -War Department Archives. - -[149] Return of Right Division, Richardson, p. 129. - -[150] Prevost to Bathurst, Feb. 14, 1815; MSS. British Archives. - -[151] W. H. Robinson to Prevost, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives. - -[152] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives, Lower -Canada, vol. cxxviii. no. 190. - -[153] James, i. 140. - -[154] Report of Major Macdonnell, Feb. 23, 1813; James, i. Appendix no. -16. - -[155] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 608. - -[156] Armstrong to Dearborn, Feb. 10, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 221. - -[157] Note presented to Cabinet, Feb. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -iii. Appendix xxvi.; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 439. - -[158] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 440. - -[159] Distribution of Forces in Canada; Canadian Archives, Freer -Papers, 1812–1813, p. 47. - -[160] Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 441. - -[161] Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 442. - -[162] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442. - -[163] Armstrong to Dearborn, April 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 442. - -[164] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442. - -[165] James, i. 143, 149. - -[166] Letter of Dearborn, Oct. 17, 1814; Niles, viii. 36. - -[167] Niles, iv. 238. - -[168] Table of Land Battles; Niles, x. 154. - -[169] Dearborn to Armstrong, April 28, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 443. - -[170] Dearborn to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 444. - -[171] James, i. p. 151. - -[172] Vincent to Sir George Prevost, May 28, 1813; James, i. 407; -Appendix no. 21. - -[173] Return of killed, etc.; James, i. 410. - -[174] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[175] James, i. 203. - -[176] Armstrong to Dearborn, June 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 449. - -[177] Table of land battles; Niles, x. 154. - -[178] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14, 1813; Official Letters, p. -165. Chandler to Dearborn, June 18, 1813; Official Letters, p. 169. - -[179] Vincent to Prevost, June 6, 1813; James, i. p. 431. - -[180] Chandler’s Report of June 18, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. p. 448. - -[181] Report of Colonel Harvey, June 6, 1813; Canadiana, April, 1889. -Report of General Vincent, June 6, 1813; James, i. p. 431. - -[182] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14 (8?), 1813; Official Letters, -p. 165. - -[183] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 445. - -[184] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 447. - -[185] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 448. - -[186] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 446. - -[187] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 449. - -[188] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[189] Memoir of Dearborn, etc., compiled by Charles Coffin, p. 139. - -[190] Court of Inquiry on Colonel Boerstler, Feb. 17, 1815; Niles x. 19. - -[191] James, i. 216. - -[192] Dearborn to Armstrong, June 25, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs; i. 449. - -[193] James, i. 165; Colonel Baynes to Prevost, May 30, 1813; James, i. -413. - -[194] Report of Sir George Prevost, June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[195] Prevost to Bathurst, June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. -Prevost’s Life, p. 82, 83. - -[196] James, i. 165, 166. Brenton to Freer, May 30, 1813; MSS. Canadian -Archives, Freer Papers, 1812–1813, p. 183. - -[197] Report of Colonel Baynes, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[198] Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS. - -[199] Prevost’s Report of June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[200] James, i. 175. - -[201] Report of Colonel Baynes, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[202] Brenton to Freer, May 30, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives. Freer -Papers, 1812–1813. - -[203] Quarterly Review, xxvii. 419; Christie, ii. 81; James, i. 177. - -[204] Brown’s Report of June 1, 1813; Niles, iv. 260. - -[205] Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS. - -[206] James, i. 165. - -[207] Return, etc.; James, i. 417. - -[208] Baynes’s Report of May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[209] Strictures on General Wilkinson’s Defence; from the Albany -“Argus.” Niles, ix. 425. - -[210] Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 10, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -341. - -[211] Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 12, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -342. - -[212] Autobiography, p. 94, _note_. - -[213] Strictures; Niles, ix. 425. - -[214] Wilkinson, to Armstrong, May 23, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -341. - -[215] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 23. - -[216] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 23. - -[217] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 50. - -[218] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 36. - -[219] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xxxvi. - -[220] Memorandum by Armstrong, July 23, 1813; Wilkinson to Armstrong, -Aug. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463; Armstrong’s -Notices, ii. 31. - -[221] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Aug. 8, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 464. - -[222] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 32. - -[223] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxv. - -[224] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvi. - -[225] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 358. - -[226] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 31, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -iii. Appendix xxxvii. - -[227] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 33; Memorandum of July 23, 1813; State -Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463. - -[228] Minutes, etc.; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix no. 1. - -[229] Wilkinson to Swartwout, Aug. 25, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -51. - -[230] Cf. Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[231] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xxxvii. - -[232] Testimony of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 80. - -[233] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 354. - -[234] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 357. - -[235] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 353. - -[236] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 190; Paper A, _note_. - -[237] Armstrong to Hampton, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -361. - -[238] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[239] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[240] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 63. - -[241] Armstrong to Swartwout, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -70. - -[242] Council of War, Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix -xxiv. Report of Adjutant-General, Dec. 1, 1813, Appendix vii. - -[243] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 28, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[244] General Order of Encampment; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 126; Order -of October 9, Appendix iii. - -[245] Minutes etc.; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxiv. - -[246] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 27, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xli. - -[247] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 474. - -[248] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Nov. 12, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 474. - -[249] Journal etc.; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 477. - -[250] Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 84; Evidence -of Doctor Bull; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 214. - -[251] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 364. - -[252] Autobiography, pp. 93, 94. - -[253] Wilkinson’s Defence, Memoirs, iii. 451; Ripley’s Evidence, -Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 139. - -[254] Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 85. - -[255] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 18, 1813; Niles, v. 235. - -[256] Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 151. - -[257] James, i. 323–325, 467. - -[258] Return, etc., State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 476. - -[259] Morrison’s Report of Nov. 12, 1813; James, i. 451. - -[260] Journal, Nov. 11, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 478. - -[261] Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 145; -Evidence of Colonel Pinkney, iii. 311. - -[262] Evidence of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 91. - -[263] James, i. 242; Christie, ii. 94. - -[264] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Aug. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 466. - -[265] Armstrong to Hampton, Sept. 28, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 460. Cf. Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 25. - -[266] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 461. - -[267] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 8, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[268] Weekly General Return, Sept. 15, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives, -Freer Papers, 1813, p. 35. - -[269] Cf. Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxiv.; Council of War, -Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Defence, Memoirs, iii. 449. - -[270] Hampton to Armstrong, Oct. 12, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 460. - -[271] James, i. 307. - -[272] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 461. - -[273] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 30, 1813; James, i. 462. - -[274] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 461. - -[275] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs iii. -Appendix lxix. - -[276] Wilkinson to Hampton, Nov. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 462. - -[277] Hampton to Wilkinson, Nov. 8, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, 462. - -[278] Wilkinson to Hampton; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix v. -Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, -i. 480. - -[279] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 17, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 478. - -[280] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 43. - -[281] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 362, _note_. - -[282] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 486. - -[283] Armstrong to McClure, Oct. 4, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 484. - -[284] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Sept. 16, 1813; Sept. 20, 1813; State -Papers, Military Affairs, i. 467, 469. - -[285] Armstrong to McClure, Nov. 25, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 485. - -[286] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10 and 13, 1813; State Papers, -Military Affairs, i. 486. - -[287] James, ii. 77. - -[288] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 487. - -[289] Christie, ii. 140. - -[290] James, ii. 20, 21. - -[291] James, ii. 23. - -[292] Christie, ii. 143; Niles, v. 382. - -[293] Parton’s Jackson, i. 372. - -[294] Monroe to Pinckney, Jan. 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[295] Monroe to Wilkinson, Jan. 30, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[296] Annals of Congress, 1812–1813, p. 124. - -[297] Annals of Congress, 1812–1813, p. 127. - -[298] Act of Feb. 12, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 339. - -[299] Parton’s Jackson, i. 377. - -[300] Armstrong to Jackson, March 22, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[301] Armstrong to Pinckney, Feb. 15, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[302] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 7, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[303] Gallatin’s Works, i. 539, _note_. - -[304] Gallatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 539. - -[305] Monroe to Gallatin, May 5, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 540. - -[306] Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, 1. 542. - -[307] Gallatin to Monroe, May 8, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 544. - -[308] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Feb. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -339. - -[309] Minutes of a Council of War, Aug. 4, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -i. 498–503. - -[310] Eustis to Wilkinson, April 15, 1812; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 495. - -[311] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 507–522. - -[312] Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 22, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 521. - -[313] Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 27, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[314] Hawkins’s Sketch, p. 24. - -[315] U. S. Commissioners to Governor Irwin, July 1, 1796; State -Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 611. - -[316] Talk of the Creek Indians, June 24, 1796; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 604. - -[317] Life of Sam Dale, p. 59. - -[318] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, June 16, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845. - -[319] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845, 846. - -[320] Hawkins to General Pinckney, July 9, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 848. - -[321] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 839. - -[322] Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i 851. - -[323] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 846. - -[324] Letter from Kaskaskias, Feb. 27, 1813; Niles, iv. 135. - -[325] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 839. - -[326] Hawkins to Armstrong, March 25, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 840. - -[327] Report of the Big Warrior, April 26, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 843. - -[328] Report of Nimrod Doyell, May 3, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 843. - -[329] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845. - -[330] Talosee Fixico to Hawkins, July 5, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 847. - -[331] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 849. - -[332] Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 851. - -[333] Carson to Claiborne, July 29, 1813; Life of Dale, p. 78. - -[334] Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 854. - -[335] Pickett’s Alabama, ii. 264. - -[336] Life of Dale, 106. - -[337] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 849. - -[338] Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 854. - -[339] Big Warrior to Hawkins, Aug. 4, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 851. - -[340] Report of General Coffee, Nov. 4, 1813; Niles, v. 218. - -[341] Jackson to Blount, Nov. 11, 1813; Niles, v. 267. - -[342] Parton’s Jackson, i. 445. - -[343] Blount to Jackson, Dec. 22, 1813; Parton’s Jackson, i. 479, -480–484. - -[344] Hawkins’s Sketch, pp. 43, 44. - -[345] Cocke to the Secretary of War, Nov. 28, 1813; Niles, v. 282, 283. - -[346] Cocke to White; Parton’s Jackson, i. 451. - -[347] Floyd to Pinckney, Dec. 4, 1813; Niles, v. 283. - -[348] Pinckney to Armstrong, Dec. 28, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[349] Pinckney to Jackson, Jan. 19, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[350] Parton, i. 864. - -[351] Hawkins’s Sketch, p. 45. - -[352] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[353] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[354] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[355] Pickett’s Alabama, ii. 336. - -[356] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles v. 427. - -[357] Letter from Milledgeville, March 16, 1814; “The War,” April 5, -1814. - -[358] Floyd to Pinckney, Jan. 27, 1814; Niles, v. 411. - -[359] Floyd to Pinckney, Feb. 2, 1814; Military and Naval Letters, p. -306. Hawkins to Armstrong, June 7, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 858. - -[360] Pinckney to the Governor of Georgia, Feb. 20, 1814; Niles, vi. -132. - -[361] Pinckney to Colonel Williams, Dec. 23, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[362] Parton’s Jackson, i. 503. - -[363] Parton’s Jackson, i. 454. - -[364] Cocke’s Defence; “National Intelligencer,” October, 1852. -Parton’s Jackson, i. 455. Eaton’s Jackson, p. 155. - -[365] Parton’s Jackson, i. 511. - -[366] Col. Gideon Morgan to Governor Blount, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. -148. - -[367] Eaton’s Jackson, p. 156. - -[368] Jackson to Pinckney, March 28, 1814; Military and Naval Letters, -p. 319. - -[369] Coffee to Jackson, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. 148. - -[370] Colonel Morgan to Governor Blount, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. 148. - -[371] Jackson to Governor Blount, March 31, 1814; Niles, vi. 147. - -[372] Jackson to Governor Blount, April 18, 1814; Niles, vi. 212. April -25, 1814; Niles, vi. 219. - -[373] Hawkins to Pinckney, April 25, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 858. - -[374] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 19, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 860. - -[375] Abstract of Correspondence, Expedition to New Orleans, 1814–1815; -MSS. British Archives. - -[376] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 17, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 836. - -[377] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 20, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 837. - -[378] Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 399. -Madison’s Works, iii. 400, 401. - -[379] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826. - -[380] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826. - -[381] Proclamation and Notice; Niles, v. 264. - -[382] Prices Current; Niles, v. 41. - -[383] Table No. II.; Pitkin, p. 56. - -[384] Table No. I.; Pitkin, p. 415. - -[385] Admiral Warren to J. W. Croker, May 28, 1813; London “Gazette,” -July 6, 1813. - -[386] Warren’s Report of May 28, 1813; London “Gazette.” - -[387] Cockburn to Warren, May 3, 1813; London “Gazette,” July 6, 1813. - -[388] Cassin to Secretary Jones, June 21, 1813; Niles, iv. 291. - -[389] James, ii. 55. - -[390] Report of Robert Taylor, July 4, 1813; Niles, iv. 324. - -[391] James, ii. 54. - -[392] Warren’s Report of June 24, 1813; James, ii. 414. - -[393] James, ii. 59. - -[394] Napier’s Life, i. 221. - -[395] Warren’s Report of June 24, 1813; London “Gazette,” Aug. 10, 1813. - -[396] Return, etc.; James, ii. 414, 415. - -[397] Colonel Beatty’s Report of June 25, 1813; Niles, iv. 324. - -[398] Warren’s Report of June 27, 1813; James, ii. 414. - -[399] Niles, v. 302. - -[400] Broke to Lawrence, June 1, 1813; Broke’s Life, 159. Niles, v. 29. - -[401] Broke’s Life, pp. 150, 151. - -[402] Broke’s Life, p. 156. - -[403] Broke’s Life, pp. 160, 383. - -[404] Letter of Captain Greene; James, Appendix, no. 35. - -[405] James, p. 209. - -[406] James, p. 202. - -[407] James, p. 206; Roosevelt’s Naval War of 1812, p. 48. - -[408] Lawrence’s Report of March 19, 1813; Niles, iv. 84. - -[409] Biography; from “The Portfolio.” Niles, Supplement to vol. v. p. -29. Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 247. - -[410] Broke’s Life, p. 333. - -[411] Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 247. - -[412] Life of Broke, p. 203. - -[413] Evidence of Midshipman Edmund Russell; Court-Martial of -Lieutenant Cox. MSS. Navy Department Archives. - -[414] List of killed and wounded; Life of Broke, p. 203. - -[415] James, p. 216. - -[416] Life of Broke, p. 170. - -[417] Broke’s letter of challenge; James, Appendix, p. 36. - -[418] Broke’s Life, p. 298. - -[419] Broke’s Life, p. 300. - -[420] Cobbett’s Debates, xxvi. 1160. - -[421] Report of Captain Maples, Aug. 14, 1813; James, Appendix no. 42, -p. lxv. - -[422] James, pp. 275–282. - -[423] Report of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815; Niles, viii. 43. - -[424] Niles, v. 118. - -[425] Report of Captain Maples, Aug. 14, 1813; Niles, v. 118. James, -Appendix no. 42. - -[426] James, p. 273. - -[427] Lieutenant Creighton to Secretary Jones, March 9, 1814; Niles, -vi. 69. - -[428] Niles, vi. 391. - -[429] James, p. 18. - -[430] Coggeshall’s History of American Privateers, p. 188. - -[431] Extract of letter from Captain Champlin; Niles, viii. 110. - -[432] Extract from log, March 11, 1813; Niles, iv. 133. - -[433] Shaler’s Report of Jan. 1, 1813; Niles, v. 429. - -[434] London Gazette for 1813, p. 1574. - -[435] Emmons’s Navy of the United States, pp. 170–197. - -[436] Memorial of Baltimore merchants, Feb. 19, 1814; State Papers, -Naval Affairs, p. 300. - -[437] Emmons’s Navy of the United States. - -[438] Gallatin to Langdon Cheves, Dec. 8, 1812; Annals, 1812–1813, p. -434. - -[439] Annals, 1813–1814, i. 473. - -[440] Roads’s Marblehead, p. 255. - -[441] Diary of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813, ii. 479. - -[442] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 5, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[443] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 13, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[444] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh Papers, Third -Series, i. 35. - -[445] Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 546. - -[446] Castlereagh to Cathcart, Sept. 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[447] Diary of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813, ii. 479. - -[448] Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813; MSS. State Department Archives. - -[449] Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 489. - -[450] Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 501. - -[451] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh’s Papers, -Third Series, i. 35. - -[452] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 23, 1813, ii. 539, 542. - -[453] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 593. - -[454] Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. 1, 1813; State Papers, iii. 622. - -[455] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 23, 1814, ii. 599. - -[456] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 10, 1813, ii. 531. - -[457] Cathcart to Castlereagh, Sept. 25, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[458] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 3, 1813, ii. 541. - -[459] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 591. - -[460] Cathcart to Castlereagh, Dec. 12, 1813; Castlereagh Papers. - -[461] The Times, Oct. 17, 1813. - -[462] The Courier, July 27, 1813. - -[463] The Courier, Nov. 4, 1813. - -[464] Prevost to Wilkinson, Oct. 17, 1813; State Papers, Foreign -Relations, iii. 635. Bathurst to Prevost, Aug. 12, 1813; State Papers, -Foreign Relations, iii. 641. - -[465] Proclamation of Nov. 10, 1813; Niles, v. 212. - -[466] Message of Dec. 9, 1813; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2031. - -[467] Act laying an Embargo, Dec. 17, 1813; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2781. - -[468] Act of Jan. 25, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2788. - -[469] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1965. - -[470] Macon to Nicholson, April 6, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[471] Gallatin MSS. - -[472] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 928. - -[473] Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94. - -[474] Note to abstract of regular troops in service, January, 1814; -adjutant-general’s office. MSS. War Department Archives. - -[475] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 940. - -[476] Speech of Timothy Pitkin, Feb. 10, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. -1297. - -[477] Considerations on Currency, etc. By Albert Gallatin, 1831. -Statements II. and III., pp. 101, 103. - -[478] Schedule, 1803–1837; Senate Document No. 38. Massachusetts -Legislature, 1838. - -[479] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45. - -[480] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45. Schedules II. and III., pp. -101, 103. Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 286, 357, 359. - -[481] Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 284. - -[482] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1787. - -[483] Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[484] Serurier to Bassano, Dec. 10, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[485] Serurier to Bassano, Jan. 14, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[486] Serurier to Bassano, April 15, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[487] Serurier to Bassano, April 25, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[488] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 253. - -[489] Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 8, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[490] Madison to Pinkney, Jan. 29, 1814; Works, ii. 581. - -[491] Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 17, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[492] Report and Resolution of Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, v. 356. - -[493] Granger to John Todd, February, 1814; New England “Palladium,” -March 4, 1814. - -[494] Madison to Jefferson, April 19, 1811; Works, ii. 493. - -[495] Works, iii. 384. - -[496] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 762. - -[497] Memoir of Brown from the “Port Folio;” Niles, vii. 32. - -[498] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 402. - -[499] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 65. - -[500] Autobiography, p. 118. - -[501] Dawson, p. 436; Lossing, p. 563. - -[502] Armstrong to Jackson, May 23, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 376. - -[503] Armstrong to Madison, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 375. - -[504] Madison’s Works, iii. 375. - -[505] Madison’s Works, iii. 377. - -[506] Kosciusko Armstrong’s Notice of J. Q. Adams’s Eulogy on James -Monroe, p. 32, _note_. - -[507] Dawson, p. 436. - -[508] Gilman’s Monroe, p. 114. - -[509] Monroe to Madison, Dec. 27, 1813; Monroe MSS. State Department -Archives. - -[510] Monroe MSS. State Department Archives. - -[511] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, and Dec. 8, 1813. State Papers, -Military Affairs, p. 480. Order of Arrest. Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix v. - -[512] Defence of General Hampton; “National Intelligencer,” June 7, -1814. - -[513] Notices, etc., ii. 26. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. - -Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of pages, have been collected, -renumbered, and placed near the end of this eBook. - -The Title Page and Table of Contents indicate that this is Volume I, -but that refers to its position in the “Second Administration of James -Madison” subset of the full “History”. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online -at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, -you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located -before using this eBook. - -Title: History of the United States of America, Volume 7 (of 9) - During the second administration of James Madison - - -Author: Henry Adams - -Release date: January 31, 2024 [eBook #72846] - -Language: English - -Original publication: New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889 - -Credits: Richard Hulse and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VOLUME 7 (OF 9) *** - - - - - -Transcriber’s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Additional -notes will be found near the end of this ebook. - - - - - THE - - SECOND ADMINISTRATION - - OF - - JAMES MADISON - - 1813–1817 - - - - - HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. - - BY - - HENRY ADAMS. - - - VOLS. I. AND II.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON. - 1801–1805. - - VOLS. III. AND IV.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF JEFFERSON. - 1805–1809. - - VOLS. V. AND VI.--THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF MADISON. 1809–1813. - - VOLS. VII., VIII., AND IX.--THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF MADISON. - 1813–1817. WITH AN INDEX TO THE ENTIRE WORK. - - - - - HISTORY - - OF THE - - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF - - JAMES MADISON - - - BY HENRY ADAMS - - - VOL. I. - - - NEW YORK - CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS - 1891 - - - - - _Copyright, 1890_ - BY CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS. - - - University Press: - JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE. - - - - -CONTENTS OF VOL. I. - - - CHAPTER PAGE - I. ENGLAND ANGRY 1 - - II. RUSSIAN MEDIATION 26 - - III. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813 48 - - IV. THE RIVER RAISIN 72 - - V. PROCTOR AND PERRY 99 - - VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES 128 - - VII. DEARBORN’S CAMPAIGN 144 - - VIII. WILKINSON’S CAMPAIGN 172 - - IX. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS 206 - - X. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS 232 - - XI. THE BLOCKADE 262 - - XII. “CHESAPEAKE” AND “ARGUS” 285 - - XIII. PRIVATEERING 309 - - XIV. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 339 - - XV. THE LAST EMBARGO 364 - - XVI. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG 391 - - - - -HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. - - - - -CHAPTER I. - - -THE American declaration of war against England, July 18, 1812, annoyed -those European nations that were gathering their utmost resources for -resistance to Napoleon’s attack. Russia could not but regard it as an -unfriendly act, equally bad for political and commercial interests. -Spain and Portugal, whose armies were fed largely if not chiefly on -American grain imported by British money under British protection, -dreaded to see their supplies cut off. Germany, waiting only for -strength to recover her freedom, had to reckon against one more element -in Napoleon’s vast military resources. England needed to make greater -efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in Russia -and Spain. Even in America, no one doubted the earnestness of England’s -wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe insisted on her acquiescence -in their terms, they insisted because they believed that their military -position entitled them to expect it. The reconquest of Russia and -Spain by Napoleon, an event almost certain to happen, could hardly fail -to force from England the concessions, not in themselves unreasonable, -which the United States required. - -This was, as Madison to the end of his life maintained, “a fair -calculation;”[1] but it was exasperating to England, who thought that -America ought to be equally interested with Europe in overthrowing -the military despotism of Napoleon, and should not conspire with him -for gain. At first the new war disconcerted the feeble Ministry that -remained in office on the death of Spencer Perceval: they counted on -preventing it, and did their utmost to stop it after it was begun. -The tone of arrogance which had so long characterized government and -press, disappeared for the moment. Obscure newspapers, like the London -“Evening Star,” still sneered at the idea that Great Britain was to be -“driven from the proud pre-eminence which the blood and treasure of her -sons have attained for her among the nations, by a piece of striped -bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by -a handful of bastards and outlaws,”--a phrase which had great success -in America,--but such defiances expressed a temper studiously held in -restraint previous to the moment when the war was seen to be inevitable. - -Castlereagh did not abandon the hope of peace until Jonathan Russell, -August 24, reported to him the concessions which the President required -antecedent to negotiation, the stoppage of impressments, dismissal -of impressed seamen, indemnity for spoliations, and abandonment of -paper blockades. The British secretary intimated that he thought -these demands, as conditions precedent to an armistice, somewhat -insulting;[2] and in conversation he explained to Russell that such -concessions would merely cost the Ministry their places without result. -“You are not aware,” he said,[3] “of the great sensibility and jealousy -of the people of England on this subject; and no administration could -expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right -of impressment or to suspend the practice, without certainty of an -arrangement which should obviously be calculated to secure its object.” -Russell then proposed an informal understanding,--adding of his own -accord, without authority from his Government, a proposal, afterward -adopted by Congress, that the United States should naturalize no more -British seamen. Castlereagh made the obvious reply that an informal -understanding offered no more guaranty to England than a formal one; -that it had the additional disadvantage of bearing on its face a -character of disguise; that in any case the discussion of guaranties -must precede the understanding; and that Russell had on this subject -neither authority nor instructions.[4] - -The correspondence closed September 19, and Russell left England; but -not until October 13, after learning that the President had refused to -ratify the armistice made by Prevost with Dearborn, did the British -government order general reprisals,--and even this order closed with -a proviso that nothing therein contained should affect the previous -authority given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to arrange a -cessation of hostilities. - -The realization that no escape could be found from an American war -was forced on the British public at a moment of much discouragement. -Almost simultaneously a series of misfortunes occurred which brought -the stoutest and most intelligent Englishmen to the verge of despair. -In Spain Wellington, after winning the battle of Salamanca in July, -occupied Madrid in August, and obliged Soult to evacuate Andalusia; but -his siege of Burgos failed, and as the French generals concentrated -their scattered forces, Wellington was obliged to abandon Madrid -once more. October 21, he was again in full retreat on Portugal. -The apparent failure of his campaign was almost simultaneous with -the apparent success of Napoleon’s; for the Emperor entered Moscow -September 14, and the news of this triumph, probably decisive of -Russian submission, reached England about October 3. Three days later -arrived intelligence of William Hull’s surrender at Detroit; but this -success was counterbalanced by simultaneous news of Isaac Hull’s -startling capture of the “Guerriere,” and the certainty of a prolonged -war. - -In the desponding condition of the British people,--with a deficient -harvest, bad weather, wheat at nearly five dollars a bushel, and the -American supply likely to be cut off; consols at 57½, gold at thirty -per cent premium; a Ministry without credit or authority, and a general -consciousness of blunders, incompetence, and corruption,--every new -tale of disaster sank the hopes of England and called out wails of -despair. In that state of mind the loss of the “Guerriere” assumed -portentous dimensions. The “Times” was especially loud in lamenting the -capture:-- - - “We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and - honorable minds.... Never before in the history of the world did - an English frigate strike to an American; and though we cannot say - that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for - this act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English navy - who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colors - flying, than have set their fellow sailors so fatal an example.” - -No country newspaper in America, railing at Hull’s cowardice and -treachery, showed less knowledge or judgment than the London “Times,” -which had written of nothing but war since its name had been known -in England. Any American could have assured the English press that -British frigates before the “Guerriere” had struck to American; -and even in England men had not forgotten the name of the British -frigate “Serapis,” or that of the American captain Paul Jones. Yet -the “Times’s” ignorance was less unreasonable than its requirement -that Dacres should have gone down with his ship,--a cry of passion -the more unjust to Dacres because he fought his ship as long as she -could float. Such sensitiveness seemed extravagant in a society which -had been hardened by centuries of warfare; yet the “Times” reflected -fairly the feelings of Englishmen. George Canning, speaking in open -Parliament not long afterward,[5] said that the loss of the “Guerriere” -and the “Macedonian” produced a sensation in the country scarcely to -be equalled by the most violent convulsions of Nature. “Neither can I -agree with those who complain of the shock of consternation throughout -Great Britain as having been greater than the occasion required.... It -cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility of -the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures.” - -Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of believing itself -invincible was perhaps the one most profitably broken; but the process -of recovering its senses was agreeable to no nation, and to England, at -that moment of distress, it was as painful as Canning described. The -matter was not mended by the “Courier” and “Morning Post,” who, taking -their tone from the Admiralty, complained of the enormous superiority -of the American frigates, and called them “line-of-battle ships in -disguise.” Certainly the American forty-four was a much heavier ship -than the British thirty-eight, but the difference had been as well -known in the British navy before these actions as it was afterward; and -Captain Dacres himself, the Englishman who best knew the relative force -of the ships, told his court of inquiry a different story:[6] “I am so -well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that -it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest period of my life, to -be once more opposed to the ‘Constitution,’ with them [the old crew] -under my command, in a frigate of similar force with the ‘Guerriere.’” -After all had been said, the unpleasant result remained that in future -British frigates, like other frigates, could safely fight only their -inferiors in force. What applied to the “Guerriere” and “Macedonian” -against the “Constitution” and “United States,” where the British force -was inferior, applied equally to the “Frolic” against the “Wasp,” where -no inferiority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward -admitted what America wished to prove, that, ship for ship, British -were no more than the equals of Americans. - -Society soon learned to take a more sensible view of the subject, -but as the first depression passed away a consciousness of personal -wrong took its place. The United States were supposed to have stabbed -England in the back at the moment when her hands were tied, when her -existence was in the most deadly peril and her anxieties were most -heavy. England never could forgive treason so base and cowardice so -vile. That Madison had been from the first a tool and accomplice of -Bonaparte was thenceforward so fixed an idea in British history that -time could not shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so historical had -the causes of war become that no one even in America could explain or -understand them, while Englishmen could see only that America required -England as the price of peace to destroy herself by abandoning her -naval power, and that England preferred to die fighting rather than to -die by her own hand. The American party in England was extinguished; -no further protest was heard against the war; and the British people -thought moodily of revenge. - -This result was unfortunate for both parties, but was doubly -unfortunate for America, because her mode of making the issue told -in her enemy’s favor. The same impressions which silenced in England -open sympathy with America, stimulated in America acute sympathy with -England. Argument was useless against people in a passion, convinced -of their own injuries. Neither Englishmen nor Federalists were open to -reasoning. They found their action easy from the moment they classed -the United States as an ally of France, like Bavaria or Saxony; and -they had no scruples of conscience, for the practical alliance was -clear, and the fact proved sufficiently the intent. - -This outbreak of feeling took place in the month of October, when the -hopes of England were lowest. While Wellington retreated from Madrid -and Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo; while Napoleon was supposed to be still -victorious at Moscow, although his retreat began October 19, two days -before Wellington abandoned the siege of Burgos; and while, October 18, -the “Wasp” captured the “Frolic,” and October 25 the “United States” -captured the “Macedonian,”--in England public opinion broke into outcry -against the temporizing conduct of the government toward America, and -demanded vigorous prosecution of the war. - - “In any other times than the present,” said the “Times” of October - 30, “it would appear utterly incredible that men should adopt - so drivelling a line of conduct as to think of waging a war of - conciliation and forbearance, and that with enemies whom they - themselves represent as alike faithless and implacable.” - -The Government hastened to pacify these complaints. Orders were given -to hurry an overwhelming force of ships-of-the-line and frigates to the -American coast. Almost immediately England recovered from her dismay; -for November 11 news arrived that the Russians were again masters of -Moscow, and that Napoleon was retreating. Day after day the posts -arrived from Russia, bringing accounts more and more encouraging, until -when Parliament met, November 24, the hope that Napoleon might never -escape from Russia had become strong. - -Thus the new Ministry found themselves able to face opposition with -unexpected strength. Madison’s calculations, reasonable as they seemed -to be, were overthrown, and the glow of English delight over the -success of Russia made the burden of the American war seem easy to -bear. In Parliament hardly a voice was raised for peace. The Marquess -Wellesley in the debate on the King’s speech attacked ministers, -not because they had brought the country into war with America, but -because they had been unprepared for it; “they ought as statesmen to -have known that the American government had been long infected with -a deadly hatred toward this country, and, if he might be allowed -an unusual application of a word, with a deadly affection toward -France.”[7] America had been suffered to carry on hostilities without -danger to herself, and must be convinced of her folly and desperation. -Lord Grenville also asserted that the American government was always -hostile to England, but that only the conduct of ministers had enabled -it to pluck up courage to show its enmity.[8] Canning, in the Commons, -attacked still more sharply the forbearance of the Ministry and their -silence toward America: - - “It never entered into my mind that the mighty naval power of - England would be allowed to sleep while our commerce was swept - from the surface of the Atlantic; and that at the end of six - months’ war it would be proclaimed in a speech from the throne that - the time was now at length come when the long-withheld thunder of - Britain must be launched against an implacable foe, and the fulness - of her power at length drawn out. It never entered into my mind - that we should send a fleet to take rest and shelter in our own - ports in North America, and that we should then attack the American - ports with a flag of truce.”[9] - -From such criticisms Lord Castlereagh had no difficulty in defending -himself. Whitbread alone maintained that injustice had been done to -America, and that measures ought to be taken for peace. - -This debate took place November 30, two days after the destruction of -Napoleon’s army in passing the Beresina. From that moment, and during -the next eighteen months, England had other matters to occupy her mind -than the disagreeable subject of the American war. Napoleon arrived in -Paris December 18, and set himself to the task of renewing the army of -half a million men which had been lost in Russia, and of strengthening -his hold on Germany, where a violent popular emotion threatened to -break into open alliance with the Russian Czar. December 30 the -Prussian corps of the Grand Army deserted to the Russians; and soon -afterward the French abandoned Poland and the province of old Prussia, -and with difficulty, no enemy attacking, held Berlin. The interest -of England turned to the negotiations and military movements of the -Continent, After January 1, 1813, Englishmen never willingly thought of -the American war, or gave attention to terms of peace. They regarded -the result in America as dependent on the result in Germany; and they -would have ignored the war altogether had not the American frigates and -privateers from time to time compelled their attention. - -With the prospect of a great trade about to open with the continent -of Europe, as the French garrisons were driven out of Germany and -Spain, English manufacturers could afford to wait with patience for -better times; but although a nation so long accustomed to the chances -of war could adapt itself quickly to changes in the course of trade, -England felt more than it liked to admit the annoyance of American -hostilities on the ocean. During the first few months this annoyance -was the greater because it was thought to be the result of official -negligence. December 30, a merchant writing to the “Times” declared -that “the Americans have taken upward of two hundred sail of British -merchantmen and three or four packets from the West Indies. Recent -advices from the Windward Islands state that the Admiral is mortified -at the depredations of the American privateers, it not being in his -power to prevent them, most of the few cruisers under his orders having -been out so long from England that their copper is nearly off,--so that -the privateers remain unmolested, as they can sail round our ships -whenever they think proper; they are in consequence become so daring -as even to cut vessels out of harbors, though protected by batteries, -and to land and carry off cattle from plantations. The accounts from -Jamaica by the mail which arrived on Friday represent that island to be -literally blockaded by American privateers.” - -When the press spoke at all of naval matters, it talked wildly about -the American frigates. “Such fearful odds,” said the “Morning Post” in -regard to the “Macedonian,” December 26, “would break the heart and -spirit of our sailors, and dissolve that charm, that spell, which has -made our navy invincible.” “The land-spell of the French is broken, -and so is our sea-spell,” said the “Times.” The American frigates were -exaggerated into ships-of-the-line, and were to be treated as such, -British frigates keeping out of their way. At first, the British naval -officers hesitated to accept this view of a subject which had never -before been suggested. Neither Captain Dacres nor his court-martial -attributed his defeat to this cause; but before long, nearly all -England agreed to rate the American frigates as seventy-fours, and -complained that the Americans, with their accustomed duplicity, should -have deceived the British navy by representing the “Constitution” and -“United States” to be frigates. The “Times” protested in vain against -this weakness:-- - - “Good God! that a few short months should have so altered the tone - of British sentiments! Is it true, or is it not, that our navy was - accustomed to hold the Americans in utter contempt? Is it true, or - is it not, that the ‘Guerriere’ sailed up and down the American - coast with her name painted in large characters on her sails, in - boyish defiance of Commodore Rodgers? Would any captain, however - young, have indulged such a foolish piece of vain-boasting if he - had not been carried forward by the almost unanimous feeling of his - associates?”[10] - -To the charge that the British Admiralty had been taken unprepared by -the war, the Admiralty replied that its naval force on the American -station at the outbreak of hostilities exceeded the American in the -proportion of eighty-five to fourteen. - - “We have since sent out more line-of-battle ships and heavier - frigates,” added the “Times,” January 4, 1813. “Surely we must now - mean to smother the American navy.... A very short time before the - capture of the ‘Guerriere’ an American frigate was an object of - ridicule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually setting - the other way, and great pains seem to be taken by the friends of - ministers to prepare the public for the surrender of a British - seventy-four to an opponent lately so much contemned.” - -The loss of two or three thirty-eight gun frigates on the ocean was a -matter of trifling consequence to the British government, which had a -force of four ships-of-the-line and six or eight frigates in Chesapeake -Bay alone, and which built every year dozens of ships-of-the-line -and frigates to replace those lost or worn out; but although the -American privateers wrought more injury to British interests than was -caused or could be caused by the American navy, the pride of England -cared little about mercantile losses, and cared immensely for its -fighting reputation. The theory that the American was a degenerate -Englishman,--a theory chiefly due to American teachings,--lay at -the bottom of British politics. Even the late British minister at -Washington, Foster, a man of average intelligence, thought it manifest -good taste and good sense to say of the Americans in his speech of -February 18, 1813, in Parliament, that “generally speaking, they were -not a people we should be proud to acknowledge as our relations.”[11] -Decatur and Hull were engaged in a social rather than in a political -contest, and were aware that the serious work on their hands had little -to do with England’s power, but much to do with her manners. The -mortification of England at the capture of her frigates was the measure -of her previous arrogance. - -The process of acquiring knowledge in such light as was furnished by -the cannon of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge could not be rendered easy -or rapid. News of the American victories dropped in at intervals, as -though American captains intentionally prolonged the enjoyment of their -certain success, in order to keep England in constant ill temper. -News of the “Java” arrived about the middle of March, and once more -the press broke into a chorus of complaints. The “Times” renewed its -outcry; the “Courier” abused the “Times” for its “tone of whining -lamentation, of affected sensibility, and puerile grief,” but admitted -that the behavior of the American frigates seemed extraordinary; while -the “Pilot,” the chief naval authority, lamented in set periods the -incomprehensible event:-- - - “The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall not - presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has struck - to an American. This is an occurrence that calls for serious - reflection,--this, and the fact stated in our paper of yesterday, - that Loyd’s list contains notices of upwards of five hundred - British vessels captured in seven months by the Americans. Five - hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these statements be - true; and can the English people hear them unmoved? Any one who - had predicted such a result of an American war this time last year - would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He would have - been told, if his opponents had condescended to argue with him, - that long ere seven months had elapsed the American flag would be - swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States - annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. - Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck - her flag. They insult and laugh at our want of enterprise and - vigor. They leave their ports when they please, and return to them - when it suits their convenience; they traverse the Atlantic; they - beset the West India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the - Channel; they parade along the coasts of South America; nothing - chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them but to yield them - triumph.” - -The immediate moral drawn from these complaints was the necessity of -punishing the United States; but no one could longer deny that the -necessary punishment was likely to prove tedious and costly. February -18 Parliament took up the subject of the American war, and both -Houses debated it. In the Lords, Bathurst made a temperate speech -devoted to showing that America in claiming immunity from impressments -claimed more than England could afford to yield,--“a right hitherto -exercised without dispute, and of the most essential importance to our -maritime superiority.” Lord Lansdowne replied with tact and judgment, -rather hinting than saying that the right was becoming too costly -for assertion. “Some time ago it was imagined on all hands that in -the event of a war with America, the first operation would be the -destruction of her navy. What the fact had turned out to be, he was -almost ashamed to mention. If any one were asked what had been the -success of our navy in this war, he would unfortunately find some -difficulty in giving an answer.”[12] Lord Liverpool, while defending -his administration from the charge of imbecility, tended to strengthen -the prevailing impression by the tone of his complaints against -America: “Although she might have had wrongs, although she might -have had grounds for complaint, although she might have had pressing -provocations, yet she ought to have looked to this country as the -guardian power to which she was indebted not only for her comforts, -not only for her rank in the scale of civilization, but for her very -existence.”[13] Perhaps these words offered as good an explanation as -the Prime Minister could give of the war itself, for apart from the -unconscious sarcasm they contained, they implied that England assumed -to act as guardian to the United States, and had hitherto denied to the -United States the right to act independently. - -Both Lord Holland and Lord Erskine gently glanced at this assumption; -and Erskine went so far as to intimate that sooner or later England -must give way. “It has been said that this war, if the Americans -persist in their claims, must be eternal. If so, our prospects are -disheartening. America is a growing country,--increasing every day -in numbers, in strength, in resources of every kind. In a lengthened -contest all the advantages are on her side, and against this country.” -The warning lost none of its point from Lord Eldon, who, always ready -to meet any logical necessity by an equally logical absurdity, granted -that “unless America should think proper to alter her tone, he did not -see how the national differences could be settled.” - -Such a debate was little likely to discourage America. Every country -must begin war by asserting that it will never give way, and of all -countries England, which had waged innumerable wars, knew best when -perseverance cost more than concession. Even at that early moment -Parliament was evidently perplexed, and would willingly have yielded -had it seen means of escape from its naval fetich, impressment. -Perhaps the perplexity was more evident in the Commons than in the -Lords, for Castlereagh, while defending his own course with elaborate -care, visibly stumbled over the right of impressment. Even while -claiming that its abandonment would have been “vitally dangerous if -not fatal” to England’s security, he added that he “would be the last -man in the world to underrate the inconvenience which the Americans -sustained in consequence of our assertion of the right of search.” The -embarrassment became still plainer when he narrowed the question to one -of statistics, and showed that the whole contest was waged over the -forcible retention of some eight hundred seamen among one hundred and -forty-five thousand employed in British service. Granting the number -were twice as great, he continued, “could the House believe that there -was any man so infatuated, or that the British empire was driven to -such straits, that for such a paltry consideration as seventeen hundred -sailors, his Majesty’s government would needlessly irritate the pride -of a neutral nation or violate that justice which was due to one -country from another?” If Liverpool’s argument explained the causes of -war, Castlereagh’s explained its inevitable result, for since the war -must cost England at least ten million pounds a year, could Parliament -be so infatuated as to pay ten thousand pounds a year for each American -sailor detained in service, when one tenth of the amount, if employed -in raising the wages of the British sailor, would bring any required -number of seamen back to their ships? The whole British navy in 1812 -cost twenty million pounds; the pay-roll amounted to only three million -pounds; the common sailor was paid four pounds bounty and eighteen -pounds a year, which might have been trebled at half the cost of an -American war. - -No one rose in the House to press this reasoning. Castlereagh completed -his argument, showing, with more temper than logic, that England was -wholly in the right and America altogether in the wrong; the American -government and people were infatuated; they had an inordinate and -insolent spirit of encroachment and unreasonable hostility; had -prostituted their character and showed an unexampled degeneracy of -feeling. “For America he confessed that he deeply lamented the injury -which her character had sustained by the conduct of her government; it -was conduct unworthy of any State calling itself civilized and free.” - -Castlereagh’s invective had the merit of being as little serious as his -logic, and left as little sting; but what Castlereagh could say without -causing more than a smile, never failed to exasperate Americans like -drops of vitriol when it came from the lips of George Canning. Canning -had not hitherto succeeded better in winning the confidence of England -than in curbing the insolence of America; he was still in opposition, -while the man whom in 1807 he could hardly condescend to consider a -rival was Secretary for Foreign Affairs and leader of the House. Worst -of all, Canning could not escape the necessity of supporting him, for -Castlereagh’s position in regard to America was strong, while Canning’s -own position was weak and needed constant excuse. In the debate of -Feb. 18, 1813, he undertook the difficult task of appearing to attack -Castlereagh while defending himself. - -Canning’s speech began by an argument so characteristic as to win the -praise of John Wilson Croker, Secretary to the Admiralty,--a man less -than most politicians prone to waste praise on opponents. Whitbread -had quoted, in excuse of the American practice of naturalization, two -Acts of Parliament,--one the 6th Anne, according to which any foreigner -who served two years in any British vessel, military or merchant, -without further condition or even oath, or more than the statement of -the fact of service, became entitled to every protection of a natural -subject of the realm. No words could be more emphatic than those of -the statutes. “Such foreign mariner,” said the 6th Anne, “shall to all -intents and purposes be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject -of his Majesty’s kingdom of Great Britain, and have and enjoy all the -privileges, powers, rights, and capacities” which a native could enjoy. -Again, by the 13th George II. every foreign seaman who in time of war -served two years on board an English ship by virtue of the king’s -proclamation was _ipso facto_ naturalized. Other naturalization laws -existed, guaranteeing all the privileges of a natural-born subject to -foreigners under certain conditions; but the Acts of Anne and George -II. were most in point, as they referred to foreign sailors alone; -and with these laws on the statute-book Parliament seemed to stand in -an unfavorable position for disputing the right of America to adopt a -similar system. Canning’s argument on the meaning of these statutes was -interesting, not only as an example of his own mind, but as the only -legal justification of a long war which England fought against America -at prodigious expense,--a justification which she maintained for years -to be sound. - - “My construction of the Acts of Anne was altogether different,” - said Canning in reply to these quotations. “I understood that by - it this country professed to give that only which it is competent - to bestow without interfering in any degree with the rights or - claims of other Powers; that it imparted to foreigners on certain - conditions certain municipal privileges, but leaves untouched and - unimpaired their native allegiance.... The enactments of this - statute are a testimony of national gratitude to brave men of - whatever country who may lend their aid in fighting the battles - of Great Britain, but not an invitation to them to abandon the - cause of their own country when it may want their aid; not an - encouragement to them to deny or to undervalue the sacred and - indestructible duty which they owe to their own sovereign and to - their native soil.” - -Something peculiarly sacred must have inhered in the statute of Anne -which thus conferred naturalization on Dutch or Swedish seamen as “a -testimony of national gratitude” for “fighting the battles of Great -Britain” for two years in the British merchant service in time of -peace, and converted them into citizens enjoying “all the privileges, -powers, rights, and capacities” of natural-born subjects of Great -Britain, which consisted, according to Canning, only in “certain -municipal privileges” in England, subject to the will of a foreign -sovereign. Such a definition of the “privileges, powers, rights, and -capacities” of a natural-born subject of his Majesty’s kingdom of -Great Britain seemed new to American lawyers; but it was received with -applause by the House, and was further developed by Croker, who laid -down the principle, new to the popular view of England’s pride, that -the naturalized citizen, who was by the law required “to all intents -and purposes” to “be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject,” -was in fact by the Admiralty “considered as having two countries,--the -voluntary service of the one being looked upon as unable to debar the -natural allegiance to the other.” - -The rest of Canning’s speech consisted in defence of impressment -and of paper blockades, and in panegyric upon European republics -at the expense of “the hard features of transatlantic democracy.” -While assailing the British government because “the arm which should -have launched the thunderbolt was occupied in guiding the pen,” he -expressed his devout wish that the war might not be concluded until -England had smothered in victories the disasters to which she was -so little habituated. If an harangue of this character served in -any degree to guide or aid the councils of England, it served much -more effectually the war-party of America, where Canning was held in -singular antipathy, and where every admission he made in regard to “the -shock of consternation” caused by the American frigates gave pleasure -more acute than any pain his sarcastic phrases could thenceforward -inflict. - -Alexander Baring spoke with his usual good sense, pointing out that -Castlereagh’s speech proved chiefly the greater interest of England -to call for and court negotiation on the subject of impressments. -Whitbread challenged public opinion by going to the verge of actual -sympathy with America. The debate ended in an unopposed vote for -a vigorous prosecution of the war, leaving the subject in truth -untouched, except that England had avowed an extreme desire to punish -America, and naturally felt an extreme irritation because America -showed ability to bear punishment. - -The spring came, bringing no new prospects. England refused to make a -suggestion on which the governments could discuss terms of peace. She -refused even to think upon the problem, but massed a huge armament in -Chesapeake Bay and Delaware River to restore her naval invincibility. -Yet reflection seemed still to be silently at work, for, March 22, -the “Times” interrupted its outcry over the loss of the “Java” by -publishing a temperate article on the new Foreign Seamen Bill of -Congress,--an article in which the suggestion first appeared that peace -might after all be restored by simply omitting in the pacification any -mention of impressment. The idea found support nowhere; but while, -insufficient as it seemed, the human imagination could hardly conceive -of any other expedient, at the same moment the uselessness of trying -to obtain peace on any terms was made clear by the interference of the -Russian Czar. - - - - -CHAPTER II. - - -NAPOLEON declared war against Russia June 22, four days after the -American declaration against England; crossed the Niemen June 24, -and August 1 was already at Vitebsk, about three hundred miles south -of St. Petersburg, and about equally distant from the frontier and -from Moscow. There, in the heart of Russia, he paused to collect his -strength for some blow that should lay the Russian empire at his feet; -and while he hesitated, the Czar, August 3, returned to his capital to -wait. At that moment the chances of war favored Napoleon. Nothing was -more likely than his success in destroying the Russian army, and in -dictating terms of peace in St. Petersburg. - -News of the American declaration of war reached St. Petersburg August -6, and added a new anxiety to the overburdened mind of Alexander. The -American minister at that court found himself in a delicate position. -His Government declared war against England and became for military -purposes an ally of France at the moment when Russia entered into -formal alliance with England and went to war with France. If Napoleon -caught and crushed the Russian army and marched on St. Petersburg, -the American minister would certainly be no favorite with Russians; -if Napoleon were beaten, the American minister need expect no -consideration, for in that case every influence at the Russian Court -was certain to be English, and from England could come no favors. - -At the moment when Brock, with his force of a few hundred men attacked -Detroit, Napoleon with two hundred thousand men moved upon Smolensk and -the Russian army. August 15, he celebrated his fête-day on the banks -of the Dnieper; and while Hull was surrendering the fort of Detroit, -the Russian army, hardly in better humor than the Ohio militia, were -preparing to abandon Smolensk to save themselves from Hull’s fate. -Napoleon took possession of the town August 18, but failed to destroy -the Russian army, and then, turning away from St. Petersburg, pursued -his retreating enemy toward Moscow. The battle of Borodino, or Moscowa, -followed, September 6, and the French army entered Moscow September 14. -There it remained more than a month. - -During these weeks of alarm and incessant fighting, the Czar still -found time to think of American affairs. The influence of Count -Roumanzoff, though lessening every day, still controlled the regular -course of foreign relations. September 21 Roumanzoff sent for Adams, -and said that the Emperor had been much concerned to find the interests -of his subjects defeated and lost by the new war, and it had occurred -to him that perhaps an arrangement might be more easily made by an -indirect than by a direct negotiation: he wished to know whether an -offer of mediation on his part would meet with any difficulty on the -part of the United States.[14] Adams replied that his Government could -not fail to consider it as a new evidence of the Czar’s friendship, but -suggested that there was a third party to be consulted,--the British -government. Roumanzoff answered that he had already sounded the British -minister, who had written to Lord Castlereagh on the subject. - -The British minister, lately arrived in Russia, was not a person -calculated to aid Roumanzoff. Lord Cathcart, who had been chosen by -Castlereagh for the post of ambassador at St. Petersburg, was best -known as the commander of the Copenhagen expedition in 1807. Some -Americans might perhaps remember that he had served in America during -the Revolutionary War. A well-informed writer in the London “Times,” -who belonged to the Wellesley interest, seemed to doubt Lord Cathcart’s -qualifications for his new post. “He is only better fitted for it than -the horse he rides,” was the criticism;[15] but the better he had been -fitted for it, the worse he would have suited Roumanzoff’s purpose, -for his first object could be no other than to overthrow Roumanzoff -and thwart his policy. No serious support of Russian mediation could -be expected from him. He began his career by seeking access to the -Emperor through other channels than the chancellor.[16] - -Adams, September 30, advised his Government of the Czar’s proposed -mediation. October 15, Roumanzoff announced that his proposal was -ready, and would be sent at once to Washington,--which was actually -done, before receiving a reply from London. The step could hardly -please the British government; but Roumanzoff seemed almost to take -pleasure in disregarding England, and perhaps felt that the course of -events must either remove him entirely from the government, or make him -independent of British support. He clung to the American mediation as -the last remnant of his anti-British policy. - -The British government would have preferred to make no answer to the -Russian offer of mediation. To English statesmen the idea was absurd -that England could allow Russia, more than France or the United States -themselves, to mediate on blockade and impressment, or upon points of -neutrality in any form; but Castlereagh had every reason to conciliate -the Czar, and rather than flatly reject a suggestion from such a -source, he replied that he thought the time had not yet come, and that -the offer would not be accepted by America.[17] So it happened that the -offer of Russian mediation went to America without positive objection -from England, finding its way slowly across the Atlantic during the -winter months. - -With it went the tale of Napoleon’s immense disaster. October 23 he -began his retreat; November 23 he succeeded in crossing the Beresina -and escaping capture; December 5 he abandoned what was still left of -his army; and December 19, after travelling secretly and without rest -across Europe, he appeared suddenly in Paris, still powerful, but in -danger. Nothing could be better calculated to support the Russian -mediation in the President’s mind. The possibility of remaining without -a friend in the world while carrying on a war without hope of success, -gave to the Czar’s friendship a value altogether new. - -Other news crossed the ocean at the same time, but encouraged no hope -that England would give way. First in importance, and not to be trifled -with, was the British official announcement, dated December 26, 1812, -of the blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware. Americans held that -this blockade was illegal,[18]--a blockade of a coast, not of a port; a -paper-blockade, one of the grievances against which the war was waged; -but whatever they might choose to call it, they could not successfully -disprove its efficiency, or deny that it made Chesapeake Bay, Delaware -River, and the Vineyard Sound little better than British waters. Export -of American produce from the Chesapeake and Delaware ceased. - -The blockade, though serious beyond all other military measures, -roused less attention and less protest than another measure of the -British government which had the character of a profitable insult. A -circular dated November 9, addressed to the governors of West Indian -colonies by the British government, authorized them to issue licenses -for importation of necessary supplies during the war,--a precaution -commonly taken to meet the risk of famine in those regions. The -Governor of the Bermudas, in issuing a proclamation January 14, 1813, -published the circular, which contained one unusual provision:[19]-- - - “Whatever importations are proposed to be made, under the order, - from the United States of America, should be by your licenses - confined to the ports in the Eastern States exclusively, unless - you have reason to suppose that the object of the order would not - be fulfilled if licenses are not also granted for the importations - from the other ports in the United States.” - -Probably the discrimination was intended, like the exemption from -blockade, as a favor to New England, and must have been meant to be -more or less secret, since publication was likely to counteract its -effect; but in time of war the British government was at liberty to -seek supplies where it chose. - -Madison thought differently. He sent to Congress, February 24, 1813, a -special Message expressing indignation at the conduct of England. - - “The policy now proclaimed to the world,” he charged, “introduces - into her modes of warfare a system equally distinguished - by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its - character,--having for its object to dissolve the ties of - allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation, - and to seduce and separate its component parts the one from the - other. The general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing - contrivances will be reprobated by the civilized world.” - -Although many persons shared Madison’s view of war as a compulsory -process of international law, Federalists and Republicans were at a -loss to understand his view of “deformity” and “depravity” in modes -of warfare. The whole truth in regard to West and East Florida was -not known, but so much was notorious, even in 1811, as to warrant the -British minister in protesting “against an attempt so contrary to every -principle of public justice, faith, and national honor.”[20] What the -United States could do in Florida in time of peace, England could -surely do in Massachusetts in time of war; but if England’s conduct -was in reality deformed and depraved, as charged, the celebrated -proclamation of William Hull to the Canadians in 1812, inviting them -to quit their allegiance and to “choose wisely” the side of the United -States, should have been previously disavowed by the United States -government. No little ridicule was caused by the contrast between -Madison’s attitude toward Canada and his denunciation of England’s -attitude toward Massachusetts. - -Taken together, the news from Europe in the last days of winter gave -ground for deep reflection. With the overthrow of Napoleon’s authority -and the close alliance between Great Britain and Russia, the last -chance of forcing concessions from England vanished. A long war, -with no prospect of success, lay before the United States. New York -harbor, the Delaware River, and Chesapeake Bay were already so nearly -closed to commerce as to foreshadow complete stoppage; and if Boston -was still open, its privileges must soon cease unless Great Britain -deliberately intended to regard New England as neutral. All this, -though alarming enough, might be met with courage; but against the -pronounced disaffection of Massachusetts and Connecticut no defence -existed; and whenever those States should pass from stolid inertia into -the stage of active resistance to the war, the situation would become -hopeless. Under such circumstances England would have a strong motive -for refusing peace on any terms. - -The shadow of these fears lay over the Inaugural Address which the -President pronounced March 4, 1813, after taking for a second time the -oath of office at the Capitol. His speech contained only the defence -of a war that needed no defence, and complaints against England which -were drowned in the tumult of war, the loudest complaint that man could -make. Every tone showed that Madison felt doubtful of support, and that -in proving the war to be just he betrayed consciousness that it was not -energetic. Perhaps the most characteristic sentence in the Address was -that in which he congratulated the country “with a proud satisfaction,” -that in carrying on the war, “no principle of justice or honor, no -usage of civilized nations, no precept of courtesy or humanity, have -been infringed; the war has been waged on our part with scrupulous -regard to all these relations, and in a spirit of liberality which was -never surpassed.” Madison’s phrases were the more remarkable because -at about the same time the British government announced its intention -of making America feel what war meant. The courtesy and humanity of -the war were to be all on the American side; while not a word in the -Inaugural Address gave the pledge which could win victories,--the -assurance that the President himself had energy and meant to exert it. - -Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly from failure of -military calculations at home and abroad, but chiefly from want of -national experience in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded -the President, and could not fail to make him wish for peace. Armstrong -had not been six weeks in the War Department before he set the -members of Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert Smith -returned, and the President found the task of maintaining discipline -as great in the Cabinet as it was in the army. One of the strongest -characters called into prominence by the war, who was himself destined -to have charge of the War Department, spoke of Armstrong, four months -later, in language hinting impatient consciousness of something too -complicated to describe. “And Armstrong!--he was the devil from the -beginning, is now, and ever will be.”[21] Only by studying what -Armstrong did, could the causes be understood of the passion which he -excited in every man he crossed. - -Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong’s proceedings. Monroe’s -character, the opposite of Armstrong’s, was transparent; no one could -mistake his motives, except by supposing them to be complex; and in -his relations with Armstrong his motives were simpler than usual, for -Armstrong’s views could not be carried into effect without loss of -pride to Monroe. Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to -him, with the expectation that if any one was to have general command -of the armies in the field, Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time -when Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that the next -campaign was to be fought by Monroe. Jan. 13, 1813, Serurier wrote to -his Government:[22] - - “There is much talk of Mr. Monroe for the command of the army, and - he has shown a zeal in organizing his Department which tends to - confirm me in that belief.... Mr. Monroe is not a brilliant man, - and no one expects to find a great captain in him; but he served - through the War of Independence with much bravery under the orders - and by the side of Washington. He is a man of great good sense, - of the most austere honor, the purest patriotism, and the most - universally admitted integrity. He is loved and respected by all - parties, and it is believed that he would soon gain the hearts - of all his officers and soldiers. He would be given a staff as - good as possible, and with this assistance as well as all his own - recognized resources, it is believed that he would be perfectly - suited to carry on the campaign about to open against the last - continental possession of England in America.” - -As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged Congress to increase -the number of major-generals; and after Armstrong took charge of the -Department Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing -the increase. February 27 the nominations were sent to the Senate. In a -letter to Jefferson, Monroe told the story:[23]-- - - “On the day that the nomination of these officers was made to the - Senate the President sent for me and stated that the Secretary of - War had placed me in his list of major-generals, at their head, and - wished to know whether I would accept the appointment, intimating - that he did not think I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to leave - my present station. I asked where I was to serve. He supposed it - would be with the Northern army under General Dearborn. I replied - that if I left my present office for such a command it would be - inferred that I had a passion for military life, which I had not; - that in such a station I could be of no service in any view to - the general cause or to military operations, even perhaps with - the army in which I might serve; that with a view to the public - interest the commander ought to receive all the support which the - government could give him, and by accepting the station proposed, - I might take from General Dearborn without aiding the cause by - anything that I might add. I stated, however, that the grade made - no difficulty with me, a desire to be useful being my only object; - and that if the command was given me even with a lower grade than - that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it. The - difficulty related to General Dearborn, who could not well be - removed to an inactive station.” - -Monroe said, in effect, that he would have the command in chief -or nothing. Armstrong said, in effect, that he meant to be -commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James -Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina, Morgan -Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison of Indiana Territory, and -Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left -to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn’s incompetence to conduct -a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to -conduct it as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in the field, -performing the duties of lieutenant-general. - -No sooner was Monroe satisfied that Armstrong meant to follow this -course than he took the unusual step of writing to the President a -formal remonstrance against his colleague’s supposed plan. The act -appointing six major-generals was approved February 24. The same -evening Monroe had a conversation on the subject with the President, -and the next day, February 25, submitted the substance of his remarks -in writing.[24] His argument chiefly regarded the inconvenience and -unconstitutionality of separating the War Department from the President -and of mixing military with civil functions:-- - - “As soon as General Armstrong took charge of the Department at - War, I thought I saw his plan; that is, after he had held it a few - days. I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the - army which should be competent to a general control of military - operations; that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands; that - each operation should be distinct and separate, with distinct and - separate objects, and of course to be directed by himself, not - simply in outline but in detail. I anticipated mischief from this, - because I knew that the movements could not be directed from this - place. I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in mind.” - -From that moment began a feud between the two Cabinet ministers. The -cause was obvious. Armstrong had found that if a general command were -to be created, it must be given to Monroe. Probably he felt no more -confidence in Monroe’s military abilities than in those of Dearborn; -but determined that his hand should not be thus forced, Armstrong -decided to retain Dearborn, although his opinion of Dearborn, as shown -afterward,[25] made the retention an act of grave responsibility. The -decision once taken, he had no choice but to supply Dearborn’s wants -by his own presence with the army,--a course certain to challenge -attack from all Virginia. Had Armstrong been bent on destroying his -rival by means which the world could have found no chance to oppose or -criticise, he would have removed Dearborn, and would have sent Monroe -to waste his reputation in the task of conquering and holding Canada. -The retention of Dearborn was an unfortunate beginning for the new -Secretary of War. - -The first effect of Armstrong’s administration was to turn Monroe into -a vindictive enemy; the second was to alienate Gallatin. Of all the -old Republican leaders, Gallatin cared least for office and most for -consistency. Under any reasonable distribution of party favors, the -Presidency should have fallen to him after Madison, not only because he -was the fittest man, the oldest, ablest, and most useful member of the -Executive government, but also because he represented Pennsylvania; and -if any State in the Union had power to select a President, it was she. -Madison would have been glad to secure for Gallatin the succession; -he had no special love or admiration for Monroe, while his regard for -Gallatin was strong and constant; but Pennsylvania cared more for -interests than for men, while Virginia cared so much for men that she -became prodigal of interests. Pennsylvania allowed Virginia, through -the agency of William B. Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, to -thrust Gallatin aside and to open the path for a third Virginian at -the risk of the Union itself. Gallatin, too proud to complain, had no -longer an object of ambition; and from the moment ambition ceased -abstract ideas of duty alone remained to counteract the disgusts of -disappointment. - -Gallatin’s abstract ideas were those of 1801,--simplicity, economy, -and purity. Financiering--the providing of money for wasteful -expenditure--was his abhorrence. “I cannot consent to act the part of -a mere financier,” he wrote to Jefferson in 1809;[26] “to become a -contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a seeker of resources for the -purpose of supporting useless baubles, of increasing the number of idle -and dissipated members of the community, of fattening contractors, -pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all its ramifications that -system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness which you so justly -execrate.” These words were meant to apply only to a state of peace, -but they applied equally well to a state of war from the moment war -became useless. In the beginning of Madison’s second term, no man of -intelligence denied that the war had failed; that its avowed objects -could not be gained; that every month of war increased the danger of -disunion, brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened habits -of extravagance and corruption on the country. From his post at the -Treasury, Gallatin could see better than most men the dangers, both -financial and political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance -with European affairs showed him the need of rapid diplomacy. - -Armstrong represented everything antagonistic to Gallatin; his methods -were arbitrary and underhand; his political training was that of -the New York school, tempered by personal contact with the court of -Napoleon; from him economy could hardly be expected. Yet perhaps -the worst feature of his administration was likely to be his use of -patronage. The number of Gallatin’s personal enemies was small, and -the use of patronage in a way that would outrage him seemed difficult; -yet within a few weeks Armstrong offended him deeply. March 18, 1813, -William Duane, of the “Aurora” newspaper, was appointed to the post -of adjutant-general. The appointment was improper, and the motives to -which it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous than the -unfitness of the person made it harmful to the service. Gallatin’s -anger was deep: “Duane’s last appointment has disgusted me so far as to -make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who have -appointed him.”[27] - -Into this embroglio of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff, -the Russian _chargé_ at Washington, suddenly dropped the Czar’s offer -to mediate a peace. Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances, -no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united. -Daschkoff’s letter bore date March 8, and Monroe’s reply was sent -March 11. The letter of reply was a civil and somewhat flattering -compliment to Alexander;[28] the mission itself was a matter to be more -deliberately arranged. - -The next decision regarded the character of the mission. The necessary -powers might have been sent, without further form, to Minister Adams -at St. Petersburg, but the President and his advisers thought with -reason that the addition of other negotiators to the mission would give -more weight and political effect to the measure.[29] They decided to -send two new envoys to join Adams; and on the same reasoning to select -prominent men. As a guaranty of their wish for peace, they decided -that one of these men should be a Federalist, and they chose James -A. Bayard of Delaware for the post. For the other, Monroe thought -of naming some Western man, to secure the confidence of the Western -country, and reconcile it to the result; but a different turn was given -to the measure by Gallatin, who asked the appointment for himself. -Gallatin’s exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections. -The President consented to appoint him; and Monroe, who had from the -first attached himself to Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the -consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury. - -A question less easy to decide was whether the new mission should -be despatched at once, or should wait until England should formally -accept the mediation. There again political motives dictated immediate -action. If England should accept, much time might be saved if the -mission were on the spot; if she did not accept, the peace-party in -America would be more effectually silenced. In either case, Russia -would be deeply pledged to support her own undertaking. - -The President did not intend to lose Gallatin in the Treasury. Abundant -precedents warranted the double employment of government officers. In -1794 John Jay, then chief-justice, had been sent to negotiate with -England, and the Senate had approved the appointment. In 1799 Oliver -Ellsworth, also chief-justice, was sent to negotiate with France, -and the Senate had again approved. These were Federalist precedents, -supposed to be binding, at least on the Federalist party. If the -chief-justice, the head of an independent branch of government, could -be sent abroad as an Envoy Extraordinary in Executive employment, no -objection could exist to sending an Executive officer on a temporary -service of the same kind, unless on the score of expediency. To prevent -difficulty on that account, the Secretary of the Navy consented to -act as head of the Treasury until Gallatin’s return. Gallatin himself -inclined to look on his separation from the Treasury as final,[30] but -made his arrangements in agreement with the President’s views, which -looked to his return in the autumn. - -Before he could depart he was obliged to complete the necessary -financial arrangements for the coming year, on which he was busily -engaged at the moment when Daschkoff’s letter arrived. First in -importance was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12, -subscription books were opened in all the principal towns, and the -public was invited to take the whole amount at seven per cent interest, -to be reduced to six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four -million dollars were offered on these terms. Proposals in writing were -then invited by a Treasury circular, dated March 18, and after an -active negotiation between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of -New York and Philadelphia,--John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, David -Parish,--the remainder of the loan was provided. In all about eighteen -millions were offered. Fifteen and a half millions were taken, in the -form of six per cent stock, issued at eighty-eight dollars for every -hundred-dollar certificate, redeemable after the year 1825. About half -a million was taken at par, with an annuity of 1½ per cent for thirteen -years, in addition to the six per cent interest. - -Calculated as a perpetual annuity, as English borrowers would have -viewed it, the rate of this loan was less than seven per cent; but if -the nominal capital must or should be repaid after twelve years, the -rate was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government paid 7.487 -per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years. -The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England -in effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could not have been -taken at all, had not credit and currency been already expanded to the -danger-point, as the allotment showed; for while New England, where -most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half a million, and -Boston took but seventy-five thousand, Pennsylvania, where banking had -become a frenzy, took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore -together contributed only half a million more than was given by -Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars were taken by Astor, Girard, -and Parish,--three foreign-born Americans, without whose aid the money -could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all. Doubtless they -were bold operators; but Americans were supposed to be not wanting in -the taste for speculation, and the question could not but rise how -these men knew the secret of distributing the load which no native -American dared carry. - -The bargain was completed April 7. At that moment the Treasury was -empty, and could not meet the drafts of the other departments; but -with sixteen millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and -an estimated revenue of something more than nine millions, Gallatin -collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the -Secretaries of War and Navy,[31] allotting to the one thirteen millions -and a quarter, to the other four and a half millions, which could not -be exceeded without the consent of Congress. This done, and every -question having been settled that could be foreseen,--the tax-bills -ready to be laid before Congress, and even the draft for a new -bank-charter prepared,--Gallatin bade farewell to the Treasury, and May -9 sailed from the Delaware River, with Bayard, for the Baltic. - -Twelve years had passed since Gallatin took charge of the finances, -and his retirement was an event hardly less serious than a change of -President; for it implied that the political system he had done so -much to create and support stood so near the brink of disaster as to -call him from the chosen field of his duties into a new career, where, -if anywhere, he could save it. As Monroe felt called to the army, so -Gallatin turned naturally to diplomacy. He knew that after another -year of war the finances must be thrown into disorder like that of -the Revolutionary War, beyond the reach of financial skill; and he -believed that if any one could smooth the path of negotiation, that -person was likely to serve best the needs of the Treasury. Yet he took -grave responsibility, of which he was fully aware, in quitting his -peculiar post at a moment so serious. Success alone could save him from -universal censure; and perhaps nothing in his career better proved the -high character he bore, and the extraordinary abilities he possessed, -than the ease with which he supported responsibility for this almost -desperate venture. - -The task he had set for himself was hopeless, not so much because of -the concessions he was to require, as on account of the change in -European affairs which made England indifferent for the moment to -any injury the United States could inflict. Monroe’s instructions -to the new commission, though long, consisted largely in arguments -against the legality of impressment as a part of the _jus gentium_; -although the legality of European war-measures had long ceased to be -worth discussing. As the solution of the dispute, Monroe could offer -only the new Foreign Seamen Act, which England had refused from the -first to consider, and which was certainly open to objections,--on -the American side because it offered too much; on the British side -because it offered more than could in practice be performed. To make -the utmost possible concession, Monroe proposed that no native-born -British subject, thenceforward naturalized in America, should be -allowed to serve either in the national or the private vessels of the -United States,--a provision which carried one step further the offer to -naturalize no British seamen except on condition of leaving the sea, -and which went to the verge of conceding the right of impressment. -Notwithstanding these concessions, the instructions were still positive -on the main point. Without a clear and distinct stipulation against -impressments, no treaty was to be signed; negotiations must cease, and -the negotiators must return home.[32] - - - - -CHAPTER III. - - -During the winter the Republican legislature of New York chose Rufus -King, the chief Federalist in the country, to succeed John Smith as -United States senator. Some Republicans charged that this election -was the price paid by De Witt Clinton for Federalist votes in the -Presidential contest; but Clinton’s friends declared it to be the price -paid by the Administration Republicans for Federalist aid in granting -a corrupt bank charter. That the choice was due to a bargain of some -kind no one denied, and possibly both stories were true. Rufus King -himself stood above suspicion, and had been considered an opponent of -the Federalist alliance with Clinton; but he was a powerful recruit -to the opposition in the Senate, which numbered thenceforward nine -votes, or precisely one fourth of the body. The annoyance to the -Administration was the greater because King’s Republican colleague, -Obadiah German, belonged to the Clintonian opposition, and voted with -the Federalists. At the same time Charles Cutts of New Hampshire was -succeeded by Jeremiah Mason, a very able and extreme Federalist. -Three more senators--Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib--could -be counted as personally hostile to the President. Jesse Franklin of -North Carolina was succeeded by David Stone, an independent, opposed -to the war. Already the opposition threatened to outweigh the votes -on which the President could depend. As though legislation had become -a matter of inferior importance, William H. Crawford of Georgia, the -only vigorous Republican leader in the Senate, resigned his seat, and -followed Gallatin to Europe. He was sent to take the place of Joel -Barlow at Paris, and hurried to his post. In this condition of party -weakness, the election of Rufus King and Jeremiah Mason to the Senate -was a disaster to the Administration; and all the more anxiously the -President feared lest the popular election in May should convert New -York altogether into a Federalist State, and give Massachusetts the -necessary strength to stop the war. - -This election, on which the fate of the war was believed to turn, -took place as usual, May 1, and began by a Federalist success in -the city of New York, followed by another in Kings, Queens, and -Westchester counties. These counties before the century ended had a -voting population of near half a million, but in 1813 they cast in -State elections about eight thousand votes, and gave a majority of -eight hundred for the Federalist candidate Stephen Van Rensselaer, -the unfortunate general of the Niagara campaign. Throughout the -eastern and central counties the election was disputed; three of the -four districts into which the State was divided left the result so -close--within about three hundred votes--that only the western counties -of Cayuga, Seneca, and Genesee turned the scale. Governor Tompkins was -re-elected by the moderate majority of three thousand in a total vote -of eighty-three thousand; but the Federalists obtained a majority of -ten in the Assembly, and gained confidence with their strength. In this -election, for the first time, the issue was distinct between those who -supported and those who opposed the war. The chief towns, New York, -Hudson, and Albany, were strong in opposition; the country districts -tended to support. - -In Massachusetts the Federalist governor Caleb Strong, who had made -himself peculiarly obnoxious by refusing to call out the State’s quota -of militia, received nearly fifty-seven thousand votes, while Senator -Varnum, the Republican candidate, received forty-three thousand. -Considering that the population of Massachusetts was about one fourth -smaller than that of New York, the vote of one hundred thousand persons -in the smaller State, and only eighty-three thousand in the larger, -seemed a proof of popular indifference; but in truth the vote of New -York was larger than usual, and only one thousand less than at the next -election of governor, in 1816. The difference was due to the unequal -suffrage, which in New York State elections was restricted to one -hundred pound free-holds, while in Massachusetts all citizens worth -sixty pounds were entitled to vote. - -At the same time John Randolph met with defeat, for the only time in -his life. John W. Eppes, one of Jefferson’s sons-in-law, took residence -within Randolph’s district for the purpose of contesting it; and after -a struggle succeeded in winning the seat, on the war-issue, by a vote -of eleven hundred and twelve to nine hundred and forty-three.[33] This -change of membership tended, like the New York election, to show that -the people were yielding to the necessity of supporting the war. Yet -the process was alarmingly slow. In the second year of hostilities, New -Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey -were Federal in all branches of their State governments; New York, -Delaware, and Maryland were partly Republican and partly Federalist; -of the eighteen States only ten were wholly Republican, and seven of -these were Southern. In the United States Senate the Administration -could count upon twenty-two votes, with reasonable certainty; the other -fourteen senators were more or less lukewarm or hostile. In the House, -one hundred and fourteen members supported the Administration, and -sixty-eight opposed it. As far as concerned numbers, the Administration -was strong enough in Congress; but the universal want of faith in its -capacity to conduct a war of such consequence gave the Federalists -an advantage beyond proportion to their numerical strength. The task -of opposition was easy, and its force irresistible when the ablest -and oldest Republican in office--the Secretary of the Treasury--felt -himself helpless in face of the Government’s inaptitude for war, -and wrote to his closest intimates that no one could “expect much -improvement in the manner of making it more efficient. I think that -there exists real incapacity in that respect,--an incapacity which must -necessarily exhaust our resources within a very short time.”[34] - -Fortunately for the Government the same slowness of movement which -counteracted its undertakings, affected equally its internal enemies -in their hostility. The New England extremists wished and expected -to act energetically against the war. Chief-Justice Parsons quieted -Pickering in the autumn of 1812 by assuring him that the Massachusetts -House of Representatives would act at its winter session;[35] yet the -legislature met and adjourned without action. The party waited for -the spring election of 1813, which was to give them control of New -York. Their disappointment at the re-election of Governor Tompkins -was extreme, and the temptation to wait until the national government -should become bankrupt and disgraced became irresistible. Another -campaign was likely to answer their purpose. While England grew -stronger every day, America grew weaker; the struggle became more -and more unequal, the result more and more certain; and the hope of -peaceably restoring the Federalist party to power diminished the -temptation to adopt measures of force. - -Thus when the Thirteenth Congress met for its extra session, May 24, -the Government felt stronger than on March 5, when the old Congress -expired. The elections were safely passed; the peace negotiations might -be considered as begun; taxation was no longer a matter of taste. The -majority liked taxation as little in 1813 as they had liked it in -1812 or in 1801; but they could no longer dispute or even discuss it. -Gallatin had gone, leaving the bills for them to pass; and Congress, -which at any other time would have rebelled, had no choice but to pass -them. - -Once more Henry Clay was chosen Speaker, and setting Cheves aside he -placed John W. Eppes at the head of the Ways and Means Committee. The -House missed John Randolph, but gained John Forsyth of Georgia, and -Daniel Webster,--a new member from New Hampshire, of the same age as -Calhoun and Lowndes, but five years younger than Clay. Otherwise the -members varied little from the usual type, and showed more than their -usual faculty for discussing topics no longer worth discussion. - -President Madison’s Message of May 25 challenged no angry comment. Its -allusion to the Russian mediation and the terms of peace had an accent -of self-excuse, as though he were anxious to convince England of her -true interests; its allusion to France contained the usual complaint of -delays “so unreasonably spun out;” and its reference to the war and -the finances was rather cheerful than cheering. Daring as Madison’s -policy had been, he commonly spoke in tones hardly to be called bold; -and this Message had the disadvantage, which under the circumstances -could not be called a fault, of addressing itself rather to Europe and -to enemies, than to a spirited and united nation. It had also the merit -of directing Congress strictly to necessary business; and Congress -acted on the direction. - -Nothing less than necessity could at that moment of early summer have -induced the members of Congress to remain in session at all. Stout -as the majority might be in support of the war, the stoutest were -depressed and despondent. They saw themselves disappointed in every -hope and calculation on which they had counted a year before. Even -their unexpected naval glory was lost for the moment by the victory -of Broke’s frigate the “Shannon” over the “Chesapeake,” June 1, as -Congress began its work. Disaster after disaster, disgrace upon -disgrace, had come and were every moment multiplying. Suffocated with -heat, members were forced to sit day by day in the half-finished -Capitol, with a Southern village about them, their nearest neighbor a -British fleet. “Defeated and disgraced everywhere,” said one of the -stanchest war members describing the scene, “Congress was to impose the -burden of taxes on a divided people, who had been taught by leaders -of the war party to look upon a tax-gatherer as a thief, if not to -shoot him as a burglar.”[36] According to the same authority, “the -country was at the lowest point of depression, where fear is too apt to -introduce despair.” In this condition of spirits, Gallatin’s tax-bills -were reported to the House June 10,--measures such as the Republican -party had, till very lately, not conceived as within the range of its -possible legislation. They included a direct tax of three million -dollars; taxes on salt, licenses, spirits, carriages, auctions, sugar -refineries; a stamp tax, and a complete machinery for the assessment -and collection of these odious and oppressive imposts. - -At the same moment, Daniel Webster began his career in Congress by -moving Resolutions which caused a long and unprofitable debate on the -conduct of France and the character of the French repealing Decree of -April 28, 1811,--a debate that could have no other result or object -than to mortify and annoy the President, who had been, like so many -other rulers, the victim of Napoleon’s audacity. Pending this debate, -June 13, the President took to his bed with a remittent fever, and for -five weeks his recovery was doubtful. Madison was still confined to -his bed, when, July 15, messengers from the lower Potomac brought news -that the British fleet, consisting of eight or ten ships-of-the-line -and frigates, was in the river, sixty miles below, making its way up -the difficult channel to Washington. A reasonable and well-grounded -fear took possession of the city. July 21, Serurier wrote to his -Government:[37]-- - - “Every one is making ready to move. I know that they are secretly - packing up at the Departments. I have as yet sent nothing away, - in order not to show distrust of the Government’s power; but I - have got ready my most valuable papers, and from the moment the - President shall quit his residence, I shall follow where he goes, - with my principal portfolios in one of my carriages.” - -The British ships were approaching the city; the sound of their guns -was believed to be heard; and the Government had little means of -stopping them. Every man prepared for volunteer duty; other work was -suspended. About three thousand militia and volunteers, among whom -were all the Cabinet and many members of Congress, were mustered, and -marched to Fort Washington, which was occupied by some six hundred -regular troops, with the Secretary of War at their head; while the -Secretary of the Navy took his post on the 28-gun frigate “Adams” in -the river beneath, and the Secretary of State rode down the river shore -with a cavalry scouting party to reconnoitre the British ships.[38] -July 15 and 16 the House of Representatives ordered a Fast, and went -into secret session to consider modes of defence. - -Unfortunately the motion for inquiry was made by a Federalist. The -majority, determined to make no admissions, referred the subject -to the Military Committee, which reported the next day through its -chairman, Troup of Georgia, that the preparation was “in every respect -adequate to the emergence.” When a majority could benefit only its -enemies by telling the truth, history showed that honorable men often -preferred to tell what was untrue. In this case the British ships -made their soundings, and obtained whatever knowledge they sought; -then left the river to visit other parts of the Bay, but never were -so far distant that they might not, with energy and a fair wind, -within four-and-twenty hours, have raided the defenceless village. -They had but to choose their own time and path. Not a defensible fort -or a picket-fence stood within ten miles of Washington, nor could a -sufficient garrison be summoned in time for defence. Armstrong, Jones, -and Monroe doubtless assured Congress that their means of defence were -“in every respect adequate,” but Congress took the responsibility on -its own shoulders when it accepted their assurance. - -Perhaps of all the incompetence shown in the war this example most -exasperated patriotic citizens, because it was shared by every branch -of the government. For six months the Administration and its friends -had denounced Hull, Van Rensselaer, and Smyth for betraying the -government, while the Clintonians and peace Democrats had denounced -the President for imbecility; but in regard to the city of Washington -the generals were not in question, for no generals were there, while -the President was dangerously ill in bed. The Legislature and Cabinet -were chiefly responsible for whatever should happen,--the more because -their warning was ample, even if under such circumstances warning was -needed. If Jefferson assumed as a matter of course that William Hull -was to be shot and Stephen Van Rensselaer broken for their mistakes, -Republicans might properly ask what punishment should be reserved for -Armstrong, Jones, and Monroe of the Cabinet, Troup of Georgia, Sevier -of Tennessee, Wright of Maryland, and other members of the Military -Committees of the House and Senate for their neglect of the national -capital. - -The debate on Webster’s Resolutions, and the report made in consequence -by Monroe, July 12, tended to throw additional discredit on the -Government. In no respect did Madison’s Administration make an -appearance less creditable than in its attitude toward Napoleon’s -Decrees, again and again solemnly asserted by it to have been repealed, -in the face of proof that the assertion was unfounded. No Federalist -rhetoric was necessary to make this mortification felt. Madison seldom -expressed himself with more bitterness of temper than in regard to the -Emperor’s conduct, and with Monroe the subject drew forth recurrent -outbursts of anger and disgust. His report tacitly admitted everything -that the Federalists charged, except that the Administration had a -secret engagement with France: it had deceived itself, but it had not -wilfully deceived the public. - -While the House was busied with these unpleasant subjects, the Senate -took up the President’s recent nominations. May 29, four names were -sent to it for diplomatic appointments,--those of Albert Gallatin, -J. Q. Adams, and James A. Bayard, to negotiate treaties of peace and -commerce with Great Britain, and a treaty of commerce with Russia; -that of Jonathan Russell to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden. -Rufus King immediately began opposition by moving three Resolutions -of inquiry in regard to the nature of the Russian appointments and -the authority under which the Treasury was to be administered in the -Secretary’s absence. The President replied, June 3, that the duties of -the Secretary of the Treasury were discharged by the Secretary of the -Navy under the provisions of the Act of 1792. The Senate, by a vote -of twenty to fourteen, referred the matter to a committee consisting -of Anderson of Tennessee, Rufus King, Brown of Louisiana, and Bledsoe -of Kentucky. Anderson, the chairman, wrote to the President and went -to see him on behalf of the committee, but received only the answer -that the President declined to discuss the matter with them in their -official character. The Senate then adopted a Resolution that the -functions of Secretary of the Treasury and Envoy Extraordinary were -incompatible. The Federalists obtained on this vote the support of -Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smith, German of New York, and Gilman of New -Hampshire, all of whom were disaffected Republicans; but even with -this aid they would have failed without the votes of Anderson, Bledsoe, -and the two Louisiana senators, who joined the malcontents. - -Madison was then slowly recovering strength, and greatly harassed by -anxieties. He would not sacrifice Gallatin to the Senate; he hoped that -firmness would carry the point,[39] and at worst he could throw upon -senators the charge of factious opposition. This he succeeded in doing. -July 16 the Senate committee, naturally expecting Madison to suggest -some arrangement, once more sought and obtained a conference,--“when -the President was pleased to observe,” said their report,[40] “that he -was sorry that the Senate had not taken the same view of the subject -which he had done; and that he regretted that the measure had been -taken under circumstances which deprived him of the aid or advice of -the Senate. After the committee had remained a reasonable time for the -President to make any other observations if he thought proper to do so, -and observing no disposition manifested by him to enter into further -remarks, the committee retired without making any observations on the -matter of the Resolutions, or in reply to those made by the President.” - -Finding itself thus defied, the Senate, without more discussion, -rejected Gallatin’s nomination by eighteen votes to seventeen, Anderson -and the two Louisiana senators still adhering to the hostile interest. -Adams and Bayard were then confirmed with little opposition. - -After the passage of many years, the propriety of the decision may -still be left open to debate. As far as the Federalists were concerned, -their votes contradicted their own precedents; and if they conceded, -as their precedents required, that the question was not one of law but -of expediency, they assumed responsibility in acting as final judges. -The incompatibility asserted by them was a matter of dispute. Two -successive chief-justices had been sent as envoys abroad. No one could -doubt that the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other member of the -Executive or Judicial departments, might be appointed to negotiate -a treaty in Washington. Temporary absence from Washington had never -implied incompatibility. Everyone knew that the Secretary of War meant -in person to conduct the war on the frontier. No one could question -the President’s right to appoint acting secretaries. If convenience -alone was the point at issue, surely the President knew best the -demands of his own Executive departments, and might be trusted with the -responsibility which belonged to him. That he should fail to see, as -soon as the Senate could discover, an incompatibility that would work -only against himself, need not be taken for granted by his own party, -whatever might be the case with the opposition. - -On the other hand every one might admit that as the country grew, -Secretaries of the Treasury were likely to find work in their own -Department that would effectually limit their capacity for foreign -travel; and if the Senate thought that stage to be already reached, -senators were right in insisting upon the appointment of a new -secretary in Gallatin’s place. Unfortunately for their argument, -their power did not extend so far. Gallatin remained Secretary of the -Treasury, and continued to negotiate as such, without paying attention -to the Senate or its theories. - -The Senate further weakened its position in acting on the nomination -of Jonathan Russell as Minister to Sweden. The subject was referred, -June 2, to a committee consisting of Senator Goldsborough of Maryland, -together with Anderson and Rufus King. Jonathan Russell had made -himself obnoxious to the peace party by eagerness shown, while he -was in charge at London, to bring on the war. The committee not -only entered on an investigation of his doings at Paris, but also -introduced a Resolution declaring that any mission to Sweden at that -time was inexpedient, and by order of the Senate asked a conference -with the President. Monroe, angry at this conduct, declared privately -that a faction in the Senate, counting on the death not only of -President Madison but of Vice-President Gerry, and the election of -Giles as President of the Senate, were scheming to usurp the Executive -power.[41] - -In order to counteract their manœuvre, and also to relieve the -President, who was then dangerously ill, Monroe took the ground that -the Executive would not confer with a co-ordinate branch of government -except through an agent, because his dignity would not allow him -to meet a committee except by a committee of his own. Monroe thus -expressed this somewhat unrepublican doctrine: “A committee of the -Senate ought to confer with a committee of the President through a -head of a Department, and not with the Chief Magistrate; for in the -latter case a committee of that House is equal to the President.”[42] -As a necessary conclusion, Monroe’s argument seemed to the Senate not -beyond dispute; but they answered it, three days afterward, still less -logically, by passing Goldsborough’s Resolution that it was inexpedient -at that time to send a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden. - -Whatever might have been the case with Gallatin’s rejection, no one -could doubt that the vote on Russell’s appointment was factious. When -twenty-two senators, including Jeremiah Mason, Christopher Gore, Samuel -Dana, Rufus King, and William B. Giles, declared that a minister -resident in Sweden was inexpedient in the summer of 1813, they declared -what every other well-informed man knew to be an error. If any American -envoy was ever expedient, it was an envoy to Sweden in 1813; for in -Sweden at that moment all that was left of American commerce centred -after being driven from England, and the political interests of Sweden -were greatly involved with those of the United States. The error was -the less to be denied, because, only six months afterward, the Senate -admitted itself in the wrong, and approved the appointment of Russell. - -These votes of the Senate made a deep impression. In time of peace and -safety the Senate might show factiousness without necessarily exciting -public anger, although at no time was the experiment quite safe; but at -a moment like July, 1813, when public opinion tended toward a serious -temper, factiousness was out of place, and was the more dangerous -because President Madison, though never showing great power as a -popular leader, had still a clear perception of the moment when to -strike an enemy. He rarely failed to destroy when he struck. The time -had come when the Republican party, with one voice, would be obliged -to insist that party discipline must be restored; and this result -was precipitated by the Senate’s conduct in regard to the diplomatic -nominations. - -An illustration of the dangers into which the spirit of faction at -that excited moment led the factious, was furnished by the legislature -of Massachusetts, which met, May 26, and after listening to a long -speech from Governor Strong arraigning the national government for its -injustice to England and partiality to France, referred the subject -to committees which lost no time in reporting. One of these reports, -presented June 4 by Josiah Quincy of the State Senate, closed with a -Resolution that the Act admitting Louisiana into the Union violated the -Constitution, and that the Massachusetts senators in Congress should -use their utmost endeavors to obtain its repeal. Another report, by a -joint committee, contained a remonstrance addressed to Congress against -the war, couched in terms of strong sectional hostility to the Southern -States, and marked throughout by a covert argument for disunion. A -third report, also by Josiah Quincy, on a naval victory lately won by -Captain James Lawrence of the “Hornet,” contained a phrase even longer -remembered than Quincy’s assertion that the Government could not be -kicked into a war. The Government had in fact been kicked into the -war, but Quincy was not the better pleased. He reported that in order -not to give offence to many of the good people of the Commonwealth by -appearing to encourage the continuance of an unjust, unnecessary, and -iniquitous war, the Massachusetts senate while admiring Lawrence’s -virtues refrained from approving his acts,-- - - “And to the end that all misrepresentations on this subject may be - obviated,-- - - _Resolved_, as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that - in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and - prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition - are its real motives, it is not becoming a moral and religious - people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits - which are not immediately connected with the defence of our - sea-coast and soil.” - -Such tactics, whether in or out of Congress, were more dangerous to -their authors than any blunders of the Administration could ever be -to the party in power. If the nation should be successful in the war, -it might perhaps in good nature leave unpunished the conduct of its -malcontents; but if by their means the nation should be conquered or -forced into a humiliating peace, the people would never forget, and -never forego revenge. Mere opposition to foreign war rarely injured -public men, except while the war-fever lasted. Many distinguished -statesmen of Europe and America had been, at one time or another, in -opposition to some special war,--as was the case with Talleyrand, -Charles James Fox, Lord Grey, Jefferson, and Madison; but opposition -became unpardonable when it took a form which could have no apparent -object except national ruin. The Federalists who held the ideas -expressed by the legislature of Massachusetts could explain or defend -their future course only by the conviction that the inevitable -and long-expected “crisis” was at hand, which must end either in -disunion or in reconstruction of the Union on new ground. As “a moral -and religious people,” they separated from the common stock, and -thenceforward, if the Union lasted, could expect no pardon. - -The extravagance of the Massachusetts Federalists was counterbalanced -by the same national disasters which caused it. Nothing showed that -the war was popular in any of the sea-board States; but the pressure -of circumstances, little by little, obliged lukewarm and even hostile -communities to support it. Virginia and the Southern States were drawn -into relations toward the government which they had never intended to -accept. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee submitted to exactions -that would at any previous stage of their history have produced a -revolution. Perhaps the strongest proof of change in popular prejudices -was furnished by the taxes. Tax-bills which were supposed to have -already overthrown one great political party,--bills which inflicted -the evils so hotly and persistently denounced by Jefferson, Gallatin, -and John Randolph in opposition, and which had been long delayed by -fear of their popular effect,--were passed by Congress quickly, by -decided votes, and with less debate than was given to the discussion -whether the President had or had not told all he knew about Bassano’s -Decree of April 28, 1811. From the time they were approved by the -President, in July and August, 1813, to the time of their repeal, -neither the President nor his party was troubled by popular discontent -on account of the passage of these Acts. They were accepted as a -necessary part of the national system, and of a war-policy. - -The most curious symptom, and the one which most perplexed the -Federalists, was that this popular movement of concentration acted -in direct resistance to the movement of events. In every respect as -the Federalists looked back at the past twelve years their prophecies -had come true. The Republican party, they argued, had proved itself -incompetent, and had admitted the failure of its principles; it had -been forced to abandon them in practice, to replace the government -where the Federalists had put it, and to adopt all the Federalists’ -methods; and even then the party failed. Equally imbecile in peace -and war, the democratic movement had ended in such disgrace and -helplessness as few governments had ever outlived, and such as no -nation with a near and powerful neighbor could have survived. In 1813 -the evidence of downfall had become patent. The government was ruined -in credit and character; bankrupt, broken, and powerless, it continued -to exist merely because of habit, and must succumb to the first shock. -All this the Federalists had long foreseen. Fisher Ames in the press, -scores of clergymen in the pulpit, numberless politicians in Congress, -had made no other use of their leisure than to point out, step by step, -every succeeding stage in the coming decline. The catastrophe was no -longer far away, it was actually about them,--they touched and felt it -at every moment of their lives. Society held itself together merely -because it knew not what else to do. - -Under circumstances following each other in necessity so stringent, -no Federalist could doubt that society would pursue the predicted -course; but it did not. Illogical and perverse, society persisted in -extending itself in lines which ran into chaos. The threatened “crisis” -had arrived, wanting no characteristic of those so long foretold; -but society made no effort to save itself. A vaster ruin and still -more terrible retribution lay beyond. The Federalists were greatly -and naturally perplexed at discovering the silent under-current which -tended to grow in strength precisely as it encountered most resistance -from events. They tried to explain the phenomenon in their own -way,--the clergy according to religious conceptions, the politicians -according to their ideas of popular character. The political theory -was the more plausible and less respectable. A. C. Hanson, the extreme -Maryland Federalist, mobbed and nearly killed in Baltimore in June, -1812, only to be elected to Congress in November, thought that the -national movement of 1813 was due to military glory. Hanson wrote to -Pickering on the subject, in the autumn:[43]-- - - “The war is becoming more popular every day in this State - [Maryland]. Our successes, and the weak manner in which it is - conducted by the enemy make it so.... It would seem that after - a while, unless the British can gather the sense and courage to - strike some severe blows, the war by its own generative powers - will create the means for its support. The vanity of a people - cannot bear these brilliant naval victories, and there is no - passion to which the rulers of a people can address themselves - with greater effect. Even in my district the active opposers of - the war are falling off every day, and unless we shortly meet with - some reverses, the Administration will shortly find more friends - than enemies in this State by a great deal.... The impression is - becoming universal that the enemy cannot harm us if he would. A few - hard blows struck in the right place would be of great service to - the country.” - -A people that could feel its vanity flattered by such glories as the -war gave in 1813 must have felt the want of flattery to an unusual -degree. The idea was extravagant. Not so much the glories as the -disgraces of the war roused public sympathy; not so much the love -of victory as the ignominy of defeat, and the grinding necessity of -supporting government at any cost of private judgment. At such a moment -any success was keenly felt, and covered every failure. The slow -conviction that come what would the nation must be preserved, brought -one man after another into support of the war, until the Federalists -found their feet in a quicksand. The “crisis” produced the opposite -effect to that which Burke’s philosophy predicted. - -Congress finished its work, and August 2 adjourned. Immediately -afterward the President went to Montpelier to recover his strength in -the air of the Blue Ridge. The session had not been unsatisfactory, -for although the Senate refused to impose an embargo, wanted by the -President in order to cut off illegitimate trade with England’s -dependencies, and although the same body put its negative on the -appointments of Gallatin and Jonathan Russell, yet Congress passed the -tax-bills, authorized another loan of seven and a half millions, and -made the business of trading under a British license a penal offence. -The operations of war alone remained to burden the President’s mind. - - - - -CHAPTER IV. - - -The fall of Detroit and Chicago in August, 1812, threw the American -frontier back to the line of the Wabash and the Maumee, and threatened -to throw it still farther back to the Indian boundary itself. The Miami -or Maumee River was defended by Fort Wayne; the Wabash had no other -defence than the little fort or blockhouse which Harrison built during -the Tippecanoe campaign, and named after himself. Fort Harrison stood -near the later city of Terre Haute, close to the border of Illinois; -Fort Wayne stood within twenty miles of the Ohio border. The width of -Indiana lay between the two. - -Had Brock been able, after the capture of Detroit, to lead his little -army into Ohio, he might have cleared not only the Maumee River, but -the whole western end of Lake Erie from American possession. Recalled -in haste to defend Niagara, Brock left only two or three companies of -troops as garrison at Detroit and Malden. The Indians could do little -without the aid of regular forces, but they tried to carry both Fort -Wayne and Fort Harrison by stratagem. The attacks were made almost -simultaneously a few days after September 1, and not without skill. -In the case of Fort Harrison the Indians were nearly successful, not -so much in fighting as in burning it. With great difficulty its young -captain, Zachary Taylor, of the Seventh Infantry, succeeded in saving -his post. Fort Wayne was held by Captain James Rhea of the First -Infantry until reinforcements arrived, September 12. Except the usual -massacres of scattered families, the Indians accomplished nothing. - -Upon the State of Ohio, with its quarter of a million inhabitants, and -of Kentucky with four hundred thousand, fell the immediate burden of -defending the border between the Ohio and the Lakes. Governor William -Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory leaving Vincennes June 19, the -day after the declaration of war, was at Cincinnati when threatening -news began to arrive from Detroit. Harrison had military knowledge and -instincts. He saw that after the capture of Mackinaw Detroit must fall, -and that Hull could save himself only by evacuating it.[44] Harrison’s -ambition, which had drawn him to Tippecanoe, drew him also to lead -the new crusade for the relief or recovery of Detroit. He went to -Kentucky at the invitation of Governor Scott, and under the patronage -of Scott and Henry Clay he took the direction of military affairs. -August 24 news reached Kentucky that Hull was shut in Detroit, and must -surrender unless immediately relieved.[45] The Governor of Kentucky at -once summoned what was then called a _caucus_, composed of himself, -his successor elect Governor Shelby, Henry Clay, Justice Todd of the -United States Supreme Court, Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky -militia, various Congressmen, judges, and other citizens,[46] whose -whole authority was needed to warrant giving to Harrison, who was not -a citizen of Kentucky, the commission of major-general and the command -of the expedition to Detroit. By general acclamation, and on the warm -assurances of universal popular approval, the measure was taken; and -Harrison started at once for Cincinnati and Detroit to organize the -campaign. The news of Hull’s surrender met him as he left Frankfort. - -By this combination of skill and accident, Harrison reached the object -of his ambition,--the conduct of war on a scale equal to his faith -in his own powers; but the torrent of Western enthusiasm swept him -forward faster than his secret judgment approved. Appointed by caucus -the general of volunteers, he could keep his position only by keeping -his popularity. Without deciding precisely where to march, or what -military object to pursue, he talked and acted on the idea that he -should recover Detroit by a _coup-de-main_.[47] He knew that the idea -was baseless as a practical plan, and futile as a military measure; but -nothing less would satisfy the enthusiasm of his Kentucky volunteers, -and the national government almost compelled him to pretend what he -did not at heart believe possible. - -The confusion thus created was troublesome. First, Harrison insisted -on commanding the troops marching to relieve Fort Wayne, and obliged -the good-natured General Winchester, who outranked him, to yield the -point.[48] Then after a forced march with the Kentuckians down the -St. Mary’s River, having relieved Fort Wayne, Harrison was obliged, -September 19, to surrender the command to Winchester, who arrived -with orders from the Secretary of War to take general charge of the -northwestern army. Harrison then left Fort Wayne for Piqua. Meanwhile -the President and Eustis, learning what had been done in Kentucky, -September 17, after much debate decided to give to Harrison the -commission of brigadier-general, with the command of the northwestern -army, to consist of ten thousand men, with unlimited means and no -orders except to retake Detroit.[49] Brigadier-General Winchester, -who was already at Fort Wayne, was given the option of serving under -Harrison, or of joining the army at Niagara. - -These new orders reached Harrison September 25 at Piqua. Harrison then -resumed command, and two days afterward, September 27, wrote to the -secretary, announcing his plan for the autumn campaign. Three columns -of troops, from widely distant quarters, were to move to the Maumee -Rapids,--the right column, consisting of Virginia and Pennsylvania -troops, by way of the Sandusky River; the centre column, of twelve -hundred Ohio militia, by Hull’s road; the left column, consisting of -four Kentucky regiments and the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, was to -descend the Auglaize River to Fort Defiance on the Maumee, and thence -to fall down that river to the point of junction with the two other -columns. - -Compared with Hull’s resources, Harrison’s were immense; and that he -had no serious enemy to fear was evident from his dividing the army -into three columns, which marched by lines far beyond supporting -distance of each other. At the same time he ordered Major-General -Hopkins of the Kentucky militia to march with two thousand men up the -Wabash into the Indian country, and to destroy the Indian settlements -on the Wabash and Illinois rivers. Had a British force been opposed -to the Americans, its general would have had little difficulty in -destroying some one of these four isolated columns, and driving -Harrison back to central Ohio; but only bands of Indians, not exceeding -five hundred at most, were to be feared before the army should cross -the Maumee, and little anxiety existed on account of enemies, unless -for the safety of Fort Wayne. - -Harrison’s anxieties bore a different character. September 23 he wrote -to the Secretary of War: “If the fall should be very dry, I will take -Detroit before the winter sets in; but if we should have much rain, it -will be necessary to wait at the rapids until the Miami of the Lakes is -sufficiently frozen to bear the army and its baggage.”[50] The promise -was rash. However dry the season might be, the task of marching an army -with siege-artillery past Malden to Detroit, and of keeping it supplied -from a base two hundred miles distant, with the British commanding the -Lake, was one which Harrison had too much sense to attempt. Nothing but -disaster could have resulted from it, even if Detroit had been taken. -In the actual condition of that territory, no army could be maintained -beyond the Maumee River without controlling the Lake. Perhaps Harrison -was fortunate that constant rains throughout the month of October -brought the army to a halt long before it reached the Maumee. Only the -left division of five Kentucky regiments succeeded in getting to the -river, and camped in the neighborhood of old Fort Defiance, waiting for -the other columns to reach the rapids. There the Kentuckians remained, -under the command of General Winchester, without food, clothing, or -sufficient shelter, in a state of increasing discontent and threatening -mutiny, till the year closed. - -Within a month after assuming command Harrison found himself helpless -either to advance or to retreat, or to remain in any fixed position. -The supplies required for ten thousand troops could not be sent forward -by any means then known. October 22 the left column, consisting of -the Kentucky regiments and some regulars, was at Defiance on the -Maumee; the central column of a thousand Ohio troops under General -Tupper was on Hull’s road, a hundred miles from the Maumee, unable to -march beyond Urbana, where its supplies were collecting; the right -column of Pennsylvanians and Virginians was still farther from the -front, slowly approaching the Sandusky River from the southeast, but -far out of reach. General Hopkins’s expedition up the Wabash ended -in failure, his troops becoming a mere mob, and at last disbanding, -leaving their general to follow them home. Harrison himself was riding -indefatigably through the mud, from one end to the other of his vast -concave line,--now at Defiance, making speeches to pacify Winchester’s -Kentuckians; then at Piqua and Urbana with the Ohioans; soon a hundred -miles away at the river Huron, east of Sandusky; next at Wooster, -Delaware, or Franklinton, afterward Columbus, in the centre of Ohio, -looking for his right wing; but always searching for a passable ridge -of dry land, on which his supplies could go forward to the Maumee -Rapids. The result of his search was given in a letter of October 22, -from Franklinton, to the Secretary of War:-- - - “I am not able to fix any period for the advance of the troops to - Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot be done upon proper - principles until the frost shall become so severe as to enable us - to use the rivers and the margin of the Lake for transportation - of the baggage and artillery upon the ice. To get them forward - through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in wagons - or on packhorses which are to carry their own provisions, is - absolutely impossible.” - -The obstacle which brought Harrison’s autumn campaign to this sudden -close was the vast swamp that extended from the Sandusky River on his -right to the Auglaize River on his left, and for the moment barred the -passage of his necessary supplies as effectually as though it had been -the Andes. Hull had crossed it, cutting a road as he went, and no one -had then appreciated his effort; but he had marched with a small force -in May and June. Harrison tried to transport supplies, heavy guns, -military stores, and all the material for an army of ten thousand men -on a long campaign, as the autumn rains set in. On the extreme right, -with great effort and expense, a considerable quantity of rations was -accumulated on the Sandusky River, to be sent to the Maumee Rapids -whenever the frosts should harden the swamps. On the extreme left, -desperate efforts were made to carry supplies to Winchester’s army at -Defiance by way of the Auglaize and St. Mary’s rivers. Hull’s road was -impassable, and for that reason the column of Ohio troops and their -supplies were stopped in the neighborhood of Urbana. - -Throughout the months of October and November Harrison’s army stood -still, scattered over the State of Ohio, while wagons and packhorses -wallowed in mud toward the Maumee Rapids. None arrived. Sometimes -the wagons were abandoned in the mud; sometimes the packhorses broke -down; sometimes the rivers were too low for boats; then they froze and -stopped water-transport. Universal confusion, want of oversight and -organization, added to physical difficulties, gave play to laziness, -incapacity, and dishonesty. No bills of lading were used; no accounts -were kept with the wagoners; and the teams were valued so high, on -coming into service, that the owners were willing to destroy them -for the price to be received.[51] The waste of government funds was -appalling, for nothing short of a million rations at the Maumee Rapids -could serve Harrison’s objects, and after two months of effort not a -ration had been carried within fifty miles of the spot. In Winchester’s -camp at Defiance the men were always on half rations, except when they -had none at all. During the greater part of December they had no flour, -but lived on poor beef and hickory roots. Typhus swept them away by -scores; their numbers were reduced to about one thousand. The exact -force which Harrison had in the field was matter of conjecture, for he -sent no return of any description to the adjutant-general’s office.[52] -The Government gave him _carte blanche_, and he used it.[53] Chaos and -misconduct reigned in every department, while he, floundering through -the mud along his line of two hundred miles front, sought in vain for -a road. - -For the train of errors and disasters in the northwest Secretary Eustis -was chiefly responsible, and his resignation, Dec. 3, 1812, left the -campaign in this hopeless condition. From Dec. 3, 1812, until Jan. 13, -1813, Monroe acted as Secretary of War; and to him Harrison next wrote -from Delaware, December 12, a letter which not only disheartened the -Government, but was calculated to create a prejudice against the writer -in the mind of any Secretary of War who was not invincibly prejudiced -in his favor.[54] - - “If there were not some important political reason,” said - Harrison, “urging the recovery of the Michigan Territory and - the capture of Malden as soon as those objects can possibly be - effected, and that to accomplish them a few weeks sooner expense - was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say that if - a small proportion of the sums which will be expended in the - quartermaster’s department in the active prosecution of the - campaign during the winter was devoted to obtaining the command of - Lake Erie, the wishes of the Government, in their utmost extent, - could be accomplished without difficulty in the months of April and - May. Malden, Detroit, and Mackinaw would fall in rapid succession. - On the contrary, all that I can certainly promise to accomplish - during the winter, unless the strait should afford us a passage - on the ice, is to recover Detroit. I must further observe that no - military man would think of retaining Detroit, Malden being in - possession of the enemy, unless his army was at least twice as - strong as the disposable force of the enemy. An army advancing to - Detroit along a line of operation passing so near the principal - force of the enemy as to allow them access to it whenever they - think proper, must be covered by another army more considerable - than the disposable force of the enemy. I mention this circumstance - to show that the attack ought not to be directed against Detroit, - but against Malden; and that it depends upon the ice affording a - safe passage across the strait, whether I shall be able to proceed - in this way or not. Detroit is not tenable. Were I to take it - without having it in my power to occupy the opposite shore, I - should be under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent - swamp to preserve it from the effects of the shot and shells which - the enemy would throw with impunity from the opposite shore. This - result is so obvious to every man who has the least military - information, that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other - part of General Hull’s conduct that he should choose to defend - Detroit rather than attack Malden.” - -Hull could have asked no better apology for his surrender. Harrison -did not know that the insubordination and refusal of the Ohio colonels -to evacuate Detroit had forced Hull to remain there; but that Detroit -was not tenable came at last to the surface as a self-evident truth of -the campaign,--which Hull had always seen, and which Harrison himself -announced almost as clearly in August as in December, but which he -ignored in the interval. - - “If it should be asked,” he continued, “why these statements were - not made sooner,--I answer that although I was always sensible - that there were great difficulties to be encountered in the - accomplishment of the wishes of the President in relation to the - recovery of Detroit and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper - Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allowance - for the imbecility and inexperience of the public agents and the - villany of the contractors. I am still, however, very far from - believing that the original plan is impracticable. I believe on the - contrary that it can be effected.” - -The excuse did not satisfy the Cabinet, who thought they saw that -Harrison wished to throw upon Government the responsibility for a -military failure fatal to himself. Perhaps a simpler motive guided -Harrison, who from the first never had known precisely what to do, -or had seen any clear path to success. He wrote, January 4, from -Franklinton,-- - - “When I was directed to take the command in the latter end of - September, I thought it possible by great exertions to effect the - objects of the campaign before the setting in of winter.... The - experience of a few days was sufficient to convince me that the - supplies of provisions could not be procured for our autumnal - advance; and even if this difficulty was removed, another of equal - magnitude existed in the want of artillery. There remained then no - alternative but to prepare for a winter campaign.” - -According to this account he had seen early in October that advance was -impossible, yet he wasted millions of money and many of his best troops -in attempting it. Winter had come, and he was pledged to a winter -campaign as impracticable as the autumn campaign had proved to be. -Without the control of the Lake, any army beyond the Maumee must starve -or surrender. The government had already paid a vast price in money and -men in order to obtain this knowledge; yet Harrison proposed a winter -campaign, with full persuasion of its uselessness. - -December 20 he sent orders[55] to Winchester to descend the Maumee -River from Defiance to the rapids, there to prepare sleds for an -expedition against Malden, to be made by a choice detachment when -the whole army should concentrate at the rapids. Early in January, -the ground being at last frozen, provisions in large quantities -were hurried to the Maumee River. Artillery was sent forward. The -Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades moved to the Sandusky River, making -an effective force of fifteen hundred men at that point. The whole -effective force on the frontier amounted to six thousand three hundred -infantry.[56] Harrison intended to move his headquarters forward from -the Sandusky, and to reach the Maumee Rapids January 20, to which point -he supposed General Winchester already in motion from Defiance.[57] - -This was the situation January 12; and although Harrison hinted in -his reports of January 4 and 8 that his winter campaign would probably -fail,[58] he showed the intention of advancing at least as far as the -strait opposite Malden, about thirty-five miles beyond the Maumee. This -he might venture without much danger; and if he reached that point, -supposing the straits to be frozen, the enemy to show little sign of -resistance, and the weather to favor, he might attack Malden. Hull had -been expected to take Malden with twelve or fourteen hundred men, with -an open river behind him, a British fleet on his flank, fifty miles -of road to cover, and supplies for only a few days at Detroit; but -Harrison with six thousand men, the river frozen and the British fleet -frozen in it, a secure base, with a million rations close in his rear, -and no Isaac Brock in his front, still spoke with extreme doubt of his -prospects, and said that “most of the well-informed men who knew the -character of the country”[59] expected a suspension of operations for -the winter. - -Aware that from a military point of view no land-campaign could, except -by accident, effect any result proportionate to its cost, Harrison had -placed himself at the head of a popular movement so strong that he -would have met the fate of Hull and Alexander Smyth, had he not made at -least a demonstration against an enemy whose face he had not yet seen. -Forced by his own pledges and the public discontent to enter on an -unmilitary campaign, he was anxious to risk as little as possible where -he could hardly expect to gain anything; and he would probably have -contented himself with his first scheme of a _coup-de-main_ against -Malden or Detroit, without attempting to hold either place, had not his -subordinate, General Winchester, rescued him from an awkward position -by a blunder that relieved Harrison of further responsibility. - -Brigadier-General Winchester was a planter of Tennessee, sixty-one -years old, and formerly an officer in the Revolutionary War. Though -outranking Harrison, he had allowed himself to be set aside by what he -thought intrigue,[60] and consented to conduct the left wing of the -force under Harrison’s command. Winchester was not a favorite with -his Kentucky militia-men, who had no choice in electing him to their -command. Their term of service was to expire in February; they had -been imprisoned since September in a wilderness at Defiance,--hungry, -cold, sick, and mutinous, able to find no enemy willing to fight them, -and disgusted with idleness. No sooner was the ground frozen and the -general movement of concentration possible, than Winchester’s command -by common consent, under Harrison’s orders, broke up their camp near -Defiance and marched to the rapids, where Hull’s road crossed the -Maumee. There they arrived January 10, as Harrison expected. They -fortified themselves on the north bank, and waited for the arrival of -Harrison, who intended to join them January 20. - -Winchester’s force included three regiments of Kentucky militia, -numbering nine hundred effectives,[61] and the Seventeenth United -States Infantry, numbering three hundred men, also Kentuckians. -Altogether he had under his command at the rapids about thirteen -hundred men,[62]--a force barely sufficient to hold the exposed -position it had taken on the north bank of the river. The three -Kentucky militia regiments were soon to go home. The other columns were -not yet within supporting distance. If Colonel Proctor, who commanded -at Malden, were capable of imitating Brock’s enterprise, he would -hardly throw away an opportunity, which might never recur, to strike a -blow at the Kentuckians, and by defeating them to drive Harrison’s army -behind the Sandusky River. Every military motive warned Winchester not -to divide, detach, or expose his troops without caution. He was himself -a detachment, and he had no support nearer than the Sandusky. - -While the troops were busily engaged in building a store-house and -throwing up log-works in an injudicious and untenable position,[63] -two Frenchmen came into camp, begging protection for the inhabitants -of Frenchtown on the river Raisin, thirty miles in front, and within -the British lines. Thirty-three families, or about one hundred and -fifty persons, were resident at Frenchtown, and the place was held by -a few Canadian militia, supposed to consist of two companies, with -about as many Indians,--in all, some three hundred men.[64] This -force might easily be destroyed, and the loss to the British would be -serious. Winchester’s troops became eager to dash at them. A council -of war decided, January 16, without a voice in remonstrance, that the -movement should be made. The most ardent supporter of the adventure -was Col. John Allen of the Kentucky Rifle regiment; but no one offered -opposition, and Winchester agreed to the council’s opinion.[65] - -The next morning, Jan. 17, 1813, Col. William Lewis, of the Fifth -Kentucky militia, started for the river Raisin, with four hundred and -fifty men.[66] A few hours afterward he was followed by Colonel Allen -with one hundred and ten men. No reports told what regiments were -taken, or where they were at any moment stationed; but Lewis and Allen -probably led twelve companies, drawn from four Kentucky regiments,--the -Seventeenth United States Infantry, recruited in Kentucky, commanded -by Col. Samuel Wells; the Kentucky Rifles, Col. John Allen; the First -Kentucky Infantry; and Colonel Lewis’s regiment, the Fifth Kentucky -Infantry,--in all, six hundred and sixty men, representing the flower -of Kentucky. - -They marched on the ice, along the shore of Maumee Bay and Lake -Erie, until nightfall, when they camped, and at two o’clock the next -afternoon, January 18, reached without meeting resistance the houses -on the south bank of the river Raisin. The north bank was occupied, -according to British authority,[67] by fifty Canadian militia and two -hundred Indians. The British force opened fire with a three-pound -howitzer. The action began at three o’clock and lasted till dark, when -the enemy after an obstinate resistance was driven about two miles -into the woods with inconsiderable loss.[68] The action was sharp, and -cost the Americans not less than twelve killed and fifty-five wounded, -reducing their effective number to six hundred. - -Colonel Lewis had orders to take possession of Frenchtown, and hold -it. He reported his success to General Winchester at the rapids, and -remained at Frenchtown waiting further orders. Winchester became -then aware that the situation was hazardous. Six hundred men were -with him in a half-fortified camp on the north bank of the Maumee; -six hundred more were thirty miles in advance, at the Raisin River; -while fully two thousand--or, according to Harrison’s estimate, four -thousand[69]--enemies held two fortresses only eighteen miles beyond -the Raisin. The Kentuckians at the Maumee, equally aware of their -comrades’ peril, insisted on going to their aid. Winchester promptly -started on the evening of January 19, and arrived at Frenchtown the -next morning. Colonel Wells’s Seventeenth United States Infantry, -two hundred and fifty men, followed, arriving at Frenchtown in the -evening.[70] - -Winchester, before leaving the Maumee Rapids, sent a despatch to -Harrison with a report of the battle of the 18th, which met Harrison -on the road hurrying to the Maumee Rapids. The next morning, January -20, Harrison arrived at the camp on the Maumee, and found there about -three hundred Kentucky troops,[71] the remainder being all with -Winchester at the river Raisin. Probably Harrison, whose own caution -was great, felt the peril of Winchester’s situation,[72] but he sent -his inspector-general, Captain Hart, forward with orders to Winchester -“to hold the ground we had got at any rate,”[73] while he wrote to the -Secretary of War:-- - - “Upon my way to this place [Maumee Rapids] last evening, I received - the letter from the General [Winchester] of which the enclosed is - a copy, informing me of the complete success of the enterprise in - the defeat of the enemy and taking the stores they had collected. - The detachment under Colonel Lewis remain at the river Raisin, - and General Winchester very properly marched yesterday with two - hundred and fifty men to reinforce him and take the command.... - It is absolutely necessary to maintain the position at the river - Raisin, and I am assembling the troops as fast as possible for the - purpose.”[74] - -Harrison added that his only fear was lest Winchester should be -overpowered. He waited at the Maumee Rapids two days, until at noon, -January 22, a messenger arrived with disastrous tidings from the front. - -Winchester afterward told the story of his own proceedings with so much -candor that his narrative became a necessary part of any explanation of -his disaster:-- - - “Suspecting that Proctor would make an attempt to avenge this - stroke, and knowing that our wounded men could not be removed, I - hastened to reinforce Colonel Lewis with Wells’s regiment, two - hundred and fifty men; and set out myself to join him, and arrived - on the morning of the 20th. The town, lying on the north side - of the river, was picketed on three sides, the longest facing - the north, and making the front. Within these pickets Colonel - Lewis’s corps was found. Not thinking the position eligible, nor - the pickets a sufficient defence against artillery, I would have - retreated but for the wounded, of whom there were fifty-five; - but having no sufficient means for transporting these, and being - equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly, I - issued an order for putting the place in the best condition for - defence that might be practicable, intending to construct some new - works as soon as the means for getting out timber might be had. On - the evening of the 20th Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp - on the right, in an open field, immediately without the picketing. - On the 21st a patrol as far as Brownstown [opposite Malden] was - sent out, and returned without seeing anything of an enemy. On the - same day a man from Malden came in who reported that the enemy were - preparing to attack us; but knowing nothing of the kind or extent - of the preparation made or making, what he brought was thought to - be only conjecture and such as led to a belief that it would be - some days before Proctor would be ready to do anything.... Neither - night-patrol nor night-pickets were ordered by me, from a belief - that both were matters of routine and in constant use.... Not to - discommode the wounded men, ... I took quarters for myself and - suite in a house on the southern bank, directly fronting the troops - and only separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and - but between eighty and a hundred yards wide.” - -The only educated officer under Harrison’s command was Major E. D. -Wood of the Engineers, one of the early graduates of West Point, and -an officer of high promise. He was not with Winchester’s division, but -with the right wing on the Sandusky, and arrived at the Maumee Rapids -some ten days afterward, where he built Fort Meigs, in February. During -the campaign he kept a diary, and his criticisms of Winchester, Lewis, -Allen, and their command were quoted with approval by the Kentucky -historian,[75] as well as by Harrison’s biographer:[76]-- - - “The troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such - quarters on the west side of the river as might please him best, - whilst the general ... took his quarters on the east side,--not the - least regard being paid to defence, order, regularity, or system, - in the posting of the different corps.... With only one third - or one fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute - of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen or heard - the least of an enemy; and with but a very inadequate supply of - ammunition,--how he ever could have entertained the most distant - hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is - to me one of the strangest things in the world.... Winchester was - destitute of every means of supporting his corps long at the river - Raisin; was in the very jaws of the enemy, and beyond the reach of - succor. He who fights with such flimsy pretensions to victory will - always be beaten, and eternally ought to be.” - -Defeat under such conditions was disgraceful enough; but defeat by -Colonel Proctor was one of the worst misfortunes that happened to -an American general. The Prince Regent took occasion, at the close -of the war, to express his official opinion of this officer, then -Major-General Proctor, in language of unusual severity.[77] Yet -Proctor’s first movements at the Raisin River showed no apparent sign -of his being “so extremely wanting in professional knowledge, and -deficient in those active, energetic qualities which must be required -of every officer,” as his later career, in the Prince Regent’s opinion, -proved him to be. He had opposed Brock’s bold movement on Detroit; -but he did not hesitate to make a somewhat similar movement himself. -January 21 he marched with artillery across the river on the ice, to -Brownstown opposite Malden, in full view of any American patrol in the -neighborhood. His force consisted of six hundred whites, all told,[78] -besides either four hundred and fifty, six hundred or eight hundred -Indians, under the chief Round Head, Tecumthe being absent collecting -reinforcements on the Wabash.[79] This large body of more than a -thousand men, without an attempt at concealment, crossed to Brownstown -and marched twelve miles, January 21, camping at night within five -miles of Frenchtown.[80] If the British historian James was correct, -they numbered eleven hundred and eighty men, of whom five hundred and -thirty were white, and the rest Indians;[81] but the official return -reported the whites, including every person present, at five hundred -and ninety-seven men. Two hours before dawn, January 22, they again -advanced, and before daybreak approached within musket-shot of the -picket-fence, and half-formed their line, before an alarm was given. - -Had Proctor dashed at once on the defenceless Seventeenth regiment and -the fence that covered the militia, he would probably have captured the -whole without loss; but he preferred to depend on his three-pound guns, -which gave the Kentuckians opportunity to use their rifles. In such -fighting the Americans had much the advantage, especially as British -regulars were opposite them. Within an hour the Forty-first regiment -lost fifteen killed and ninety-eight wounded, and of the entire body -of six hundred British troops not less than twenty-four were killed -and one hundred and sixty-one wounded.[82] Their three-pound guns were -abandoned, so murderous were the Kentucky rifles.[83] Had all the -American troops been under cover, the battle would have been theirs; -but Wells’s Seventeenth regiment was a hundred yards away, on open -ground outside the picket-fence on the right, where it was flanked by -the Canadian militia and Indians and driven back toward the river, -until Allen’s Rifle regiment went out to help it. Gradually forced -toward the rear, across the river, this part of the line was at last -struck with a panic and fled, carrying with it Winchester himself, -Colonel Allen, and Colonel Lewis; while six hundred Indians were in hot -pursuit, or already in advance of them. - -In the deep snow escape was impossible. Nearly a hundred Kentuckians -fell almost side by side, and were scalped. Among these was Colonel -Allen. General Winchester and Colonel Lewis were so fortunate as to -fall into the hands of the chief Round Head, who first stripped them -and then took them to Proctor, who had for the time withdrawn his -forces and ceased firing. By Proctor’s advice, General Winchester sent -an order to the men within the picket-fence to surrender. - -By eight o’clock all resistance had ceased except from three hundred -and eighty-four Kentuckians who remained within the picket-fence, -under the command of Major Madison of the Rifle regiment. Surrounded -by a thousand enemies, they had no chance of escape. Their ammunition -was nearly exhausted; retreat was impossible; they could choose only -between surrender and massacre, and they surrendered.[84] The British -officers looked at them with curiosity, as they came within the British -line. - - “Their appearance,” said Major Richardson,[85] “was miserable - to the last degree. They had the air of men to whom cleanliness - was a virtue unknown, and their squalid bodies were covered by - habiliments that had evidently undergone every change of season, - and were arrived at the last stage of repair.... It was the depth - of winter; but scarcely an individual was in possession of a - great coat or cloak, and few of them wore garments of wool of any - description. They still retained their summer dress, consisting of - cotton stuff of various colors shaped into frocks, and descending - to the knee. Their trowsers were of the same material. They were - covered with slouched hats, worn bare by constant use, beneath - which their long hair fell matted and uncombed over their cheeks; - and these, together with the dirty blankets wrapped round their - loins to protect them against the inclemency of the season, and - fastened by broad leathern belts, into which were thrust axes - and knives of an enormous length, gave them an air of wildness - and savageness which in Italy would have caused them to pass for - brigands of the Apennines. The only distinction between the garb of - the officer and that of the soldier was that the one, in addition - to his sword, carried a short rifle instead of a long one, while - a dagger, often curiously worked and of some value, supplied the - place of the knife.” - -This description gave a lifelike idea of what Harrison justly thought -the best material in the world for soldiery, had it been properly -handled. Men who for four months had suffered every hardship, and -were still unclothed, unfed, uncared for, and sacrificed to military -incompetence, but hardened to cold, fatigue, and danger, had no reason -to be ashamed of their misfortunes or of their squalor. Fortunately -about five hundred were saved as prisoners, and thirty or forty -escaped to the rapids; the rest, four hundred in number, were killed in -battle, or massacred afterward. - -Had Proctor acted with energy, he might have advanced to the rapids, -and there have captured Harrison with his remaining force of nine -hundred men, his artillery train and stores. Even with the utmost -celerity Harrison could hardly have escaped, if an active pursuit -had been made by Indians through the swamp which he had with extreme -difficulty crossed two days before,[86] and in the heavy rain which -followed the battle;[87] but Proctor had no wish for fighting. So far -from thinking of attack, he thought only of escaping it, and hurried -back to Malden at noon the same day, leaving the wounded prisoners -behind without a guard. Nothing excused such conduct, for Proctor -knew the fate to which he was exposing his prisoners. That night -the Indians, drunk with whiskey and mad with their grievances and -losses, returned to Frenchtown and massacred the wounded. About thirty -perished, some apparently burned. Fortunately for the United States the -glamour of Proctor’s victory hid his true character, and he was made a -major-general,--the most favorable event of the war for the American -armies he was to meet, and one which cost Great Britain even more in -pride than in power. - - - - -CHAPTER V. - - -If Proctor was afraid of Harrison, with more military reason Harrison -was afraid of Proctor; and while the British colonel, deserting his -wounded prisoners, hurried from the field of battle, and felt himself -in danger until the next day he was again entrenched at Malden, at -the same moment Harrison, burning the post at the Maumee Rapids and -destroying such stores as were collected there, hastened back to the -Portage or Carrying River some fifteen miles in the rear. Within -thirty-six hours after the battle, the two enemies were sixty miles -apart. At the Portage River Harrison remained a week, until he had -collected a force of two thousand men. With these he returned to the -rapids February 1, and began to construct a regularly fortified camp on -the south bank of the river. Fort Meigs, as it was called, did credit -to the skill of Major Wood, the engineer officer who constructed it; -but such a fortress seemed rather intended for defence than for the -conquest of Canada. - -In fact, Harrison had succeeded only in making the most considerable -failure that had thus far marked the progress of the war; but while -the public was still assuming treason and cowardice in William Hull, -who had been sent with fifteen hundred men to hold Detroit and conquer -Canada, and had been left unsupported to face destruction,--the same -public admitted the excuses of Harrison, who with ten thousand men, -unlimited means, and active support at Niagara, after four months of -effort, failed even to pass the Maumee River except with a detachment -so badly managed that only thirty-three men in a thousand escaped. This -was the crowning misfortune which wrung from Gallatin the complaint -that a “real incapacity” for war existed in the government itself, -and must inevitably exhaust its resources without good result; but -although it drove Gallatin to Europe, it left Harrison on the Maumee. -Harrison would not take on himself the disgrace of admitting his -inability to recapture Detroit, and the President would not, without -his express admission, order him to desist. As Armstrong afterward -explained:[88] “The Cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military -diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring any responsibility it could -avoid, determined, with perhaps less of patriotism than of prudence, -to leave the question of continuing the winter campaign exclusively -with the General.” The General, not inclined to sink into obscurity -or to admit failure, set himself to a third campaign as hopeless as -either of its predecessors. Ordering all the troops in his rear to -join him, making a body of four thousand men, he fixed February 11 as -the day for his advance on Malden, not expecting to reduce that place, -but merely to raid it.[89] When the day arrived, the roads had again -become impassable, the ice was no longer safe; and Harrison, “with much -reluctance and mortification,”[90] was reduced to write from the Maumee -Rapids to the Secretary of War that the campaign must cease. - -Thus the Western movement, likened by Henry Clay to a tenth-century -crusade, ended in failure. The Government would have been in a better -position had it never sent a man to the Maumee, but merely built a few -sloops at Cleveland. The entire result of six months’ immense effort -was confined to raids into the Indian country; and even these were -costly beyond proportion to their results. When the militia of Kentucky -and Ohio, which had been mustered in August for six months’ service, -returned to their homes in February, 1813, not only had they failed to -reoccupy a foot of the ground abandoned by Hull, but they left Harrison -almost alone at Fort Meigs, trembling lest the enemy should descend -on his rear and destroy his supplies, or force him back to protect -them.[91] He had accumulated artillery, ammunition, and stores at the -Maumee Rapids, in a fortress which itself required a garrison of two -thousand men and from which he could neither fall back, as he thought -the wiser course,[92] nor remain with safety exposed to an active -enemy. He called for more militia from Kentucky and Ohio, but the -people no longer felt enthusiasm for war. - - “I am sorry to mention,” reported Harrison, March 17,[93] “the - dismay and disinclination to the service which appear to prevail in - the Western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought - to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never - existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater - part of the militia who were with me through the winter. The new - drafts from this State [Ohio] are entirely of another character, - and are not to be depended on.” - -In short, Harrison, who had in 1812 commanded ten thousand militia, -seemed to think double the number necessary for 1813, besides regular -troops and a fleet. - -President Madison and two successive Secretaries of War had allowed -themselves, for fear of displeasing Kentucky, to give Harrison _carte -blanche_,[94] which Harrison had used without other limit than that -of the entire resources of the West. The time at last came when -such management must be stopped, and Secretary Armstrong, naturally -impatient under the load of Eustis’s and Monroe’s failures, quickly -decided to stop it. Harrison’s letter of February 11, announcing his -failure, reached the Department March 1. March 5 the secretary wrote -to Harrison ordering him to maintain a threatening attitude, but -altering the mode of warfare. Henceforward the army was to be made -subordinate,--the navy was to take the lead; and until the middle of -May, when the fleet on Lake Erie should be constructed, Harrison was to -maintain a strict defensive, and to protect the line of the Maumee with -six regular regiments, only three of which had been yet partly raised. - -Meanwhile, Harrison had but a few hundred regulars and some -Pennsylvania and Virginia militia,--perhaps five hundred men in -all,--to hold Fort Meigs, and mere squads of militia to guard eight -other posts which had cost the government some millions of dollars. -These five hundred troops, whose service was mostly near its end, -he left at Fort Meigs, and in the middle of March he set out for -Chillicothe and Cincinnati. Greatly annoyed at the summary manner in -which Armstrong had put an end to his campaigning, he protested only -against the inadequacy of his force for the defence required of it, -and insisted on a temporary reinforcement of militia to garrison the -fortress that had cost him so much effort to construct at the Maumee -Rapids. - -Then the value of General Proctor to his enemy became immense. Between -January 22, when he attacked Winchester, and the end of April, when -he moved on Fort Meigs, Proctor molested in no way the weak and -isolated American garrisons. With hundreds of scouts and backwoodsmen -at his command, he had not the energy or the knowledge to profit by -his opponents’ exposed and defenceless condition. He allowed Major -Wood to make Fort Meigs capable of standing a siege; he let Harrison, -unmolested, pass a month away from his command; he looked on while the -Virginia militia marched home, leaving only a handful of sickly men, -under a major of artillery, to defend the unfinished fort; he made no -attempt to waylay Harrison, who returned with reinforcements by way of -the Auglaize River; and not until Harrison had enjoyed all the time -necessary to prepare for attack, did Proctor disturb him. - -Harrison, expecting an assault, hurried back from Cincinnati to Fort -Meigs with some three hundred men, leaving a brigade of Kentucky -militia to follow him. April 12 he reached the fort, but not till -April 28 did Proctor appear at the mouth of the Maumee, with about -five hundred regulars and nearly as many militia,--nine hundred and -eighty-three whites, all told, and twelve hundred Indians under -Tecumthe and other chiefs.[95] Besides this large force, he brought -two twenty-four pound guns with other artillery from Detroit, and -two gunboats supported the land-battery. While the guns were placed -in position on the north bank of the river, the Indians crossed and -surrounded the fort on the south. May 1 the batteries opened, and -during four days kept up a heavy fire. Proctor, like Harrison, moved in -the wilderness as though he were conducting a campaign on the Rhine; -he liked regular modes of warfare, and with a force almost wholly -irregular, after allowing Fort Meigs to be built, he besieged it as -though he could take it by battering its earthen ramparts. Untaught -by his losses at the river Raisin, he gave once more advantage to -the Kentucky rifle; and with every opportunity of destroying the -reinforcement which he knew to be near, he allowed himself to be -surprised by it. - -The Kentucky brigade of twelve hundred men, under Brigadier-General -Green Clay, had descended the Auglaize River in boats, and arrived -at Defiance May 3, where they learned that Fort Meigs was invested. -So neglectful of his advantages was Proctor that he not only failed -to prevent General Clay from advancing, but failed to prevent -communication between the besieged fort and the relief-column, so that -Harrison was able to arrange a general attack on the investing lines, -and came near driving the British force back to Malden with the loss -of all its artillery and baggage. At about nine o’clock on the morning -of May 5, Clay’s brigade descended the rapids, and eight hundred -and sixty-six men under Colonel William Dudley,[96] landing on the -north side of the river, surprised and took possession of the British -batteries, which were entirely unsupported. Had Clay’s whole force -been on the ground, and had it been vigorously pushed forward, the -small British division which held the north bank must have abandoned -all its positions; but Dudley’s men were under no discipline, and -though ready to advance were in no hurry to retreat, even when ordered. -Three companies of the British Forty-first, and some of the Canadian -militia soon gathered together; and although these could hardly have -been half the number of Dudley’s force,[97] yet with Tecumthe and a -body of Indians they attacked the batteries, drove the Kentuckians out, -dispersed them, and either captured or massacred the whole body, under -the eyes of Harrison and Fort Meigs. - -This affair, though little less fatal to the Americans than that of the -river Raisin, was much less dearly bought by the British. Five hundred -prisoners fell into Proctor’s hands; two or three hundred more of the -Kentucky brigade, including “the weak and obstinate but brave”[98] -Dudley himself, must have been either killed in battle or massacred -after surrender;[99] only one hundred and seventy escaped; the boats -with the baggage were captured; while the whole British loss on the -north side of the river hardly exceeded fifty killed and wounded. A -bitter feeling against Proctor was caused by the massacre of some -forty American prisoners while under a British guard, and also, as was -alleged, under the eyes of General Proctor, who did not interpose, -although a soldier of the Forty-first was murdered in trying to -protect them. Probably all the prisoners would have been massacred had -Tecumthe not ridden up at full speed, tomahawk in hand, and threatened -to kill the first Indian who defied his authority.[100] - -On the south side Harrison had better fortune, and Colonel John Miller -of the Nineteenth U. S. Infantry by a sortie gallantly captured a -battery, with some forty prisoners; but neither on the north nor on the -south did the fighting of May 5 decide any immediate military result. -Besides losing on the north bank half the reinforcement brought by -General Green Clay, Harrison had lost in the siege and in the sorties -on the south bank nearly three hundred men in killed and wounded.[101] -If the numbers loosely reported in the American accounts were correct, -the siege cost Harrison one thousand men, or fully half his entire -force, including his reinforcements. After the fighting of May 5, he -withdrew once more into the fort; the British batteries reopened fire, -and the siege went on. No further attempt was made to trouble the enemy -in open field. Harrison felt himself too weak for further ventures; yet -never had his chance of a great success been so fair. - -Proctor’s siege of Fort Meigs was already a failure. Not only had the -fort proved stronger than he expected, but the weather was bad; his -troops were without shelter; dysentery and loss in battle rapidly -weakened them; half his militia went home, and, what was fatal to -further action, his Indians could not be held together. Within three -days after the battle of May 5, the twelve hundred Indians collected -by Tecumthe’s influence and exertions in the northwest territory -dispersed, leaving only Tecumthe himself and a score of other warriors -in the British camp.[102] Proctor had no choice but to retire as -rapidly as possible, and May 9 embarked his artillery and left his -encampment without interference from Harrison, who looked on as a -spectator while the movement was effected. - -From that time until the middle of July Proctor remained quiet. -Harrison moved his headquarters to Upper Sandusky and to Cleveland, and -began to prepare for advance under cover of a naval force; but he was -not allowed to rest, even though Proctor might have preferred repose. -Proctor’s position was difficult. Told by Sir George Prevost[103] -that he must capture what supplies he needed from the Americans, and -must seek them at Erie and Cleveland, since Lower Canada could spare -neither food nor transport, he was compelled to look for support to the -American magazines. He was issuing ten thousand rations a day to the -Indian families at Malden, and his resources were near an end.[104] -Leaving Malden with either three hundred and ninety-one regulars, -or about five hundred regulars and militia, and by one British -account nearly a thousand Indians, by another between three and four -thousand,[105] Proctor returned by water to the Maumee Rapids July -20, and tried to draw the garrison of Fort Meigs into an ambush. The -attempt failed. General Green Clay, who was in command, had learned -caution, and imposed it on his troops. Proctor then found that his -Indians were leaving him and returning to Detroit and Amherstburg. To -occupy them, Proctor took again to his boats and coasted the Lake shore -as far as the Sandusky River, while the Indians who chose to accompany -him made their way by land. August 1 the expedition effected a landing -at the mouth of the Sandusky, and scattered panic into the heart of -Ohio. - -In truth, nothing could be more alarming than this movement, which -threatened Harrison in all directions,--from Fort Meigs, on the Maumee, -to Erie, or Presqu’isle, where Perry’s fleet was building. On Sandusky -River Harrison had collected his chief magazines. All the supplies -for his army were lying at Upper Sandusky, some thirty miles above -the British landing-place, and he had only eight hundred raw recruits -to defend their unfortified position.[106] Nothing but an untenable -stockade, called Fort Stephenson, on the Sandusky River, where the -town of Fremont afterward grew, offered an obstacle to the enemy in -ascending; and Tecumthe with two thousand Indians was said to be -moving from Fort Meigs by the direct road straight for the magazines, -thus flanking Fort Stephenson and every intermediate position on the -Sandusky. - -In just panic for the safety of his magazines, the only result of a -year’s campaigning, Harrison’s first thought was to evacuate Fort -Stephenson in order to protect Upper Sandusky. The flank-attack from -two thousand Indians, who never showed themselves, impelled him to -retire before Proctor, and to leave the river open. July 29, after a -council of war, he sent down a hasty order to young Major Croghan who -commanded Fort Stephenson, directing him immediately to burn the fort -and retreat up the river or along the Lake shore, as he best could, -with the utmost haste.[107] Croghan, a Kentuckian, and an officer of -the Seventeenth U. S. regiment, refused to obey. “We have determined -to maintain this place, and by Heaven, we will,” he wrote back.[108] -Harrison sent Colonel Wells, of the same regiment, to relieve him; but -Croghan went to headquarters, and by somewhat lame excuses carried his -point, and resumed his command the next day. Harrison gave him only -conditional orders to abandon the fort,--orders which Croghan clearly -could not regard, and which Harrison seemed to feel no confidence in -his wishing to follow.[109] In the face of British troops with cannon -he was to retreat; but “you must be aware that the attempt to retreat -in the face of an Indian force would be vain.” Proctor’s main force was -believed to be Indian. - -Neither evacuating nor defending Fort Stephenson, Harrison remained -at Seneca, ten miles behind it, watching for Tecumthe and the -flank attack, and arranging a plan of battle for his eight hundred -men by which he could repel the Indians with dragoons in the open -prairie.[110] Croghan remained at Fort Stephenson with one hundred and -sixty men, making every preparation to meet an attack. August 1 the -woods were already filled with Indians, and retreat was impossible, -when the British boats appeared on the river, and Proctor sent to -demand surrender of the fort. Immediately on Croghan’s refusal, the -British howitzers opened fire and continued until it became clear that -they were too light to destroy the stockade. - -If experience had been of service to Proctor, he should have learned to -avoid direct attack on Americans in fortified places; but his position -was difficult, and he was as much afraid of Harrison as Harrison was -afraid of him. Fearing to leave Croghan’s little fort in the rear, -and to seek Harrison himself, ten miles above, on the road to Upper -Sandusky; fearing delay, which would discontent his Indian allies; -fearing to go on to Cleveland or Erie without crippling Harrison; still -more afraid to retire to Malden without striking a blow,--Proctor again -sacrificed the Forty-first regiment which had suffered at the river -Raisin and had been surprised at Fort Meigs. On the afternoon of August -2 the Forty-first regiment and the militia, in three columns of about -one hundred and twenty men each,[111] with the utmost gallantry marched -to the pickets of Fort Stephenson, and were shot down. After two hours’ -effort, and losing all its officers, the assaulting column retired, -leaving twenty-six dead, forty-one wounded, and about thirty missing, -or more than one fifth of their force. The same night the troops -re-embarked and returned to Malden. - -Proctor’s report[112] of this affair was filled with complaints of -the Indians, who could not be left idle and who would not fight. At -Sandusky, he said, “we could not muster more hundreds of Indians than I -might reasonably have expected thousands.” - - “I could not, therefore, with my very small force remain more than - two days, from the probability of being cut off, and of being - deserted by the few Indians who had not already done so.... On the - morning of the 2d inst. the gentlemen of the Indian department who - have the direction of it, declared formally their decided opinion - that unless the fort was stormed we should never be able to bring - an Indian warrior into the field with us, and that they proposed - and were ready to storm one face of the fort if we would attempt - another. I have also to observe that in this instance my judgment - had not that weight with the troops I hope I might reasonably - have expected.... The troops, after the artillery had been used - for some hours, attacked two faces, and impossibilities being - attempted, failed. The fort, from which the severest fire I ever - saw was maintained during the attack, was well defended. The troops - displayed the greatest bravery, the much greater part of whom - reached the fort and made every effort to enter; but the Indians - who had proposed the assault, and, had it not been assented to, - would have ever stigmatized the British character, scarcely came - into fire before they ran out of its reach. A more than adequate - sacrifice having been made to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave - assailants.” - -Sir George Prevost seemed to doubt whether Proctor’s excuse for the -defeat lessened or increased the blame attached to it.[113] The defeat -at Sandusky ruined Proctor in the esteem of his men. On the American -side, Harrison’s conduct roused a storm of indignation. Through the -whole day, August 2, he remained at Seneca with eight hundred men, -listening to the cannonade at Fort Stephenson till late at night, -when he received an express from Croghan to say that the enemy were -embarking. The story ran, that as the distant sound of Croghan’s guns -reached the camp at Seneca, Harrison exclaimed: “The blood be on his -own head; I wash my hands of it.[114]” Whatever else might be true, -his conduct betrayed an extravagant estimate of his enemy’s strength. -The only British eye-witness who left an account of the expedition -reckoned Proctor’s force, on its departure from Malden, at about four -hundred troops, and “nearly a thousand Indians.”[115] The Indians -dispersed until those with Proctor at Fort Stephenson probably numbered -two or three hundred,[116] the rest having returned to Detroit and -Malden. Harrison reported the British force as five thousand strong, on -the authority of General Green Clay.[117] - -Whether the British force was large or small, Harrison’s arrangements -to meet it did not please Secretary Armstrong. “It is worthy of -notice,” he wrote long afterward,[118] “that of these two commanders, -always the terror of each other, one [Proctor] was now actually flying -from his supposed pursuer; while the other [Harrison] waited only the -arrival of Croghan at Seneca to begin a camp-conflagration and flight -to Upper Sandusky.” - -The well-won honors of the campaign fell to Major George Croghan, -with whose name the whole country resounded. Whatever were the faults -of the two generals, Major Croghan showed courage and intelligence, -not only before and during the attack, but afterward in supporting -Harrison against the outcry which for a time threatened to destroy the -General’s authority. Immediately after the siege of Fort Stephenson -every energy of the northwest turned toward a new offensive movement by -water against Malden, and in the task of organizing the force required -for that purpose, complaints of past failures were stifled. Secretary -Armstrong did not forget them, but the moment was not suited for -making a change in so important a command. Harrison organized, under -Armstrong’s orders, a force of seven thousand men to cross the Lake in -boats, under cover of a fleet. - -The fleet, not the army, was to bear the brunt of reconquering the -northwest; and in nothing did Armstrong show his ability so clearly -as in the promptness with which, immediately after taking office, he -stopped Harrison’s campaign on the Maumee, while Perry was set to work -at Erie. Feb. 5, 1813, Armstrong entered on his duties. March 5 his -arrangements for the new movements were already made. Harrison did not -approve them,[119] but he obeyed. The Navy Department had already begun -operations on Lake Erie, immediately after Hull’s surrender; but though -something was accomplished in the winter, great difficulties had still -to be overcome when February 17 Commander Perry, an energetic young -officer on gunboat service at Newport, received orders from Secretary -Jones to report to Commodore Chauncey on Lake Ontario. Chauncey ordered -him to Presqu’isle, afterward called Erie, to take charge of the -vessels under construction on Lake Erie. March 27 he reached the spot, -a small village in a remote wilderness, where timber and water alone -existed for the supply of the fleets. - -When Perry reached Presqu’isle the contractors and carpenters had -on the stocks two brigs, a schooner, and three gunboats. These were -to be launched in May, and to be ready for service in June. Besides -these vessels building at Erie, a number of other craft, including -the prize brig “Caledonia,” were at the Black Rock navy-yard in the -Niagara River, unable to move on account of the British fort opposite -Buffalo and the British fleet on the Lake. Perry’s task was to unite -the two squadrons, to man them, and to fight the British fleet, without -allowing his enemy to interfere at any stage of these difficult -operations. - -The British squadron under Commander Finnis, an experienced officer, -had entire control of the Lake and its shores. No regular garrison -protected the harbor of Presqu’isle; not two hundred men could be -armed to defend it, nor was any military support to be had nearer than -Buffalo, eighty miles away. Proctor or Prevost were likely to risk -everything in trying to destroy the shipyard at Erie; for upon that -point, far more than on Detroit, Fort Meigs, Sandusky, or Buffalo, -their existence depended. If Perry were allowed to control the Lake, -the British must not only evacuate Detroit, but also Malden, must -abandon Tecumthe and the military advantages of three or four thousand -Indian auxiliaries, and must fall back on a difficult defensive at the -Niagara River. That they would make every effort to thwart Perry seemed -certain. - -Superstition survived in nothing more obstinately than in faith in -luck; neither sailors nor soldiers ever doubted the value of this -inscrutable quality in the conduct of war. The “Chesapeake” was an -unlucky ship to the luckiest commanders, even to the British captain -who captured it. The bad luck of the “Chesapeake” was hardly steadier -than the good luck of Oliver Perry. Whatever he touched seemed to -take the direction he wanted. He began with the advantage of having -Proctor for his chief enemy; but Harrison, also a lucky man, had the -same advantage and yet suffered constant disasters. Commander Finnis -was a good seaman, yet Finnis failed repeatedly, and always by a -narrow chance, to injure Perry. Dearborn’s incompetence in 1813 was -not less than it had been in 1812; but the single success which in two -campaigns Dearborn gained on the Niagara obliged the British, May 27, -to evacuate Fort Erie opposite Buffalo, and to release Perry’s vessels -at Black Rock. June 6, at leisure, Perry superintended the removal of -the five small craft from the navy-yard at Black Rock; several hundred -soldiers, seamen, and oxen warped them up stream into the Lake. Loaded -with stores, the little squadron sailed from Buffalo June 13; the wind -was ahead; they were five days making eighty miles; but June 19 they -arrived at Presqu’isle, and as the last vessel crossed the bar, Finnis -and his squadron came in sight. Finnis alone could explain how he, a -first-rate seaman, with a strong force and a fair wind, in such narrow -seas, could have helped finding Perry’s squadron when he knew where it -must be. - -From June 19 to August 1 Perry’s combined fleet lay within the bar at -Presqu’isle, while Proctor, with a sufficient fleet and a military -force superior to anything on the Lake, was planning expeditions from -Malden against every place except the one to which military necessity -and the orders of his Government bade him go. August 4, Perry took -out the armaments of his two brigs and floated both over the bar into -deep water. Had the British fleet been at hand, such a movement would -have been impossible or fatal; but the British fleet appeared just as -Perry’s vessels got into deep water, and when for the first time an -attack could not be made with a fair hope of success. - -These extraordinary advantages were not gained without labor, energy, -courage, and wearing anxieties and disappointments. Of these Perry had -his full share, but no more; and his opponents were no better off than -himself. By great exertions alone could the British maintain themselves -on Lake Ontario, and to this necessity they were forced to sacrifice -Lake Erie. Sir George Prevost could spare only a new commander with -a few officers and some forty men from the lower Lake to meet the -large American reinforcements on the upper. When the commander, R. H. -Barclay, arrived at Malden in June, he found as many difficulties there -as Perry found at Presqu’isle. Barclay was a captain in the British -Royal Navy, thirty-two years old; he had lost an arm in the service, -but he was fairly matched as Perry’s antagonist, and showed the -qualities of an excellent officer. - -Perry’s squadron, once on the Lake, altogether overawed the British -fleet, and Barclay’s only hope lay in completing a vessel called the -“Detroit,” then on the stocks at Amherstburg. Rough and unfinished, -she was launched, and while Perry blockaded the harbor, Barclay, early -in September, got masts and rigging into her, and armed her with guns -of every calibre, taken from the ramparts.[120] Even the two American -twenty-four pound guns, used by Proctor against Fort Meigs, were put -on board the “Detroit.” Thus equipped, she had still to be manned; but -no seamen were near the Lake. Barclay was forced to make up a crew of -soldiers from the hardworked Forty-first regiment and Canadians unused -to service. September 6 the “Detroit” was ready to sail, and Barclay -had then no choice but to fight at any risk. “So perfectly destitute of -provisions was the port that there was not a day’s flour in store, and -the crews of the squadron under my command were on half allowance of -many things; and when that was done, there was no more.”[121] - -Early on the morning of September 9 Barclay’s fleet weighed and sailed -for the enemy, who was then at anchor off the island of Put-in-Bay -near the mouth of Sandusky River. The British squadron consisted of -six vessels,--the “Detroit,” a ship of four hundred and ninety tons, -carrying nineteen guns, commanded by Barclay himself; the “Queen -Charlotte” of seventeen guns, commanded by Finnis; the “Lady Prevost” -of thirteen guns; the “Hunter” of ten; the “Little Belt” carrying -three, and the “Chippeway” carrying one gun,--in all, sixty-three guns, -and probably about four hundred and fifty men. The American squadron -consisted of nine vessels,--the “Lawrence,” Perry’s own brig, nearly -as large as the “Detroit,” and carrying twenty guns; the “Niagara,” -commander Jesse D. Elliott, of the same tonnage, with the same -armament; the “Caledonia,” a three-gun brig; the schooners “Ariel,” -“Scorpion,” “Somers,” “Porcupine,” and “Tigress,” carrying ten guns; -and the sloop “Trippe,” with one gun,--in all, fifty-four guns, with -a nominal crew of five hundred and thirty-two men, and an effective -crew probably not greatly differing from the British. In other respects -Perry’s superiority was decided, as it was meant to be. The Americans -had thirty-nine thirty-two pound carronades; the British had not a gun -of that weight, and only fifteen twenty-four pound carronades. The -lightest guns on the American fleet were eight long twelve-pounders, -while twenty-four of the British guns threw only nine-pound shot, or -less. The American broadside threw at close range about nine hundred -pounds of metal; the British threw about four hundred and sixty. At -long range the Americans threw two hundred and eighty-eight pounds of -metal; the British threw one hundred and ninety-five pounds. In tonnage -the Americans were superior as eight to seven. In short, the Navy -Department had done everything reasonably necessary to insure success; -and if the American crews, like the British, were partly made up of -landsmen, soldiers or volunteers, the reason was in each case the same. -Both governments supplied all the seamen they had. - -Between forces so matched, victory ought not to have been in doubt; -and if it was so, the fault certainly lay not in Perry. When, at -daylight September 10, his look-out discovered the British fleet, Perry -got his own squadron under way, and came down with a light wind from -the southeast against Barclay’s line, striking it obliquely near the -head. Perry must have been anxious to fight at close range, where his -superiority was as two to one, while at long range his ship could use -only two long twelve-pounders against the “Detroit’s” six twelves, -one eighteen, and two twenty-fours,--an inferiority amounting to -helplessness. Both the “Lawrence” and the “Niagara” were armed for -close fighting, and were intended for nothing else. At long range their -combined broadside, even if all their twelve-pounders were worked on -one side, threw but forty-eight pounds of metal; at short range the two -brigs were able to throw six hundred and forty pounds at each broadside. - -Perry could not have meant to fight at a distance, nor could Commander -Elliott have thought it good seamanship. Yet Perry alone acted on this -evident scheme; and though his official account showed that he had -himself fought at close range, and that he ordered the other commanders -to do the same, it gave no sufficient reasons to explain what prevented -the whole fleet from acting together, and made the result doubtful. He -did not even mention that he himself led the line in the “Lawrence,” -with two gunboats, the “Ariel” and the “Scorpion,” supporting him, the -“Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and three gunboats following. The “Lawrence” -came within range of the British line just at noon, the wind being very -light, the Lake calm, and Barclay, in the “Detroit,” opposite. Perry’s -report began at that point:-- - - “At fifteen minutes before twelve the enemy commenced firing; - at five minutes before twelve the action commenced on our part. - Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, - and its being mostly directed to the ‘Lawrence,’ I made sail (at - quarter-past twelve) and directed the other vessels to follow, for - the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline - being shot away, she became unmanageable, notwithstanding the - great exertions of the sailing-master. In this situation she - sustained the action upwards of two hours, within canister-shot - distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and a greater part - of the crew either killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer - annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of Lieutenant Yarnall, who, I - was convinced from the bravery already displayed by him, would do - what would comport with the honor of the flag. At half-past two, - the wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his - vessel, the ‘Niagara,’ gallantly into close action. I immediately - went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by volunteering - to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness - of the wind, into close action.... At forty-five minutes past two - the signal was made for ‘close action.’ The ‘Niagara’ being very - little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy’s line; bore - up, and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking - fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and - sloop, from the larboard side, at half pistol-shot distance. The - smaller vessels at this time having got within grape and canister - distance, under the direction of Captain Elliott, and keeping - up a well-directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner - surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.” - -From this reticent report, any careful reader could see that for some -reason, not so distinctly given as would have been the case if the -wind alone were at fault, the action had been very badly fought on the -American side. The British official account confirmed the impression -given by Perry. Barclay’s story was as well told as his action was -well fought:-- - - “At a quarter before twelve I commenced the action by a few long - guns; about a quarter-past, the American commodore, also supported - by two schooners, ... came to close action with the ‘Detroit.’ The - other brig [the ‘Niagara’] of the enemy, apparently destined to - engage the ‘Queen Charlotte,’ kept so far to windward as to render - the ‘Queen Charlotte’s’ twenty-four pounder carronades useless, - while she was, with the ‘Lady Prevost,’ exposed to the heavy and - destructive fire of the ‘Caledonia’ and four other schooners, armed - with heavy and long guns.... The action continued with great fury - until half-past two, when I perceived my opponent [the ‘Lawrence’] - drop astern, and a boat passing from him to the ‘Niagara,’ which - vessel was at this time perfectly fresh. The American commodore, - seeing that as yet the day was against him, ... made a noble and, - alas! too successful an effort to regain it; for he bore up, and - supported by his small vessels, passed within pistol-shot and took - a raking position on our bow.... The weather-gage gave the enemy a - prodigious advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their - position, but their distance also, which they [the ‘Caledonia,’ - ‘Niagara,’ and the gunboats] did in such a manner as to prevent - the carronades of the ‘Queen Charlotte’ and ‘Lady Prevost’ from - having much effect, while their long ones did great execution, - particularly against the ‘Queen Charlotte.’” - -Barclay’s report, agreeing with Perry’s, made it clear that while -Perry and the head of the American line fought at close quarters, -the “Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and the four gunboats supporting them -preferred fighting at long range,--not because they wanted wind, but -because the “Caledonia” and gunboats were armed with long thirty-two -and twenty-four pounders, while the British vessels opposed to them had -only one or two long twelve-pounders. Certainly the advantage in this -respect on the side of the American brig and gunboats was enormous; -but these tactics threw the “Niagara,” which had not the same excuse, -out of the battle, leaving her, from twelve o’clock till half-past -two, firing only two twelve-pound guns, while her heavy armament was -useless, and might as well have been left ashore. Worse than this, -the persistence of the “Caledonia,” “Niagara,” and their gunboats in -keeping, beyond range of their enemies’ carronades nearly lost the -battle, by allowing the British to concentrate on the “Lawrence” all -their heavy guns, and in the end compelling the “Lawrence” to strike. -On all these points no reasonable doubt could exist. The two reports -were the only official sources of information on which an opinion as to -the merits of the action could properly be founded. No other account, -contemporaneous and authoritative, threw light on the subject, except -a letter by Lieutenant Yarnall, second in command to Perry on the -“Lawrence,” written September 15, and published in the Ohio newspapers -about September 29,--in which Yarnall said that if Elliott had brought -his ship into action when the signal was given, the battle would have -ended in much less time, and with less loss to the “Lawrence.” This -statement agreed with the tenor of the two official reports. - -Furious as the battle was, a more furious dispute raged over it when -in the year 1834 the friends of Perry and of Elliott wrangled over -the action. With their dispute history need not concern itself. The -official reports left no reasonable doubt that Perry’s plan of battle -was correct; that want of wind was not the reason it failed; but that -the “Niagara” was badly managed by Elliott, and that the victory, when -actually forfeited by this mismanagement, was saved by the personal -energy of Perry, who, abandoning his own ship, brought the “Niagara” -through the enemy’s line, and regained the advantage of her heavy -battery. The luck which attended Perry’s career on the Lake saved him -from injury, when every other officer on the two opposing flagships -and four-fifths of his crew were killed or wounded, and enabled him to -perform a feat almost without parallel in naval warfare, giving him a -well-won immortality by means of the disaster unnecessarily incurred. -No process of argument or ingenuity of seamanship could deprive Perry -of the fame justly given him by the public, or detract from the -splendor of his reputation as the hero of the war. More than any other -battle of the time, the victory on Lake Erie was won by the courage and -obstinacy of a single man. - -Between two opponents such as Perry and Barclay, no one doubted that -the ships were fought to their utmost. Of the “Lawrence” not much -was left; ship, officers, and crew were shot to pieces. Such carnage -was not known on the ocean, for even the cockpit where the sick and -wounded lay, being above water, was riddled by shot, and the wounded -were wounded again on the surgeon’s board. Of one hundred and three -effectives on the “Lawrence,” twenty-two were killed and sixty-one -wounded. The brig herself when she struck was a wreck, unmanageable, -her starboard bulwarks beaten in, guns dismounted, and rigging cut to -pieces. The British ships were in hardly better condition. The long -guns of the gunboats had raked them with destructive effect. Barclay -was desperately wounded; Finnis was killed; Barclay’s first lieutenant -was mortally wounded; not one commander or second in command could -keep the deck; the squadron had forty-one men killed and ninety-four -wounded, or nearly one man in three; the “Detroit” and “Queen -Charlotte” were unmanageable and fell foul; the “Lady Prevost” was -crippled, and drifted out of the fight. Perry could console himself -with the thought that if his ship had struck her flag, she had at least -struck to brave men. - - - - -CHAPTER VI. - - -GENERAL HARRISON, waiting at Seneca on the Sandusky River, received, -September 12, Perry’s famous despatch of September 10: “We have met the -enemy, and they are ours.” The navy having done its work, the army was -next to act. - -The force under Harrison’s command was ample for the required purpose, -although it contained fewer regular troops than Armstrong had intended. -The seven regular regiments assigned to Harrison fell short in numbers -of the most moderate expectations. Instead of providing seven thousand -rank-and-file, the recruiting service ended in producing rather -more than twenty-five hundred.[122] Divided into two brigades under -Brigadier-Generals McArthur and Lewis Cass, with a light corps under -Lieutenant-Colonel Ball of the Light Dragoons, they formed only one -wing of Harrison’s army. - -To supply his main force, Harrison had still to depend on Kentucky; -and once more that State made a great effort. Governor Shelby took the -field in person, leading three thousand volunteers,[123] organized -in eleven regiments, five brigades, and two divisions. Besides the -militia, who volunteered for this special purpose, Harrison obtained -the services of another Kentucky corps, which had already proved its -efficiency. - -One of Armstrong’s happiest acts, at the beginning of his service as -War Secretary,[124] was to accept the aid of Richard M. Johnson in -organizing for frontier defence a mounted regiment of a thousand men, -armed with muskets or rifles, tomahawks, and knives.[125] Johnson and -his regiment took the field about June 1, and from that time anxiety -on account of Indians ceased. The regiment patrolled the district from -Fort Wayne to the river Raisin, and whether in marching or fighting -proved to be the most efficient corps in the Western country. Harrison -obtained the assistance of Johnson’s regiment for the movement into -Canada, and thereby increased the efficiency of his army beyond the -proportion of Johnson’s numbers. - -While the mounted regiment moved by the road to Detroit, Harrison’s -main force was embarked in boats September 20, and in the course of a -few days some forty-five hundred infantry were safely conveyed by way -of Bass Island and Put-in-Bay to Middle Sister Island, about twelve -miles from the Canadian shore.[126] Harrison and Perry then selected -a landing place, and the whole force was successfully set ashore, -September 27, about three miles below Malden. - -Although Proctor could not hope to maintain himself at Malden or -Detroit without control of the Lake, he had still the means of -rendering Harrison’s possession insecure. According to the British -account, he commanded at Detroit and Malden a force of nine hundred -and eighty-six regulars, giving about eight hundred effectives.[127] -Not less than thirty-five hundred Indian warriors had flocked to -Amherstburg, and although they greatly increased the British general’s -difficulties by bringing their families with them, they might be -formidable opponents to Harrison’s advance. Every motive dictated to -Proctor the necessity of resisting Harrison’s approach. To Tecumthe and -his Indians the evacuation of Malden and Detroit without a struggle -meant not only the sacrifice of their cause, but also cowardice; and -when Proctor announced to them, September 18, that he meant to retreat, -Tecumthe rose in the council and protested against the flight, likening -Proctor to a fat dog that had carried its tail erect, and now that it -was frightened dropped its tail between its legs and ran.[128] He told -Proctor to go if he liked, but the Indians would remain. - -Proctor insisted upon retiring at least toward the Moravian town, -seventy miles on the road to Lake Ontario, and the Indians yielded. -The troops immediately began to burn or destroy the public property -at Detroit and Malden, or to load on wagons or boats what could not -be carried away. September 24, three days before Harrison’s army -landed, the British evacuated Malden and withdrew to Sandwich, allowing -Harrison to establish himself at Malden without a skirmish, and -neglecting to destroy the bridge over the Canards River. - -Harrison was surprised at Proctor’s tame retreat. - - “Nothing but infatuation,” he reported,[129] “could have governed - General Proctor’s conduct. The day that I landed below Malden he - had at his disposal upward of three thousand Indian warriors; his - regular force reinforced by the militia of the district would have - made his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which on the day of - landing did not exceed forty-five hundred.... His inferior officers - say that his conduct has been a series of continued blunders.” - -This crowning proof of Proctor’s incapacity disorganized his force. -Tecumthe expressed a general sentiment of the British army in his -public denunciation of Proctor’s cowardice. One of the inferior British -officers afterward declared that Proctor’s “marked inefficiency” and -“wanton sacrifice” of the troops raised more than a doubt not only of -his capacity but even of his personal courage, and led to serious -thoughts of taking away his authority.[130] The British at Sandwich -went through the same experience that marked the retreat of Hull and -his army from the same spot, only the year before. - -Harrison on his side made no extreme haste to pursue. His army marched -into Malden at four o’clock on the afternoon of September 27,[131] -and he wrote to Secretary Armstrong that evening: “I will pursue the -enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking -him, as he has upwards of a thousand horses, and we have not one in -the army.”[132] The pursuit was not rapid. Sandwich, opposite Detroit, -was only thirteen miles above Malden, but Harrison required two days -to reach it, arriving at two o’clock on the afternoon of September 29. -From there, September 30, he wrote again to Secretary Armstrong that -he was preparing to pursue the enemy on the following day;[133] but he -waited for R. M. Johnson’s mounted regiment, which arrived at Detroit -September 30, and was obliged to consume a day in crossing the river. -Then the pursuit began with energy, but on the morning of October 2 -Proctor had already a week’s advance and should have been safe. - -Proctor seemed to imagine that the Americans would not venture to -pursue him. Moving, according to his own report,[134] “by easy -marches,” neither obstructing the road in his rear nor leaving -detachments to delay the enemy, he reached Dolson’s October 1, and -there halted his army, fifty miles from Sandwich, while he went to the -Moravian town some twenty-six miles beyond. He then intended to make a -stand at Chatham, three miles behind Dolson’s. - - “I had assured the Indians,” said Proctor’s report of October 23, - “that we would not desert them, and it was my full determination - to have made a stand at the Forks (Chatham), by which our vessels - and stores would be protected; but after my arrival at Dover - [Dolson’s] three miles lower down the river, I was induced to take - post there first, where ovens had been constructed, and where there - was some shelter for the troops, and had accordingly directed that - it should be put into the best possible state of defence that time - and circumstances would admit of; indeed it had been my intention - to have opposed the enemy nearer the mouth of the river, had not - the troops contrary to my intention been moved, during my absence - of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the - country in my rear.” - -The British army, left at Dolson’s October 1, without a general or -orders,[135] saw the American army arrive in its front, October 3, -and retired three miles to Chatham, where the Indians insisted upon -fighting; but when, the next morning, October 4, the Americans advanced -in order of battle,[136] the Indians after a skirmish changed their -minds and retreated. The British were compelled to sacrifice the -supplies they had brought by water to Chatham for establishing their -new base, and their retreat precipitated on the Moravian town the -confusion of flight already resembling rout. - -Six miles on their way they met General Proctor returning from the -Moravian town, and as much dissatisfied with them as they with him. -Pressed closely by the American advance, the British troops made what -haste they could over excessively bad roads until eight o’clock in the -evening, when they halted within six miles of the Moravian town.[137] -The next morning, October 5, the enemy was again reported to be close -at hand, and the British force again retreated. About a mile and a -half from the Moravian town it was halted. Proctor had then retired as -far as he could, and there he must either fight, or abandon women and -children, sick and wounded, baggage, stores, and wagons, desert his -Indian allies, and fly to Lake Ontario. Probably flight would not have -saved his troops. More than a hundred miles of unsettled country lay -between them and their next base. The Americans had in their advance -the mounted regiment of R. M. Johnson, and could outmarch the most -lightly equipped British regulars. Already, according to Proctor’s -report, the rapidity of the Americans had destroyed the efficiency of -the British organization:[138]-- - - “In the attempt to save provisions we became encumbered with boats - not suited to the state of navigation. The Indians and the troops - retreated on different sides of the river, and the boats to which - sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed - to the fire of the enemy who were advancing on the side the Indians - were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into possession of the - enemy, and with them several of the men, provisions, and all the - ammunition that had not been issued to the troops and Indians. This - disastrous circumstance afforded the enemy the means of crossing - and advancing on both sides of the river. Finding the enemy were - advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry, - in a wood below the Moravian town, which last was not cleared of - Indian women and children, or of those of the troops, nor of the - sick.” - -The whole British force was then on the north bank of the river Thames, -retreating eastward by a road near the river bank. Proctor could hardly -claim to have exercised choice in the selection of a battleground, -unless he preferred placing his little force under every disadvantage. -“The troops were formed with their left to the river,” his report -continued, “with a reserve and a six-pounder on the road, near the -river; the Indians on the right.” According to the report of officers -of the Forty-first regiment, two lines of troops were formed in a -thick forest, two hundred yards apart. The first line began where the -six-pound field-piece stood, with a range of some fifty yards along -the road. A few Canadian Light Dragoons were stationed near the gun. -To the left of the road was the river; to the right a forest, free -from underbrush that could stop horsemen, but offering cover to an -approaching enemy within twenty paces of the British line.[139] In the -wood about two hundred men of the British Forty-first took position as -well as they could, behind trees, and there as a first line they waited -some two hours for their enemy to appear. - -The second line, somewhat less numerous, two hundred yards behind the -first, and not within sight, was also formed in the wood; and on the -road, in rear of the second line, Proctor and his staff stationed -themselves. The Indians were collected behind a swamp on the right, -touching and covering effectually the British right flank, while the -river covered the left. - -Such a formation was best fitted for Harrison’s purposes, but the mere -arrangement gave little idea of Proctor’s weakness. The six-pound -field-piece, which as he afterward reported “certainly should have -produced the best effect if properly managed,” had not a round of -ammunition, and could not be fired.[140] The Forty-first regiment -was almost mutinous, but had it been in the best condition it could not -have held against serious attack. The whole strength of the Forty-first -was only three hundred and fifty-six rank-and-file, or four hundred -and eight men all told.[141] The numbers of the regiment actually in -the field were reported as three hundred and fifteen rank-and-file, -or three hundred and sixty-seven men all told.[142] The dragoons were -supposed not to exceed twenty. This petty force was unable to see -either the advancing enemy or its own members. The only efficient -corps in the field was the Indians, who were estimated by the British -sometimes at five hundred, at eight hundred, and twelve hundred in -number, and who were in some degree covered by the swamp. - -[Illustration: - - A. B. Advance Guard on foot at head of 5 Collumns--the 1st - Battalion of the mounted Regiments. - - C. D. Capt. Slecker’s Comp. of 100 men on foot at head of 2 Collumns - - Note: five Brigades & Reserved Corps, Governor Shelbys troops - - G. D. E. represents the whole of the 2d Battalion after I was - wounded & finding it impracticable on account of logs & the - thickness of the woods to break through the Indian line & form - in their rear, I ordered the men to dismount & fight the Indians - in their own way, part of the time the Indians contended for the - ground at the 2d Swamp. - -ACCOMPANYING COL. R. M. JOHNSON’S LETTER OF NOV. 21st 1813, DETAILING -THE AFFAIR OF THE 5th AT THE RIVER THAMES, ETC.--WAR DEPARTMENT -ARCHIVES, MSS.] - -Harrison came upon the British line soon after two o’clock in the -afternoon, and at once formed his army in regular order of battle. As -the order was disregarded, and the battle was fought, as he reported, -in a manner “not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard -of,”[143] the intended arrangement mattered little. In truth, the -battle was planned as well as fought by Richard M. Johnson, whose -energy impressed on the army a new character from the moment he joined -it. While Harrison drew up his infantry in order of battle, Johnson, -whose mounted regiment was close to the British line, asked leave to -charge,[144] and Harrison gave him the order, although he knew no rule -of war that sanctioned it. - -Johnson’s tactics were hazardous, though effective. Giving to his -brother, James Johnson, half the regiment to lead up the road against -the six-pound gun and the British Forty-first regiment, R. M. Johnson -with the other half of his regiment wheeled to the left, at an angle -with the road, and crossed the swamp to attack twice his number of -Indians posted in a thick wood. - -James Johnson, with his five hundred men, galloped directly through -the British first line,[145] receiving a confused fire, and passing -immediately to the rear of the British second line, so rapidly as -almost to capture Proctor himself, who fled at full speed.[146] As the -British soldiers straggled in bands or singly toward the rear, they -found themselves among the American mounted riflemen, and had no choice -but to surrender. About fifty men, with a single lieutenant, contrived -to escape through the woods; all the rest became prisoners. - -R. M. Johnson was less fortunate. Crossing the swamp to his left, he -was received by the Indians in underbrush which the horses could not -penetrate. Under a sharp fire his men were obliged to dismount and -fight at close quarters. At an early moment of the battle, Johnson -was wounded by the rifle of an Indian warrior who sprang forward to -despatch him, but was killed by a ball from Johnson’s pistol. The -fighting at that point was severe, but Johnson’s men broke or turned -the Indian line, which was uncovered after the British defeat, and -driving the Indians toward the American left, brought them under fire -of Shelby’s infantry, when they fled. - -In this contest Johnson maintained that his regiment was alone engaged. -In a letter to Secretary Armstrong, dated six weeks after the battle, -he said:[147]-- - - “I send you an imperfect sketch of the late battle on the river - Thames, fought solely by the mounted regiment; at least, so much - so that not fifty men from any other corps assisted.... Fought the - Indians, twelve hundred or fifteen hundred men, one hour and twenty - minutes, driving them from the extreme right to the extreme left - of my line, at which last point we came near Governor Shelby, who - ordered Colonel Simrall to reinforce me; but the battle was over, - and although the Indians were pursued half a mile, there was no - fighting.” - -Harrison’s official report gave another idea of the relative share -taken by the Kentucky infantry in the action; but the difference in -dispute was trifling. The entire American loss was supposed to be -only about fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The battle lasted, with -sharpness, not more than twenty minutes; and none but the men under -Johnson’s command enjoyed opportunity to share in the first and most -perilous assault. - -The British loss was only twelve men killed and thirty-six wounded. -The total number of British prisoners taken on the field and in the -Moravian town, or elsewhere on the day of battle, was four hundred -and seventy-seven; in the whole campaign, six hundred. All Proctor’s -baggage, artillery, small arms, stores, and hospital were captured in -the Moravian town. The Indians left thirty-three dead on the field, -among them one reported to be Tecumthe. After the battle several -officers of the British Forty-first, well acquainted with the Shawnee -warrior, visited the spot, and identified his body. The Kentuckians -had first recognized it, and had cut long strips of skin from the -thighs, to keep, as was said, for razor-straps, in memory of the river -Raisin.[148] - -After Perry’s victory on Lake Erie, Tecumthe’s life was of no value -to himself or his people, and his death was no subject for regret; -but the manner chosen for producing this result was an expensive mode -of acquiring territory for the United States. The Shawnee warrior -compelled the government to pay for once something like the value -of the lands it took. The precise cost of the Indian war could not -be estimated, being combined in many ways with that of the war with -England; but the British counted for little, within the northwestern -territory, except so far as Tecumthe used them for his purposes. Not -more than seven or eight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the -Detroit River; but the United States raised fully twenty thousand men, -and spent at least five million dollars and many lives in expelling -them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign of -Tippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres at -Fort Dearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the murders along the -frontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian -lands in the Wabash Valley. - -No part of the war more injured British credit on the American -continent than the result of the Indian alliance. Except the capture of -Detroit and Mackinaw at the outset, without fighting, and the qualified -success at the river Raisin, the British suffered only mortifications, -ending with the total loss of their fleet, the abandonment of their -fortress, the flight of their army, and the shameful scene before the -Moravian town, where four hundred British regulars allowed themselves -to be ridden over and captured by five hundred Kentucky horsemen, with -hardly the loss of a man to the assailants. After such a disgrace -the British ceased to be formidable in the northwest. The Indians -recognized the hopelessness of their course, and from that moment -abandoned their dependence on England. - -The battle of the Thames annihilated the right division of the -British army in Upper Canada. When the remnants of Proctor’s force -were mustered, October 17, at Ancaster, a hundred miles from the -battlefield, about two hundred rank-and-file were assembled.[149] -Proctor made a report of the battle blaming his troops, and Prevost -issued a severe reprimand to the unfortunate Forty-first regiment on -the strength of Proctor’s representations. In the end the Prince Regent -disgraced both officers, recognizing by these public acts the loss of -credit the government had suffered; but its recovery was impossible. - -So little anxiety did General Harrison thenceforward feel about the -Eighth Military District which he commanded, that he returned to -Detroit October 7; his army followed him, and arrived at Sandwich, -October 10, without seeing an enemy. Promptly discharged, the Kentucky -Volunteers marched homeward October 14; the mounted regiment and its -wounded colonel followed a few days later, and within a fortnight only -two brigades of the regular army remained north of the Maumee. - -At Detroit the war was closed, and except for two or three distant -expeditions was not again a subject of interest. The Indians were for -the most part obliged to remain within the United States jurisdiction. -The great number of Indian families that had been collected about -Detroit and Malden were rather a cause for confidence than fear, -since they were in effect hostages, and any violence committed by -the warriors would have caused them, their women and children, to be -deprived of food and to perish of starvation. Detroit was full of -savages dependent on army supplies, and living on the refuse and offal -of the slaughter-yard; but their military strength was gone. Some -hundreds of the best warriors followed Proctor to Lake Ontario, but -Tecumthe’s northwestern confederacy was broken up, and most of the -tribes made submission. - - - - -CHAPTER VII. - - -THE new Secretaries of War and Navy who took office in January, 1813, -were able in the following October to show Detroit recovered. Nine -months solved the problem of Lake Erie. The problem of Lake Ontario -remained insoluble. - -In theory nothing was simpler than the conquest of Upper Canada. Six -months before war was declared, Jan. 2, 1812, John Armstrong, then a -private citizen, wrote to Secretary Eustis a letter containing the -remark,-- - - “In invading a neighboring and independent territory like Canada, - having a frontier of immense extent; destitute of means strictly - its own for the purposes of defence; separated from the rest of the - empire by an ocean, and having to this but one outlet,--this outlet - forms your true object or point of attack.” - -The river St. Lawrence was the true object of attack, and the Canadians -hardly dared hope to defend it. - - “From St. Regis to opposite Kingston,” said the Quebec “Gazette” in - 1814, “the southern bank of the river belongs to the United States. - It is well known that this river is the only communication between - Upper and Lower Canada. It is rapid and narrow in many places. - A few cannon judiciously posted, or even musketry, could render the - communication impracticable without powerful escorts, wasting and - parcelling the force applicable to the defence of the provinces. It - is needless to say that no British force can remain in safety or - maintain itself in Upper Canada without a ready communication with - the lower province.” - -Closure of the river anywhere must compel the submission of the whole -country above, which could not provide its supplies. The American, -who saw his own difficulties of transport between New York and the -Lakes, thought well of his energy in surmounting them; but as the war -took larger proportions, and great fleets were built on Lake Ontario, -the difficulties of Canadian transport became insuperable. Toward the -close of the war, Sir George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst[150] that -six thirty-two-pound guns for the fleet, hauled in winter four hundred -miles from Quebec to Kingston, would cost at least £2000 for transport. -Forty twenty-four-pounders hauled on the snow had cost £4,800; a cable -of the largest size hauled from Sorel to Kingston, two hundred and -fifty-five miles, cost £1000 for transport. In summer, when the river -was open, the difficulties were hardly less. The commissary-general -reported that the impediments of navigation were incalculable, and the -scarcity of workmen, laborers, and voyageurs not to be described.[151] - -[Illustration: UPPER CANADA - -NEW YORK - - EAST END OF - LAKE ONTARIO - AND - RIVER ST. LAWRENCE - FROM - Kingston to French Mills - REDUCED FROM AN - ORIGINAL DRAWING IN THE - NAVAL DEPARTMENT - BY JOHN MELISH. - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y. -] - -If these reasons for attacking and closing the river St. Lawrence had -not been decisive with the United States government, other reasons -were sufficient. The political motive was as strong as the military. -Americans, especially in New England, denied that treasonable -intercourse existed with Canada; but intercourse needed not to be -technically treasonable in order to have the effects of treason. Sir -George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814,[152] when the war -had lasted two years,-- - - “Two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef - provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States - of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as that of the - introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being - notorious in the United States, it is to be expected Congress - will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and under that - apprehension, large droves are daily crossing the lines coming into - Lower Canada.” - -This state of things had then lasted during three campaigns, from -the beginning of the war. The Indians at Malden, the British army at -Niagara, the naval station at Kingston were largely fed by the United -States. If these supplies could be stopped, Upper Canada must probably -fall; and they could be easily stopped by interrupting the British line -of transport anywhere on the St. Lawrence. - -The task was not difficult. Indeed, early in the war an enterprising -officer of irregulars, Major Benjamin Forsyth, carried on a troublesome -system of annoyance from Ogdensburg, which Sir George Prevost treated -with extreme timidity.[153] The British commandant at Prescott, Major -Macdonnell, was not so cautious as the governor-general, but crossed -the river on the ice with about five hundred men, drove Forsyth from -the town, destroyed the public property, and retired in safety with -a loss of eight killed and fifty-two wounded.[154] This affair, Feb. -23, 1813, closed hostilities in that region, and Major Forsyth was -soon ordered to Sackett’s Harbor. His experience, and that of Major -Macdonnell, proved how easy the closure of such a river must be, -exposed as it was for two hundred miles to the fire of cannon and -musketry. - -The St. Lawrence was therefore the proper point of approach and attack -against Upper Canada. Armstrong came to the Department of War with that -idea fixed in his mind. The next subject for his consideration was the -means at his disposal. - -During Monroe’s control of the War Department for two months, between -Dec. 3, 1812, and Feb. 5, 1813, much effort had been made to increase -the army. Monroe wrote to the chairman of the Military Committee Dec. -22, 1812, a sketch of his ideas.[155] He proposed to provide for the -general defence by dividing the United States into military districts, -and apportioning ninety-three hundred and fifty men among them as -garrisons. For offensive operations he required a force competent to -overpower the British defence, and in estimating his wants, he assumed -that Canada contained about twelve thousand British regulars, besides -militia, and three thousand men at Halifax. - - “To demolish the British force from Niagara to Quebec,” said - Monroe, “would require, to make the thing secure, an efficient - regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of - ten thousand.... If the government could raise and keep in the - field thirty-five thousand regular troops, ... the deficiency to - be supplied even to authorize an expedition against Halifax would - be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient; - but there is danger of not being able to raise that force, and to - keep it at that standard.... My idea is that provision ought to be - made for raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present - establishment.” - -Congress voted about fifty-eight thousand men, and after deducting ten -thousand for garrisons, counted on forty-eight thousand for service -in Canada. When Armstrong took control, Feb. 5, 1813, he began at -once to devise a plan of operation for the army which by law numbered -fifty-eight thousand men, and in fact numbered, including the staff and -regimental officers, eighteen thousand nine hundred and forty-five -men, according to the returns in the adjutant-general’s office February -16, 1813. Before he had been a week in the War Department, he wrote, -February 10, to Major-General Dearborn announcing that four thousand -men were to be immediately collected at Sackett’s Harbor, and three -thousand at Buffalo. April 1, or as soon as navigation opened, the four -thousand troops at Sackett’s Harbor were to be embarked and transported -in boats under convoy of the fleet across the Lake at the mouth of -the St. Lawrence, thirty-five miles, to Kingston. After capturing -Kingston, with its magazines, navy-yards, and ships, the expedition -was to proceed up the Lake to York (Toronto) and capture two vessels -building there. Thence it was to join the corps of three thousand men -at Buffalo, and attack the British on the Niagara River.[156] - -In explaining his plan to the Cabinet, Armstrong pointed out that the -attack from Lake Champlain on Montreal could not begin before May 1; -that Kingston, between April 1 and May 15, was shut from support by -ice; that not more than two thousand men could be gathered to defend -it; and that by beginning the campaign against Kingston rather than -against Montreal, six weeks’ time would be gained before reinforcements -could arrive from England.[157] - -Whatever defects the plan might have, Kingston, and Kingston alone, -possessed so much military importance as warranted the movement. -Evidently Armstrong had in mind no result short of the capture of -Kingston. - -Dearborn received these instructions at Albany, and replied, February -18, that nothing should be omitted on his part in endeavoring to -carry into effect the expedition proposed.[158] Orders were given -for concentrating the intended force at Sackett’s Harbor. During the -month of March the preparations were stimulated by a panic due to the -appearance of Sir George Prevost at Prescott and Kingston. Dearborn -hurried to Sackett’s Harbor in person, under the belief that the -governor-general was about to attack it. - -Armstrong estimated the British force at Kingston as nine hundred -regulars, or two thousand men all told; and his estimate was probably -correct. The usual garrison at Kingston and Prescott was about eight -hundred rank-and-file. In both the British and American services, the -returns of rank-and-file were the ordinary gauge of numerical force. -Rank-and-file included corporals, but not sergeants or commissioned -officers; and an allowance of at least ten sergeants and officers was -always to be made for every hundred rank-and-file, in order to estimate -the true numerical strength of an army or garrison. Unless otherwise -mentioned, the return excluded also the sick and disabled. The -relative force of every army was given in effectives, or rank-and-file -actually present for duty. - -In the distribution of British forces in Canada for 1812–1813, the -garrison at Prescott was allowed three hundred and seventy-six -rank-and-file, with fifty-two officers including sergeants. To Kingston -three hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file were allotted, with sixty -officers including sergeants. To Montreal and the positions between -Prescott and the St. John’s River about five thousand rank-and-file -were allotted.[159] At Prescott and Kingston, besides the regular -troops, the men employed in ship-building or other labor, the sailors, -and the local militia were to be reckoned as part of the garrison, and -Armstrong included them all in his estimate of two thousand men. - -The British force should have been known to Dearborn nearly as well -as his own. No considerable movement of troops between Lower and -Upper Canada could occur without his knowledge. Yet Dearborn wrote to -Armstrong, March 9, 1813, from Sackett’s Harbor,[160]-- - - “I have not yet had the honor of a visit from Sir George Prevost. - His whole force is concentrated at Kingston, probably amounting - to six or seven thousand,--about three thousand of them regular - troops. The ice is good, and we expect him every day.... As soon - as the fall [fate?] of this place [Sackett’s Harbor] shall be - decided, we shall be able to determine on other measures. If we - hold this place, we will command the Lake, and be able to act in - concert with the troops at Niagara.” - -A few days later, March 14, Dearborn wrote again.[161] - - “Sir George,” he said, had “concluded that it is too late to - attack this place.... We are probably just strong enough on each - side to defend, but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive - movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it - regards the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett’s Harbor, - cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, - arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the - defensive.” - -Clearly Dearborn did not approve Armstrong’s plan, and wished to -change it. In this idea he was supported, or instigated, by the naval -commander on the Lake, Isaac Chauncey, a native of Connecticut, forty -years of age, who entered the service in 1798 and became captain in -1806. Chauncey and Dearborn consulted together, and devised a new -scheme, which Dearborn explained to Armstrong about March 20:[162]-- - - “To take or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the - complete command of the Lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him - ten or twelve hundred troops to be commanded by Pike; take York; - from thence proceed to Niagara and attack Fort George by land - and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry Forts - Erie and Chippewa, and join those at Fort George; and then collect - our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature - deliberation the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and - myself as the most certain of ultimate success.” - -Thus Dearborn and Chauncey inverted Armstrong’s plan. Instead of -attacking on the St. Lawrence, they proposed to attack on the -Niagara. Armstrong acquiesced. “Taking for granted,” as he did[163] -on Dearborn’s assertion, “that General Prevost ... has assembled at -Kingston a force of six or eight thousand men, as stated by you,” he -could not require that his own plan should be pursued. “The alteration -in the plan of campaign so as to make Kingston the last object instead -of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least -proper,” he wrote to Dearborn, March 29.[164] - -The scheme proposed by Dearborn and Chauncey was carried into effect by -them. The contractors furnished new vessels, which gave to Chauncey for -a time the control of the Lake. April 22 the troops, numbering sixteen -hundred men, embarked. Armstrong insisted on only one change in the -expedition, which betrayed perhaps a shade of malice, for he required -Dearborn himself to command it, and Dearborn was suspected of shunning -service in the field. - -From the moment Dearborn turned away from the St. Lawrence and -carried the war westward, the naval and military movements on Lake -Ontario became valuable chiefly as a record of failure. The fleet -and army arrived at York early in the morning of April 27. York, a -village numbering in 1806, according to British account, more than -three thousand inhabitants, was the capital of Upper Canada, and -contained the residence of the lieutenant-governor and the two brick -buildings where the Legislature met. For military purposes the place -was valueless, but it had been used for the construction of a few -war-vessels, and Chauncey represented, through Dearborn, that “to take -or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the complete command -of the Lake.” The military force at York, according to British account, -did not exceed six hundred men, regulars and militia; and of these, -one hundred and eighty men, or two companies of the Eighth or King’s -regiment, happened to be there only in passing.[165] - -Under the fire of the fleet and riflemen, Pike’s brigade was set -ashore; the British garrison, after a sharp resistance, was driven -away, and the town capitulated. The ship on the stocks was burned; -the ten-gun brig “Gloucester” was made prize; the stores were -destroyed or shipped; some three hundred prisoners were taken; and -the public buildings, including the houses of Assembly, were burned. -The destruction of the Assembly houses, afterward alleged as ground -for retaliation against the capitol at Washington, was probably the -unauthorized act of private soldiers. Dearborn protested that it was -done without his knowledge and against his orders.[166] - -The success cost far more than it was worth. The explosion of a powder -magazine, near which the American advance halted, injured a large -number of men on both sides. Not less than three hundred and twenty -Americans were killed or wounded in the battle or explosion,[167] or -about one fifth of the entire force. General Pike, the best brigadier -then in the service, was killed. Only two or three battles in the -entire war were equally bloody.[168] “Unfortunately the enemy’s armed -ship the ‘Prince Regent,’” reported Dearborn,[169] “left this place for -Kingston four days before we arrived.” - -Chauncey and Dearborn crossed to Niagara, while the troops remained -some ten days at York, and were then disembarked at Niagara, May -8, according to Dearborn’s report, “in a very sickly and depressed -state; a large proportion of the officers and men were sickly and -debilitated.”[170] Nothing was ready for the movement which was to -drive the British from Fort George, and before active operations -could begin, Dearborn fell ill. The details of command fell to his -chief-of-staff, Colonel Winfield Scott. - -The military organization at Niagara was at best unfortunate. One of -Secretary Armstrong’s earliest measures was to issue the military -order previously arranged by Monroe, dividing the Union into military -districts. Vermont and the State of New York north of the highlands -formed the Ninth Military District, under Major-General Dearborn. In -the Ninth District were three points of activity,--Plattsburg on Lake -Champlain, Sackett’s Harbor on Lake Ontario, and the Niagara River. -Each point required a large force and a commander of the highest -ability; but in May, 1813, Plattsburg and Sackett’s Harbor were denuded -of troops and officers, who were all drawn to Niagara, where they -formed three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals John P. Boyd, -who succeeded Pike, John Chandler, and W. H. Winder. Niagara and the -troops in its neighborhood were under the command of Major-General -Morgan Lewis, a man of ability, but possessing neither the youth nor -the energy to lead an army in the field, while Boyd, Chandler, and -Winder were competent only to command regiments. - -Winfield Scott in effect assumed control of the army, and undertook to -carry out Van Rensselaer’s plan of the year before for attacking Fort -George in the rear, from the Lake. The task was not very difficult. -Chauncey controlled the Lake, and his fleet was at hand to transfer the -troops. Dearborn’s force numbered certainly not less than four thousand -rank-and-file present for duty. The entire British regular force on the -Niagara River did not exceed eighteen hundred rank-and-file, and about -five hundred militia.[171] At Fort George about one thousand regulars -and three hundred militia were stationed, and the military object to -be gained by the Americans was not so much the capture of Fort George, -which was then not defensible, as that of its garrison. - -Early on the morning of May 27, when the mist cleared away, the British -General Vincent saw Chauncey’s fleet, “in an extended line of more than -two miles,” standing toward the shore. When the ships took position, -“the fire from the shipping so completely enfiladed and scoured the -plains, that it became impossible to approach the beach,” and Vincent -could only concentrate his force between the Fort and the enemy, -waiting attack. Winfield Scott at the head of an advance division first -landed, followed by the brigades of Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, and -after a sharp skirmish drove the British back along the Lake shore, -advancing under cover of the fleet. Vincent’s report continued:[172]-- - - “After awaiting the approach of the enemy for about half an hour - I received authentic information that his force, consisting of - from four to five thousand men, had reformed his columns and was - making an effort to turn my right flank. Having given orders for - the fort to be evacuated, the guns to be spiked, and the ammunition - destroyed, the troops under my command were put in motion, and - marched across the country in a line parallel to the Niagara - River, toward the position near the Beaver Dam beyond Queenston - mountain.... Having assembled my whole force the following morning, - which did not exceed sixteen hundred men, I continued my march - toward the head of the Lake.” - -Vincent lost severely in proportion to his numbers, for fifty-one -men were killed, and three hundred and five were wounded or missing, -chiefly in the Eighth or King’s regiment.[173] Several hundred militia -were captured in his retreat. The American loss was about forty killed -and one hundred and twenty wounded. According to General Morgan Lewis, -Col. Winfield Scott “fought nine-tenths of the battle.”[174] Dearborn -watched the movements from the fleet. - -For a time this success made a deep impression on the military -administration of Canada, and the abandonment of the whole country west -of Kingston was thought inevitable.[175] The opportunity for achieving -a decided advantage was the best that occurred for the Americans -during the entire war; but whatever might be said in public, the -battle of Fort George was a disappointment to the War Department[176] -as well as to the officers in command of the American army, who had -hoped to destroy the British force. The chief advantage gained was the -liberation of Perry’s vessels at Black Rock above the Falls, which -enabled Perry to complete his fleet on Lake Erie. - -On Lake Ontario, May 31, Chauncey insisted, not without cause, on -returning to Sackett’s Harbor. Dearborn, instead of moving with his -whole force, ordered Brigadier-General Winder, June 1, to pursue -Vincent. Winder, with eight hundred or a thousand men marched twenty -miles, and then sent for reinforcements. He was joined, June 5, by -General Chandler with another brigade. Chandler then took command, and -advanced with a force supposed to number in the aggregate two thousand -men[177] to Stony Creek, within ten miles of Vincent’s position at -Hamilton, where sixteen hundred British regulars were encamped. There -Chandler and Winder posted themselves for the night, much as Winchester -and his Kentuckians had camped at the river Raisin four months -earlier.[178] - -Vincent was not to be treated with such freedom. Taking only seven -hundred rank-and-file,[179] he led them himself against Chandler’s -camp. The attack began, in intense darkness, at two o’clock in the -morning of June 6. The British quickly broke the American centre and -carried the guns. The lines became mixed, and extreme confusion lasted -till dawn. In the darkness both American generals, Chandler and Winder, -walked into the British force in the centre, and were captured.[180] -With difficulty the two armies succeeded in recovering their order, and -then retired in opposite directions. The British suffered severely, -reporting twenty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, -and fifty-five missing, or two hundred and twelve men in all; but they -safely regained Burlington Heights at dawn.[181] The American loss -was less in casualties, for it amounted only to fifty-five killed and -wounded, and one hundred missing; but in results the battle at Stony -Creek was equally disgraceful and decisive. The whole American force, -leaving the dead unburied, fell back ten miles, where Major-General -Lewis took command in the afternoon of June 7. An hour later the -British fleet under Sir James Yeo made its appearance, threatening to -cut off Lewis’s retreat. Indians hovered about. Boats and baggage were -lost. Dearborn sent pressing orders to Lewis directing him to return, -and on the morning of June 8 the division reached Fort George.[182] - -These mortifications prostrated Dearborn, whose strength had been -steadily failing. June 8 he wrote to Armstrong: “My ill state of health -renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and -unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire -to some place where my mind may be more at ease for a short time.”[183] -June 10, his adjutant-general, Winfield Scott, issued orders devolving -on Major-General Morgan Lewis the temporary command not only of -the Niagara army but also of the Ninth Military district.[184] “In -addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with,” wrote -Dearborn’s aid, S. S. Connor, to Secretary Armstrong, June 12,[185] -“he has, within the last twenty-four hours, experienced a violent -spasmodic attack on his breast, which has obliged him to relinquish -business altogether.” “I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit -for service,” wrote Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14;[186] “he has -been repeatedly in a state of convalescence, but relapses on the least -agitation of mind.” June 20 Dearborn himself wrote in a very despondent -spirit both in regard to his health and to the military situation: “I -have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. -Brigadier-General Boyd is the only general officer present.”[187] - -The sudden departure of Morgan Lewis, ordered to Sackett’s Harbor, -left General Boyd for a few days to act as the general in command at -Niagara. Boyd, though well known for his success at Tippecanoe, was -not a favorite in the army. “A compound of ignorance, vanity, and -petulance,” wrote his late superior, Morgan Lewis,[188] “with nothing -to recommend him but that species of bravery in the field which is -vaporing, boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation, and -better adapted to the bully than the soldier.” - -Galled by complaints of the imbecility of the army, Boyd, with -Dearborn’s approval,[189] June 23, detached Colonel Boerstler of the -Fourteenth Infantry with some four hundred men and two field-pieces, -to batter a stone house at Beaver Dam, some seventeen miles from Fort -George.[190] Early in the morning of June 24 Boerstler marched to -Beaver Dam. There he found himself surrounded in the woods by hostile -Indians, numbering according to British authority about two hundred. -The Indians, annoying both front and rear, caused Boerstler to attempt -retreat, but his retreat was stopped by a few militia-men, said to -number fifteen.[191] A small detachment of one hundred and fifty men -came to reinforce Boerstler, and Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the British -Forty-ninth regiment, with forty-seven men, reinforced the Indians. -Unable to extricate himself, and dreading dispersion and massacre, -Boerstler decided to surrender; and his five hundred and forty men -accordingly capitulated to a British lieutenant with two hundred and -sixty Indians, militia, and regulars. - -Dearborn reported the disaster as “an unfortunate and unaccountable -event;”[192] but of such events the list seemed endless. A worse -disaster, equally due to Dearborn and Chauncey, occurred at the -other end of the Lake. Had they attacked Kingston, as Armstrong -intended, their movement would have covered Sackett’s Harbor; but -when they placed themselves a hundred and fifty miles to the westward -of Sackett’s Harbor, they could do nothing to protect it. Sackett’s -Harbor was an easy morning’s sail from Kingston, and the capture of the -American naval station was an object of infinite desire on the part of -Sir George Prevost, since it would probably decide the result of the -war. - -Prevost, though not remarkable for audacity, could not throw away such -an opportunity without ruining his reputation. He came to Kingston, and -while Dearborn was preparing to capture Fort George in the night of -May 26–27, Prevost embarked his whole regular force, eight hundred men -all told,[193] on Yeo’s fleet at Kingston, set sail in the night, and -at dawn of May 27 was in sight of Sackett’s Harbor.[194] - -Had Yeo and Prevost acted with energy, they must have captured the -Harbor without serious resistance. According to Sir George’s official -report, “light and adverse winds” prevented the ships from nearing the -Fort until evening.[195] Probably constitutional vacillation on the -part of Sir James Yeo caused delay, for Prevost left the control wholly -to him and Colonel Baynes.[196] - -At Sackett’s Harbor about four hundred men of different regular -regiments, and about two hundred and fifty Albany volunteers were in -garrison; and a general alarm, given on appearance of the British fleet -in the distance, brought some hundreds of militia into the place; but -the most important reinforcement was Jacob Brown, a brigadier-general -of State militia who lived in the neighborhood, and had been requested -by Dearborn to take command in case of an emergency. Brown arrived at -the Harbor in time to post the men in order of battle. Five hundred -militia were placed at the point where the British were expected to -land; the regulars were arranged in a second line; the forts were in -the rear. - -[Illustration: - - EAST END - OF - LAKE ONTARIO - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S., N.Y. -] - -At dawn of May 28, under command of Colonel Baynes, the British -grenadiers of the One Hundredth regiment landed gallantly under “so -heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as -to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up.”[197] -Pressing rapidly forward, without stopping to fire, the British -regulars routed the militia and forced the second line back until they -reached a block-house at the edge of the village, where a thirty-two -pound gun was in position, flanked by log barracks and fallen timber. -While Brown with difficulty held his own at the military barracks, the -naval lieutenant in charge of the ship-yard, being told that the battle -was lost, set fire to the naval barracks, shipping, and store-houses. -Brown’s indignation at this act was intense. - - “The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction - as ever occurred among military men,” he wrote to Dearborn.[198] - “The fire was set as our regulars met the enemy upon the main line; - and if anything could have appalled these gallant men it would have - been the flames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered - in the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful - burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled to much - higher praise than though it had not occurred. The navy are alone - responsible for what happened on Navy Point, and it is fortunate - for them that they have reputations sufficient to sustain the - shock.” - -Brown’s second line stood firm at the barracks, and the British attack -found advance impossible. Sir George Prevost’s report admitted his -inability to go farther:[199]-- - - “A heavier fire than that of musketry having become necessary - in order to force their last position, I had the mortification - to learn that the continuation of light and adverse winds had - prevented the co-operation of the ships, and that the gunboats - were unequal to silence the enemy’s elevated batteries, or to - produce any effect on their block houses. Considering it therefore - impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by - which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the troops to - leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven before them for upwards - of three hours, and who did not venture to offer the slightest - opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper - deliberation and in perfect order.” - -If Sir George was correct in regarding the Americans as “a beaten -enemy,” his order of retreat to his own troops seemed improper; but -his language showed that he used the words in a sense of his own, and -Colonel Baynes’s report gave no warrant for the British claim of a -victory.[200] - - “At this point,” said Baynes,[201] “the further energies of the - troops became unavailing. Their [American] block-houses and - stockaded battery could not be carried by assault, nor reduced by - field-pieces had we been provided with them.... Seeing no object - within our reach to attain that could compensate for the loss we - were momentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy’s - cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position we had - charged from. From this position we were ordered to re-embark, - which was performed at our leisure and in perfect order, the enemy - not presuming to show a single soldier without the limits of his - fortress.” - -Another and confidential report was written by E. B. Brenton of -Prevost’s staff to the governor’s military secretary, Noah Freer.[202] -After describing the progress of the battle until the British advance -was stopped, Brenton said that Colonel Baynes came to Sir George to -tell him that the men could not approach nearer the works with any -prospect of success:-- - - “It was however determined to collect all the troops at a point, - to form the line, and to make an attack immediately upon the - battery and barracks in front. For this purpose the men in advance - were called in, the line formed a little without the reach of the - enemy’s musketry, and though evidently much fagged, was, after - being supplied with fresh ammunition, again led in line. At this - time I do not think the whole force collected in the lines exceeded - five hundred men.” - -The attack was made, and part of the Hundred-and-fourth regiment -succeeded in getting shelter behind one of the American barracks, -preparing for a farther advance. Sir George Prevost, under a fire which -his aid described as tremendous,--“I do not exaggerate when I tell you -that the shot, both of musketry and grape, was falling about us like -hail,”--watched the American position through a glass, when, “at this -time those who were left of the troops behind the barracks made a dash -out to charge the enemy; but the fire was so destructive that they -were instantly turned by it, and the retreat was sounded. Sir George, -fearless of danger and disdaining to run or to suffer his men to run, -repeatedly called out to them to retire in order; many however made off -as fast as they could.” - -These reports agreed that the British attack was totally defeated, with -severe loss, before the retreat was sounded. Such authorities should -have silenced dispute; but Prevost had many enemies in Canada, and -at that period of the war the British troops were unused to defeat. -Both Canadians and English attacked the governor-general privately and -publicly, freely charging him with having disgraced the service, and -offering evidence of his want of courage in the action.[203] Americans, -though not interested in the defence of Prevost, could not fail to -remark that the British and Canadian authorities who condemned him, -assumed a condition of affairs altogether different from that accepted -by American authorities. The official American reports not only -supported the views taken by Prevost and Baynes of the hopelessness of -the British attack, but added particulars which made Prevost’s retreat -necessary. General Brown’s opinion was emphatic: “Had not General -Prevost retired _most rapidly_ under the guns of his vessels, he would -never have returned to Kingston.”[204] These words were a part of -Brown’s official report. Writing to Dearborn he spoke with the same -confidence:[205]-- - - “The militia were all rallied before the enemy gave way, and were - marching perfectly in his view towards the rear of his right flank; - and I am confident that even then, if Sir George had not retired - with the utmost precipitation to his boats, he would have been cut - off.” - -Unlike the Canadians, Brown thought Prevost’s conduct correct and -necessary, but was by no means equally complimentary to Sir James Yeo, -whom he blamed greatly for failing to join in the battle. The want of -wind which Yeo alleged in excuse, Brown flatly denied. From that time -Brown entertained and freely expressed contempt for Yeo, as he seemed -also to feel little respect for Chauncey. His experience with naval -administration on both sides led him to expect nothing but inefficiency -from either. - -Whatever were the true causes of Prevost’s failure, Americans could -not admit that an expedition which cost the United States so much, -and which so nearly succeeded, was discreditable to the British -governor-general, or was abandoned without sufficient reason. The -British return of killed and wounded proved the correctness of Prevost, -Baynes, and Brown in their opinion of the necessity of retreat. -According to the report of Prevost’s severest critics, he carried less -than seven hundred and fifty rank-and-file to Sackett’s Harbor.[206] -The returns showed forty-four rank-and-file killed; one hundred and -seventy-two wounded, and thirteen missing,--in all, two hundred and -twenty-nine men, or nearly one man in three. The loss in officers was -relatively even more severe; and the total loss in an aggregate which -could hardly have numbered much more than eight hundred and fifty men -all told, amounted to two hundred and fifty-nine killed, wounded, and -missing, leaving Prevost less than six hundred men to escape,[207] in -the face of twice their numbers and under the fire of heavy guns.[208] - -The British attack was repulsed, and Jacob Brown received much credit -as well as a commission of brigadier-general in the United States -army for his success; but the injury inflicted by the premature -destruction at the navy-yard was very great, and was sensibly felt. -Such a succession of ill news could not but affect the Government. -The repeated failures to destroy the British force at Niagara; the -disasters of Chandler, Winder, and Boerstler; the narrow and partial -escape of Sackett’s Harbor; the total incapacity of Dearborn caused -by fever and mortification,--all these evils were not the only or the -greatest subjects for complaint. The two commanders, Dearborn and -Chauncey, had set aside the secretary’s plan of campaign, and had -substituted one of their own, on the express ground of their superior -information. While affirming that the garrison at Kingston had been -reinforced to a strength three or four times as great as was humanly -possible, they had asserted that the capture of York would answer their -purpose as well as the capture of Kingston, to “give us the complete -command of the Lake.” They captured York, April 27, but the British -fleet appeared June 6, and took from them the command of the Lake. -These miscalculations or misstatements, and the disasters resulting -from them, warranted the removal of Chauncey as well as Dearborn from -command; but the brunt of dissatisfaction fell on Dearborn alone. Both -Cabinet and Congress agreed in insisting on Dearborn’s retirement, -and the President was obliged to consent. July 6, Secretary Armstrong -wrote,-- - - “I have the President’s orders to express to you the decision that - you retire from the command of District No. 9, and of the troops - within the same, until your health be re-established and until - further orders.” - - - - -CHAPTER VIII. - - -ARMSTRONG’S embarrassment was great in getting rid of the generals -whom Madison and Eustis left on his hands. Dearborn was one example of -what he was obliged to endure, but Wilkinson was a worse. According -to Armstrong’s account,[209] New Orleans was not believed to be safe -in Wilkinson’s keeping. The senators from Louisiana, Tennessee, and -Kentucky remonstrated to the President, and the President ordered his -removal. Armstrong and Wilkinson had been companions in arms, and -had served with Gates at Saratoga. For many reasons Armstrong wished -not unnecessarily to mortify Wilkinson, and in conveying to him, -March 10, the abrupt order[210] to proceed with the least possible -delay to the headquarters of Major-General Dearborn at Sackett’s -Harbor, the Secretary of War added, March 12, a friendly letter of -advice:[211]-- - - “Why should you remain in your land of cypress when patriotism and - ambition equally invite to one where grows the laurel? Again, the - men of the North and East want you; those of the South and West are - less sensible of your merits and less anxious to have you among - them. I speak to you with a frankness due to you and to myself, and - again advise, Come to the North, and come quickly! If our cards be - well played, we may renew the scene of Saratoga.” - -The phrase was curious. Saratoga suggested defeated invasion rather -than conquest; the surrender of a British army in the heart of New York -rather than the capture of Montreal. The request for Wilkinson’s aid -was disheartening. No one knew better than Armstrong the feebleness -of Wilkinson’s true character. “The selection of this unprincipled -imbecile was not the blunder of Secretary Armstrong,” said Winfield -Scott long afterward;[212] but the idea that Wilkinson could be -chief-of-staff to Dearborn,--that one weak man could give strength to -another,--was almost as surprising as the selection of Wilkinson to -chief command would have been. Armstrong did not intend that Wilkinson -should command more than a division under Dearborn;[213] but he must -have foreseen that in the event of Dearborn’s illness or incapacity, -Wilkinson would become by seniority general-in-chief. - -[Illustration: _REMARKS_ - - Cedars: _A small Village, a place of business, built pretty - compact, several stone houses: Settlers, Scottish and 9 or 10 - French_. - - River d l’Isle _The course of this River is S. and E. till within 4 - or 5 miles of the St. Lawrence thence it runs almost parallel with - that river to its mouth at the Coteau. It is about 4 rods wide at - its mouth and is shoal. One mile above the confluence the distance - is only ¾ mile between the two rivers: The banks of both are low - and flat._ - - _There is a settlement of 60 French Families or upwards 4 miles - above Coteau. No road thence to Point Bodet distant 7½ miles._ - - _The road is excellent from Pt. Bodet to Raisin R._ - - _McPherson keeps Tavern at Pt. Mouille and a Ferry to Pt. Bodet._ - - _McGee keeps Tavern at Pt. Bodet and a Ferry down the Lake._ - - _There is a Ferry from Coteau to Pt. Bodet._ - - MAP OF THE - RIVER ST. LAWRENCE - AND ADJACENT COUNTRY - From Williamsburg to Montreal. - FROM AN ORIGINAL DRAWING - IN THE - WAR DEPARTMENT. - - MILITARY AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ATLAS - - BY JOHN MELISH, 1815. - - STRUTHERS & CO., ENGR’S, N.Y. -] - -Wilkinson at New Orleans received Armstrong’s letter of March 10 only -May 19,[214] and started, June 10, for Washington, where he arrived -July 31, having consumed the greater part of the summer in the journey. -On arriving at Washington, he found that Dearborn had been removed, -and that he was himself by seniority in command of the Ninth Military -District.[215] This result of Dearborn’s removal was incalculably -mischievous, for if its effect on Wilkinson’s vanity was unfortunate, -its influence on the army was fatal. Almost every respectable officer -of the old service regarded Wilkinson with antipathy or contempt. - -Armstrong’s ill-fortune obliged him also to place in the position -of next importance Wilkinson’s pronounced enemy, Wade Hampton. A -major-general was required to take command on Lake Champlain, and but -one officer of that rank claimed employment or could be employed; and -Wade Hampton was accordingly ordered to Plattsburg.[216] Of all the -major-generals Hampton was probably the best; but his faults were -serious. Proud and sensitive even for a South Carolinian; irritable, -often harsh, sometimes unjust, but the soul of honor,[217] Hampton -was rendered wholly intractable wherever Wilkinson was concerned, by -the long-standing feud which had made the two generals for years the -heads of hostile sections in the army.[218] Hampton loathed Wilkinson. -At the time of his appointment to command on Lake Champlain he had -no reason to expect that Wilkinson would be his superior; but though -willing and even wishing to serve under Dearborn, he accepted only -on the express understanding that his was a distinct and separate -command,[219] and that his orders were to come directly from the War -Department. Only in case of a combined movement uniting different -armies, was he to yield to the rule of seniority. With that agreement -he left Washington, June 15, and assumed command, July 3, on Lake -Champlain. - -Nearly a month afterward Wilkinson arrived in Washington, and reported -at the War Department. By that time Armstrong had lost whatever chance -he previously possessed of drawing the army at Niagara back to a -position on the enemy’s line of supply. Three insuperable difficulties -stood in his way,--the season was too late; the army was too weak; and -the generals were incompetent. Armstrong found his generals the chief -immediate obstacle, and struggled perseveringly and good-humoredly to -overcome it. Wilkinson began, on arriving at Washington, by showing -a fancy for continuing the campaign at Niagara.[220] Armstrong was -obliged to give an emphatic order, dated August 8, that Kingston -should be the primary object of the campaign, but he left Wilkinson at -liberty to go there by almost any route, even by way of Montreal.[221] -Disappointed at the outset by finding Wilkinson slow to accept -responsibility or decided views,[222] he was not better pleased when -the new general began his duties in Military District No. 9. - -Wilkinson left Washington August 11, and no sooner did he reach Albany -than he hastened to write, August 16, two letters to General Hampton, -assuming that every movement of that general was directly dependent -on Wilkinson’s orders.[223] Considering the relations between the two -men, these letters warranted the inference that Wilkinson intended -to drive Hampton out of his Military District, and if possible from -the service. Hampton instantly leaped to that conclusion, and wrote -to Armstrong, August 23, offering his resignation in case Wilkinson’s -course was authorized by government.[224] Wilkinson also wrote to -the secretary August 30, substantially avowing his object to be what -Hampton supposed:[225]-- - - “You have copies of my letters to Major-General Hampton, which I - know he has received, yet I have no answer. The reflection which - naturally occurs is that if I am authorized to command he is bound - to obey; and if he will not respect the obligation, he should be - turned out of the service.” - -Armstrong pacified Hampton by promising once more that all his orders -and reports should pass through the Department. Hampton promised to -serve cordially and vigorously through the campaign, but he believed -himself intended for a sacrifice, and declared his intention of -resigning as soon as the campaign was ended.[226] Wilkinson, after -having at Albany provoked this outburst, started for Sackett’s Harbor, -where he arrived August 20. - -At Sackett’s Harbor Wilkinson found several general officers. Morgan -Lewis was there in command, Commodore Chauncey was there with his -fleet. Jacob Brown was also present by virtue of his recent appointment -as brigadier-general. The quartermaster-general, Robert Swartwout, a -brother of Burr’s friend who went to New Orleans, was posted there. -Wilkinson summoned these officers to a council of war August 26, which -deliberated on the different plans of campaign proposed to it, and -unanimously decided in favor of one called by Armstrong “No. 3 of the -plans proposed by the government.”[227] As defined in Wilkinson’s -language[228] the scheme was-- - - “To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in this - vicinity, and in co-operation with our squadron to make a bold - feint upon Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy - in our rear to starve or surrender, or oblige him to follow us - without artillery, baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay - down his arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in - concert with the division under Major-General Hampton to take - Montreal.” - -Orders were given, August 25, for providing river transport for seven -thousand men, forty field-pieces, and twenty heavy guns, to be in -readiness by September 15.[229] - -The proposed expedition closely imitated General Amherst’s expedition -against Montreal in 1760, with serious differences of relative -situation. After Wolfe had captured Quebec and hardly twenty-five -hundred French troops remained to defend Montreal, in the month of -July Amherst descended the river from Lake Ontario with more than ten -thousand men, chiefly British veterans, capturing every fortified -position as he went. Wilkinson’s council of war proposed to descend -the river in October or November with seven thousand men, leaving a -hostile fleet and fortresses in their rear, and running past every -fortified position to arrive in the heart of a comparatively well -populated country, held by a force greater than their own, with -Quebec to support it, while Wilkinson would have no certain base of -supplies, reinforcements, or path of escape. Knowledge of Wilkinson’s -favorite Quintus Curtius or of Armstrong’s familiar Jomini was not -required to satisfy any intelligent private, however newly recruited, -that under such circumstances the army would be fortunate to escape -destruction.[230] - -Wilkinson next went to Niagara, where he arrived September 4, and where -he found the army in a bad condition, with Boyd still in command, -but restrained by the President’s orders within a strict defensive. -Wilkinson remained nearly a month at Fort George making the necessary -preparations for a movement. He fell ill of fever, but returned October -2 to Sackett’s Harbor, taking with him all the regular troops at -Niagara. At that time Chauncey again controlled the Lake. - -Secretary Armstrong also came to Sackett’s Harbor, September 5, -and established the War Department at that remote point for nearly -two months.[231] When Wilkinson arrived, October 2, Armstrong’s -difficulties began. Wilkinson, then fifty-six years old, was broken -by the Lake fever. “He was so much indisposed in mind and body,” -according to Brigadier-General Boyd,[232] “that in any other service -he would have perhaps been superseded in his command.” According to -Wilkinson’s story, he told Secretary Armstrong that he was incapable of -commanding the army, and offered to retire from it; but the secretary -said there was no one to take his place, and he could not be spared. -In private Armstrong was believed to express himself more bluntly, -and Wilkinson was told that the secretary said: “I would feed the -old man with pap sooner than leave him behind.”[233] Wilkinson’s -debility did not prevent him from giving orders, or from becoming -jealous and suspicious of every one, but chiefly of Armstrong.[234] -Whatever was suggested by Armstrong was opposed by Wilkinson. Before -returning to Sackett’s Harbor, October 4, Wilkinson favored an -attack on Kingston.[235] On reaching Sackett’s Harbor, finding that -Armstrong also favored attacking Kingston, Wilkinson argued “against -my own judgment” in favor of passing Kingston and descending upon -Montreal.[236] Ten days afterward Armstrong changed his mind. Yeo had -succeeded in returning to Kingston, bringing reinforcements. - - “He will bring with him about fifteen hundred effectives,” wrote - Armstrong;[237] “and thanks to the storm and our snail-like - movements down the Lake, they will be there before we can reach it. - The manœuvre intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we - now do against that place must be done by hard blows, at some risk.” - -Accordingly, October 19, Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson a letter advising -abandonment of the attack on Kingston, and an effort at “grasping the -safer and the greater object below.”[238] - - “I call it the safer and greater object, because at Montreal you - find the weaker place and the smaller force to encounter; at - Montreal you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of - four thousand men; at Montreal you approach your own resources, - and establish between you and them an easy and an expeditious - intercourse; at Montreal you occupy a point which must be gained - in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and - which, if seized now, will save one campaign; at Montreal you hold - a position which completely severs the enemy’s line of operations, - which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him, - and which while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all - above itself.” - -As Armstrong veered toward Montreal Wilkinson turned decidedly toward -Kingston, and wrote the same day to the secretary a letter[239] of -remonstrance, closing by a significant remark:-- - - “Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal - to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which - by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is necessary to my - justification that you should by the authority of the President - direct the operations of the army under my command particularly - against Montreal.” - -The hint was strong that Wilkinson believed Armstrong to be trying to -evade responsibility, as Armstrong believed Wilkinson to be trying -to shirk it. Both insinuations were probably well-founded; neither -Armstrong nor Wilkinson expected to capture Kingston, and still -less Montreal. Wilkinson plainly said as much at the time. “I speak -conjecturally,” he wrote; “but should we surmount every obstacle in -descending the river we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the -force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, -the army must surrender at discretion.” Armstrong’s conduct was more -extraordinary than Wilkinson’s, and could not be believed except on his -own evidence. He not only looked for no capture of Montreal, but before -writing his letter of October 19 to Wilkinson, he had given orders for -preparing winter quarters for the army sixty or eighty miles above -Montreal, and did this without informing Wilkinson. In later years he -wrote:[240]-- - - “Suspecting early in October, from the lateness of the season, - the inclemency of the weather, and the continued indisposition of - the commanding general, that the campaign then in progress would - terminate as it did,--‘with the disgrace of doing nothing, but - without any material diminution of physical power,’--the Secretary - of War, then at Sackett’s Harbor, hastened to direct Major-General - Hampton to employ a brigade of militia attached to his command, in - constructing as many huts as would be sufficient to cover an army - of ten thousand men during the winter.” - -The order dated October 16 and addressed to the -quartermaster-general,[241] prescribed the cantonment of ten thousand -men within the limits of Canada, and plainly indicated the secretary’s -expectation that the army could not reach Montreal. In other ways -Armstrong showed the same belief more openly. - -All the available troops on or near Lake Ontario were concentrated at -Sackett’s Harbor about the middle of October, and did not exceed seven -thousand effectives, or eight thousand men.[242] “I calculate on six -thousand combatants,” wrote Wilkinson after starting,[243] “exclusive -of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season.” -The army was divided into four brigades under Generals Boyd, Swartwout, -Jacob Brown, and Covington,--the latter a Maryland man, forty-five -years old, who entered the service in 1809 as lieutenant-colonel -of dragoons. The brigades of Boyd and Covington formed a division -commanded by Major-General Morgan Lewis. The second division was -intended for Major-General Hampton; a reserve under Colonel Macomb, and -a park of artillery under Brigadier-General Moses Porter, completed the -organization.[244] - -The men were embarked in bateaux, October 17, at Henderson’s Bay, to -the westward of Sackett’s Harbor. The weather had been excessively -stormy, and continued so. The first resting-point to be reached was -Grenadier Island at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, only sixteen -or eighteen miles from the starting-point; but the bateaux were -dispersed by heavy gales of wind, October 18, 19, and 20, and the last -detachments did not reach Grenadier Island until November 3. “All our -hopes have been nearly blasted,” wrote Wilkinson October 24; but at -length, November 5, the expedition, numbering nearly three hundred -boats, having safely entered the river, began the descent from French -Creek. That day they moved forty miles, and halted about midnight -six miles above Ogdensburg. The next day was consumed in running -the flotilla past Ogdensburg under the fire of the British guns at -Prescott. The boats floated down by night and the troops marched by -land. November 7 the army halted at the White House, about twenty miles -below Ogdensburg. There Wilkinson called a council of war, November 8, -to consider whether the expedition should proceed. Lewis, Boyd, Brown, -and Swartwout voted simply in favor of attacking Montreal. Covington -and Porter were of the opinion “that we proceed from this place under -great danger, ... but ... we know of no other alternative.”[245] - -More than any other cause, Armstrong’s conduct warranted Wilkinson -in considering the campaign at an end. If the attack on Montreal was -seriously intended, every motive required Armstrong to join Hampton -at once in advance of Wilkinson’s expedition. No one knew so well as -he the necessity of some authority to interpose between the tempers -and pretensions of these two men in case a joint campaign were to be -attempted, or to enforce co-operation on either side. Good faith toward -Hampton, even more than toward Wilkinson, required that the secretary -who had led them into such a situation should not desert them. Yet -Armstrong, after waiting till Wilkinson was fairly at Grenadier -Island, began to prepare for return to Washington. From the village -of Antwerp, half way between Sackett’s Harbor and Ogdensburg, the -secretary wrote to Wilkinson, October 27, “Should my fever continue I -shall not be able to approach you as I intended.”[246] Three days later -he wrote again from Denmark on the road to Albany,-- - - “I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to - enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I - should have met you there; but bad roads, worse weather, and a - considerable degree of illness admonished me against receding - farther from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st - proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at - Antwerp.”[247] - -From Albany Armstrong wrote, November 12, for the last time, “in the -fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal,”[248] that he had sent -orders to Hampton to effect a junction with the river expedition. Such -letters and orders, whatever Armstrong meant by them, were certain to -impress both Wilkinson and Hampton with a conviction that the secretary -intended to throw upon them the whole responsibility for the failure of -an expedition which he as well as they knew to be hopeless. - -Doubtless a vigorous general might still have found means if not to -take Montreal, at least to compel the British to evacuate Upper Canada; -but Wilkinson was naturally a weak man, and during the descent of the -river he was excessively ill, never able to make a great exertion. -Every day his difficulties increased. Hardly had his flotilla begun -its descent, when a number of British gunboats commanded by Captain -Mulcaster, the most energetic officer in the British naval service -on the Lake, slipping through Chauncey’s blockade, appeared in -Wilkinson’s rear, and caused him much annoyance. Eight hundred British -rank-and-file from Kingston and Prescott were with Mulcaster, and at -every narrow pass of the river, musketry and artillery began to open -on Wilkinson from the British bank. Progress became slow. November 7, -Macomb was landed on the north bank with twelve hundred men to clear -away these obstructions.[249] The day and night of November 8 were -consumed at the White House in passing troops across the river. Brown’s -brigade was landed on the north shore to reinforce Macomb. The boats -were delayed to keep pace with Brown’s march on shore, and made but -eleven miles November 9, and the next day, November 10, fell down only -to the Long Saut, a continuous rapid eight miles in length. The enemy -pressed close, and while Brown marched in advance to clear the bank -along the rapid, Boyd was ordered to take all the other troops and -protect the rear. - -The flotilla stopped on the night of November 10 near a farm called -Chrystler’s on the British bank; and the next morning, November 11, -at half-past ten o’clock Brown having announced that all was clear -below, Wilkinson was about to order the flotilla to run the rapids when -General Boyd sent word that the enemy in the rear were advancing in -column. Wilkinson was on his boat, unable to leave his bed;[250] Morgan -Lewis was in no better condition; and Boyd was left to fight a battle -as he best could. Boyd never had the confidence of the army; Brown was -said to have threatened to resign rather than serve under him,[251] and -Winfield Scott, who was that day with Macomb and Brown in the advance, -described[252] Boyd as amiable and respectable in a subordinate -position, but “vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief -under high responsibilities.” - -The opportunity to capture or destroy Mulcaster and his eight hundred -men was brilliant, and warranted Wilkinson in turning back his whole -force to accomplish it. Boyd actually employed three brigades, and -made an obstinate but not united or well-supported attempt to crush -the enemy. Colonel Ripley with the Twenty-first regiment drove in the -British skirmishers, and at half-past two o’clock the battle became -general. At half-past four, after a stubborn engagement, General -Covington was killed; his brigade gave way, and the whole American line -fell back, beaten and almost routed. - -This defeat was the least creditable of the disasters suffered by -American arms during the war. No excuse or palliation was ever offered -for it.[253] The American army consisted wholly of regulars, and all -the generals belonged to the regular service. Wilkinson could hardly -have had less than three thousand men with him, after allowing for -his detachments, and was alone to blame if he had not more. Boyd, -according to his own account, had more than twelve hundred men and two -field-pieces under his immediate command on shore.[254] The reserve, -under Colonel Upham of the Eleventh regiment, contained six hundred -rank-and-file,[255] with four field-pieces. Wilkinson’s official report -admitted that eighteen hundred rank-and-file were engaged; Colonel -Walbach, his adjutant-general, admitted two thousand,[256] while -Swartwout thought that twenty-one hundred were in action. The American -force was certainly not less than two thousand, with six field-pieces. - -The British force officially reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison -of the Eighty-ninth regiment, who was in command, consisted of eight -hundred rank-and-file, and thirty Indians. The rank-and-file consisted -of three hundred and forty-two men of the Forty-ninth regiment, about -as many more of the Eighty-ninth, and some Canadian troops. They had -three six-pound field-pieces, and were supported on their right flank -by gunboats.[257] - -On the American side the battle was ill fought both by the generals -and by the men. Wilkinson and Morgan Lewis, the two major-generals, -who were ill on their boats, never gave an order. Boyd, who -commanded, brought his troops into action by detachments, and the -men, on meeting unexpected resistance, broke and fled. The defeat -was bloody as well as mortifying. Wilkinson reported one hundred and -two killed, and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, but strangely -reported no missing,[258] although the British occupied the field of -battle, and claimed upward of one hundred prisoners.[259] Morrison -reported twenty-two killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and -twelve missing. The American loss was twice that of the British, -and Wilkinson’s reports were so little to be trusted that the loss -might well have been greater than he represented it. The story had no -redeeming incident. - -If three brigades, numbering two thousand men, were beaten at -Chrystler’s farm by eight hundred British and Canadians, the chance -that Wilkinson could capture Montreal, even with ten thousand men, was -small. The conduct of the army showed its want of self-confidence. Late -as it was, in the dusk of the evening Boyd hastened to escape across -the river. “The troops being much exhausted,” reported Wilkinson,[260] -“it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that -the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation -took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the -flotilla made a harbor near the head of the Saut on the opposite -shore.” In truth, neither Wilkinson nor his adjutant gave the order -of embarkation,[261] nor was Boyd willing to admit it as his.[262] -Apparently the army by common consent embarked without orders. - -Early the next morning, November 12, the flotilla ran the rapids and -rejoined Brown and Macomb near Cornwall, where Wilkinson learned that -General Hampton had taken the responsibility of putting an end to an -undertaking which had not yet entered upon its serious difficulties. - -Four months had passed since Hampton took command on Lake Champlain. -When he first reached Burlington, July 3, neither men nor material -were ready, nor was even a naval force present to cover his weakness. -While he was camped at Burlington, a British fleet, with about a -thousand regulars, entered the Lake from the Isle aux Noix and the -Richelieu River, and plundered the American magazines at Plattsburg, -July 31, sweeping the Lake clear of American shipping.[263] Neither -Hampton’s army nor McDonough’s small fleet ventured to offer -resistance. Six weeks afterward, in the middle of September, Hampton -had but about four thousand men, in bad condition and poor discipline. - -Wilkinson, though unable to begin his own movement, was earnest that -Hampton should advance on Montreal.[264] Apparently in order to assist -Wilkinson’s plans, Hampton moved his force, September 19, to the Canada -line. Finding that a drought had caused want of water on the direct -road to Montreal, Hampton decided to march his army westward to the -Chateaugay River, forty or fifty miles, and established himself there, -September 26, in a position equally threatening to Montreal and to the -British line of communication up the St. Lawrence. Armstrong approved -the movement,[265] and Hampton remained three weeks at Chateaugay, -building roads and opening lines of communication while waiting for -Wilkinson to move. - -October 16 Armstrong ordered Hampton, in view of Wilkinson’s probable -descent of the river, to “approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or -other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy -in check.”[266] Hampton instantly obeyed, and moved down the Chateaugay -to a point about fifteen miles from its mouth. There he established -his army, October 22, and employed the next two days in completing his -road, and getting up his artillery and stores. - -Hampton’s movements annoyed the British authorities at Montreal. Even -while he was still within American territory, before he advanced from -Chateaugay Four Corners, Sir George Prevost reported, October 8, to his -government,[267]-- - - “The position of Major-General Hampton at the Four Corners on the - Chateaugay River, and which he continued to occupy, either with the - whole or a part of his force, from the latest information I have - been able to obtain from thence, is highly judicious,--as at the - same time that he threatens Montreal and obliges me to concentrate - a considerable body of troops in this vicinity to protect it, he - has it in his power to molest the communication with the Upper - Province, and impede the progress of the supplies required there - for the Navy and Army.” - -If this was the case, October 8, when Hampton was still at Chateaugay, -fifty miles from its mouth, the annoyance must have been much greater -when he advanced, October 21, to Spear’s, within ten miles of the St. -Lawrence on his left, and fifteen from the mouth of the Chateaugay. -Hampton accomplished more than was expected. He held a position equally -well adapted to threaten Montreal, to disturb British communication -with Upper Canada, and to succor Wilkinson. - -That Hampton, with only four thousand men, should do more than this, -could not fairly be required. The defences of Montreal were such as -required ten times his force to overcome. The regular troops defending -Montreal were not stationed in the town itself, which was sufficiently -protected by a broad river and rapids. They were chiefly at Chambly, -St. John’s, Isle aux Noix, or other points on the Richelieu River, -guarding the most dangerous line of approach from Lake Champlain; or -they were at Coteau du Lac on the St. Lawrence about twenty miles -northwest of Hampton’s position. According to the general weekly return -of British forces serving in the Montreal District under command -of Major-General Sir R. H. Sheaffe, Sept. 15, 1813, the aggregate -rank-and-file present for duty was five thousand seven hundred and -fifty-two. At Montreal were none but sick, with the general staff. -At Chambly were nearly thirteen hundred effectives; at St. John’s -nearly eight hundred; at Isle aux Noix about nine hundred. Excluding -the garrison at Prescott, and including the force at Coteau du Lac, -Major-General Sheaffe commanded just five thousand effectives.[268] - -Besides the enrolled troops, Prevost could muster a considerable number -of sailors and marines for the defence of Montreal; and his resources -in artillery, boats, fortifications, and supplies of all sorts were -ample. In addition to the embodied troops, Prevost could count upon -the militia, a force almost as good as regulars for the defence of -a forest-clad country where axes were as effective as musketry in -stopping an invading army. In Prevost’s letter to Bathurst of October -8, announcing Hampton’s invasion, the governor-general said:-- - - “Measures had been in the mean time taken by Major-General Sir - Roger Sheaffe commanding in this district, to resist the advance - of the enemy by moving the whole of the troops under his command - nearer to the frontier line, and by calling out about three - thousand of the sedentary militia. I thought it necessary to - increase this latter force to nearly eight thousand by embodying - the whole of the sedentary militia upon the frontier, this being in - addition to the six battalions of incorporated militia amounting to - five thousand men; and it is with peculiar satisfaction I have to - report to your Lordship that his Majesty’s Canadian subjects have a - second time answered the call to arms in defence of their country - with a zeal and alacrity beyond all praise.” - -Thus the most moderate estimate of the British force about Montreal -gave at least fifteen thousand rank-and-file under arms.[269] Besides -this large array of men, Prevost was amply protected by natural -defences. If Hampton had reached the St. Lawrence at Caughnawaga, he -would still have been obliged to cross the St. Lawrence, more than -two miles wide, under the fire of British batteries and gunboats. -Hampton had no transports. Prevost had bateaux and vessels of every -description, armed and unarmed, above and below the rapids, besides two -river steamers constantly plying to Quebec. - -Hampton’s command consisted of four thousand infantry new to service, -two hundred dragoons, and artillery.[270] With such a force, his chance -of suffering a fatal reverse was much greater than that of his reaching -the St. Lawrence. His position at the Chateaugay was not less perilous -than that of Harrison on the Maumee, and far more so than that which -cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara. - -The British force in Hampton’s immediate front consisted at first of -only three hundred militia, who could make no resistance, and retired -as Hampton advanced. When Hampton made his movement to Spear’s, -Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry in his front commanded about eight -hundred men, and immediately entrenched himself and obstructed the -road with abattis.[271] Hampton felt the necessity of dislodging -Salaberry, who might at any moment be reinforced; and accordingly, -in the night of October 25, sent a strong force to flank Salaberry’s -position, while he should himself attack it in front. - -The flanking party failed to find its way, and the attack in front -was not pressed.[272] The American loss did not exceed fifty men. -The British loss was reported as twenty-five. Sir George Prevost and -his officers were greatly pleased by their success;[273] but Prevost -did not attempt to molest Hampton, who fell back by slow marches to -Chateaugay, where he waited to hear from the Government. The British -generals at Montreal showed little energy in thus allowing Hampton to -escape; and the timidity of their attitude before Hampton’s little army -was the best proof of the incompetence alleged against Prevost by many -of his contemporaries. - -Hampton’s retreat was due more to the conduct of Armstrong than to the -check at Spear’s or to the movements of Prevost. At the moment when he -moved against Salaberry, October 25, a messenger arrived from Sackett’s -Harbor, bringing instructions from the quartermaster-general for -building huts for ten thousand men for winter quarters. These orders -naturally roused Hampton’s suspicions that no serious movement against -Montreal was intended. - - “The papers sunk my hopes,” he wrote to Armstrong, November 1,[274] - “and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support - that had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, - but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it - impracticable.” - -In a separate letter of the same date[275] which Hampton sent to -Armstrong by Colonel King, assuming that the campaign was at an end, -he carried out his declared purpose of resigning. “Events,” he said, -“have had no tendency to change my opinion of the destiny intended for -me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can neither -feel security nor expect honor. The campaign I consider substantially -at an end.” The implication that Armstrong meant to sacrifice him was -certainly disrespectful, and deserved punishment; but when Colonel -King, bearing these letters, arrived in the neighborhood of Ogdensburg, -he found that Armstrong had already done what Hampton reproached him -for intending to do. He had retired to Albany, “suspecting ... that the -campaign ... would terminate as it did.” - -A week afterward, November 8, Hampton received a letter from -Wilkinson, written from Ogdensburg, asking him to forward supplies and -march his troops to some point of junction on the river below St. -Regis.[276] Hampton replied from Chateaugay that he had no supplies -to forward; and as, under such circumstances, his army could not -throw itself on Wilkinson’s scanty means, he should fall back on -Plattsburg, and attempt to act against the enemy on some other road -to be indicated.[277] Wilkinson received the letter on his arrival at -Cornwall, November 12, the day after his defeat at Chrystler’s farm; -and with extraordinary energy moved the whole expedition the next day -to French Mills, six or seven miles up the Salmon River, within the -United States lines, where it went into winter quarters. - -Armstrong and Wilkinson made common cause in throwing upon Hampton -the blame of failure. Wilkinson at first ordered Hampton under -arrest, but after reflection decided to throw the responsibility upon -Armstrong.[278] The secretary declined to accept it, but consented -after some delay to accept Hampton’s resignation when renewed in -March, 1814. Wilkinson declared that Hampton’s conduct had blasted his -dawning hopes and the honor of the army.[279] Armstrong sneered at -Wilkinson for seizing the pretext for abandoning his campaign.[280] -Both the generals believed that Armstrong had deliberately led them -into an impossible undertaking, and deserted them, in order to shift -the blame of failure from himself.[281] Hampton behaved with dignity, -and allowed his opinion to be seen only in his contemptuous silence; -nor did Armstrong publicly blame Hampton’s conduct until Hampton was -dead. The only happy result of the campaign was to remove all the older -generals--Wilkinson, Hampton, and Morgan Lewis--from active service. - -The bloodless failure of an enterprise which might have ended in -extreme disaster was not the whole cost of Armstrong’s and Wilkinson’s -friendship and quarrels. In November nearly all the regular forces, -both British and American, had been drawn toward the St. Lawrence. Even -Harrison and his troops, who reached Buffalo October 24, were sent to -Sackett’s Harbor, November 16, to protect the navy. Not a regiment of -the United States army was to be seen between Sackett’s Harbor and -Detroit. The village of Niagara and Fort George on the British side -were held by a few hundred volunteers commanded by Brigadier-General -McClure of the New York militia. As long as Wilkinson and Hampton -threatened Montreal, Niagara was safe, and needed no further attention. - -After November 13, when Wilkinson and Hampton withdrew from Canada, -while the American army forgot its enemy in the bitterness of its own -personal feuds, the British generals naturally thought of recovering -their lost posts on the Niagara River. McClure, who occupied Fort -George and the small town of Newark under its guns, saw his garrison -constantly diminishing. Volunteers refused to serve longer on any -conditions.[282] The War Department ordered no reinforcements, -although ten or twelve thousand soldiers were lying idle at French -Mills and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about sixty men of the -Twenty-fourth infantry, and some forty volunteers, at Fort George, -while the number of United States troops present for duty at Fort -George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village, Black Rock, and Buffalo, to -protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or -three hundred and twenty-four men. - -As early as October 4, Armstrong authorized McClure to warn the -inhabitants of Newark that their town might suffer destruction in case -the defence of Fort George should render such a measure proper.[283] -No other orders were given, but Wilkinson repeatedly advised that Fort -George should be evacuated,[284] and Armstrong did nothing to protect -it, further than to issue a requisition from Albany, November 25, upon -the Governor of New York for one thousand militia.[285] - -The British, though not rapid in their movements, were not so slow as -the Americans. Early in December Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond -came from Kingston to York, and from York to the head of the Lake where -the British had maintained themselves since losing the Niagara posts -in May. Meanwhile General Vincent had sent Colonel Murray with five -hundred men to retake Fort George. McClure at Fort George, December -10, hearing that Murray had approached within ten miles, evacuated the -post and crossed the river to Fort Niagara; but before doing so he -burned the town of Newark and as much as he could of Queenston, turning -the inhabitants, in extreme cold, into the open air. He alleged as -his motive the wish to deprive the enemy of winter quarters;[286] yet -he did not destroy the tents or military barracks,[287] and he acted -without authority, for Armstrong Had authorized him to burn Newark only -in case he meant to defend Fort George. - - “The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a descent on this - frontier if possible,” wrote McClure from the village of Niagara, - December 13; “but I shall watch them close with my handful of men - until a reinforcement of militia and volunteers arrives.... I am - not a little apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of - the exposed condition of Buffalo and our shipping there. My whole - effective force on this extensive frontier does not exceed two - hundred and fifty men.” - -Five days passed, and still no reinforcements arrived, and no regular -troops were even ordered to start for Niagara. “I apprehended an -attack,” wrote McClure;[288] and he retired thirty miles to Buffalo, -“with a view of providing for the defence.” On the night of December -18 Colonel Murray, with five hundred and fifty regular rank-and-file, -crossed the river from Fort George unperceived; surprised the sentinels -on the glacis and at the gates of Fort Niagara; rushed through the main -gate; and, with a loss of eight men killed and wounded, captured the -fortress with some three hundred and fifty prisoners. - -Nothing could be said on the American side in defence or excuse -of this disgrace. From Armstrong at the War Department to Captain -Leonard who commanded the fort, every one concerned in the transaction -deserved whatever punishment the law or army regulations could -inflict. The unfortunate people of Niagara and Buffalo were victims -to official misconduct. The British, thinking themselves released -from ordinary rules of war by the burning of Newark and Queenston, -showed unusual ferocity. In the assault on Fort Niagara they killed -sixty-seven Americans, all by the bayonet, while they wounded only -eleven. Immediately afterward they “let loose”[289] their auxiliary -Indians on Lewiston and the country around. On the night of December -29, Lieutenant-General Drummond sent a force of fifteen hundred men -including Indians[290] across the river above the falls, and driving -away the militia, burned Black Rock and Buffalo with all their public -stores and three small war-schooners.[291] - -These acts of retaliation were justified by Sir George Prevost in a -long proclamation[292] dated Jan. 12, 1814, which promised that he -would not “pursue further a system of warfare so revolting to his own -feelings and so little congenial to the British character unless the -future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to -it.” The Americans themselves bore Drummond’s excessive severity with -less complaint than usual. They partly suspected that the destruction -effected on the Thames, at York and at Newark, by American troops, -though unauthorized by orders, had warranted some retaliation; but they -felt more strongly that their anger should properly be vented on their -own government and themselves, who had allowed a handful of British -troops to capture a strong fortress and to ravage thirty miles of -frontier, after repeated warning, without losing two hundred men on -either side, while thousands of regular troops were idle elsewhere, and -the neighborhood ought without an effort to have supplied five thousand -militia. - -Fort Niagara, which thus fell into British hands, remained, like -Mackinaw, in the enemy’s possession until the peace. - - - - -CHAPTER IX. - - -MILITARY movements in the Southern department attracted little notice, -but were not the less important. The Southern people entered into -the war in the hope of obtaining the Floridas. President Madison, -like President Jefferson, gave all the support in his power to the -scheme. Throughout the year 1812 United States troops still occupied -Amelia Island and the St. Mary’s River, notwithstanding the refusal of -Congress to authorize the occupation. The President expected Congress -at the session of 1812–1813 to approve the seizure of both Floridas, -and took measures in advance for that purpose. - -October 12, 1812, Secretary Eustis wrote to the Governor of Tennessee -calling out fifteen hundred militia for the defence of the “lower -country.” The force was not intended for defence but for conquest; it -was to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine by -the regular troops. For that object every man in Tennessee was ready -to serve; and of all Tennesseeans, Andrew Jackson was the most ardent. -Governor Blount immediately authorized Jackson, as major-general of -the State militia, to call out two thousand volunteers. The call was -issued November 14; the volunteers collected at Nashville December 10; -and Jan. 7, 1813, the infantry embarked in boats to descend the river, -while the mounted men rode through the Indian country to Natchez. - - “I have the pleasure to inform you,” wrote Jackson to Eustis in - departing,[293] “that I am now at the head of two thousand and - seventy volunteers, the choicest of our citizens, who go at the - call of their country to execute the will of the Government; who - have no Constitutional scruples, and if the Government orders, will - rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the - ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine.” - -The Tennessee army reached Natchez, February 15, and went into camp to -wait orders from Washington, which were expected to direct an advance -on Mobile and Pensacola. - -While Jackson descended the Mississippi, Monroe, then acting Secretary -of War, wrote, January 13, to Major-General Pinckney,[294] whose -military department included Georgia: “It is intended to place under -your command an adequate force for the reduction of St. Augustine -should it be decided on by Congress, before whom the subject will be -in a few days.” A fortnight later, January 30, Monroe wrote also to -Wilkinson,[295] then commanding at New Orleans: “The subject of taking -possession of West Florida is now before Congress, and will probably -pass. You will be prepared to carry into effect this measure should it -be decided on.” - -Neither Madison nor Monroe raised objection to the seizure of territory -belonging to a friendly power; but Congress showed no such readiness -to act. Senator Anderson of Tennessee, as early as Dec. 10, 1812, -moved,[296] in secret session of the Senate, that a committee be -appointed to consider the expediency of authorizing the President -“to occupy and hold the whole or any part of East Florida, including -Amelia Island, and also those parts of West Florida which are not now -in the possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States.” -After much debate the Senate, December 22, adopted the resolution by -eighteen votes to twelve, and the committee, consisting of Anderson, -Samuel Smith, Tait of Georgia, Varnum of Massachusetts, and Goodrich -of Connecticut, reported a bill,[297] January 19, authorizing the -President to occupy both Floridas, and to exercise government there, -“provided ... that the section of country herein designated that is -situated to the eastward of the river Perdido may be the subject of -future negotiation.” - -The bill met opposition from the President’s personal enemies, Giles, -Leib, and Samuel Smith, as well as from the Federalists and some of -the Northern Democrats. January 26, Samuel Smith moved to strike -out the second section, which authorized the seizure of Florida east -of the Perdido; and the Senate, February 2, by a vote of nineteen -to sixteen, adopted Smith’s motion. The vote was sectional. North -and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana supported the -bill; Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and -Rhode Island opposed it; Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Massachusetts, New -Hampshire, and Vermont were divided; New Jersey threw one vote in its -favor, the second senator being absent. Had Leib not changed sides the -next day, the whole bill would have been indefinitely postponed; but -the majority rallied, February 5, and by a vote of twenty-one to eleven -authorized the President to seize Florida west of the Perdido, or, in -other words, to occupy Mobile. The House passed the bill in secret -session February 9, and the President signed it February 12.[298] - -In refusing to seize East Florida, the Senate greatly disarranged -Madison’s plans. Three days afterward, February 5, Armstrong took -charge of the War Department, and his first orders were sent to Andrew -Jackson directing him to dismiss his force, “the causes of embodying -and marching to New Orleans the corps under your command having ceased -to exist.”[299] Jackson, ignorant that the Administration was not to -blame, and indignant at his curt dismissal, marched his men back to -Tennessee, making himself responsible for their pay and rations. On -learning these circumstances, Armstrong wrote, March 22, a friendly -letter thanking him for the important services his corps would have -rendered “had the Executive policy of occupying the two Floridas been -adopted by the national legislature.”[300] - -After the Senate had so persistently refused to support Madison’s -occupation of East Florida, he could hardly maintain longer the illegal -possession he had held during the past year of Amelia Island. February -15, Armstrong wrote to Major-General Pinckney,[301] “The late private -proceedings of Congress have resulted in a decision not to invade -East Florida at present;” but not until March 7, did the secretary -order Pinckney to withdraw the troops from Amelia Island and Spanish -territory.[302] - -The troops were accordingly withdrawn from Amelia Island, May 16; -but nothing could restore East Florida to its former repose, and the -anarchy which had been introduced from the United States could never -be mastered except by the power that created it. Perhaps Madison -would have retained possession, as the least of evils, in spite of -the Senate’s vote of February 3, had not another cause, independent -of legislative will, overcome his repugnance to the evacuation. The -Russian offer of mediation arrived while the President was still in -doubt. The occupation of Florida, being an act of war against Spain, -could not fail to excite the anger of England, and in that feeling of -displeasure the Czar must inevitably share. From the moment their cause -against Napoleon was common, Russia, England, and Spain were more than -likely to act together in resistance to any territorial aggression upon -any member of their alliance, the evacuation of East Florida by the -United States evaded a serious diplomatic difficulty; and probably not -by mere coincidence, Armstrong’s order to evacuate Amelia Island was -dated March 7, while Daschkoff’s letter offering the Czar’s mediation -was dated March 8. - -The Cabinet was so little united in support of the Executive policy -that Madison and Monroe ordered the seizure of Mobile without -consulting Gallatin, whose persistent hostility to the Florida -intrigues was notorious. When Monroe in April gave to Gallatin and -Bayard the President’s instructions[303] for the peace negotiations, -among the rest he directed them to assert “a right to West Florida -by cession from France, and a claim to East Florida as an indemnity -for spoliations.” On receiving these instructions, Gallatin wrote to -Monroe, May 2, asking,[304]-- - - “Where is the importance of taking possession of Mobile this - summer? We may do this whenever we please, and is it not better to - delay every operation of minor importance which may have a tendency - to impede our negotiations with Great Britain and Russia? You know - that to take by force any place in possession of another nation, - whatever our claim to that place may be, is war; and you must be - aware that both Russia and Great Britain will feel disposed, if not - to support the pretensions of Spain against us, at least to take - part against the aggressor.” - -Monroe quickly replied:[305] “With respect to West Florida, possession -will be taken of it before you get far on your voyage. That is a -question settled.” In fact, possession had been taken of it three weeks -before he wrote, in pursuance of orders sent in February, apparently -without Gallatin’s knowledge. Monroe added views of his own, singularly -opposed to Gallatin’s convictions. - - “On the subject of East Florida,” wrote Monroe to Gallatin, May - 6,[306] “I think I intimated to you in my last that Colonel - Lear was under the most perfect conviction, on the authority of - information from respectable sources at Cadiz, that the Spanish - regency had sold that and the other province to the British - government, and that it had done so under a belief that we had, - or should soon get, possession of it. My firm belief is that if - we were possessed of both, it would facilitate your negotiations - in favor of impressment and every other object, especially if it - was distinctly seen by the British ministers or minister that, - instead of yielding them or any part of either, we would push our - fortunes in that direction, and in Canada, if they did not hasten - to accommodate.” - -Gallatin, on the eve of sailing for Russia, replied with good temper, -expressing opinions contrary to those of the President and Secretary of -State. - - “On the subject of Florida,” Gallatin said,[307] “I have always - differed in opinion with you, and am rejoiced to have it in our - power to announce the evacuation of the province. Let it alone - until you shall, by the introduction of British troops, have a - proof of the supposed cession. In this I do not believe. It can be - nothing more than a permission to occupy it in order to defend it - for Spain. By withdrawing our troops, we withdraw the pretence; - but the impolitic occupancy of Mobile will, I fear, renew our - difficulties. The object is at present of very minor importance, - swelled into consequence by the representations from that quarter, - and which I would not at this moment have attempted, among other - reasons, because it was a Southern one, and will, should it involve - us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of Washington. You - will pardon the freedom with which, on the eve of parting with you, - I speak on this subject. It is intended as a general caution, which - I think important, because I know and see every day the extent of - geographical feeling, and the necessity of prudence if we mean to - preserve and invigorate the Union.” - -No sooner did the Act of February 12 become law than Armstrong wrote, -February 16, to Wilkinson at New Orleans, enclosing a copy of the -Act, and ordering him immediately to take possession of Mobile and the -country as far as the Perdido.[308] Wilkinson, who had for years looked -forward to that step, hastened to obey the instruction. When Gallatin -remonstrated, the measure had been already taken and could not be -recalled. - -Since July 9, 1812, Wilkinson had again commanded at New Orleans. No -immediate attack was to be feared, nor could a competent British force -be collected there without warning; but in case such an attack should -be made, Wilkinson had reason to fear the result, for his regular -force consisted of only sixteen hundred effectives, ill equipped -and without defences.[309] The War Department ordered him to depend -on movable ordnance and temporary works rather than on permanent -fortifications;[310] but with his usual disregard of orders he began -the construction or the completion of extensive works at various points -on the river and coast, at a cost which the government could ill afford. - -While engaged in this task Wilkinson received, March 14, Armstrong’s -order of February 16 for the invasion of West Florida. When the -government’s orders were agreeable to Wilkinson, they reached him -promptly and were executed with rapidity. Within three weeks he -collected at Pass Christian a force of about six hundred men, supported -by gunboats, and entered the Bay of Mobile on the night of April 10, -while at the same time the garrison at Fort Stoddert descended the -Tensaw River, and cut the communication by land between Mobile and -Pensacola. At that time Mobile Point was undefended. The only Spanish -fortress was Fort Charlotte at Mobile, garrisoned by one hundred and -fifty combatants. Wilkinson summoned the fort to surrender, and the -commandant had no choice but to obey, for the place was untenable and -without supplies. The surrender took place April 15. Wilkinson then -took possession of the country as far as the Perdido, and began the -construction of a fort, to be called Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point at -the entrance of the Bay, some sixty miles below the town.[311] - -This conquest, the only permanent gain of territory made during the -war, being effected without bloodshed, attracted less attention than it -deserved. Wilkinson committed no errors, and won the President’s warm -approval.[312] Wilkinson was greatly pleased by his own success, and -wished to remain at New Orleans to carry out his projected defences; -but Armstrong had written as early as March 10, ordering him to the -Lakes. As so often happened with orders that displeased the general, -Armstrong’s letter, though dated March 10, and doubtless arriving -in New Orleans before April 10, was received by Wilkinson only on -his return, May 19. After another delay of three weeks, he started -northward, and travelled by way of Mobile through the Creek country to -Washington. - -Wilkinson’s departure, June 10, and the evacuation of Amelia Island -by General Pinckney May 16, closed the first chapter of the war in -the South. Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson, May 27:[313] “The mission -to Petersburg and the instructions to our envoys will put a barrier -between you and Pensacola for some time to come at least, and -permanently in case of peace.” The sudden stop thus put by the Senate -and the Russian mediation to the campaign against Pensacola and St. -Augustine deranged the plans of Georgia and Tennessee, arrested the -career of Andrew Jackson, and caused the transfer of Wilkinson from New -Orleans to the Lakes. The government expected no other difficulties in -the Southern country, and had no reason to fear them. If new perils -suddenly arose, they were due less to England, Spain, or the United -States than to the chance that gave energy and influence to Tecumthe. - -[Illustration: - - MAP OF THE - - Seat of War among the - Creek Indians. - - _From the Original Drawing_ - IN THE - WAR DEPARTMENT. - - PUBLISHED BY JOHN MELISH, - 1815. -] - -The Southern Indians were more docile and less warlike than the Indians -of the Lakes. The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who occupied the whole -extent of country on the east bank of the Mississippi River from -the Ohio to the Gulf, gave little trouble or anxiety; and even the -great confederacy of Muskogees, or Creeks, who occupied the territory -afterward called the State of Alabama and part of Georgia, fell in some -degree into a mode of life which seemed likely to make them tillers -of the soil. In 1800 the Creeks held, or claimed, about three hundred -miles square from the Tennessee River to the Gulf, and from the middle -of Georgia nearly to the line which afterward marked the State of -Mississippi. The Seminoles, or wild men, of Florida were a branch of -the Muskogees, and the Creek warriors themselves were in the habit of -visiting Pensacola and Mobile, where they expected to receive presents -from the Spanish governor. - -Two thirds of the Creek towns were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers -in the heart of Alabama. Their inhabitants were called Upper Creeks. -The Lower Creeks lived in towns on the Chattahooche River, the modern -boundary between Alabama and Georgia. The United States government, -following a different policy in 1799 from that of Jefferson toward -the Northwestern Indians, induced the Creeks to adopt a national -organization for police purposes; it also helped them to introduce -ploughs, to learn cotton-spinning, and to raise crops. The success of -these experiments was not at first great, for the larger number of -Indians saw no advantage in becoming laborers, and preferred sitting -in the squares of the towns, or hunting; but here and there chiefs or -half-breeds had farms, slaves, stock, orchards, and spinning-wheels. - -Large as the Creek country was, and wild as it had ever been, it did -not abound in game. A good hunter, passing in any direction through -the three hundred miles of Alabama and Georgia, found difficulty -in obtaining game enough for his support.[314] For that reason the -Seminoles left their old towns and became wild people, as their name -implied, making irregular settlements in Florida, where game and food -were more plenty. The mass of the Creek nation, fixed in the villages -in the interior, clung to their habits of hunting even when obliged to -cultivate the soil, and their semi-civilization rendered them a more -perplexing obstacle to the whites than though they had obstinately -resisted white influence. - -Had the Indian problem been left to the people of Georgia and -Tennessee, the Indians would soon have disappeared; but the national -government established under President Washington in 1789 put a sharp -curb on Georgia, and interposed decisively between the Georgians and -the Creeks.[315] President Washington in 1796 appointed Benjamin -Hawkins of North Carolina as Indian agent among the Creeks, and Hawkins -protected and governed them with devotion; but the result of his -friendliness was the same as that of others’ greed. The Indians slowly -lost ground. - -The Creeks complained of grievances similar to those of the -Northwestern Indians, and their position was even more helpless. -They had no other outlet than Pensacola and Mobile. Except from the -Spaniards they could expect no aid in case of trouble, and the Spanish -governors of Florida, after the abdication of Carlos IV. in 1807, could -scarcely maintain their own position, much less supply the Creeks with -arms or gunpowder. While the Northwestern Indians could buy at Malden -all the weapons and ammunition they wanted, the Creeks possessed few -firearms, and these in bad condition; nor were they skilful in using -guns. - -The United States government prevented the Georgians from compelling -the Indians to sell their lands, but nothing could prevent them from -trespass; and the Indian woods along the frontier were filled with -cattle, horses, and hogs belonging to the whites, while white men -destroyed the game, hunting the deer by firelight, and scaring the -Indian hunters from their hunting-grounds. “Every cane-swamp where they -go to look for a bear--which is part of their support--is near eat out -by the stocks put over by the citizens of Georgia.”[316] This complaint -was made in 1796, and as time went on the Indian hunting-grounds were -more rapidly narrowed. Not only from Georgia but also from Fort -Stoddert, along the course of the Tombigbee River, above Mobile, -intruders pressed into the Creek country. The Indians had no choice but -to sell their lands for annuities, and under this pressure the Creeks, -in 1802 and 1803, were induced to part with the district between the -Oconee and Ocmulgee in the centre of Georgia. They retained their towns -on the Chattahoochee, where Hawkins’s agency was established in the -town of Coweta, on the edge of the Creek country. - -Hawkins was satisfied with their behavior, and believed the chiefs -to be well disposed. They showed none of the restlessness which -characterized the Northwestern Indians, until Tecumthe conceived -the idea of bringing them into his general league to check the -encroachments of the whites. After Tecumthe’s interview with Governor -Harrison at Vincennes, in July, 1811, he made a long journey through -the Chickasaw and Choctaw country, and arrived among the Creeks in -October, bringing with him a score of Indian warriors. The annual -council of the Creeks was held in that month at the village of -Tuckaubatchee,--an ancient town of the Upper Creeks on the Tallapoosa. -The rumor that Tecumthe would be present brought great numbers of -Indians, even Cherokees and Choctaws, to the place, while Hawkins -attended the council in his character as agent. - -Tecumthe and his warriors marched into the centre of the square and -took their places in silence. That night “they danced the dance of the -Indians of the Lakes,” which became thenceforward a political symbol of -their party among the Creeks. Some nights afterward Tecumthe addressed -the council. Versions more or less untrustworthy have been given of the -speech;[317] but the only official allusion to it by a person entitled -to credit seemed to show that it was in substance the address made by -Tecumthe at Vincennes. Hawkins, recalling to the Creek chiefs in 1814 -the course of events which had caused their troubles, reminded them -how “Tecumseh, in the square of Tuckaubatchee, ... told the Creeks -not to do any injury to the Americans; to be in peace and friendship -with them; not to steal even a bell from any one of any color. Let the -white people on this continent manage their affairs their own way. Let -the red people manage their affairs their own way.”[318] Hawkins and -the old chiefs would have certainly interfered had Tecumthe incited -the Creeks to war or violence; but according to Hawkins the speech was -a pacific “talk,” delivered by Tecumthe in the name of the British. -Indian tradition preserved another form of Tecumthe’s rhetoric, which -seemed to complete the identity with the Vincennes address. Unable -to express himself in the Muskogee language, Tecumthe used pantomime -familiar to Indians. Holding his war-club with outstretched arm, he -opened first the little finger, then the next and the next, till the -club fell from his hand. - -Indian union was unquestionably the chief theme of all Tecumthe’s -public addresses. Whether in private he taught other doctrines must -be matter of surmise; but he certainly brought into the Creek nation -a religious fanaticism of a peculiar and dangerous kind. Prophets -soon appeared, chiefly among the Alabamas, a remnant of an ancient -race, not of Creek blood, but members of the Creek confederacy.[319] -The prophets, with the usual phenomena of hysteria, claimed powers -of magic, and promised to bring earthquakes to destroy an invading -army. They preached the total destruction of everything, animate and -inanimate, that pertained to civilization. As the nation generally was -badly armed, and relied chiefly on their bows, arrows, and war-clubs -for battle,[320] the moral support of magic was needed to give them -confidence. - -So secret was the influence of Tecumthe’s friends that no suspicion of -the excitement reached Hawkins even when the war with England began; -and the old chiefs of the nation--known to be devoted to peace and -to the white alliance--were kept in ignorance of all that was done -among the young warriors. The Alabamas, or Coosadas, lived below the -junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, on the west bank of the Alabama -River, about eight miles above the modern town of Montgomery; they -were considered by Hawkins the most industrious and best behaved of -all the Creeks, whose fields were the granaries of the upper towns and -furnished supplies even to Mobile. Their town was the last place in -which Hawkins expected to see conspiracy, violence, or fanaticism. The -young men “sang the song of the Indians of the Lakes, and danced the -dance” in secret for eighteen months after Tecumthe’s visit, without -public alarm, and probably would have continued to do so except for an -outbreak committed by some of their nation three hundred miles away. - -In 1812 a band of six Indians led by the Little Warrior of Wewocau, a -Creek town on the Coosa, was sent by the nation on a public mission to -the Chickasaws.[321] Instead of delivering their “talks” and returning, -they continued their journey to the northern Lakes and joined Tecumthe -at Malden. They took part in the massacre at the river Raisin, Jan. 22, -1813, and soon afterward began their return, bringing talks from the -Shawanese and British and also a letter from some British officer at -Malden to the Spanish officials at Pensacola, from whom they hoped to -obtain weapons and powder. According to common report, Tecumthe told -the Little Warrior that he was about to aid the British in capturing -Fort Meigs, and as soon as the fort was taken he would come to join the -Creeks.[322] Until then his friends were to increase their party by the -secret means and magic that had proved so successful, but were not to -begin open war.[323] - -The Little Warrior and his party, including a warrior from Tuskegee, -a Creek town at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, after crossing -Indiana in the month of February reached the north bank of the Ohio -River about seven miles above its mouth, where were two cabins occupied -by white families.[324] Unable to resist the temptation to spill blood, -the band murdered the two families with the usual Indian horrors. This -outrage was committed February 9; and the band, crossing the Ohio, -passed southward through the Chickasaw country, avowing the deed and -its motive.[325] - -The Little Warrior arrived at home about the middle of March, and -reported that he brought talks from the Shawanese and British. The -old chiefs of the Upper Creeks immediately held a council March 25, -and after listening to the talks, reprimanded the Little Warrior and -ordered him to leave the Council House.[326] On the same day Hawkins -wrote to them from Coweta, demanding delivery of the Little Warrior -and his six companions to answer for the murders they had committed. -On hearing this demand, the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee under the lead -of the Big Warrior held another council, while the Little Warrior, the -Tuskegee Warrior, and the murderers took to the woods. The old chiefs -in council decided to execute the murderers, and sent out parties to -do it. The Little Warrior was found in the swamp, well armed, but was -decoyed out and killed by treachery; “the first and second man’s gun -snapped at him, but the third man’s gun fired and killed; ... four men -that had on pouches kept them shaking following after him, so that he -could not hear the gun snap; if he had found out that, he would have -wounded a good many with his arrows.”[327] - -The Tuskegee warrior and four others were found in a house on the -Hickory Ground at the fork of the rivers. As long as they had -ammunition, they held the attack at a distance, but at last the house -was fired. The Tuskegee Warrior being wounded, was burned in the house, -while his two young brothers were taken out and tomahawked. One warrior -broke away, but was caught and killed; two more were killed elsewhere. -One escaped, and “set out the morning after to kill white people.” -Warriors were sent after him. - - “He made battle, firing at the warriors, and was near killing - one; the bullet passed near his ear. He then drew his knife and - tomahawk, defended himself, and the warriors shot three balls - through him. He fell, retained the power of speech till next day, - and died. He said he had been to the Shawanese helping of them, and - had got fat eating white people’s flesh. Every one to the very last - called on the Shawanese general, Tecumseh.”[328] - -Such political executions, in the stifled excitement of the moment, -could not but rouse violent emotion throughout the Creek nation. The -old chiefs, having given life for life, felt the stronger for their -assertion of authority; but they knew nothing of the true situation. -For several weeks no open outbreak occurred, but the prophets were more -active than ever. About June 4 the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee, hearing -that the prophets “kept as usual their fooleries,” sent a runner to the -Alabamas with a message:[329]-- - - “You are but a few Alabama people. You say that the Great Spirit - visits you frequently; that he comes in the sun and speaks to you; - that the sun comes down just above your heads. Now we want to see - and hear what you say you have seen and heard. Let us have the - same proof you have had, and we will believe what we see and hear. - You have nothing to fear; the people who committed murders have - suffered for their crimes, and there is an end of it.” - -The runner who carried this message was one of the warriors who had -aided in killing the seven murderers. The Alabamas instantly put him to -death, and sent his scalp to their friends at the forks of the river. -Then began a general uprising, and every warrior who had aided in -killing the murderers was himself killed or hunted from the Upper Creek -country. The chiefs of Tuckaubatchee with difficulty escaped to the -agency at Coweta, where they were under the protection of Georgia. - -The Lower Creek towns did not join the outbreak; but of the Upper -Creek towns twenty-nine declared for war, and only five for peace. At -least two thousand warriors were believed to have taken the war-club -by August 1, and got the name of Red Clubs, or Red Sticks, for that -reason. Everywhere they destroyed farms, stock, and all objects of -white civilization, and killed or drove away their opponents.[330] - -With all this the Spaniards had nothing to do. The outbreak was caused -by the Indian War in the Northwest, and immediately by the incompetence -of General Winchester and by the massacre at the river Raisin. The -Creeks were totally unprepared for war, except so far as they trusted -to magic; they had neither guns, powder, nor balls. For that reason -they turned to the Spaniards, who could alone supply them. When the -Little Warrior was put to death, the British letter which he carried -from Malden for the Spanish officials at Pensacola came into the -charge of another Creek warrior, Peter McQueen, a half-breed. In July, -McQueen, with a large party of warriors started for Pensacola, with the -letter and four hundred dollars, to get powder.[331] On arriving there -they saw the Spanish governor, who treated them civilly, and in fear -of violence gave them, according to McQueen’s account,[332] “a small -bag of powder each for ten towns, and five bullets to each man.” With -this supply, which the governor represented as a friendly present for -hunting purposes, they were obliged to content themselves, and started -on their return journey. - -News that McQueen’s party was at Pensacola instantly reached the -American settlements above Mobile, where the inhabitants were already -taking refuge in stockades.[333] A large number of Americans, without -military organization, under several leaders, one of whom was a -half-breed named Dixon Bailey, started July 26 to intercept McQueen, -and succeeded in surprising the Indians July 27 at a place called -Burnt Corn, about eighty miles north of Pensacola. The whites at first -routed the Indians, and captured the pack-mules with the ammunition; -but the Indians quickly rallied, and in their turn routed the whites, -with a loss of two killed and fifteen wounded,--although they failed to -recover the greater part of the pack-animals. With the small amount of -powder left to him, McQueen then returned to his people. - -Angry at the attack and eager to revenge the death of his warriors, -McQueen summoned the warriors of thirteen towns, some eight hundred -in number, and about August 20 started in search of his enemies. -The Creek war differed from that on the Lakes in being partly a war -of half-breeds. McQueen’s strongest ally was William Weatherford, a -half-breed, well known throughout the country as a man of property and -ability, as nearly civilized as Indian blood permitted, and equally at -home among Indians and whites. McQueen and Weatherford were bitterly -hostile to the half-breeds Bailey and Beasley, who were engaged in -the affair of Burnt Corn.[334] Both Beasley and Bailey were at a -stockade called Fort Mims, some thirty-five miles above Mobile, on -the eastern side of the Alabama River, where about five hundred and -fifty persons were collected,--a motley crowd of whites, half-breeds, -Indians, and negroes, old and young, women and children, protected -only by a picket wall, pierced by five hundred loop-holes three and a -half feet from the ground, and two rude gates.[335] Beasley commanded, -and wrote, August 80, that he could “maintain the post against any -number of Indians.”[336] To Fort Mims the Creek warriors turned, for -the reason that Beasley and Bailey were there, and they arrived in the -neighborhood, August 29, without giving alarm. Twice, negroes tending -cattle outside rushed back to the fort reporting that painted warriors -were hovering about; but the horsemen when sent out discovered no sign -of an enemy, and Beasley tied up and flogged the second negro for -giving a false alarm. - -At noon, August 30, when the drum beat for dinner no patrols were out, -the gates were open, and sand had drifted against that on the eastern -side so that it could not quickly be closed. Suddenly a swarm of -Indians raising the warwhoop rushed toward the fort. Beasley had time -to reach the gate, but could not close it, and was tomahawked on the -spot. The Indians got possession of the loop-holes outside, and of one -inclosure. The whites, under Dixon Bailey, held the inner inclosure and -fought with desperation; but at last the Indians succeeded in setting -fire to the house in the centre, and the fire spread to the whole -stockade. The Indians then effected an entrance, and massacred most -of the inmates. Fifteen persons escaped, and among these was Dixon -Bailey mortally wounded. Most of the negroes were spared to be slaves. -Two hundred and fifty scalps became trophies of the Creek warriors,--a -number such as had been seldom taken by Indians from the white people -on a single day. - - - - -CHAPTER X. - - -THE battle at Burnt Corn was regarded by the Indians as a declaration -of war by the whites. Till then they seemed to consider themselves -engaged in a domestic quarrel, or civil war;[337] but after the -massacre at Fort Mims they could not retreat, and yet knew that they -must perish except for supernatural aid. Their destiny was controlled -by that of Tecumthe. Ten days after the massacre at Fort Mims, Perry -won his victory on Lake Erie, which settled the result of the Indian -wars both in the North and in the South. Tecumthe had expected to -capture Fort Meigs, and with it Fort Wayne and the line of the Maumee -and Wabash. On the impulse of this success he probably hoped to raise -the war-spirit among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, and then in person to -call the Creeks into the field. Proctor’s successive defeats blasted -Indian hopes, and the Creeks had hardly struck their first blow in -his support when Tecumthe himself fell, and the Indians of the Lakes -submitted or fled to Canada. - -At best, the Creek outbreak would have been hopeless. Although the -number of hostile Creek warriors was matter of conjecture, nothing -showed that they could exceed four thousand. At Pensacola, Peter -McQueen was said to have claimed forty-eight hundred “gun-men” on -his side.[338] At such a moment he probably exaggerated his numbers. -The Big Warrior, who led the peace party, estimated the hostile -Creeks, early in August, as numbering at least twenty-five hundred -warriors.[339] If the number of gun-men was four thousand, the number -of guns in their possession could scarcely be more than one thousand. -Not only had the Creeks few guns, and those in poor condition, but they -had little powder or lead, and no means of repairing their weapons. -Their guns commonly missed fire, and even after discharging them, -the Creeks seldom reloaded, but resorted to the bow-and-arrows which -they always carried. As warriors they felt their inferiority to the -Shawanese and Indians of the Lakes, while their position was more -desperate, for the Choctaws and Cherokees behind them refused to join -in their war. - -Four thousand warriors who had never seen a serious war even with -their Indian neighbors, and armed for the most part with clubs, or -bows-and-arrows, were not able to resist long the impact of three or -four armies, each nearly equal to their whole force, coming from every -quarter of the compass. On the other hand, the military difficulties -of conquering the Creeks were not trifling. The same obstacles that -stopped Harrison in Ohio, stopped Pinckney in Georgia. Pinckney, -like Harrison, could set in motion three columns of troops on three -converging lines, but he could not feed them or make roads for them. -The focus of Indian fanaticism was the Hickory Ground at the fork of -the Coosa and Tallapoosa, about one hundred and fifty miles distant -from the nearest point that would furnish supplies for an American army -coming from Georgia, Tennessee, or Mobile. Pinckney’s natural line of -attack was through Georgia to the Lower Creek towns and the American -forts on the Chattahoochee, whence he could move along a good road -about eighty miles to the Upper Creek towns, near the Hickory Ground. -The next convenient line was from Mobile up the Alabama River about one -hundred and fifty miles to the same point. The least convenient was the -pathless, mountainous, and barren region of Upper Alabama and Georgia, -through which an army from Tennessee must toil for at least a hundred -miles in order to reach an enemy. - -The State of Georgia was most interested in the Creek war, and was -chiefly to profit by it. Georgia in 1813 had a white population of -about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and a militia probably -numbering thirty thousand. Military District No. 6, embracing the two -Carolinas and Georgia, was supposed to contain two thousand regular -troops, and was commanded by Major-General Pinckney. Under Pinckney’s -command, a thousand regulars and three thousand militia, advancing from -Georgia by a good road eighty miles into the Indian country, should -have been able to end the Creek war within six months from the massacre -at Fort Mims; but for some reason the attempts on that side were not -so successful as they should have been, and were neither rapid nor -vigorous. Tennessee took the lead. - -In respect of white population, the State of Tennessee was more than -double the size of Georgia; but it possessed a greater advantage in -Andrew Jackson, whose extreme energy was equivalent to the addition of -an army. When news of the Mims massacre reached Nashville about the -middle of September, Jackson was confined to his bed by a pistol-shot, -which had broken his arm and nearly cost his life ten days before in -a street brawl with Thomas H. Benton. From his bed he issued an order -calling back into service his two thousand volunteers of 1812; and -as early as October 12, little more than a month after the affair at -Fort Mims, he and his army of twenty-five hundred men were already -camped on the Tennessee River south of Huntsville in Alabama. There was -his necessary base of operations, but one hundred and sixty miles of -wilderness lay between him and the Hickory Ground. - -On the Tennessee River Jackson’s position bore some resemblance to -that of Harrison on the Maumee a year before. Energy could not save him -from failure. Indeed, the greater his energy the more serious were his -difficulties. He depended on supplies from east Tennessee descending -the river; but the river was low, and the supplies could not be moved. -He had taken no measures to procure supplies from Nashville. Without -food and forage he could not safely advance, or even remain where he -was. Under such conditions, twenty-five hundred men with half as many -horses could not be kept together. Harrison under the same difficulties -held back his main force near its magazines till it disbanded, without -approaching within a hundred miles of its object. Jackson suffered -nearly the same fate. He sent away his mounted men under General Coffee -to forage on the banks of the Black Warrior River, fifty miles to the -southwest, where no Creeks were to be feared. He forced his infantry -forward through rough country some twenty miles, to a point where -the river made its most southern bend, and there, in the mountainous -defile, he established, October 23, a camp which he called Deposit, -where his supplies were to be brought when the river should permit. - -Coffee’s mounted men returned October 24. Then, October 25, in the -hope of finding food as he went, Jackson plunged into the mountains -beyond the river, intending to make a raid, as far as he could, into -the Creek country. Except fatigue and famine, he had nothing to fear. -The larger Creek towns were a hundred miles to the southward, and -were busy with threatened attacks nearer home. After a week’s march -Jackson reached the upper waters of the Coosa. Within a short distance -were two or three small Creek villages. Against one of these Jackson -sent his mounted force, numbering nine hundred men, under General -Coffee. Early in the morning of November 3, Coffee surrounded and -destroyed Talishatchee. His report represented that the Indians made -an obstinate resistance.[340] “Not one of the warriors escaped to tell -the news,--a circumstance unknown heretofore.” According to Coffee’s -estimate, Talishatchee contained two hundred and eighty-four Indians of -both sexes and all ages. If one in three could be reckoned as capable -of bearing arms, the number of warriors was less than one hundred. -Coffee’s men after the battle counted one hundred and eighty-six dead -Indians, and estimated the total loss at two hundred. In every attack -on an Indian village a certain number of women and children were -necessarily victims, but the proportion at Talishatchee seemed large. - - “I lost five men killed, and forty-one wounded,” reported - Coffee,--“none mortally, the greater part slightly, a number with - arrows. Two of the men killed was with arrows; this appears to form - a very principal part of the enemy’s arms for warfare, every man - having a bow with a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first - fire with the gun until a leisure time for loading offers.” - -Meanwhile Jackson fortified a point on the Coosa, about thirty-five -miles from his base on the Tennessee, and named it Fort Strother. -There he expected to be joined by a division of east Tennessee militia -under General Cocke, approaching from Chattanooga, as he hoped, with -supplies; but while waiting, he received, November 7, a message from -Talladega, a Creek village thirty miles to the southward, reporting -that the town, which had refused to join the war-party, was besieged -and in danger of capture by a large body of hostile warriors. Jackson -instantly started to save Talladega, and marched twenty-four miles -November 8, surrounding and attacking the besieging Creeks the next -morning. - - “The victory was very decisive,” reported Jackson to Governor - Blount,[341] November 11; “two hundred and ninety of the enemy were - left dead, and there can be no doubt but many more were killed who - were not found.... In the engagement we lost fifteen killed, and - eighty-five wounded.” - -Coffee estimated the number of Indians, on their own report,[342] at -about one thousand. Jackson mentioned no wounded Indians, nor the -number of hostile Creeks engaged. Male Indians, except infants, were -invariably killed, and probably not more than five or six hundred were -in the battle, for Coffee thought very few escaped unhurt. - -At Talladega Jackson was sixty miles from the Hickory Ground, and -still nearer to several large Indian towns, but he had already passed -the limit of his powers. News arrived that the army of eastern -Tennessee had turned eastward toward the Tallapoosa, and that his -expected supplies were as remote as ever. Returning to Fort Strother -November 10, Jackson waited there in forced inactivity, as Harrison had -waited at Fort Meigs, anxious only to avoid the disgrace of retreat. -For two weeks the army had lived on the Indians. A month more passed -in idle starvation, until after great efforts a supply train was -organized, and difficulties on that account ceased; but at the same -moment the army claimed discharge. - -The claim was reasonable. Enlisted Dec. 10, 1812, for one year, the -men were entitled to their discharge Dec. 10, 1813. Had Jackson been -provided with fresh levies he would doubtless have dismissed the old; -but in his actual situation their departure would have left him at Fort -Strother to pass the winter alone. To prevent this, he insisted that -the men had no right to count as service, within the twelve months for -which they had enlisted, the months between May and October when they -were dismissed to their homes. The men, unanimous in their own view -of the contract, started to march home December 10; and Jackson, in a -paroxysm of anger, planted two small pieces of artillery in their path -and threatened to fire on them. The men, with good-temper, yielded for -the moment; and Jackson, quickly recognizing his helplessness, gave -way, and allowed them to depart December 12, with a vehement appeal -for volunteers who made no response. - -Fort Strother was then held for a short time by east Tennessee militia, -about fourteen hundred in number, whose term of service was a few weeks -longer than that of the west Tennesseeans. Jackson could do nothing -with them, and remained idle. The Governor of Tennessee advised him to -withdraw to the State frontier; but Jackson, while admitting that his -campaign had failed, declared that he would perish before withdrawing -from the ground he considered himself to have gained.[343] Fortunately -he stood in no danger. The Creeks did not molest him, and he saw no -enemy within fifty miles. - -While Jackson was thus brought to a stand-still, Major-General Cocke of -east Tennessee, under greater disadvantages, accomplished only results -annoying to Jackson. Cocke with twenty-five hundred three-months -militia took the field at Knoxville October 12, and moving by way -of Chattanooga reached the Coosa sixty or seventy miles above Camp -Strother. The nearest Creek Indians were the Hillabees, on a branch of -the Tallapoosa about sixty miles from Cocke’s position, and the same -distance from Jackson. The Hillabees, a group of four small villages, -numbered in 1800 one hundred and seventy warriors.[344] Unaware that -the Hillabees were making their submission to Jackson, and were to -receive his promise of protection, Cocke sent a large detachment, which -started November 12 into the Indian country, and surprised one of the -Hillabee villages November 18, massacring sixty-one warriors, and -capturing the other inmates, two hundred and fifty in number, without -losing a drop of blood or meeting any resistance.[345] - -Jackson was already displeased with General Cocke’s conduct, and the -Hillabee massacre increased his anger. Cocke had intentionally kept -himself and his army at a distance in order to maintain an independent -command.[346] Not until Jackson’s troops disbanded and marched home, -December 12, did Cocke come to Fort Strother. There his troops remained -a month, guarding Jackson’s camp, until January 12, 1814, when their -three months’ term expired. - -While five thousand men under Jackson and Cocke wandered about northern -Alabama, able to reach only small and remote villages, none of which -were actively concerned in the outbreak, the Georgians organized a -force to enter the heart of the Creek country. Brigadier-General -John Floyd commanded the Georgia army, and neither Major-General -Pinckney nor any United States troops belonged to it. Jackson’s battle -of Talladega was fought November 9; Cocke’s expedition against the -Hillabees started November 12, and surprised the Hillabee village -November 18. Floyd entered the hostile country November 24. The -Georgians though nearest were last to move, and moved with the weakest -force. Floyd had but nine hundred and forty militia, and three or four -hundred friendly warriors of the Lower Creek villages. - -Floyd had heard that large numbers of hostile Indians were assembled -at Autossee,--a town on the Tallapoosa River near Tuckaubatchee, in -the centre of the Upper Creek country. He crossed the Chattahoochee -November 24 with five days rations, and marched directly against -Autossee, arriving within nine or ten miles without meeting resistance. -At half-past six on the morning of November 29 he formed his troops for -action in front of the town.[347] - -The difference between the Northwestern Indians and the Creeks was -shown in the battle of Autossee compared with Tippecanoe. Floyd was -weaker than Harrison, having only militia and Indians, while Harrison -had a regular regiment composing one third of his rank-and-file. -The Creeks were probably more numerous than the Tippecanoe Indians, -although in both cases the numbers were quite unknown. Probably the -Creeks were less well armed, but they occupied a strong position and -stood on the defensive. Floyd reported that by nine o’clock he drove -the Indians from their towns and burned their houses,--supposed to be -four hundred in number. He estimated their loss at two hundred killed. -His own loss was eleven killed and fifty-four wounded. That of Harrison -at Tippecanoe was sixty-one killed or mortally wounded, and one hundred -and twenty-seven not fatally injured. The Creeks hardly inflicted one -fourth the loss caused by the followers of the Shawnee Prophet. - -General Floyd,--himself among the severely wounded,--immediately after -the battle ordered the troops to begin their return march to the -Chattahoochee. The Georgia raid into the Indian country was bolder, -less costly, and more effective than the Tennessee campaign; but at -best it was only a raid, like the Indian assault on Fort Mims, and -offered no immediate prospect of regular military occupation. Another -attempt, from a third quarter, had the same unsatisfactory result. - -The successor of General Wilkinson at New Orleans and Mobile, and in -Military District No. 7, was Brigadier-General Thomas Flournoy. Under -his direction an expedition was organized from Fort Stoddert, commanded -by Brigadier-General Claiborne of the Mississippi volunteers. Claiborne -was given the Third United States Infantry, with a number of militia, -volunteers, and Choctaw Indians,--in all about a thousand men. He -first marched to a point on the Alabama River, about eighty-five miles -above Fort Stoddert, where he constructed a military post, called Fort -Claiborne. Having established his base there, he marched, December 13, -up the river till he reached, December 23, the Holy Ground, where the -half-breed Weatherford lived. There Claiborne approached within about -fifty miles of the point which Floyd reached a month before, but for -want of co-operation he could not maintain his advantage. He attacked -and captured Weatherford’s town, killing thirty Indians, with a loss of -one man; but after destroying the place he retreated, arriving unharmed -at Fort Claiborne, on the last day of the year. - -Thus the year 1813 ended without closing the Creek war. More than seven -thousand men had entered the Indian country from four directions; and -with a loss of thirty or forty lives had killed, according to their -reports, about eight hundred Indians, or one fifth of the hostile Creek -warriors; but this carnage had fallen chiefly on towns and villages -not responsible for the revolt. The true fanatics were little harmed, -and could offer nearly as much resistance as ever. The failure and -excessive expense of the campaign were the more annoying, because they -seemed beyond proportion to the military strength of the fanatics. -Major-General Pinckney wrote to the War Department at the close of the -year:[348]-- - - “The force of the hostile Creeks was estimated by the best judges - to have consisted of three thousand five hundred warriors; of these - it is apprehended that about one thousand have been put _hors de - combat_.” - -To Andrew Jackson, Pinckney wrote, Jan. 19, 1814,[349] - - “Your letter, dated December 26, did not reach me until the last - evening. Your preceding dispatches of December 14 had led me to - conclude what would probably soon be the diminished state of your - force. I therefore immediately ordered to your support Colonel - Williams’s regiment of twelve-months men, and wrote to the Governor - of Tennessee urging him to complete the requisition of fifteen - hundred for the time authorized by law. I learn from the person who - brought your letter that Colonel Williams’s regiment is marching - to join you; if the fifteen hundred of the quota should also be - furnished by Governor Blount, you will in my opinion have force - sufficient for the object to be attained. The largest computation - that I have heard of the hostile Creek warriors, made by any - competent judge, is four thousand. At least one thousand of them - have been killed or disabled; they are badly armed and supplied - with ammunition; little doubt can exist that two thousand of our - men would be infinitely superior to any number they can collect.” - -Jackson at Fort Strother on the departure of the east Tennesseeans, -January 14, received a reinforcement of sixty-day militia, barely -nine hundred in number.[350] Determined to use them to the utmost, -Jackson started three days afterward to co-operate with General Floyd -in an attack on the Tallapoosa villages, aiming at a town called -Emuckfaw, some forty miles north of Tuckaubatchee. The movement was -much more dangerous than any he had yet attempted. His own force -was fresh, motley, and weak, numbering only nine hundred and thirty -militia, including “a company of volunteer officers headed by General -Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men,” and assisted by two or -three hundred friendly Creeks and Cherokees. The sixty-day militia -were insubordinate and unsteady, the march was long, and the Creek -towns at which he aimed were relatively large. Emuckfaw was one -of seven villages belonging to Ocfuskee, the largest town in the -Creek nation,--in 1800 supposed to contain four hundred and fifty -warriors.[351] - -As far as Enotachopco Creek, twelve miles from Emuckfaw, Jackson had no -great danger to fear; but beyond that point he marched with caution. -At daylight, January 22, the Indians, who were strongly encamped at -about three miles distance, made an attack on Jackson’s camp, which -was repulsed after half an hour’s fighting. Jackson then sent Coffee -with four hundred men to burn the Indian camp, but Coffee returned -without attempting it. “On viewing the encampment and its strength the -General thought it most prudent to return to my encampment,” reported -Jackson.[352] Immediately after Coffee’s return the Indians again -attacked, and Coffee sallied out to turn their flank, followed by not -more than fifty-four men. The Indians were again repulsed with a loss -of forty-five killed, but Coffee was severely wounded, and Jackson -“determined to commence a return march to Fort Strother the following -day.” - -At that moment Jackson’s situation was not unlike that of Harrison -after the battle of Tippecanoe, and he escaped less happily. -Fortifying his camp, he remained during the night of January 22 -undisturbed. At half-past ten, January 23, he began his return march, -“and was fortunate enough to reach Enotachopco before night, having -passed without interruption a dangerous defile occasioned by a -hurricane.”[353] Enotachopco Creek was twelve or fifteen miles from -Emuckfaw Creek, and the Hillabee towns were about the same distance -beyond. - -At Enotachopco Jackson again fortified his camp. His position was such -as required the utmost caution in remaining or moving. So hazardous was -the passage of the deep creek and the defile beyond, through which the -army had marched in its advance, that Jackson did not venture to return -by the same path, but on the morning of January 24 began cautiously -crossing the creek at a safer point:-- - - “The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, - the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering - the creek, when an alarm-gun was heard in the woods.... To my - astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by Colonel - Carrol to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld - the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately give - way. This shameful retreat was disastrous in the extreme; it drew - along with it the greater part of the centre column, leaving not - more than twenty-five men, who being formed by Colonel Carrol - maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain - it, and it brought consternation and confusion into the centre of - the army,--a consternation which was not easily removed, and a - confusion which could not soon be restored to order.”[354] - -The Indians were either weak or ignorant of warfare, for they failed to -take advantage of the panic, and allowed themselves to be driven away -by a handful of men. Jackson’s troops escaped unharmed, or but little -injured, their loss in the engagements of January 22 and 24 being -twenty-four men killed and seventy-one wounded. Probably the Creek -force consisted of the Ocfuskee warriors, and numbered about half that -of Jackson.[355] Coffee supposed them to be eight hundred or a thousand -in number, but the exaggeration in estimating Indian forces was always -greater than in estimating white enemies in battle. An allowance of -one third was commonly needed for exaggeration in reported numbers of -European combatants; an allowance of one half was not unreasonable in -estimates of Indian forces. - -In letting Jackson escape from Emuckfaw the Creeks lost their single -opportunity. Jackson never repeated the experiment. He arrived at -Fort Strother in safety January 29, and did not again leave his -intrenchment until the middle of March, under much better conditions. - -General Floyd was no more successful. Jackson started from Fort -Strother for Emuckfaw January 17; Floyd left Fort Mitchell, on the -Chattahoochee, January 18, for Tuckaubatchee, only forty miles south -of Emuckfaw.[356] Floyd’s army, like Jackson’s, was partly composed -of militia and partly of Lower Creek warriors, in all about seventeen -hundred men, including four hundred friendly Creeks. From the best -information to be obtained at the time, the effective strength of -the hostile Indians did not then exceed two thousand warriors,[357] -scattered along the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers; while experience -proved the difficulty of concentrating large bodies of Indians, even -when supplies were furnished them. The British commissariat in Canada -constantly issued from five to ten thousand rations for Indians and -their families, but Proctor never brought more than fifteen hundred -warriors into battle. The Creeks, as far as was known, never numbered a -thousand warriors in any battle during the war. Floyd, with seventeen -hundred men well armed, was able to face the whole Creek nation, and -meant to move forward, fortifying military posts at each day’s march, -until he should establish himself on the Tallapoosa in the centre of -the Creek towns, and wait for a junction with Jackson. - -When Jackson was repulsed at Emuckfaw January 22, Floyd was about forty -miles to the southward, expecting to draw the chief attack of the -Indians. Having advanced forty-eight miles from the Chattahoochee he -arrived at a point about seven or eight miles south of Tuckaubatchee, -where he fortified, on Calibee Creek, a camp called Defiance. There, -before daybreak on the morning of January 27, he was sharply attacked, -as Harrison was attacked at Tippecanoe, and with the same result. The -attack was repulsed, but Floyd lost twenty-two killed and one hundred -and forty-seven wounded,--the largest number of casualties that had -yet occurred in the Indian war. The Indians “left thirty-seven dead on -the field; from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses -and war-clubs found in various directions, their loss must have been -considerable independent of their wounded.”[358] - -The battle of Calibee Creek, January 27, was in substance a defeat -to Floyd. So decided were his militia in their determination to go -home, that he abandoned all his fortified posts and fell back to -the Chattahoochee, where he arrived February 1, four days after the -battle.[359] - -Six months had then elapsed since the outbreak of hostilities at Burnt -Corn; a year since the Little Warrior murders on the Ohio River, yet -not a post had been permanently occupied within eighty miles of the -fanatical centre at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa. - -Pinckney was obliged to apply to the governors of North and South -Carolina to furnish him with men and equipments. The Governor of -Georgia also exerted himself to supply the deficiencies of the national -magazines.[360] By their aid Pinckney was able to collect an army with -which to make another and a decisive movement into the Creek country: -but before he could act, Jackson succeeded in striking a final blow. - -Jackson’s success in overcoming the obstacles in his path was due to -his obstinacy in insisting on maintaining himself at Fort Strother, -which obliged Governor Blount to order out four thousand more militia -in January for six months. Perhaps this force alone would have been -no more effectual in 1814 than in 1813, but another reinforcement was -decisive. The Thirty-ninth regiment of the regular army, authorized -by the Act of January 29, 1813, had been officered and recruited -in Tennessee, and was still in the State. Major-General Pinckney -sent orders, Dec. 23, 1813, to its colonel, John Williams, to join -Jackson.[361] The arrival of the Thirty-ninth regiment February 6, -1814, gave Jackson the means of coping with his militia. February 21 -he wrote to his quartermaster, Major Lewis, that he meant to use his -regulars first to discipline his own army.[362] “I am truly happy in -having the Colonel [Williams] with me. His regiment will give strength -to my arm, and quell mutiny.” His patience with militia-men had been -long exhausted, and he meant to make a warning of the next mutineer. - -The first victim was no less a person than Major-General Cocke of the -east Tennessee militia. Cocke’s division of two thousand men, mustered -for six months, began January 17 its march from Knoxville to Fort -Strother.[363] Learning on the march that the west Tennessee division, -mustered at the same time for the same service, had been accepted to -serve only three months, Cocke’s men mutinied, and Cocke tried to -pacify them by a friendly speech. Jackson, learning what had passed, -despatched a sharp order to one of Cocke’s brigadiers to arrest and -send under guard to Fort Strother every officer of whatever rank who -should be found exciting the men to mutiny. Cocke was put under arrest -when almost in sight of the enemy’s country; his sword was taken from -him, and he was sent to Nashville for trial.[364] His division came to -Fort Strother, and said no more about its term of service. - -Having dealt thus with the officers, Jackson selected at leisure a test -of strength with the men. The conduct of the Fayetteville company of -the Twenty-eighth regiment of west Tennessee light infantry gave him -ground for displeasure. Not only had they refused to obey the call -for six months’ service and insisted on serving for three months or -not at all, but they had halted on their march, and had sent their -commanding officer to bargain with Jackson for his express adhesion -to their terms. Learning that Jackson made difficulties, they marched -home without waiting for an official reply. Jackson ordered the whole -body to be arrested as deserters, accompanying his order by an offer of -pardon to such as returned to duty on their own understanding of the -term of service. The company was again mustered, and arrived at Fort -Strother not long after the arrival of the Thirty-ninth United States -Infantry. - -A few weeks later an unfortunate private of the same company, named -Woods, refused to obey the officer of the day, and threatened to shoot -any man who arrested him. Jackson instantly called a court-martial, -tried and sentenced Woods, and March 14 caused him to be shot. The -execution was a harsh measure; but Jackson gave to it a peculiar -character by issuing a general order in which he misstated facts -that made Wood’s case exceptional,[365] in order to let the company -understand that their comrade was suffering the penalty which they all -deserved. - -Without giving his army time to brood over this severity, Jackson -ordered a general movement, and within forty-eight hours after Woods’s -execution, all were well on their way toward the enemy. Jackson had -with him about five thousand men, four fifths of whom expected their -discharge in a month. He left them not a day’s repose. - -Two lines of advance were open to him in approaching the fork of the -Coosa and Tallapoosa, which was always the objective point. He might -descend the Coosa, or cross to the Tallapoosa by the way he had taken -in January. He descended the Coosa thirty miles, and then struck a -sudden blow at the Tallapoosa towns. - -The Ocfuskee Indians, elated by their success in January, collected -their whole force, with that of some neighboring towns, in a bend of -the Tallapoosa, where they built a sort of fortress by constructing -across the neck of the Horse-shoe a breastwork composed of five large -logs, one above the other, with two ranges of port-holes.[366] The -interior was covered with trees and fallen timber along the river side, -and caves were dug in the bank. Seven or eight hundred Indian warriors -together with many women and children were within the enclosure of -eighty or a hundred acres. - -Jackson, after leaving a garrison at a new fort which he constructed -on the Coosa, about half way to the Horse-shoe, had somewhat less -than three thousand effectives.[367] With these he camped, on the -evening of March 28, about six miles northwest of the bend, and the -next morning advanced to attack it. “Determined to exterminate them,” -he reported,[368] he detached Coffee with the mounted force of seven -hundred men and six hundred friendly Indians[369] to surround the bend, -along the river bank, while Jackson himself with all his infantry took -position before the breastwork. At half-past ten o’clock he planted his -cannon about two hundred yards[370] from the centre of the work, and -began a rapid fire of artillery and musketry, which continued for two -hours without producing apparent effect. Meanwhile the Cherokee allies -swam the river in the rear of the Creek warriors, who were all at the -breastwork, and seizing canoes, brought some two hundred Indians and -whites into the Horse-shoe, where they climbed the high ground in the -rear of the breastwork and fired on the Creeks, who were occupied in -defending their front. - -Jackson then ordered an assault on the breastwork, which was carried, -with considerable loss, by the Thirty-ninth regiment, in the centre. -The Creeks sought shelter in the thickets and under the bluffs, where -they were hunted or burned out, and killed. “The slaughter was greater -than all we had done before,” wrote Coffee; it was continued all day -and the next morning. When the Horse-shoe had been thoroughly cleared, -five hundred and fifty-seven dead bodies were counted within the bend; -many were killed in the river, and about twenty were supposed to have -escaped. According to Coffee, “we killed not less than eight hundred -and fifty or nine hundred of them, and took about five hundred squaws -and children prisoners.” The proportion of squaws and children to the -whole number of Indians showed the probable proportion of warriors -among the dead. “I lament that two or three women and children were -killed by accident,” reported Jackson.[371] - -Jackson’s loss was chiefly confined to the Thirty-ninth regiment and -the friendly Indians, who were most actively engaged in the storm. -The Thirty-ninth lost twenty killed and fifty-two wounded. Among the -severely wounded was Ensign Samuel Houston, struck by an arrow in the -thigh. The major and two lieutenants were killed. The Cherokees lost -eighteen killed and thirty-five wounded. The friendly Creeks lost five -killed and eleven wounded. The Tennessee militia, comprising two thirds -of the army, lost only eight killed and fifty-two wounded. The total -loss was fifty-one killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded. - -Jackson’s policy of extermination shocked many humane Americans, and -would perhaps have seemed less repulsive had the Creeks shown more -capacity for resistance. The proportion between two hundred casualties -on one side and seven or eight hundred killed on the other would have -been striking in any case, but was especially so where the advantages -of position were on the side of the defence. A more serious criticism -was that the towns thus exterminated were not the towns chiefly -responsible for the outbreak. The Alabamas and the main body of -fanatical Creeks escaped. - -Jackson was obliged to return to his new fort on the Coosa, a march of -five days; and was delayed five days more by preparations to descend -the river. When at length he moved southward, scouring the country as -he went, he could find no more enemies. He effected his junction with -the Georgia troops April 15, and the united armies reached the fork of -the Coosa and Tallapoosa April 18, where Major-General Pinckney joined -them, April 20, and took command;[372] but the Red Sticks had then fled -southward. A few of the hostile leaders, including Weatherford, made -submission, but McQueen and the chief prophets escaped to continue the -war from Florida. The friendly Creeks did not consider the war to be -finished; they reported to Hawkins[373]-- - - “They did not believe the hostile Indians were ready for peace, - although a part of them had suffered so severely in battle against - our armies. They were proud, haughty, brave, and mad by fanaticism. - Those of the towns of Tallapoosa below Tuckaubatchee and Alabama - had suffered the least, although they were the most culpable; and - it was probable they would mistake our object in offering terms of - peace to them.” - -The number of refugees was never precisely known, but Hawkins reported -that eight of the Tallapoosa towns had migrated in a body to Spanish -territory,[374] and probably a larger proportion of the Coosa and -Alabama towns accompanied them. The Indians themselves gave out that a -few more than a thousand Red Stick warriors survived, who meant to die -fighting. In May the British admiral Cochrane sent Captain Pigot of the -“Orpheus” to the Appalachicola to communicate with the refugee Creek -Indians and supply them with arms. Pigot received ten of the principal -chiefs on board his vessel May 20, and reported[375] on their authority -that “the number of the warriors of the Creek Nation friendly to the -English and ready to take up arms was about twenty-eight hundred, -exclusive of one thousand unarmed warriors who had been driven by the -Americans from their towns into the marshes near Pensacola, and who -were expected to rejoin the main body.” The Creek warriors friendly to -the Americans were estimated at about twelve hundred, and the fugitive -Red Sticks at one thousand. Whatever their number, they included the -most fanatical followers of Tecumthe, and their obstinate outlawry -caused long and costly difficulties to the United States government. - -Meanwhile the whites were conquerors and could take as much of the -Creek lands as suited them; but an irregularity of form could not -be avoided. Secretary Armstrong first authorized General Pinckney -to conclude a treaty of peace with the hostile Creeks, containing a -cession of land and other provisions.[376] A few days later Armstrong -saw reason to prefer that the proposed treaty with the Creeks -should take a form altogether military, and be in the nature of a -capitulation.[377] His idea required a treaty with the hostile Creek -chiefs;[378] but the hostile Creeks were not a separate organization -capable of making a treaty or granting lands of the Creek nation; and -besides that difficulty the hostile chiefs had fled, and refused either -to submit or negotiate. No chiefs remained except among the friendly -Creeks, who could not capitulate because they had never been at war. -They had fought in the United States service and were entitled to -reward as allies, not to punishment as enemies. - -The solution of this legal problem was entrusted to Andrew Jackson, -whose services in the war earned for him the appointment of -major-general in the regular army, and the command of Military District -No. 7, with headquarters at Mobile. Jackson met the Creek chiefs in -July. The Indians, parties to the negotiation, were friendly chiefs, -deputies, and warriors, representing perhaps one third of the entire -Creek nation. To these allies and friends Jackson presented a paper, -originally intended for the hostile Indians, entitled “Articles of -Agreement and Capitulation,” requiring as indemnity for war expenses -a surrender of two thirds of their territory. They were required to -withdraw from the southern and western half of Alabama, within the -Chattahoochee on the east and the Coosa on the west. The military -object of this policy was to isolate them from the Seminoles and -Spaniards on one side, and from the Choctaws and Chickasaws on -the other. The political object was to surround them with a white -population. - -Unanimously the Creeks refused to accept the sacrifice. Jackson told -them in reply that their refusal would show them to be enemies of the -United States; that they might retain their own part of the country, -but that the part which belonged to the hostile Indians would be taken -by the government; and that the chiefs who would not consent to sign -the paper might join the Red Sticks at Pensacola,--although, added -Jackson, he should probably overtake and destroy them before they could -get there. Such arguments could not be answered. A number of the Creeks -at last, after long resistance, signed the capitulation or agreement, -although they continued to protest against it, and refused their aid to -carry it out. - -Jackson’s capitulation of Aug. 9, 1814,[379] which, without closing -the Creek war, appropriated to the government the larger part of the -Creek lands, was nearly simultaneous with a treaty[380] signed July 22 -by William Henry Harrison and Lewis Cass, at Greenville in Ohio, with -chiefs of the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Senecas, and Miamis. This -treaty contained no land-cession, but established peace between the -parties, and obliged the Indian signers to declare war on the British. -Neither Harrison’s nor Jackson’s treaty embraced the chief body of -hostile Indians; but Harrison’s treaty served another purpose of no -small value in appearing to remove an obstacle to negotiation with -England. - - - - -CHAPTER XI. - - -BADLY as the United States fared in the campaign of 1813, their -situation would have been easy had they not suffered under the -annoyances of a blockade continually becoming more stringent. The -doctrine that coasts could be blockaded was enforced against America -with an energy that fell little short of demonstration. The summer was -well advanced before the whole naval force to be used for the purpose -could be posted at the proper stations. Not until May 26 did Admiral -Warren issue at Bermuda his proclamation of “a strict and rigorous -blockade of the ports and harbors of New York, Charleston, Port Royal, -Savannah, and of the river Mississippi,” which completed the blockade -of the coast, leaving only the ports of New England open to neutrals. -From that time nothing entered or left the blockaded coast except swift -privateers, or occasional fast-sailing vessels which risked capture -in the attempt. Toward the close of the year Admiral Warren extended -his blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given at Halifax -November 16, and by the blockading squadron off New London December 2, -thus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of every description.[381] - -The pressure of the blockade was immediately felt. In August[382] -superfine flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for -$6.00, and at Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston for -twenty cents a pound; at Charleston for nine cents. Rice sold at -Philadelphia for $12.00 a hundred weight; in Charleston and Savannah -for $3.00. Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75 a hundred weight; in -Baltimore for $26.50. Already the American staples were unsalable at -the places of their production. No rate of profit could cause cotton, -rice, or wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to -Boston. Soon speculation began. The price of imported articles rose to -extravagant points. At the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight -cents a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August. Tea which -could be bought for $1.70 per pound in August, sold for three and four -dollars in December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred -weight in New Orleans, and in August sold for twenty-one or twenty-two -dollars in New York and Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in -December. - -More sweeping in its effects on exports than on imports, the blockade -rapidly reduced the means of the people. After the summer of 1813, -Georgia alone, owing to its contiguity with Florida, succeeded in -continuing to send out cotton. The exports of New York, which exceeded -$12,250,000 in 1811, fell to $209,000 for the year ending in 1814. The -domestic exports of Virginia diminished in four years from $4,800,000 -to $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,819,000 for 1813, and $17,581 for the year -ending Sept. 30, 1814. At the close of 1813 exports, except from -Georgia and New England, ceased.[383] - -On the revenue the blockade acted with equal effect. Owing to the -increase of duties and to open ports, the New England States rather -increased than diminished their customs receipts. Until the summer of -1813, when the blockade began in earnest, New York showed the same -result; but after that time the receipts fell, until they averaged -less than $50,000 a month instead of $500,000, which would have been -a normal average if peace had been preserved. Philadelphia suffered -sooner. In 1810 the State of Pennsylvania contributed more than -$200,000 a month to the Treasury; in 1813 it contributed about $25,000 -a month. Maryland, where was collected in 1812 no less than $1,780,000 -of net revenue, paid only $182,000 in 1813, and showed an actual excess -of expenditures in 1814. After the summer, the total net revenue -collected in every port of the United States outside of New England did -not exceed $150,000 a month, or at the rate of $1,800,000 a year.[384] - -No ordinary operations of war could affect the United States so -severely as this inexorable blockade. Every citizen felt it in every -action of his life. The farmer grew crops which he could not sell, -while he paid tenfold prices for every necessity. While the country -was bursting with wealth, it was ruined. The blockade was but a part -of the evil. The whole coast was systematically swept of the means of -industry. Especially the Virginians and Marylanders felt the heavy hand -of England as it was felt nowhere else except on the Niagara River. A -large British squadron occupied Chesapeake Bay, and converted it into -a British naval station. After the month of February, 1813, the coasts -of Virginia and Maryland enjoyed not a moment’s repose. Considering the -immense naval power wielded by England, the Americans were fortunate -that their chief losses were confined to the farm-yards and poultry of -a few islands in Chesapeake Bay, but the constant annoyance and terror -were not the less painful to the people who apprehended attack. - -Fortunately the British naval officers showed little disposition to -distinguish themselves, and their huge line-of-battle ships were not -adapted to river service. The squadron under the general command of -Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren seemed contented for the most part to -close the bay to commerce. The only officer in the fleet who proved -the energy and capacity to use a part of the great force lying idle at -Lynnhaven Bay was Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, whose efficiency -was attested by the execration in which his name was held for fifty -years in the United States. His duties were not of a nature to make -him popular, and he was an admiral of the old school, whose boisterous -energy seemed to take needless pleasure in the work. - -Early in April, 1813, Admiral Warren sent Cockburn with a light -flotilla to the head of Chesapeake Bay to destroy everything that -could serve a warlike purpose, and to interrupt, as far as possible, -communication along the shore.[385] The squadron consisted of only -one light frigate, the “Maidstone,” thirty-six guns; two brigs, the -“Fantome” and “Mohawk;” and three or four prize schooners, with four -or five hundred seamen, marines, and soldiers. With this petty force -Cockburn stationed himself at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, -and soon threw Maryland into paroxysms of alarm and anger. Taking -possession of the islands in his neighborhood, he obtained supplies -of fresh food for the whole British force in Chesapeake Bay. He then -scoured every creek and inlet above his anchorage. He first moved into -the Elk River, and sent his boats, April 28, with one hundred and -fifty marines, to Frenchtown,--a village of a dozen buildings, which -had acquired a certain importance for the traffic between Baltimore -and Philadelphia since the stoppage of transit by sea. Without losing -a man, the expedition drove away the few Americans who made a show -of resistance, and burned whatever property was found, “consisting of -much flour, a large quantity of army clothing, of saddles, bridles, and -other equipments for cavalry, etc., together with various articles of -merchandise,” besides five vessels lying near the place.[386] - -Cockburn next sent the same force to destroy a battery lately erected -at Havre de Grace. The attack was made on the morning of May 3, and -like the attack on Frenchtown, met with only resistance enough to -offer an excuse for pillage. The militia took refuge in the woods; -Cockburn’s troops destroyed or carried away the arms and cannon, and -set fire to the town of some sixty houses, “to cause the proprietors -(who had deserted them and formed part of the militia who had fled -to the woods) to understand and feel what they were liable to bring -upon themselves by building batteries and acting toward us with so -much useless rancor.”[387] While engaged in this work Cockburn was -told that an extensive cannon-foundry existed about four miles up the -Susquehanna River; and he immediately started for it in his boats. -He met no resistance, and destroyed the foundry with several small -vessels. His handful of men passed the day undisturbed on the banks of -the Susquehanna, capturing fifty-one cannon, mostly heavy pieces, with -one hundred and thirty stand of small arms. The party then returned to -their ships, “where we arrived at ten o’clock, after being twenty-two -hours in constant exertion, without nourishment of any kind; and I -have much pleasure in being able to add that, excepting Lieutenant -Westphall’s wound, we have not suffered any casualty whatever.” - -These expeditions cleared every inlet in the Upper Chesapeake except -the Sassafras River on the eastern shore. During the night of May 5 -Cockburn sent his boats into the Sassafras. Militia in considerable -numbers assembled on both banks and opened a fire which Cockburn -described as “most heavy,” aided by one long gun. Cockburn landed, -dispersed the militia, and destroyed Fredericktown and Georgetown, with -the vessels and stores he found there. This expedition cost him five -men wounded, one severely. The next day, May 6, he reported to Admiral -Warren,-- - - “I had a deputation from Charleston in the Northeast River to - assure me that that place is considered by them at your mercy, and - that neither guns nor militia-men shall be suffered there; and as - I am assured that all the places in the upper part of Chesapeake - Bay have adopted similar resolutions, and as there is now neither - public property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in this - neighborhood, I propose returning to you with the light squadron - to-morrow morning.” - -Thus in the course of a week, and without loss of life on either side, -Cockburn with a few boats and one hundred and fifty men terrorized -the shores of the Upper Chesapeake, and by his loud talk and random -threats threw even Baltimore into a panic, causing every one to suspend -other pursuits in order to garrison the city against an imaginary -attack. The people, harassed by this warfare, remembered with extreme -bitterness the marauding of Cockburn and his sailors; but where he met -no resistance he paid in part for what private property he took, and as -far as was recorded, his predatory excursions cost the Marylanders not -a wound. - -For six weeks after Cockburn’s return to Warren’s station at Lynnhaven -Bay, the British fleet remained inactive. Apparently the British -government aimed at no greater object than that of clearing from -Chesapeake Bay every vessel not engaged in British interests under -British protection. The small craft and privateers were quickly -taken or destroyed; but the three chief depots of commerce and -armaments--Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington--required a greater -effort. Of these three places Norfolk seemed most open to approach, and -Admiral Warren determined to attack it. - -The British navy wished nothing more ardently than to capture or -destroy the American frigates. One of these, the “Constellation,” lay -at Norfolk, where it remained blockaded throughout the war. Admiral -Warren could earn no distinction so great as the credit of capturing -this frigate, which not only threatened to annoy British commerce -should she escape to sea, but even when blockaded in port required a -considerable squadron to watch her, and neutralized several times her -force. - -Another annoyance drew Warren’s attention to Norfolk. June 20, fifteen -gunboats issued from the harbor before daylight, and under cover of -darkness approached within easy range of a becalmed British frigate, -the “Junon” of forty-six guns. For half an hour, from four o’clock till -half-past four, the gunboats maintained, according to the official -report of Commodore Cassin who commanded them, “a heavy, galling fire -at about three quarters of a mile distance.”[388] Their armament was -not mentioned, but probably they, like the gunboats on the Lakes, -carried in part long thirty-two and twenty-four-pound guns. The attack -was intended to test the offensive value of gunboats, and the result -was not satisfactory. The fire of fifteen heavy guns for half an hour -on a defenceless frigate within easy range should have caused great -injury, but did not. When a breeze rose and enabled the “Junon” and a -neighboring frigate, the “Barrosa,” to get under weigh, the gunboats -were obliged to retire with the loss of one man killed and two wounded. -The “Junon” also had one man killed, but received only one or two shots -in her hull.[389] - -The “Constellation” lay, under the guns of two forts and with every -possible precaution, five miles up the Elizabeth River, at the -Portsmouth navy-yard. The utmost pains had been taken to provide -against approach by water. Whatever incompetence or neglect was shown -elsewhere, Norfolk was under the command of able officers in both -services, who neglected no means of defence. General Wade Hampton had -fortified the interior line immediately below the town, where two -strong forts were constructed under the direction of Captain Walker -Keith Armistead of the Engineers, the first graduate of the West -Point Academy in 1803. Five miles below these forts, where the river -widened into Hampton Roads, Brigadier-General Robert Taylor of the -Virginia militia, and Captain John Cassin commanding at the navy-yard, -established a second line of defence, resting on Craney Island on -the left, supported by fifteen or twenty gunboats moored across the -channel. A battery of seven guns was established on the island covering -the approach to the gunboats, so that the capture of the island was -necessary to the approach by water. The force on the island consisted -of about seven hundred men, of whom less than a hundred were State -troops. The rest were infantry of the line, riflemen, seamen, and -marines.[390] The town and forts were strongly garrisoned, and a large -body of State militia was constantly on service. - -To deal with the defences of Norfolk, Admiral Warren brought from -Bermuda, according to newspaper account, a detachment of battalion -marines eighteen hundred strong; three hundred men of the One -Hundred-and-second regiment of the line, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel -Charles James Napier, afterward a very distinguished officer; two -hundred and fifty chasseurs, or French prisoners of war who had -entered the British service; and three hundred men of the royal -marine artillery,[391]--in all, two thousand six hundred and fifty -rank-and-file, or about three thousand men all told, besides the -sailors of the fleet. At that time no less than thirteen sail of -British ships, including three ships-of-the-line and five frigates, lay -at anchor within thirteen miles of Craney Island. - -The attack was planned for June 22. The land forces were commanded by -Sir Sydney Beckwith, but the general movement was directed by Admiral -Warren.[392] The main attack, led by Major-General Beckwith in person, -was to land and approach Craney Island from the rear, or mainland; the -second division, under command of Captain Pechell of the flag-ship “San -Domingo,” 74, was to approach the island in boats directly under fire -of the American guns on the island, but not exposed to those in the -gunboats. - -The plan should have succeeded. The island was held by less than seven -hundred men in an open earthwork easily assaulted from the rear. The -water was so shallow as to offer little protection against energetic -attack. The British force was more than twice the American, and -the plan of attack took from the gunboats the chance of assisting the -land-battery. - -[Illustration: - - MAP - OF THE - BATTLE - OF - CRANEY ISLAND - FROM MAPS IN - OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS -] - -At daylight on the morning of June 22 Beckwith, with about eight -hundred men, landed on the main shore outside of Craney Island, and -pushed forward to take the island in the rear. Soon afterward Captain -Pechell, with about seven hundred men in fifteen boats, approached the -island from the northwest along the shore, far out of the reach of the -gunboats. Toward eleven o’clock the British boats came within range of -the American battery on the island. Contrary to the opinions of several -officers, Captain Pechell insisted on making the attack independently -of Beckwith’s approach, and pushed on. Two or three hundred yards from -land the leading boats grounded in shoal water. Apparently the men -might have waded ashore; but “one of the seamen, having plunged his -boat-hook over the side, found three or four feet of slimy mud at the -bottom;”[393] the leading officer’s boat being aground was soon struck -by a six-pound shot, the boat sunk, and himself and his crew, with -those of two other launches, were left in the water. The other boats -took a part of them in, and then quickly retired. - -The affair was not improved by the fortunes of Sir Sydney Beckwith, -who advanced to the rear of Craney Island, where he was stopped by -creeks which he reported too deep to ford, and accordingly re-embarked -his troops without further effort; but the true causes of the failure -seemed not to be understood. Napier thought it due to the division -of command between three heads, Warren, Cockburn, and Beckwith;[394] -but incompetence was as obvious as the division of command. -Admiral Warren’s official report seemed to admit that he was also -overmatched:[395]-- - - “Upon approaching the island, from the extreme shoalness of the - water on the seaside and the difficulty of getting across from the - land, as well as the island itself being fortified with a number of - guns and men from the frigate [‘Constellation’] and the militia, - and flanked by fifteen gunboats, I considered, in consequence - of the representation of the officer commanding the troops of - the difficulty of their passing over from the land, that the - persevering in the attempt would cost more men than the number with - us would permit, as the other forts must have been stormed before - the frigate and dock-yard could be destroyed. I therefore directed - the troops to be re-embarked.” - -On neither side were the losses serious. The American battery inflicted -less injury than was to be expected. Fifteen British boats containing -at least eight hundred men, all told, remained some two hours under -the fire of two twenty-four-pound and four six-pound guns, at a range -differently estimated from one hundred to three hundred yards, but -certainly beyond musketry fire, for the American troops had to wade -out before firing. Three boats were sunk; three men were killed, -and sixteen were wounded.[396] Sixty-two men were reported missing, -twenty-two of whom came ashore from the boats, while forty deserted -from Beckwith’s land force.[397] The Americans suffered no loss. - -To compensate his men for their check at Craney Island, Admiral Warren -immediately afterward devised another movement, which proved, what -the Craney Island affair suggested, that the large British force in -the Chesapeake was either ill constructed or ill led. Opposite Craney -Island, ten miles away on the north shore of James River, stood the -village of Hampton, a place of no importance either military or -commercial. Four or five hundred Virginia militia were camped there, -covering a heavy battery on the water’s edge. The battery and its -defenders invited attack, but Admiral Warren could have no military -object to gain by attacking them. His official report[398] said “that -the enemy having a post at Hampton defended by a considerable corps -commanding the communication between the upper part of the country and -Norfolk, I considered it advisable, and with a view to cut off their -resources, to direct it to be attacked.” Hampton could not fairly be -said to “command” communication with Norfolk, a place which lay beyond -ten miles of water wholly commanded by the British fleet; but Warren -was not obliged to excuse himself for attacking wherever he pleased, -and Hampton served his object best. - -At dawn of June 25, Beckwith’s troops were set ashore about two miles -above the village, and moved forward to the road, taking Hampton in -the rear, while Cockburn’s launches made a feint from the front. The -militia, after resistance costing Beckwith a total loss of nearly -fifty men, escaped, and the British troops entered the town, where -they were allowed to do what they pleased with property and persons. -Lieutenant-Colonel Napier of the One Hundred-and-second regiment, -who commanded Beckwith’s advance, wrote in his diary that Sir Sydney -Beckwith “ought to have hanged several villains at Little Hampton; had -he so done, the Americans would not have complained; but every horror -was perpetrated with impunity,--rape, murder, pillage,--and not a man -was punished.” The British officers in general shared Napier’s disgust, -but alleged that the English troops took no part in the outrages, which -were wholly the work of the French chasseurs. - -Warren made no attempt to hold the town; the troops returned two days -afterward to their ships, and the Virginia militia resumed their -station; but when the details of the Hampton affair became known, the -story roused natural exasperation throughout the country, and gave in -its turn incitement to more violence in Canada. Admiral Warren and Sir -Sydney Beckwith did not deny the wrong; they dismissed their Frenchmen -from the service, and the United States had no further reason to -complain of that corps; but the double mortification seemed to lower -the British officers even in their own eyes to the level of marauders. - -After the failure to destroy the “Constellation,” Admiral Warren -could still indulge a hope of destroying the twenty-eight-gun frigate -“Adams,” and the navy-yard at Washington; for the defence of the -Potomac had been totally neglected, and only one indifferent fort, -about twelve miles below the Federal city, needed to be captured. July -1 the British squadron entered the Potomac; but beyond rousing a panic -at Washington it accomplished nothing, except to gain some knowledge of -the shoals and windings that impeded the ascent of the river. Leaving -the Potomac, Warren turned up Chesapeake Bay toward Annapolis and -Baltimore, but made no attempt on either place. During the rest of the -year he cruised about the bay, meeting little resistance, and keeping -the States of Virginia and Maryland in constant alarm. - -Cockburn was more active. In the month of July he was detached with -a squadron carrying Napier’s One Hundred-and-second regiment, and -arrived, July 12, off Ocracoke Inlet, where he captured two fine -privateers,--the “Atlas” and “Anaconda.” Thence he sailed southward, -and established himself for the winter on Cumberland Island, near the -Florida boundary, where he vexed the Georgians. Besides the property -consumed or wasted, he gave refuge to many fugitive slaves, whom he -assisted to the West Indies or Florida. “Strong is my dislike,” wrote -Napier, “to what is perhaps a necessary part of our job: namely, -plundering and ruining the peasantry. We drive all their cattle, and of -course ruin them. _My_ hands are clean; but it is hateful to see the -poor Yankees robbed, and to be the robber.” - -Compared with the widespread destruction which war brought on these -regions half a century afterward, the injury inflicted by the British -navy in 1813 was trifling, but it served to annoy the Southern -people, who could offer no resistance, and were harassed by incessant -militia-calls. To some extent the same system of vexation was pursued -on the Northern coast. The Delaware River was blockaded and its -shores much annoyed. New York was also blockaded, and Nantucket with -the adjacent Sounds became a British naval station. There Sir Thomas -Hardy, Nelson’s favorite, officer, commanded, in his flag-ship the -“Ramillies.” Hardy did not encourage marauding such as Cockburn -practised, but his blockade was still stringent, and its efficiency was -proved by the failure of Decatur’s efforts to evade it. - -Decatur commanded a squadron composed of the “United States,” its prize -frigate the “Macedonian,” and the sloop-of-war “Hornet,” which lay in -the harbor of New York, waiting for a chance to slip out. Impatient -at the steady watch kept by the British fleet off Sandy Hook, Decatur -brought his three ships through the East River into Long Island Sound. -He reached Montauk Point, May 29, only to find Hardy’s squadron waiting -for him. June 1 he made an attempt to run out, but was chased back, -and took refuge in the harbor of New London. A large British squadron -immediately closed upon the harbor, and Decatur not only lost hope -of getting to sea but became anxious for the safety of his ships. He -withdrew them as far as he could into the river, five miles above the -town, and took every precaution to repel attack. The British officers -were said to have declared that they would get the “Macedonian” back -“even if they followed her into a cornfield.” They did not make the -attempt, but their vigilance never relaxed, and Decatur was obliged to -remain all summer idle in port. He clung to the hope that when winter -approached he might still escape; but in the month of December the -country was scandalized by the publication of an official letter from -Decatur to the Secretary of the Navy, charging the people of New London -with the responsibility for his failure. - - “Some few nights since,” he wrote,[399] Dec. 20, 1813, “the weather - promised an opportunity for this squadron to get to sea, and it was - said on shore that we intended to make the attempt. In the course - of the evening two blue lights were burned on both the points at - the harbor’s mouth as signals to the enemy; and there is not a - doubt but that they have, by signals and otherwise, instantaneous - information of our movements. Great but unsuccessful exertions - have been made to detect those who communicated with the enemy - by signal.... Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated, - and have been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, - there are men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to - disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow their disbelief.” - -Decatur’s charge roused much ill feeling, and remained a subject of -extreme delicacy with the people of New London. Perhaps Decatur would -have done better not to make such an assertion until he could prove -its truth. That blue lights, as well as other lights, were often seen, -no one denied; but whether they came from British or from American -hands, or were burned on sea or on shore, were points much disputed. -The town of New London was three miles from the river’s mouth, and -Decatur’s squadron then lay at the town. At that distance the precise -position of a light in line with the British fleet might be mistaken. -Decatur’s report, if it proved anything, proved that the signals were -concerted, and were burnt from “both the points at the river’s mouth.” -If the British admiral wanted information, he could have found little -difficulty in obtaining it; but he would hardly have arranged a system -of signals as visible to Decatur as to himself. Even had he done so, he -might have employed men in his own service as well as Americans for the -purpose. Decatur’s letter admitted that he had made great exertions to -detect the culprits, but without success. - -The rigor of the British blockade extended no farther north than -the Vineyard and Nantucket. Captain Broke in the “Shannon,” with a -companion frigate, cruised off Boston harbor rather to watch for -ships-of-war than to interfere with neutral commerce. Along the coast -of Maine an illicit trade with the British provinces was so actively -pursued that one of the few American sloops-of-war, the “Enterprise,” -cruised there, holding smugglers, privateers, and petty marauders in -check. On no other portion of the coast would an armed national vessel -have been allowed to show itself, but the “Enterprise,” protected -by the bays and inlets of Maine, and favored by the absence of a -blockade, performed a useful service as a revenue cutter. She was -not a first-rate vessel. Originally a schooner, carrying twelve guns -and sixty men, she had taken part in the war with Tripoli. She was -afterward altered into a brig, and crowded with sixteen guns and a -hundred men. In 1813 she was commanded by Lieutenant William Burrows, -a Pennsylvanian, who entered the navy in 1799, and, like all the naval -heroes, was young,--not yet twenty-eight years old. - -On the morning of September 5, as the “Enterprise” was cruising -eastward, Burrows discovered in a bay near Portland a strange brig, -and gave chase. The stranger hoisted three English ensigns, fired -several guns, and stood for the “Enterprise.” Perhaps escape would -have been impossible; but the British captain might, without disgrace, -have declined to fight, for he was no match for the American. The -“Enterprise” measured about ninety-seven feet in length; the “Boxer,” -as the British brig was named, measured about eighty-four. The -“Enterprise” was nearly twenty-four feet in extreme width; the “Boxer” -slightly exceeded twenty-two feet. The “Enterprise” carried fourteen -eighteen-pound carronades and two long-nines; the “Boxer” carried -twelve eighteen-pound carronades and two long-sixes. The “Enterprise” -had a crew of one hundred and two men; the “Boxer” had only sixty-six -men on board. With such odds against him, the British captain might -have entertained some desperate hope of success, but could not have -expected it. - -The behavior of Captain Blyth of the “Boxer” showed consciousness of -his position, for he nailed his colors to the mast, and told his men -that they were not to be struck while he lived. The day was calm, -and the two brigs manœuvred for a time before coming together; but -at quarter-past three in the afternoon they exchanged their first -broadside within a stone’s throw of one another. The effect on both -vessels was destructive. Captain Blyth fell dead, struck full in the -body by an eighteen-pound shot. Lieutenant Burrows fell, mortally -wounded, struck by a canister shot. After another broadside, at -half-past three the “Enterprise” ranged ahead, crossed the “Boxer’s” -bow, and fired one or two more broadsides, until the “Boxer” hailed and -surrendered, her colors still nailed to the mast. - -Considering the disparity of force, the two brigs suffered nearly -in equal proportion. The “Boxer” lost seven men killed or mortally -wounded; the “Enterprise” lost four. The “Boxer” had thirteen wounded, -not fatally; the “Enterprise” had eight. The “Boxer’s” injuries were -not so severe as to prevent her captors from bringing her as a prize -to Portland; and no incident in this quasi-civil war touched the -sensibilities of the people more deeply than the common funeral of -the two commanders,--both well known and favorites in the service, -buried, with the same honors and mourners, in the graveyard at Portland -overlooking the scene of their battle. - -Neither the battle between the “Enterprise” and “Boxer,” nor any -measures that could be taken by sea or land, prevented a constant -traffic between Halifax and the New England ports not blockaded. The -United States government seemed afraid to interfere with it. The -newspapers asserted that hundreds of Americans were actually in Halifax -carrying on a direct trade, and that thousands of barrels of flour were -constantly arriving there from the United States in vessels carrying -the Swedish or other neutral flag. In truth the government could do -little to enforce its non-intercourse, and even that little might prove -mischievous. Nothing could be worse than the spirit of the people on -the frontier. Engaged in a profitable illicit commerce, they could only -be controlled by force, and any force not overwhelming merely provoked -violence or treason. The Navy Department had no vessels to send there, -and could not have prevented their capture if vessels in any number had -been sent. The Secretary of War had abandoned to the State governments -the defence of the coast. When Armstrong allotted garrisons to the -various military districts, he stationed one regiment, numbering three -hundred and fifty-two effectives, besides two hundred and sixty-three -artillerists, in Military District No. 1, which included the whole -coast north of Cape Cod, with the towns of Boston, Marblehead, Salem, -Gloucester, Portsmouth, Portland, and Eastport. Such a provision was -hardly sufficient for garrisoning the fort at Boston. The government -doubtless could spare no more of its small army, but for any military -or revenue purpose might almost as well have maintained in New England -no force whatever. - - - - -CHAPTER XII. - - -DURING the month of April, 1813, four American frigates lay in Boston -Harbor fitting for sea. The “President” and “Congress” returned to -that port Dec. 31, 1812. The “Constitution,” after her battle with the -“Java,” arrived at Boston February 27, 1813. The “Chesapeake” entered -in safety April 9, after an unprofitable cruise of four months. The -presence of these four frigates at Boston offered a chance for great -distinction to the British officer stationed off the port, and one -of the best captains in the service was there to seize it. In order -to tempt the American frigates to come out boldly, only two British -frigates, the “Shannon” and “Tenedos,” remained off the harbor. They -were commanded by Captain P. B. V. Broke of the “Shannon.” Broke -expected Rodgers with his ships, the “President” and “Congress,” to -seize the opportunity for a battle with two ships of no greater force -than the “Shannon” and “Tenedos;” but either Rodgers did not understand -the challenge or did not trust it, or took a different view of his -duties, for he went to sea on the night of April 30, leaving Broke -greatly chagrined and inclined to be somewhat indignant with him for -escaping.[400] - -After May 1, Broke on the watch outside, as he ran in toward Nahant, -could see the masts of only the “Constitution” and “Chesapeake” at -the Charlestown navy-yard, and his anxiety became the greater as he -noticed that the “Chesapeake” was apparently ready for sea.[401] May 25 -Broke sent away his consort, the “Tenedos,” to cruise from Cape Sable -southward, ostensibly because the two frigates cruising separately -would have a better chance of intercepting the “Chesapeake” than if -they kept together.[402] His stronger reason was to leave a fair field -for the “Chesapeake” and “Shannon,” as he had before kept all force at -a distance except the “Shannon” and “Tenedos” in order to tempt Rodgers -to fight.[403] That there might be no second misunderstanding, he sent -several messages to Captain Lawrence commanding the “Chesapeake,” -inviting a combat. - -Nothing showed so clearly that at least one object of the war had been -gained by the Americans as the habit adopted by both navies in 1813 of -challenging ship-duels. War took an unusual character when officers -like Hardy and Broke countenanced such a practice, discussing and -arranging duels between matched ships, on terms which implied that -England admitted half-a-dozen American frigates to be equal in value -to the whole British navy. The loss of a British frigate mattered -little to a government which had more than a hundred such frigates -actually at sea, not to speak of heavier ships; but the loss of the -“Chesapeake” was equivalent to destroying nearly one fourth of the -disposable American navy. Already the “Constellation” was imprisoned at -Norfolk; the “United States” and “Macedonian” were blockaded for the -war; the “Congress” though at sea was unseaworthy and never cruised -again; the “Adams” was shut in the Potomac; the “Essex” was in the -Pacific. The United States Navy consisted, for active service on the -Atlantic, of only the “President,” 44, at sea; the “Constitution,” 44, -replacing her masts at the Charlestown navy-yard; the “Chesapeake,” -38, ready for sea; and a few sloops-of-war. Under such circumstances, -British officers who like Broke considered every American frigate bound -to offer them equal terms in a duel, seemed to admit that the American -service had acquired the credit it claimed. - -The first duty of a British officer was to take risks; the first -duty of an American officer was to avoid them, and to fight only at -his own time, on his own terms. Rodgers properly declined to seek a -battle with Broke’s ships. Captain James Lawrence of the “Chesapeake” -was less cautious, for his experience in the war led him to think -worse of the British navy than it deserved. Lawrence commanded the -“Hornet” in Bainbridge’s squadron at the time of the “Java’s” capture. -Bainbridge and Lawrence blockaded the “Bonne Citoyenne,” a twenty-gun -sloop-of-war at San Salvador in Brazil. Lawrence sent a message to -the captain of the “Bonne Citoyenne” inviting him to come out and -meet the “Hornet.” The British captain declined, doubtless for proper -reasons; but the reason he gave seemed to Lawrence insufficient, for -it was merely that Commodore Bainbridge, in spite of his pledged -word, might interfere.[404] Bainbridge sailed about Christmas, and -was absent till January 3, capturing the “Java” in the interval. -January 6 he sailed for Boston, leaving Lawrence in the “Hornet” still -blockading the “Bonne Citoyenne,” which showed no more disposition to -fight the “Hornet” in Bainbridge’s absence than before, although the -British captain’s letter had said that “nothing could give me greater -satisfaction than complying with the wishes of Captain Lawrence” if the -single alleged objection were removed. - -The conduct of the “Bonne Citoyenne”--a vessel at least the equal of -the “Hornet”[405]--gave Lawrence a low opinion of the British service, -and his respect was not increased by his next experience. A British -seventy-four arrived at San Salvador, January 24, and obliged the -“Hornet” to abandon the “Bonne Citoyenne.” During the next month the -little vessel cruised northward along the Brazil coast, making a few -prizes, until February 24 off the mouth of Demerara River, at half-past -three o’clock in the afternoon, Captain Lawrence discovered a sail -approaching him. Within the bar at the mouth of the river, seven or -eight miles distant, he saw another vessel at anchor. Both were British -sloops-of-war. The one at anchor was the “Espiègle,” carrying eighteen -thirty-two-pound carronades. The other, approaching on the “Hornet’s” -weather-quarter, was the “Peacock,” carrying eighteen twenty-four-pound -carronades, two long-sixes, and one or two lighter pieces. - -The “Peacock,” according to British report,[406] had long been “the -admiration of her numerous visitors,” and was remarkable for the -elegance of her fittings; but in size she was inferior to the “Hornet.” -Lawrence reported his ship to be four feet the longer, but the British -believed the “Hornet” to measure one hundred and twelve feet in length, -while the “Peacock” measured one hundred.[407] Their breadth was the -same. The “Hornet” carried eighteen thirty-two-pounders, while the -British captain, thinking his sloop too light for thirty-twos, had -exchanged them for twenty-fours, and carried only sixteen. The American -crew numbered one hundred and thirty-five men fit for duty; the British -numbered one hundred and twenty-two men and boys. - -At ten minutes past five, Lawrence tacked and stood for the brig. -Fifteen minutes afterward the two vessels, sailing in opposite -directions, passed each other and exchanged broadsides within a -stone’s-throw. The British fire, even at point-blank range of forty -or fifty feet, did no harm, while the “Hornet’s” broadside must have -decided the battle; for although both vessels instantly wore, and -Lawrence at thirty-five minutes past five ran his enemy close aboard, -the “Peacock” almost immediately struck at thirty-nine minutes past -five in a sinking condition, and actually went down immediately -afterward, carrying with her nine of the “Peacock’s” wounded and three -of the “Hornet’s” crew. - -The ease of this victory was beyond proportion to the odds. The British -captain and four men were killed outright, thirty-three officers -and men were wounded, and the brig was sunk in an action of less -than fifteen minutes; while the “Hornet” lost one man killed and two -wounded, all aloft, and not a shot penetrated her hull. If the facility -of this triumph satisfied Lawrence of his easy superiority in battle, -the conduct of the “Espiègle” convinced him that the British service -was worse than incompetent. Lawrence, expecting every moment to see the -“Espiègle” get under weigh, made great exertions to put his ship in -readiness for a new battle, but to his astonishment the British brig -took no notice of the action.[408] Subsequent investigation showed that -the “Espiègle” knew nothing of the battle until the next day; but -Lawrence, assuming that the British captain must have seen or heard, -or at least ought to have suspected what was happening, conceived that -cowardice was a trait of the British navy. - -When Lawrence reached New York he became famous for his victory, and -received at once promotion. The “Hornet,” given to Captain Biddle, -was attached to Decatur’s squadron and blockaded at New London, while -Lawrence received command of the “Chesapeake.” Lawrence was then -thirty-two years old; he was born in New Jersey in 1781, entered -the navy in 1798, and served in the war with Tripoli. He was first -lieutenant on the “Constitution,” and passed to the grade of commander -in 1810, commanding successively the “Vixen,” the “Wasp,” the “Argus,” -and the “Hornet.” His appointment to the “Chesapeake” was an accident, -owing to the ill health of Captain Evans, who commanded her on her -recent cruise. The “Chesapeake’s” reputation for ill luck clung to her -so persistently that neither officers nor men cared greatly to sail in -her, and Lawrence would have preferred to remain in the “Hornet;”[409] -but his instructions were positive, and he took command of the -“Chesapeake” about the middle of May. Most of the officers and crew -were new. The old crew on reaching port, April 9, had been discharged, -and left the ship, dissatisfied with their share of prize-money, and -preferring to try the privateer service. The new crew was unequal in -quality and required training; they neither knew their officers nor -each other. - -Lawrence’s opponent, Captain Broke of the “Shannon,” was an officer -whose courage could as little be questioned as his energy or skill. -Among all the commanders in the British service Broke had profited -most by the lessons of the war. More than seven years’ experience of -his ship and crew gave him every advantage of discipline and system. -Nearly every day the officers at the Charlestown navy-yard could -see the “Shannon” outside, practising her guns at floating targets -as she sailed about the bay. Broke’s most anxious wish was to fight -the “Chesapeake,” which he considered to be of the same size with -the “Shannon.”[410] The two frigates were the same length within -a few inches,--between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and -fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within a few inches. -The “Chesapeake” carried eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades -on the spar-deck; the “Shannon” carried sixteen. Each carried -twenty-eight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The “Chesapeake” -carried also two long twelve-pounders and a long eighteen-pounder, -besides a twelve-pound carronade. The “Shannon” carried four long -nine-pounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound carronades. -The “Chesapeake’s” only decided advantage was in the number of her -crew, which consisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, while the -“Shannon” carried three hundred and thirty all told. - -Broke sent the “Tenedos” away May 25, but Lawrence was not aware of -it, and wrote, May 27, to Captain Biddle of the “Hornet” a letter, -showing that till the last moment he hoped not to sail in the -“Chesapeake:”[411]-- - - “In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart, I neglected writing - to you according to promise; but as I have given over all hopes - of seeing him, and the ‘Chesapeake’ is almost ready, I shall sail - on Sunday, provided I have a chance of getting out clear of the - ‘Shannon’ and ‘Tenedos,’ who are on the look-out.” - -Sunday, May 30, the ship was ready, though the crew was not as good or -as well disciplined as it should have been, and showed some discontent -owing to difficulties about prize-money. On the morning of June 1 -the frigate was lying in President’s Roads, when between eight and -nine o’clock the second lieutenant, George Budd, reported a sail in -sight. Captain Lawrence went up the main rigging, and having made out -the sail to be a large frigate, ordered the crew to be mustered, and -told them he meant to fight. At midday he stood down the harbor and -out to sea. The “Shannon,” outside, stood off under easy sail, and -led the way until five o’clock, when she luffed and waited till the -“Chesapeake” came up. As the wind was westerly, Lawrence had the -choice of position, but he made no attempt to profit by his advantage, -although it might have been decisive. Bringing the “Chesapeake” with -a fresh breeze directly down on the “Shannon’s” quarter, at half-past -five he luffed, at about fifty yards distance, and ranged up abeam on -the “Shannon’s” starboard side. - -The “Shannon” opened fire as her guns began to bear, but discharged -only her two sternmost guns when the “Chesapeake” replied. The -two ships ran on about seven minutes, or about the length of time -necessary for two discharges of the first guns fired, when, some of the -“Shannon’s” shot having cut away the “Chesapeake’s” foretopsail tie and -jib-sheet, the ship came up into the wind and was taken aback. Lying -with her larboard quarter toward the “Shannon’s” side, at some forty -or fifty yards distance, she began to drift toward her enemy. None of -the “Chesapeake’s” guns then bore on the “Shannon,” and the American -frigate wholly ceased firing. - -From the moment the “Chesapeake” was taken aback she was a beaten ship, -and the crew felt it. She could be saved only by giving her headway, -or by boarding the “Shannon;” but neither expedient was possible. The -effort to make sail forward was tried, and proved futile. The idea -of boarding was also in Lawrence’s mind, but the situation made it -impracticable. As the “Chesapeake” drifted stern-foremost toward the -“Shannon,” every gun in the British broadside swept the American deck -diagonally from stern to stem, clearing the quarter-deck and beating -in the stern-ports, while the musketry from the “Shannon’s” tops killed -the men at the “Chesapeake’s” wheel, and picked off every officer, -sailor, or marine in the after-part of the ship. Boarders could not be -rallied under a fire which obliged them to seek cover. The men on the -spar-deck left their stations, crowding forward or going below. - -[Illustration: _Chesapeake_ _Shannon_] - -Nevertheless, Lawrence ordered up his boarders,--he could do nothing -else; but the affair hurried with such rapidity to its close that -almost at the same instant the “Chesapeake’s” quarter touched the -“Shannon” amidships. From the moment when the “Chesapeake” was taken -aback until the moment when she fell foul, only four minutes were given -for Lawrence to act. Before these four minutes were at an end, he was -struck and mortally wounded by a musket-ball from the “Shannon.” His -first lieutenant, Ludlow, had already been carried below, wounded. His -second lieutenant, Budd, was stationed below. His third lieutenant, -Cox, improperly assisted Lawrence to reach the gun-deck. Not an officer -remained on the spar-deck, and neither an officer nor a living man was -on the quarter-deck when the “Chesapeake’s” quarter came against the -“Shannon’s” gangway, as though inviting the British captain to take -possession. - -As the ships fouled, Broke ran forward and called for boarders. With -about twenty men he stepped on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, and -was followed by thirty more before the ships parted. The error should -have cost him his life and the lives of all who were with him, for the -Americans might easily have killed every man of the boarding-party in -spite of the fire from the “Shannon.” For several moments Broke was in -the utmost peril, not only from the American crew but from his own. His -first lieutenant, Watt, hastening to haul down the American ensign, -was killed by the discharge of a cannon from the “Shannon;” and when -Broke, leaving the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck, went forward to clear -the forecastle, enough of the American crew were there to make a sharp -resistance. Broke himself was obliged to take part in the scuffle. -According to his report, he “received a severe sabre-wound at the first -onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy who had rallied on their -forecastle.” According to another British account he was first knocked -down with the butt-end of a musket, and then was cut by a broadsword. -Of his fifty boarders, not less than thirty-seven were killed or -wounded.[412] - -Had the American crew been in a proper state of discipline, the -struggle would have taken an extraordinary character, and the two -ships might have renewed the combat, without officers, and in a more -or less unmanageable condition. Fortunately for Broke, his fifty men -outnumbered the Americans on the spar-deck, while the men below, for -the most part, would not come up. About a score of sailors and marines -were on the forecastle, and about a dozen more rushed up from below, -led by the second lieutenant, George Budd, as soon as he, at his -station on the main-deck, learned what was happening above; but so -rapidly did the whole affair pass, that in two minutes the scuffle was -over, the Americans were killed or thrown down the hatchway, and the -ship was helpless, with its spar-deck in the hands of Broke’s boarders. -The guns ceased firing, and the crew below surrendered after some -musket-shots up and down the hatchways. - -The disgrace to the Americans did not consist so much in the loss of a -ship to one of equal force, as in the shame of suffering capture by a -boarding-party of fifty men. As Lawrence lay wounded in the cockpit, he -saw the rush of his men from the spar-deck down the after-ladders, and -cried out repeatedly and loudly, “Don’t give up the ship! blow her up!” -He was said to have added afterward: “I could have stood the wreck if -it had not been for the boarding.” - -Doubtless the “Shannon” was the better ship, and deserved to win. -Her crew could under no circumstances have behaved like the crew of -the “Chesapeake.” In discipline she was admittedly superior; but -the question of superiority in other respects was not decided. The -accident that cut the “Chesapeake’s” jib-sheet and brought her into the -wind was the only decisive part of the battle, and was mere ill luck, -such as pursued the “Chesapeake” from the beginning. As far as could be -seen, in the favorite American work of gunnery the “Shannon” showed no -superiority. - -On that point the reports agreed. The action began at half-past -five o’clock in the afternoon at close range. In seven minutes the -“Chesapeake” forged ahead, came into the wind and ceased firing, as -none of her guns could be made to bear. Seven minutes allowed time at -the utmost for two discharges of some of her guns. No more guns were -fired from the “Chesapeake” till she drifted close to the “Shannon.” -Then her two sternmost guns, the thirteenth and fourteenth on the -main deck, again bore on the enemy, and were depressed and fired by -Lieutenant Cox while the boarders were fighting on the spar-deck.[413] -Thus the number of discharges from the “Chesapeake’s” guns could be -known within reasonable certainty. She carried in her broadside nine -thirty-two-pounders and fourteen or fifteen eighteen-pounders, besides -one twelve-pounder,--twenty-five guns. Assuming them to have been -all discharged twice, although the forward guns could scarcely have -been discharged more than once, the “Chesapeake” could have fired -only fifty-two shot, including the two eighteen-pounders fired by -Lieutenant Cox at the close. - -According to the official report nearly every shot must have taken -effect. The “Shannon” was struck by thirteen thirty-two-pound shot; -the “Chesapeake” fired only eighteen, if she discharged every gun -twice. The “Shannon” was struck by twelve eighteen-pound shot, fourteen -bar-shot, and one hundred and nineteen grape-shot; the “Chesapeake’s” -fifteen eighteen-pounders could hardly have done more in the space of -seven minutes. In truth, every shot that was fired probably took effect. - -The casualties showed equal efficiency of fire, and when compared -with other battles were severe. When the “Guerriere” struck to the -“Constitution” in the previous year, she had lost in half an hour of -close action twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and fifty-six more -or less injured. The “Shannon” seems to have lost in eleven minutes, -before boarding, twenty-seven men killed or mortally wounded and -nineteen more or less injured.[414] - -The relative efficiency of the “Shannon’s” gunnery was not so -clear, because the “Shannon’s” battery continued to fire after the -“Chesapeake” ceased. As the “Chesapeake” drifted down on the “Shannon” -she was exposed to the broadside of the British frigate, while herself -unable to fire a gun. - - “The shot from the ‘Shannon’s’ aftermost guns now had a fair - range along the ‘Chesapeake’s’ decks,” said the British - account,[415] “beating in the stern-ports and sweeping the men - from their quarters. The shots from the foremost guns at the same - time entering the ports from the mainmast aft did considerable - execution.” - -Broke’s biographer[416] said that the “Chesapeake” fired but one -broadside, and then coming into the wind drifted down, “exposed while -making this crippled and helpless movement to the ‘Shannon’s’ second -and most deliberate broadside.” The “Chesapeake” was very near, almost -touching the British frigate during the four or five minutes of this -fire, and every shot must have taken effect. Broke ordered the firing -to cease when he boarded, but one gun was afterward discharged, and -killed the British first lieutenant as he was lowering the American -flag on the “Chesapeake’s” quarter-deck. - -The “Shannon’s” fire lasted eleven or twelve minutes. She -carried twenty-five guns in broadside.[417] Eight of these were -thirty-two-pound carronades, and the official report showed that the -“Chesapeake” was struck by twenty-five thirty-two-pound shot, showing -that three full broadsides were fired from the “Shannon,” and at least -one gun was discharged four times. The “Shannon’s” broadside also -carried fourteen eighteen-pounders, which threw twenty-nine shot into -the “Chesapeake,” besides much canister and grape. Considering that -at least half the “Shannon’s” shot were fired at so close a range -that they could not fail to take effect, nothing proved that her guns -were better served than those of the “Chesapeake.” The “Shannon,” -according to the British account, fired twice as many shot under twice -as favorable conditions, but the injury she inflicted was not twice -the injury inflicted in return. Setting aside the grape-shot, the -“Chesapeake” struck the “Shannon” thirty-nine times; the “Shannon” -struck the “Chesapeake” fifty-seven times. Including the grape-shot, -which Broke used freely, the “Shannon” probably did better, but even -with a liberal allowance for grape and canister, nothing proved her -superiority at the guns. - -The loss in men corresponded with the injury to the ships. The -“Shannon” lost eighty-three killed and wounded; the “Chesapeake” lost -one hundred and forty-six. Thirty-three of the “Shannon’s” men were -killed or died of their wounds; sixty-one of the “Chesapeake’s” number -were killed or mortally wounded. - -The injuries suffered by the “Chesapeake” told the same story, for -they were chiefly in the stern, and were inflicted by the “Shannon’s” -second and third broadsides, after the “Chesapeake” ceased firing. The -“Chesapeake’s” bowsprit received no injury, and not a spar of any kind -was shot away. The “Shannon” carried her prize into Halifax with all -its masts standing, and without anxiety for its safety. - -The news of Broke’s victory was received in England and by the British -navy with an outburst of pleasure that proved the smart of the -wound inflicted by Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge. The two official -expressions of Broke’s naval and civil superiors probably reflected the -unexaggerated emotion of the service. - - “At this critical moment,” wrote Admiral Warren[418] by a curious - coincidence the day before his own somewhat less creditable defeat - at Craney Island, “you could not have restored to the British naval - service the pre-eminence it has always preserved, or contradicted - in a more forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies of - a conceited, boasting enemy, than by the brilliant act you have - performed.” - -A few days later he wrote again:[419]-- - - “The relation of such an event restores the history of ancient - times, and will do more good to the service than it is possible to - conceive.” - -In Parliament, July 8, John Wilson Croker said:[420] - - “The action which he [Broke] fought with the ‘Chesapeake’ was in - every respect unexampled. It was not--and he knew it was a bold - assertion which he made--to be surpassed by any engagement which - graced the naval annals of Great Britain.” - -The Government made Broke a baronet, but gave him few other rewards, -and his wound was too serious to permit future hard service. Lawrence -died June 5, before the ships reached Halifax. His first lieutenant, -Ludlow, also died. Their bodies were brought to New York and buried -September 16, with formal services at Trinity Church. - -By the Americans the defeat was received at first with incredulity and -boundless anxiety, followed by extreme discouragement. The news came at -a dark moment, when every hope had been disappointed and the outlook -was gloomy beyond all that had been thought possible. - - “I remember,” wrote Richard Rush in later life,--“what American - does not!--the first rumor of it. I remember the startling - sensation. I remember at first the universal incredulity. I - remember how the post-offices were thronged for successive days - by anxious thousands; how collections of citizens rode out for - miles on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something by - anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known, I remember the - public gloom; funeral orations and badges of mourning bespoke it. - ‘Don’t give up the ship!’--the dying words of Lawrence--were on - every tongue.” - -Six weeks afterward another American naval captain lost another -American vessel-of-war by reason of the same over-confidence which -caused Lawrence’s mistakes, and in a manner equally discreditable to -the crew. The “Argus” was a small brig, built in 1803, rating sixteen -guns. In the summer of 1813 she was commanded by Captain W. H. Allen, -of Rhode Island, who had been third officer to Barron when he was -attacked in the “Chesapeake” by the “Leopard.” Allen was the officer -who snatched a coal from the galley and discharged the only gun that -was fired that day. On leaving the “Chesapeake,” Allen was promoted to -be first officer in the “United States.” To his exertions in training -the men to the guns, Decatur attributed his superiority in gunnery over -the “Macedonian.” To him fell one of the most distinguished honors -that ever came to the share of an American naval officer,--that of -successfully bringing the “Macedonian” to port. Promoted to the rank -of captain, he was put in command of the “Argus,” and ordered to take -William Henry Crawford to his post as Minister to France. - -On that errand the “Argus” sailed, June 18, and after safely landing -Crawford, July 11, at Lorient in Brittany, Captain Allen put to sea -again, three days afterward, and in pursuance of his instructions -cruised off the mouth of the British Channel. During an entire -month he remained between the coast of Brittany and the coast of -Ireland, destroying a score of vessels and creating a panic among the -ship-owners and underwriters of London. Allen performed his task with -as much forbearance as the duty permitted, making no attempt to save -his prizes for the sake of prize-money, and permitting all passengers -to take what they claimed as their own without inspection or restraint. -The English whose property he destroyed spoke of him without personal -ill-feeling. - -The anxiety and labor of such a service falling on a brig of three -hundred tons and a crew of a hundred men, and the impunity with which -he defied danger, seemed to make Allen reckless. On the night of August -13 he captured a brig laden with wine from Oporto. Within sight of -the Welsh coast and within easy reach of Milford Haven, he burned his -prize, not before part of his crew got drunk on the wine. The British -brig “Pelican,” then cruising in search of the “Argus,” guided by the -light of the burning prize, at five o’clock on the morning of August -14 came down on the American brig; and Captain Allen, who had often -declared that he would run from no two-masted vessel, waited for his -enemy. - -According to British measurements, the “Argus” was ninety-five and -one-half feet long; the “Pelican,” one hundred. The “Argus” was -twenty-seven feet, seven and five-eighths inches in extreme breadth; -the “Pelican” was thirty feet, nine inches. The “Argus” carried -eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, and two long twelve-pounders; -the “Pelican” carried sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, four long -six-pounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The number of the “Argus’s” -crew was disputed. According to British authority, it was one hundred -and twenty-seven,[421] while the “Pelican” carried one hundred and -sixteen men and boys.[422] - -At six o’clock in the morning, according to American -reckoning,[423]--at half-past five according to the British -report,--the “Argus” wore, and fired a broadside within grape-distance, -which was returned with cannon and musketry. Within five minutes -Captain Allen was struck by a shot which carried away his left leg, -mortally wounding him; and five minutes afterward the first lieutenant -was wounded on the head by a grape-shot. Although the second lieutenant -fought the brig well, the guns were surprisingly inefficient. During -the first fifteen minutes the “Argus” had the advantage of position, -and at eighteen minutes after six raked the “Pelican” at close range, -but inflicted no great injury on the enemy’s hull or rigging, and -killed at the utmost but one man, wounding only five. According to an -English account,[424] “the ‘Argus’ fought well while the cannonading -continued, but her guns were not levelled with precision, and many -shots passed through the ‘Pelican’s’ royals.” The “Pelican,” at the -end of twenty-five minutes, succeeded in cutting up her opponent’s -rigging so that the “Argus” lay helpless under her guns. The “Pelican” -then took a position on her enemy’s starboard quarter, and raked her -with eight thirty-two-pound carronades for nearly twenty minutes at -close range, without receiving a shot in return except from musketry. -According to the report of the British captain, the action “was kept -up with great spirit on both sides forty-three minutes, when we lay -her alongside, and were in the act of boarding when she struck her -colors.”[425] - -The “Argus” repeated the story of the “Chesapeake,” except that the -action lasted three quarters of an hour instead of fifteen minutes. -During that time, the “Pelican” should have fired all her broadside -eight or ten times into the “Argus” at a range so close that no shot -should have missed. Sixty thirty-two-pound shot fired into a small brig -less than one hundred feet long should have shivered it to atoms. Nine -thirty-two-pound shot from the “Hornet” seemed to reduce the “Peacock” -to a sinking condition in fifteen minutes; yet the “Argus” was neither -sunk nor dismasted. The British account of her condition after the -battle showed no more injury than was suffered by the “Peacock,” even -in killed and wounded, by one or at the utmost two broadsides of the -“Hornet.” - - “The ‘Argus’ was tolerably cut up in her hull. Both her lower masts - were wounded, although not badly, and her fore-shrouds on one side - nearly all destroyed; but like the ‘Chesapeake,’ the ‘Argus’ had no - spar shot away. Of her carronades several were disabled. She lost - in the action six seamen killed; her commander, two midshipmen, - the carpenter, and three seamen mortally, her first lieutenant and - five seamen severely, and eight others slightly wounded,--total - twenty-four; chiefly, if not wholly by the cannon-shot of the - ‘Pelican.’”[426] - -The “Pelican” lost seven men killed or wounded, chiefly by musketry. On -both sides the battle showed little skill with the guns; but perhaps -the “Pelican,” considering her undisputed superiority during half the -combat, showed even less than the “Argus.” As in the “Chesapeake’s” -battle, the discredit of the defeated ship lay in surrender to boarders. - -Two such defeats were calculated to shake confidence in the American -navy. That Allen should have been beaten in gunnery was the more -strange, because his training with the guns gave him his chief credit -with Decatur. Watson, the second lieutenant of the “Argus,” attributed -the defeat to the fatigue of his crew. Whatever was the immediate -cause, no one could doubt that both the “Chesapeake” and “Argus” were -sacrificed to the over-confidence of their commanders. - - - - -CHAPTER XIII. - - -THE people of the Atlantic coast felt the loss of the “Chesapeake” none -too keenly. Other nations had a history to support them in moments of -mortification, or had learned by centuries of experience to accept -turns of fortune as the fate of war. The American of the sea-coast -was not only sensitive and anxious, but he also saw with singular -clearness the bearing of every disaster, and did not see with equal -distinctness the general drift of success. The loss of the “Chesapeake” -was a terrible disaster, not merely because it announced the quick -recovery of England’s pride and power from a momentary shock, but -also because it threatened to take away the single object of American -enthusiasm which redeemed shortcomings elsewhere. After the loss of -the “Chesapeake,” no American frigate was allowed the opportunity to -fight with an equal enemy. The British frigates, ordered to cruise in -company, gave the Americans no chance to renew their triumphs of 1812. - -Indeed, the experience of 1813 tended to show that the frigate was no -longer the class of vessel best suited to American wants. Excessively -expensive compared with their efficiency, the “Constitution,” -“President,” and “United States” could only with difficulty obtain -crews; and when after much delay they were ready for sea, they could -not easily evade a blockading squadron. The original cost of a frigate -varied from two hundred thousand dollars to three hundred thousand; -that of a sloop-of-war, like the “Hornet,” “Wasp,” or “Argus,” varied -between forty and fifty thousand dollars. The frigate required a crew -of about four hundred men; the sloop carried about one hundred and -fifty. The annual expense of a frigate in active service was about -one hundred and thirty-four thousand dollars; that of the brig was -sixty thousand. The frigate required much time and heavy timber in -her construction; the sloop could be built quickly and of ordinary -material. The loss of a frigate was a severe national disaster; the -loss of a sloop was not a serious event. - -For defensive purposes neither the frigate nor the brig counted -heavily against a nation which employed ships-of-the-line by dozens; -but even for offensive objects the frigate was hardly so useful as -the sloop-of-war. The record of the frigates for 1813 showed no -results equivalent to their cost. Their cruises were soon told. The -“President,” leaving Boston April 30, ran across to the Azores, -thence to the North Sea, and during June and July haunted the shores -of Norway, Scotland, and Ireland, returning to Newport September 27, -having taken thirteen prizes. The “Congress,” which left Boston with -the “President,” cruised nearly eight months in the Atlantic, and -returned to Boston December 14, having captured but four merchantmen. -The “Chesapeake,” which sailed from Boston Dec. 13, 1812, cruised -four months in the track of British commerce, past Madeira and Cape -de Verde, across the equator, and round through the West Indies, -returning to Boston April 9, having taken six prizes; at the beginning -of her next cruise, June 1, the “Chesapeake” was herself captured. -The adventures of the “Essex” in the Pacific were such as might have -been equally well performed by a sloop-of-war, and belonged rather to -the comparative freedom with which the frigates moved in 1812 than to -the difficult situation that followed. No other frigates succeeded in -getting to sea till December 4, when the “President” sailed again. -The injury inflicted by the frigates on the Atlantic was therefore -the capture of twenty-three merchantmen in a year. At the close of -1813, the “President” and the “Essex” were the only frigates at -sea; the “Constitution” sailed from Boston only Jan. 1, 1814; the -“United States” and “Macedonian” were blockaded at New London; the -“Constellation” was still at Norfolk; the “Adams” was at Washington, -and the “Congress” at Boston. - -When this record was compared with that of the sloops-of-war the -frigates were seen to be luxuries. The sloop-of-war was a single-decked -vessel, rigged sometimes as a ship, sometimes as a brig, but never as -a sloop, measuring about one hundred and ten feet in length by thirty -in breadth, and carrying usually eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades -and two long twelve-pounders. Of this class the American navy possessed -in 1812 only four examples,--the “Hornet,” the “Wasp,” the “Argus,” -and the “Syren.” The “Wasp” was lost Oct. 18, 1812, after capturing -the “Frolic.” The “Syren” remained at New Orleans during the first -year of the war, and then came to Boston, but saw no ocean service of -importance during 1813. The “Hornet” made three prizes, including the -sloop-of-war “Peacock,” and was then blockaded with the “United States” -and “Macedonian;” but the smaller vessel could do what the frigates -could not, and in November the “Hornet” slipped out of New London and -made her way to New York, where she waited an opportunity to escape to -sea. The story will show her success. Finally, the “Argus” cruised for -a month in the British Channel, and made twenty-one prizes before she -was captured by the “Pelican.” - -The three frigates, “President,” “Congress,” and “Chesapeake,” -captured twenty-three prizes in the course of the year, and lost the -“Chesapeake.” The two sloops, the “Hornet” and “Argus,” captured -twenty-four prizes, including the sloop-of-war “Peacock,” and lost the -“Argus.” - -The government at the beginning of the war owned four smaller -vessels,--the “Nautilus” and “Vixen” of fourteen guns, and the -“Enterprise” and “Viper” of twelve. Another brig, the “Rattlesnake,” -sixteen, was bought. Experience seemed to prove that these were of -little use. The “Nautilus” fell into the hands of Broke’s squadron July -16, 1812, within a month after the declaration of war. The “Vixen” was -captured Nov. 22, 1812, by Sir James Yeo. The “Viper,” Jan. 17, 1813, -became prize to Captain Lumley in the British frigate “Narcissus.” The -“Enterprise” distinguished itself by capturing the “Boxer,” and was -regarded as a lucky vessel, but was never a good or fast one.[427] The -“Rattlesnake,” though fast, was at last caught on a lee shore by the -frigate “Leander,” July 11, 1814, and carried into Halifax.[428] - -In the enthusiasm over the frigates in 1812, Congress voted that six -forty-fours should be built, besides four ships-of-the-line. The Act -was approved Jan. 2, 1813. Not until March 3 did Congress pass an Act -for building six new sloops-of-war. The loss of two months was not -the only misfortune in this legislation. Had the sloops been begun in -January, they might have gone to sea by the close of the year. The -six sloops were all launched within eleven months from the passage of -the bill, and the first of them, the “Frolic,” got to sea within that -time, while none of the frigates or line-of-battle ships could get -to sea within two years of the passage of the law. A more remarkable -oversight was the building of only six sloops, when an equal number of -forty-fours and four seventy-fours were ordered. Had Congress voted -twenty-four sloops, the proportion would not have been improper; but -perhaps the best policy would have been to build fifty such sloops, and -to prohibit privateering. The reasons for such a course were best seen -in the experiences of the privateers. - -The history of the privateers was never satisfactorily written. Neither -their number, their measurements, their force, their captures, nor -their losses were accurately known. Little ground could be given for -an opinion in regard to their economy. Only with grave doubt could -any judgment be reached even in regard to their relative efficiency -compared with government vessels of the same class. Yet their -experience was valuable, and their services were very great. - -In the summer of 1812 any craft that could keep the sea in fine weather -set out as a privateer to intercept vessels approaching the coast. -The typical privateer of the first few months was the pilot-boat, -armed with one or two long-nine or twelve-pound guns. Of twenty-six -privateers sent from New York in the first four months of war, fifteen -carried crews of eighty men or less. These small vessels especially -infested the West Indies, where fine weather and light breezes suited -their qualities. After the seas had been cleared of such prey as these -petty marauders could manage, they were found to be unprofitable,--too -small to fight and too light to escape. The typical privateer of 1813 -was a larger vessel,--a brig or schooner of two or three hundred -tons, armed with one long pivot-gun, and six or eight lighter guns in -broadside; carrying crews which varied in number from one hundred and -twenty to one hundred and sixty men; swift enough to escape under most -circumstances even a frigate, and strong enough to capture any armed -merchantman. - -After the war was fairly begun, the British mercantile shipping always -sailed either under convoy or as armed “running ships” that did not -wait for the slow and comparatively rare opportunities of convoy, but -trusted to their guns for defence. The new American privateer was -adapted to meet both chances. Two or three such craft hanging about a -convoy could commonly cut off some merchantman, no matter how careful -the convoying man-of-war might be. By night they could run directly -into the fleet and cut out vessels without even giving an alarm, and -by day they could pick up any craft that lagged behind or happened to -stray too far away. Yet the “running ships” were the chief objects of -their search, for these were the richest prizes; and the capture of a -single such vessel, if it reached an American port in safety, insured -success to the cruise. The loss of these vessels caused peculiar -annoyance to the British, for they sometimes carried considerable -amounts of specie, and usually were charged with a mail which was -always sunk and lost in case of capture. - -As the war continued, experience taught the owners of privateers the -same lesson that was taught to the government. The most efficient -vessel of war corresponded in size with the “Hornet” or the new -sloops-of-war building in 1813. Tonnage was so arbitrary a mode of -measurement that little could be learned from the dimensions of five -hundred tons commonly given for these vessels; but in a general way -they might be regarded as about one hundred and fifteen or one hundred -and twenty feet long on the spar-deck and thirty-one feet in extreme -breadth. Unless such vessels were swift sailers, particularly handy in -working to windward, they were worse than useless; and for that reason -the utmost effort was made both by the public and private constructors -to obtain speed. At the close of the war the most efficient vessel -afloat was probably the American sloop-of-war, or privateer, of four -or five hundred tons, rigged as a ship or brig, and carrying one -hundred and fifty or sixty men, with a battery varying according to the -ideas of the captain and owners, but in the case of privateers almost -invariably including one “long Tom,” or pivot-gun. - -Yet for privateering purposes the smaller craft competed closely with -the larger. For ordinary service no vessel could do more effective work -in a more economical way than was done by Joshua Barney’s “Rossie” of -Baltimore, or Boyle’s “Comet” of the same port, or Champlin’s “General -Armstrong” of New York,--schooners or brigs of two or three hundred -tons, uncomfortable to their officers and crews, but most dangerous -enemies to merchantmen. Vessels of this class came into favor long -before the war, because of their speed, quickness in handling, and -economy during the experience of twenty years in blockade-running and -evasion of cruisers. Such schooners could be built in any Northern -sea-port in six weeks or two months at half the cost of a government -cruiser. - -The government sloop-of-war was not built for privateering purposes. -Every government vessel was intended chiefly to fight, and required -strength in every part and solidity throughout. The frame needed to be -heavy to support the heavier structure; the quarters needed to be thick -to protect the men at the guns from grape and musketry; the armament -was as weighty as the frame would bear. So strong were the sides of -American frigates that even thirty-two-pound shot fired at forty or -fifty feet distance sometimes failed to penetrate, and the British -complained as a grievance that the sides of an American forty-four -were thicker than those of a British seventy-four.[429] The American -ship-builders spared no pains to make all their vessels in every -respect--in size, strength, and speed--superior to the vessels with -which they were to compete; but the government ship-carpenter had a -harder task than the private ship-builder, for he was obliged to obtain -greater speed at the same time that he used heavier material than the -British constructors. As far as the navy carpenters succeeded in their -double object, they did so by improving the model and increasing the -proportions of the spars. - -The privateer was built for no such object. The last purpose of a -privateer was to fight at close range, and owners much preferred that -their vessels, being built to make money, should not fight at all -unless much money could be made. The private armed vessel was built -rather to fly than to fight, and its value depended far more on its -ability to escape than on its capacity to attack. If the privateer -could sail close to the wind, and wear or tack in the twinkling of an -eye; if she could spread an immense amount of canvas and run off as -fast as a frigate before the wind; if she had sweeps to use in a calm, -and one long-range gun pivoted amidships, with plenty of men in case -boarding became necessary,--she was perfect. To obtain these results -the builders and sailors ran excessive risks. Too lightly built and -too heavily sparred, the privateer was never a comfortable or a safe -vessel. Beautiful beyond anything then known in naval construction, -such vessels roused boundless admiration, but defied imitators. British -constructors could not build them, even when they had the models; -British captains could not sail them; and when British admirals, -fascinated by their beauty and tempted by the marvellous qualities of -their model, ordered such a prize to be taken into the service, the -first act of the carpenters in the British navy-yards was to reduce -to their own standard the long masts, and to strengthen the hull and -sides till the vessel should be safe in a battle or a gale. Perhaps an -American navy-carpenter must have done the same; but though not a line -in the model might be altered, she never sailed again as she sailed -before. She could not bear conventional restraints. - -Americans were proud of their privateers, as they well might be; for -this was the first time when in competition with the world, on an -element open to all, they proved their capacity to excel, and produced -a creation as beautiful as it was practical. The British navy took a -new tone in regard to these vessels. Deeply as the American frigates -and sloops-of-war had wounded the pride of the British navy, they -never had reduced that fine service to admitted inferiority. Under one -pretext or another, every defeat was excused. Even the superiority of -American gunnery was met by the proud explanation that the British -navy, since Trafalgar, had enjoyed no opportunity to use their -guns. Nothing could convince a British admiral that Americans were -better fighters than Englishmen; but when he looked at the American -schooner he frankly said that England could show no such models, and -could not sail them if she had them. In truth, the schooner was a -wonderful invention. Not her battles, but her escapes won for her the -open-mouthed admiration of the British captains, who saw their prize -double like a hare and slip through their fingers at the moment when -capture was sure. Under any ordinary condition of wind and weather, -with an open sea, the schooner, if only she could get to windward, -laughed at a frigate. - -As the sailing rather than the fighting qualities of the privateer -were the chief object of her construction, those were the points best -worth recording; but the newspapers of the time were so much absorbed -in proving that Americans could fight, as to cause almost total neglect -of the more important question whether Americans could sail better than -their rivals. All great nations had fought, and at one time or another -every great nation in Europe had been victorious over every other; but -no people, in the course of a thousand years of rivalry on the ocean, -had invented or had known how to sail a Yankee schooner. Whether ship, -brig, schooner, or sloop, the American vessel was believed to outsail -any other craft on the ocean, and the proof of this superiority was -incumbent on the Americans to furnish. They neglected to do so. No -clear evidence was ever recorded of the precise capacities of their -favorite vessels. Neither the lines of the hull, the dimensions of the -spars, the rates of sailing by the log in different weather, the points -of sailing,--nothing precise was ever set down. - -Of the superiority no doubts could be entertained. The best proof of -the American claim was the British admission. Hardly an English writer -on marine affairs--whether in newspapers, histories, or novels--failed -to make some allusion to the beauty and speed of American vessels. The -naval literature of Great Britain from 1812 to 1860 was full of such -material. The praise of the invention was still commonly accompanied -by some expression of dislike for the inventor, but even in that -respect a marked change followed the experiences of 1812–1814. Among -the Englishmen living on the island of Jamaica, and familiar with the -course of events in the West Indies from 1806 to 1817, was one Michael -Scott, born in Glasgow in 1789, and in the prime of his youth at the -time of the American war. In the year 1829, at the age of forty, he -began the publication in “Blackwood’s Magazine” of a series of sketches -which rapidly became popular as “Tom Cringle’s Log.” Scott was the -best narrator and probably the best informed man who wrote on the West -Indies at that period; and his frequent allusions to the United States -and the war threw more light on the social side of history than could -be obtained from all official sources ever printed. - - “I don’t like Americans,” Scott said; “I never did and never shall - like them. I have seldom met an American gentleman in the large and - complete sense of the term. I have no wish to eat with them, drink - with them, deal with or consort with them in any way; but let me - tell the whole truth,--_nor fight_ with them, were it not for the - laurels to be acquired by overcoming an enemy so brave, determined, - and alert, and every way so worthy of one’s steel as they have - always proved.” - -The Americans did not fight the War of 1812 in order to make themselves -loved. According to Scott’s testimony they gained the object for -which they did fight. “In gunnery and small-arm practice we were -as thoroughly weathered on by the Americans during the war as we -overtopped them in the bull-dog courage with which our boarders handled -those genuine English weapons,--the cutlass and the pike.” Superiority -in the intellectual branches of warfare was conceded to the Americans; -but even in regard to physical qualities, the British were not inclined -to boast. - - “In the field,” said Scott, “or grappling in mortal combat on the - blood-slippery quarter-deck of an enemy’s vessel, a British soldier - or sailor is the bravest of the brave. No soldier or sailor of any - other country, saving and excepting those damned Yankees, can stand - against them.” - -Had English society known so much of Americans in 1807, war would have -been unnecessary. - -Yet neither equality in physical courage nor superiority in the higher -branches of gunnery and small-arms was the chief success of Americans -in the war. Beyond question the schooner was the most conclusive -triumph. Readers of Michael Scott could not forget the best of his -sketches,--the escape of the little American schooner “Wave” from two -British cruisers, by running to windward under the broadside of a -man-of-war. With keen appreciation Scott detailed every motion of the -vessels, and dwelt with peculiar emphasis on the apparent desperation -of the attempt. Again and again the thirty-two-pound shot, as he -described the scene, tore through the slight vessel as the two crafts -raced through the heavy seas within musket-shot of one another, until -at last the firing from the corvette ceased. “The breeze had taken -off, and the ‘Wave,’ resuming her superiority in light winds, had -escaped.” Yet this was not the most significant part of “Tom Cringle’s” -experience. The “Wave,” being afterward captured at anchor, was taken -into the royal service and fitted as a ship-of-war. Cringle was ordered -by the vice-admiral to command her, and as she came to report he took a -look at her:-- - - “When I had last seen her she was a most beautiful little craft, - both in hull and rigging, as ever delighted the eye of a sailor; - but the dock-yard riggers and carpenters had fairly bedevilled her, - at least so far as appearances went. First they had replaced the - light rail on her gunwale by heavy solid bulwarks four feet high, - surmounted by hammock nettings at least another foot; so that the - symmetrical little vessel that formerly floated on the foam light - as a sea-gull now looked like a clumsy, dish-shaped Dutch dogger. - Her long, slender wands of masts which used to swing about as if - there were neither shrouds nor stays to support them were now as - taut and stiff as church-steeples, with four heavy shrouds of a - side, and stays and back-stays, and the Devil knows what all.” - -“If them heave-‘emtaughts at the yard have not taken the speed out of -the little beauty I am a Dutchman” was the natural comment,--as obvious -as it was sound. - -The reports of privateer captains to their owners were rarely -published, and the logs were never printed or deposited in any public -office. Occasionally, in the case of a battle or the loss of guns or -spars or cargo in a close pursuit, the privateer captain described the -causes of his loss in a letter which found its way into print; and -from such letters some idea could be drawn of the qualities held in -highest regard, both in their vessels and in themselves. The first and -commonest remark was that privateers of any merit never seemed to feel -anxious for their own safety so long as they could get to windward a -couple of gunshots from their enemy. They would risk a broadside in -the process without very great anxiety. They chiefly feared lest they -might be obliged to run before the wind in heavy weather. The little -craft which could turn on itself like a flash and dart away under a -frigate’s guns into the wind’s eye long before the heavy ship could -come about, had little to fear on that point of sailing; but when she -was obliged to run to leeward, the chances were more nearly equal. -Sometimes, especially in light breezes or in a stronger wind, by -throwing guns and weighty articles overboard privateers could escape; -but in heavy weather the ship-of-war could commonly outcarry them, and -more often could drive them on a coast or into the clutches of some -other man-of-war. - -Of being forced to fly to leeward almost every privateer could tell -interesting stories. A fair example of such tales was an adventure -of Captain George Coggeshall, who afterward compiled, chiefly from -newspapers, an account of the privateers, among which he preserved -a few stories that would otherwise have been lost.[430] Coggeshall -commanded a two-hundred-ton schooner, the “David Porter,” in which -he made the run to France with a cargo and a letter-of-marque. The -schooner was at Bordeaux in March, 1814, when Wellington’s army -approached. Afraid of seizure by the British if he remained at -Bordeaux, Coggeshall sailed from Bordeaux for La Rochelle with a light -wind from the eastward, when at daylight March 15, 1814, he found -a large ship about two miles to windward. Coggeshall tried to draw -his enemy down to leeward, but only lost ground until the ship was -not more than two gunshots away. The schooner could then not run to -windward without taking the enemy’s fire within pistol-shot, and dared -not return to Bordeaux. Nothing remained but to run before the wind. -Coggeshall got out his square-sail and studding-sails ready to set, -and when everything was prepared he changed his course and bore off -suddenly, gaining a mile in the six or eight minutes lost by the ship -in spreading her studding-sails. He then started his water-casks, threw -out ballast, and drew away from his pursuer, till in a few hours the -ship became a speck on the horizon. - -Apparently a similar but narrower escape was made by Captain Champlin -of the “Warrior,” a famous privateer-brig of four hundred and thirty -tons, mounting twenty-one guns and carrying one hundred and fifty -men.[431] Standing for the harbor of Fayal, Dec. 15, 1814, he was seen -by a British man-of-war lying there at anchor. The enemy slipped her -cables and made sail in chase. The weather was very fresh and squally, -and at eight o’clock in the evening the ship was only three miles -distant. After a run of about sixty miles, the man-of-war came within -grape-shot distance and opened fire from her two bow-guns. Champlin -luffed a little, got his long pivot-gun to bear, and ran out his -starboard guns as though to fight, which caused the ship to shorten -sail for battle. Then Champlin at two o’clock in the morning threw -overboard eleven guns, and escaped. The British ship was in sight the -next morning, but did not pursue farther. - -Often the privateers were obliged to throw everything overboard at the -risk of capsizing, or escaped capture only by means of their sweeps. In -1813 Champlin commanded the “General Armstrong,” a brig of two hundred -and forty-six tons and one hundred and forty men. Off Surinam, March -11, 1813, he fell in with the British sloop-of-war “Coquette,” which -he mistook for a letter-of-marque, and approached with the intention -of boarding. Having come within pistol-shot and fired his broadsides, -he discovered his error. The wind was light, the two vessels had no -headway, and for three quarters of an hour, if Champlin’s account -could be believed, he lay within pistol-shot of the man-of-war. He -was struck by a musket-ball in the left shoulder; six of his crew -were killed and fourteen wounded; his rigging was cut to pieces; his -foremast and bowsprit injured, and several shots entered the brig -between wind and water, causing her to leak; but at last he succeeded -in making sail forward, and with the aid of his sweeps crept out of -range. The sloop-of-war was unable to cripple or follow him.[432] - -Sometimes the very perfection of the privateer led to dangers as great -as though perfection were a fault. Captain Shaler of the “Governor -Tompkins,” a schooner, companion to the “General Armstrong,” chased -three sail Dec. 25, 1812, and on near approach found them to be two -ships and a brig. The larger ship had the appearance of a government -transport; she had boarding-nettings almost up to her tops, but her -ports appeared to be painted, and she seemed prepared for running -away as she fought. Shaler drew nearer, and came to the conclusion -that the ship was too heavy for him; but while his first officer went -forward with the glass to take another look, a sudden squall struck -the schooner without reaching the ship, and in a moment, before the -light sails could be taken in, “and almost before I could turn round, -I was under the guns, not of a transport, but of a large frigate, -and not more than a quarter of a mile from her.” With impudence that -warranted punishment, Shaler fired his little broadside of nine -or twelve pounders into the enemy, who replied with a broadside of -twenty-four-pounders, killing three men, wounding five, and causing an -explosion on deck that threw confusion into the crew; but the broadside -did no serious injury to the rigging. The schooner was then just abaft -the ship’s beam, a quarter of a mile away, holding the same course -and to windward. She could not tack without exposing her stern to a -raking fire, and any failure to come about would have been certain -destruction. Shaler stood on, taking the ship’s fire, on the chance of -outsailing his enemy before a shot could disable the schooner. Side by -side the two vessels raced for half an hour, while twenty-four-pound -shot fell in foam about the schooner, but never struck her, and at -last she drew ahead beyond range. Even then her dangers were not at -an end. A calm followed; the ship put out boats; and only by throwing -deck-lumber and shot overboard, and putting all hands at the sweeps, -did Shaler “get clear of one of the most quarrelsome companions that I -ever met with.”[433] - -The capacities of the American privateer could to some extent be -inferred from its mishaps. Notwithstanding speed, skill, and caution, -the privateer was frequently and perhaps usually captured in the end. -The modes of capture were numerous. April 3, 1813, Admiral Warren’s -squadron in the Chesapeake captured by boats, after a sharp action, -the privateer “Dolphin” of Baltimore, which had taken refuge in the -Rappahannock River. April 27 the “Tom” of Baltimore, a schooner of -nearly three hundred tons, carrying fourteen guns, was captured by his -Majesty’s ships “Surveillante” and “Lyra” after a smart chase. Captain -Collier of the “Surveillante” reported: “She is a remarkably fine -vessel of her class, and from her superior sailing has already escaped -from eighteen of his Majesty’s cruisers.” May 11, the “Holkar” of New -York was driven ashore off Rhode Island and destroyed by the “Orpheus” -frigate. May 19, Captain Gordon of the British man-of-war “Ratler,” -in company with the schooner “Bream,” drove ashore and captured the -“Alexander” of Salem, off Kennebunk, “considered the fastest sailing -privateer out of the United States,” according to Captain Gordon’s -report.[434] May 21, Captain Hyde Parker of the frigate “Tenedos,” in -company with the brig “Curlew,” captured the “Enterprise” of Salem, -pierced for eighteen guns. May 23, the “Paul Jones,” of sixteen guns -and one hundred and twenty men, fell in with a frigate in a thick fog -off the coast of Ireland, and being crippled by her fire surrendered. -July 13, Admiral Cockburn captured by boats at Ocracoke Inlet the fine -privateer-brig “Anaconda” of New York, with a smaller letter-of-marque. -July 17, at sea, three British men-of-war, after a chase of four hours, -captured the “Yorktown” of twenty guns and one hundred and forty men. -The schooner “Orders in Council” of New York, carrying sixteen guns -and one hundred and twenty men, was captured during the summer, after a -long chase of five days, by three British cutters that drove her under -the guns of a frigate. The “Matilda,” privateer of eleven guns and one -hundred and four men, was captured off San Salvador by attempting to -board the British letter-of-marque “Lyon” under the impression that she -was the weaker ship. - -In these ten instances of large privateers captured or destroyed in -1813, the mode of capture happened to be recorded; and in none of them -was the privateer declared to have been outsailed and caught by any -single British vessel on the open seas. Modes of disaster were many, -and doubtless among the rest a privateer might occasionally be fairly -beaten in speed, but few such cases were recorded, although British -naval officers were quick to mention these unusual victories. Unless -the weather gave to the heavier British vessel-of-war the advantage of -carrying more sail in a rough sea, the privateer was rarely outsailed. - -The number of privateers at sea in 1813 was not recorded. The list -of all private armed vessels during the entire war included somewhat -more than five hundred names.[435] Most of these were small craft, -withdrawn after a single cruise. Not two hundred were so large as to -carry crews of fifty men. Nearly two hundred and fifty, or nearly half -the whole number of privateers, fell into British hands. Probably at -no single moment were more than fifty seagoing vessels on the ocean -as privateers, and the number was usually very much less; while the -large privateer-brigs or ships that rivalled sloops-of-war in size were -hardly more numerous than the sloops themselves. - -The total number of prizes captured from the British in 1813 -exceeded four hundred, four fifths of which were probably captured -by privateers, national cruisers taking only seventy-nine. If the -privateers succeeded in taking three hundred and fifty prizes, the -whole number of privateers could scarcely have exceeded one hundred. -The government cruisers “President,” “Congress,” “Chesapeake,” -“Hornet,” and “Argus” averaged nearly ten prizes apiece. Privateers -averaged much less; but they were ten times as numerous as the -government cruisers, and inflicted four times as much injury. - -Such an addition to the naval force of the United States was very -important. Doubtless the privateers contributed more than the regular -navy to bring about a disposition for peace in the British classes most -responsible for the war. The colonial and shipping interests, whose -influence produced the Orders in Council, suffered the chief penalty. -The West India colonies were kept in constant discomfort and starvation -by swarms of semi-piratical craft darting in and out of every channel -among their islands; but the people of England could have borne with -patience the punishment of the West Indies had not the American -cruisers inflicted equally severe retribution nearer home. - -Great Britain was blockaded. No one could deny that manifest danger -existed to any merchant-vessel that entered or left British waters. -During the summer the blockade was continuous. Toward the close of -1812 an American named Preble, living in Paris, bought a small vessel, -said to have belonged in turn to the British and French navy, which -he fitted as a privateer-brig, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred -and sixty men. The “True-Blooded Yankee,” commanded by Captain Hailey, -sailed from Brest March 1, 1813, and cruised thirty-seven days on -the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, capturing twenty-seven valuable -vessels; sinking coasters in the very bay of Dublin; landing and taking -possession of an island off the coast of Ireland, and of a town in -Scotland, where she burned seven vessels in the harbor. She returned -safely to Brest, and soon made another cruise. At the same time the -schooner “Fox” of Portsmouth burned or sunk vessel after vessel in -the Irish Sea, as they plied between Liverpool and Cork. In May, the -schooner “Paul Jones” of New York, carrying sixteen guns and one -hundred and twenty men, took or destroyed a dozen vessels off the Irish -coast, until she was herself caught in a fog by the frigate “Leonidas,” -and captured May 23 after a chase in which five of her crew were -wounded. - -While these vessels were thus engaged, the brig “Rattlesnake” of -Philadelphia, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and -the brig “Scourge” of New York, carrying nine guns and one hundred and -ten men, crossed the ocean and cruised all the year in the northern -seas off the coasts of Scotland and Norway, capturing some forty -British vessels, and costing the British merchants and ship-owners -losses to the amount of at least two million dollars. In July the -“Scourge” fell in with Commodore Rodgers in the “President,” and the -two vessels remained several days in company off the North Cape, while -the British admiralty sent three or four squadrons in search of them -without success. July 19, after Rodgers had been nearly a month in -British waters, one of these squadrons drove him away, and he then made -a circuit round Ireland before he turned homeward. At the same time, -from July 14 to August 14, the “Argus” was destroying vessels in the -British Channel at the rate of nearly one a day. After the capture of -the “Argus,” August 14, the “Grand Turk” of Salem, a brig carrying -sixteen guns and one hundred and five men, cruised for twenty days -in the mouth of the British Channel without being disturbed. Besides -these vessels, others dashed into British waters from time to time as -they sailed forward and back across the ocean in the track of British -commerce. - -No one disputed that the privateers were a very important branch of -the American navy; but they suffered under serious drawbacks, which -left doubtful the balance of merits and defects. Perhaps their chief -advantage compared with government vessels was their lightness,--a -quality which no government would have carried to the same extent. The -long-range pivot-gun was another invention of the privateer, peculiarly -successful and easily adapted for government vessels. In other -respects, the same number or even half the number of sloops-of-war -would have probably inflicted greater injury at less cost. The “Argus” -showed how this result could have been attained. The privateer’s first -object was to save prizes; and in the effort to send captured vessels -into port the privateer lost a large proportion by recapture. Down to -the moment when Admiral Warren established his blockade of the American -coast from New York southward, most of the prizes got to port. After -that time the New England ports alone offered reasonable chance of -safety, and privateering received a check.[436] During the war about -twenty-five hundred vessels all told were captured from the British. -Many were destroyed; many released as cartels; and of the remainder not -less than seven hundred and fifty, probably one half the number sent -to port, were recaptured by the British navy. Most of these were the -prizes of privateers, and would have been destroyed had they been taken -by government vessels. They were usually the most valuable prizes, so -that the injury that might have been inflicted on British commerce was -diminished nearly one half by the system which encouraged private war -as a money-making speculation. - -Another objection was equally serious. Like all gambling ventures, -privateering was not profitable. In the list of five hundred privateers -furnished by the Navy Department,[437] three hundred were recorded as -having never made a prize. Of the remainder, few made their expenses. -One of the most successful cruises of the war was that of Joshua Barney -on the Baltimore schooner “Rossie” at the outbreak of hostilities, when -every prize reached port. Barney sent in prizes supposed to be worth -fifteen hundred thousand dollars; but after paying charges and duties -and selling the goods, he found that the profits were not sufficient -to counterbalance the discomforts, and he refused to repeat the -experiment. His experience was common. As early as November, 1812, the -owners of twenty-four New York privateers sent to Congress a memorial -declaring that the profits of private naval war were by no means equal -to the hazards, and that the spirit of privateering stood in danger of -extinction unless the government would consent in some manner to grant -a bounty for the capture or destruction of the enemy’s property. - -If private enterprise was to fail at the critical moment, and if the -government must supply the deficiency, the government would have done -better to undertake the whole task. In effect, the government in the -end did so. The merchants asked chiefly for a reduction of duties -on prize-goods. Gallatin pointed out the serious objections to such -legislation, and the little probability that the measure would increase -the profits of privateering or the number of privateers. The actual -privateers, he said, were more than enough for the food offered by the -enemy’s trade, and privateering, like every other form of gambling, -would always continue to attract more adventurers than it could -support.[438] - -Congress for the time followed Gallatin’s advice, and did nothing; but -in the summer session of 1813, after Gallatin’s departure for Europe, -the privateer owners renewed their appeal, and the acting Secretary of -the Treasury, Jones, wrote to the chairman of the Naval Committee July -21, 1813,[439]-- - - “The fact is that ... privateering is nearly at an end; and from - the best observation I have been enabled to make, it is more from - the deficiency of remuneration in the net proceeds of their prizes - than from the vigilance and success of the enemy in recapturing.” - -In deference to Jones’s opinion, Congress passed an Act, approved Aug. -2, 1813, reducing one third the duties on prize-goods. Another Act, -approved August 3, granted a bounty of twenty-five dollars for every -prisoner captured and delivered to a United States agent by a private -armed vessel. A third Act, approved August 2, authorized the Secretary -of the Navy to place on the pension list any privateersman who should -be wounded or disabled in the line of his duty. - -These complaints and palliations tended to show that the privateer cost -the public more than the equivalent government vessel would have cost. -If instead of five hundred privateers of all sizes and efficiency, the -government had kept twenty sloops-of-war constantly at sea destroying -the enemy’s commerce, the result would have been about the same as -far as concerned injury to the enemy, while in another respect the -government would have escaped one of its chief difficulties. Nothing -injured the navy so much as privateering. Seamen commonly preferred -the harder but more profitable and shorter cruise in a privateer, -where fighting was not expected or wished, to the strict discipline -and murderous battles of government ships, where wages were low and -prize-money scarce. Of all towns in the United States, Marblehead was -probably the most devoted to the sea; but of nine hundred men from -Marblehead who took part in the war, fifty-seven served as soldiers, -one hundred and twenty entered the navy, while seven hundred and -twenty-six went as privateersmen.[440] Only after much delay and -difficulty could the frigates obtain crews. The “Constitution” was -nearly lost by this cause at the beginning of the war; and the loss of -the “Chesapeake” was supposed to be chiefly due to the determination -of the old crew to quit the government service for that of the -privateers. - -Such drawbacks raised reasonable doubts as to the balance of advantages -and disadvantages offered by the privateer system. Perhaps more -careful inquiry might show that, valuable as the privateers were, the -government would have done better to retain all military and naval -functions in its own hands, and to cover the seas with small cruisers -capable of pursuing a system of thorough destruction against the -shipping and colonial interests of England. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV. - - -GALLATIN and Bayard, having sailed from the Delaware May 9, arrived -at St. Petersburg July 21, only to find that during the six months -since the Czar offered to mediate, Russia had advanced rapidly in -every direction except that of the proposed mediation. Napoleon -after being driven from Russia in December, 1812, passed the winter -in Paris organizing a new army of three hundred thousand men on the -Elbe, between Dresden and Magdeburg, while a second army of more than -one hundred thousand was to hold Hamburg and Bremen. Russia could not -prevent Napoleon from reconstructing a force almost as powerful as that -with which he had marched to Moscow, for the Russian army had suffered -very severely and was unfit for active service; but the Czar succeeded -in revolutionizing Prussia, and in forcing the French to retire from -the Vistula to the Elbe, while he gained a reinforcement of more than -one hundred thousand men from the fresh and vigorous Prussian army. -Even with that assistance the Czar could not cope with Napoleon, who, -leaving Paris April 17, during the month of May fought furious battles -at Lützen and Bautzen, which forced the allied Russian and Prussian -armies back from the Elbe to the Oder. - -At that point Austria interfered so energetically as to oblige Napoleon -to accept an armistice for the purpose of collecting new forces. During -the armistice the Czar stationed himself at Gitschin in Bohemia, nine -hundred miles from St. Petersburg, and about the same distance from -London by the path that couriers were obliged to take. When Gallatin -and Bayard reached St. Petersburg, July 21, the armistice, which had -been prolonged until August 10, was about to expire, and the Czar could -not be anxious to decide subordinate questions until the issue of the -coming campaign should be known. - -Meanwhile the government of England had in May, with many friendly -expressions, declined the Russian mediation.[441] Castlereagh probably -hoped that this quiet notification to Lieven, the Russian envoy in -London, would end the matter; but toward the month of July news reached -London that the American commissioners, Gallatin and Bayard, had -arrived at Gothenburg on their way to Russia, and Castlereagh then -saw that he must be more explicit in his refusal. Accordingly he took -measures for making the matter clear not only to the Russian government -but also to the American commissioners. - -With the Russian government he was obliged by the nature of their -common relations to communicate officially, and he wrote instructions -to Lord Cathcart, dated July 5, directing communication to be made. - - “I am afraid,” said Castlereagh’s letter,[442] “this tender of - mediation which on a question of maritime right cannot be listened - to by Great Britain, however kindly and liberally intended, will - have had the unfortunate effect of protracting the war with the - United States. It is to be lamented that the formal offer was made - to America before the disposition of the British government was - previously sounded as to its acceptance of a mediation. It has - enabled the President to hold out to the people of America a vague - expectation of peace, under which he may reconcile them with less - repugnance to submit to the measures of the Government. This evil, - however, cannot now be avoided, and it only remains to prevent this - question from producing any embarrassment between Great Britain and - Russia.” - -Embarrassment between Great Britain and Russia was no new thing in -European politics, and commonly involved maritime objects for which -the United States were then fighting. Castlereagh had much reason -for wishing to avoid the danger. The most fortunate result he could -reasonably expect from the coming campaign was a defeat of Bonaparte -that should drive him back to the Rhine. Then Russia and Austria would -probably offer terms to Napoleon; England would be obliged to join in -a European Congress; Napoleon would raise the question of maritime -rights, and on that point he would be supported by Russian sympathies. -Napoleon and Russia might insist that the United States should take -part in the Congress, and in that case England might be obliged to -retire from it. Castlereagh felt uneasy at the prospect, and ordered -Cathcart to “press the Emperor of Russia in the strongest manner not -to push his personal interference on this point further.” Cathcart -was to use his utmost endeavors to persuade the Czar “pointedly to -discountenance a design so mischievously calculated to promote the -views of France.” - -Another week of reflection only increased Castlereagh’s anxieties, and -caused the British government to take a step intended to leave the Czar -no opening for interference. July 13 Castlereagh wrote Cathcart new -instructions,[443] directing him to present a formal note acquainting -the Czar that the Prince Regent was “ready immediately to name -plenipotentiaries to meet and treat with the American plenipotentiaries -in the earnest desire” of peace, either in London or at Gothenburg; -although he could “not consent that these discussions should be carried -on in any place which might be supposed to imply that they were in -any way connected with any other negotiations.” He wrote privately to -Cathcart that the mere knowledge of the intervention of a third power -in any arrangement with the United States would probably decide the -British people against it.[444] - -Thus in July, 1813, when the war was barely a year old, Castlereagh -reached the point of offering to negotiate directly with the United -States. This advantage was gained by the Russian offer of mediation, -and was intended not to pacify America but to silence Alexander and -Roumanzoff. Castlereagh was frank and prompt in his declarations. -His offer of direct negotiation was dated July 13, at a time when -Alexander Baring received a letter from Gallatin announcing his arrival -at Gothenburg and inviting assistance for the proposed mediation. -Baring consulted Castlereagh, and wrote, July 22, a long letter to -Gallatin, to inform the American commissioners what the British -government had done and was willing to do. “Before this reaches you,” -said Baring,[445] “you will have been informed that this mediation -has been refused, with expressions of our desire to treat separately -and directly here; or, if more agreeable to you, at Gothenburg.” -To leave no room for misunderstanding, Baring added that if the -American commissioners were obliged by their instructions to adhere -pertinaciously to the American demands in respect to impressments, he -should think negotiation useless. - -In regular succession all these expressions of British policy were -received at St. Petersburg in the Czar’s absence, and in the doubtful -state of mind which followed the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. -Alexander had left Count Roumanzoff at St. Petersburg, continuing to -act as Chancellor of the Empire and Foreign Secretary; but in truth -the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as far as the Czar then required such -an officer, was Count Nesselrode, who attended Alexander in person and -received his orders orally. Nesselrode at that time was rather an agent -than an adviser; but in general he represented the English alliance and -hostility to Napoleon, while Roumanzoff represented the French alliance -and hostility to England. - -Of English diplomacy Americans knew something, and could by similarity -of mind divine what was not avowed. Of French diplomacy they had long -experience, and their study was rendered from time to time more easy -by Napoleon’s abrupt methods. Of Russian diplomacy they knew little -or nothing. Thus far Minister Adams had been given his own way. He -had been allowed to seem to kindle the greatest war of modern times, -and had been invited to make use of Russia against England; but the -Czar’s reasons for granting such favor were mysterious even to Adams, -for while Napoleon occasionally avowed motives, Alexander never did. -Russian diplomacy moved wholly in the dark. - -Only one point was certain. For reasons of his own, the Czar chose -to leave Roumanzoff nominally in office until the result of the war -should be decided, although Roumanzoff was opposed to the Czar’s -policy. The chancellor did not stand alone in his hostility to the war; -probably a majority of the Russian people shared the feeling. Even the -army and its old General Koutousoff, though elated with an immense -triumph, grumbled at being obliged to fight the battles of Germany, -and would gladly have returned to their own soil. The Czar himself -could not afford to break his last tie with the French interest, but -was wise to leave a path open by which he could still retreat in case -his war in Germany failed. If Napoleon should succeed once more in -throwing the Russian army back upon Russian soil, Alexander might still -be obliged to use Roumanzoff’s services if not to resume his policy. -Such a suspicion might not wholly explain Alexander’s course toward -Roumanzoff and Koutousoff, but no one could doubt that it explained -the chancellor’s course toward the Czar. Indeed, Roumanzoff made -little concealment of his situation or his hopes. Adams could without -much difficulty divine that the failure of the Czar in Germany would -alone save Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg, and that the restoration of -Roumanzoff to power was necessary to reinvigorate the mediation. - -Castlereagh’s first positive refusal to accept the mediation was -notified to Count Lieven in May, and was known to Roumanzoff in St. -Petersburg about the middle of June. Early in July the Czar received -it, and by his order Nesselrode, in a despatch to Lieven dated July -9, expressed “the perfect satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt -in the reasons which actuated the conduct of this [British] government -on a point of so much delicacy and importance.”[446] The Czar was then -in the midst of difficulties. The result of the war was doubtful, and -depended on Austria. - -Just as news of the armistice arrived in St. Petersburg, Minister Adams -went to Roumanzoff, June 22, to inform him of Gallatin’s and Bayard’s -appointment. Roumanzoff in return gave Adams explicit information -of England’s refusal to accept the Czar’s offer. Adams immediately -recorded it in his Diary:[447]-- - - “He [Roumanzoff] said that he was very sorry to say he had - received since he had seen me [June 15] further despatches from - Count Lieven, stating that the British government, with many - very friendly and polite assurances that there was no mediation - which they should so readily and cheerfully accept as that of the - Emperor of Russia, had however stated that their differences with - the United States of America involving certain principles of the - internal government of England were of a nature which they did not - think suitable to be settled by a mediation.” - -Adams expected this answer, and at once assumed it to be final; -but Roumanzoff checked him. “It would now be for consideration,” -he continued, “whether, after the step thus taken by the American -government [in sending commissioners to St. Petersburg], it would not -be advisable to renew the proposition to Great Britain; upon which he -should write to the Emperor.” Not because of any American request, but -wholly of his own motion, Roumanzoff proposed to keep the mediation -alive. His motives were for Adams to fathom. The chancellor did not -avow them, but he hinted to Adams that the chances of war were many. -“Perhaps it might be proper not to be discouraged by the ill success -of his first advances. After considerations might produce more pacific -dispositions in the British government. Unexpected things were -happening every day; ‘and in our own affairs,’ said the count, ‘a very -general report prevails that an armistice has taken place.’” A Congress -had been proposed, and the United States were expressly named among the -Powers to be invited to it. - -Adams reported this conversation to his Government in a despatch dated -June 26,[448] and waited for his two new colleagues, who arrived July -21. Personally the colleagues were agreeable to Adams, and the proposed -negotiation was still more so, for the President sent him official -notice that in case the negotiations were successful, Adams’s services -would be required as minister in London; but with the strongest -inducements to press the mediation, Adams could not but see that he and -his colleagues depended on Roumanzoff, and that Roumanzoff depended -not on Alexander, but on Napoleon. Roumanzoff’s only chance of aiding -them was by clinging to office until the Czar should be weary of war. - -Unwilling as Gallatin was to be thus made the sport of imperial policy, -he was obliged, like his colleagues, to submit. Two days after their -arrival, Roumanzoff told them that he meant, if possible, to begin the -whole transaction anew. - - “The count said he regretted much that there was such reason - to believe the British would decline the mediation; but on - transmitting the copy of the credential letter to the Emperor, he - would determine whether to renew the proposal, as the opposition in - England might make it an embarrassing charge against the Ministry - if they should under such circumstances reject it.”[449] - -Roumanzoff had written soon after June 22 to ask the Czar whether, -on the arrival of the American commissioners, the offer of mediation -should be renewed. The Czar, overwhelmed with business, wrote back, -about July 20, approving Roumanzoff’s suggestion, and authorizing him -to send a despatch directly to Count Lieven in London renewing the -offer. The Czar’s letter was communicated to Adams August 10[450] by -Roumanzoff, who was evidently much pleased and perhaps somewhat excited -by it. - -Such a letter warranted some excitement, for Roumanzoff could regard it -only as a sign of hesitation and anxiety. Alexander was in a degree -pledged to England to press the mediation no further. While he assured -England through Nesselrode, July 9, that he was perfectly satisfied -with the British reasons for refusing his offer of mediation “on a -point of so much delicacy and importance,” he authorized Roumanzoff -only ten days afterward to annoy England a second time with an offer -which he had every reason to know must be rejected; and he did this -without informing Nesselrode. - -Gallatin and Bayard found themselves, August 10, condemned to -wait two or three months for the British answer, which they knew -must be unfavorable, because Gallatin received August 17 Baring’s -letter announcing the determination of Castlereagh to negotiate -separately. Roumanzoff’s conduct became more and more mysterious to -the commissioners. He did not notify them of Castlereagh’s official -offer to negotiate directly. He confounded Adams, August 19, by flatly -denying his own information, given two months before, that England -rejected mediation in principle because it involved doctrines of -her internal government. Roumanzoff insisted that England had never -refused to accept the mediation, although he held in his hands at least -two despatches from Lieven, written as late as July 13, officially -communicating England’s determination to negotiate directly or not -at all. Castlereagh, foreseeing the possibility of misunderstanding, -had read to Lieven the instructions of July 13 for communication to -Roumanzoff, besides authorizing Cathcart to show them _in extenso_ -to the Czar.[451] In denying that such instructions had been given, -Roumanzoff could not have expected the American commissioners to -believe him. - -The motive of Roumanzoff’s persistence might be open to the simple -explanation that the chancellor hoped to recover power, and within -a few months to re-establish his policy of antagonism to England. -Alexander’s conduct could be explained by no such obvious interest. -When Castlereagh’s letters of July 13 and 14 reached Cathcart at the -Czar’s headquarters in Bohemia about August 10, they arrived at the -most critical moment of the war. On that day the armistice expired. -The next day Austria declared war on Napoleon. The combined armies -of Russia, Prussia, and Austria concentrated behind the mountains, -and then marched into Saxony. While starting on that campaign, August -20, the Czar was told by Lord Cathcart the reasons why his offer of -mediation was rejected, and answered at once that in this case he could -do nothing more.[452] Cathcart wrote to Nesselrode a formal note on -the subject August 23 or 24, but did not at once communicate it,[453] -because the campaign had then begun; the great battle of Dresden was -fought August 26 and 27, and the allies, again beaten, retired into -Bohemia August 28. The Czar saw his best military adviser Moreau -killed by his side at Dresden, and he returned to Töplitz in no happy -frame of mind. - -At Töplitz, September 1, Cathcart delivered to Nesselrode his formal -note,[454] refusing Russian mediation and communicating the offer of -England to negotiate directly. In an ordinary condition of government -Nesselrode should have taken care that the British note should be made -known without delay to the American commissioners at St. Petersburg, -but the Czar kept in his own hands the correspondence with Roumanzoff -and the Americans, and neither he nor Nesselrode communicated -Cathcart’s act to Roumanzoff.[455] Possibly their silence was due to -the new military movements. August 29 the French marshal Vandamme -with forty thousand men, pursuing the allies into Bohemia, was caught -between the Prussians and Austrians August 30 and crushed. During the -month of September severe fighting, favorable to the allies, occurred, -but no general advance was made by the allied sovereigns. - -Alexander next received at Töplitz toward September 20 a letter from -Roumanzoff enclosing a renewal of the offer of mediation, to be -proposed in a despatch to Lieven, read by Roumanzoff to the American -commissioners August 24, and sent to London August 28. The Czar must -have known the futility of this new step, as well as the mistake -into which Roumanzoff had been led, and the awkward attitude of the -American commissioners. Only a fortnight before, he had received -Cathcart’s official note, and a few days earlier he had assured -Cathcart that he should do no more in the matter. Yet, September 20, -Alexander wrote with his own hand a note of four lines to Roumanzoff, -approving his despatch to Lieven, and begging him to follow up the -affair as he had begun it.[456] - -The Czar’s letter of September 20 completed the embroglio, which -remained unintelligible to every one except himself. Cathcart was the -most mystified of all the victims to the Czar’s double attitude. At the -time when Alexander thus for the second time authorized Roumanzoff to -disregard the express entreaties of the British government, Cathcart -was making an effort to explain to Castlereagh the Czar’s first -interference. If Castlereagh understood his minister’s ideas, he was -gifted with more than common penetration. - - “I believe the not communicating the rescript of the Emperor - concerning the American plenipotentiaries to have been the effect - of accident,” wrote Cathcart[457] from Töplitz September 25; “but - what is singular is that notwithstanding his [Nesselrode’s] letter - of the ninth [July], by the Emperor’s command, to Count Lieven, - this communication from and instruction to Roumanzoff was not known - to Count Nesselrode till this day, when I mentioned it to him, - having received no caution to do otherwise, and he was not at all - pleased with it. It was during the advance to Dresden. But I cannot - help thinking that there must have been some policy of Roumanzoff’s - stated in regard to keeping hold of the mediation, which, - whether it was detailed or not, would not escape the Emperor’s - penetration, and upon which he may have been induced to act as far - as sanctioning the proposal of treating at _London_ under Russia’s - mediation, which the Prince Regent’s government might accept or - reject as they pleased; and that not wishing to go at that time - into a discussion of maritime rights with either Nesselrode or me, - he afterward forgot it.” - -Cathcart’s style was involved, but his perplexity was evident. His -remarks related only to the Czar’s first letter to Roumanzoff, written -about July 20, not “during the advance to Dresden.” He knew nothing of -the Czar’s second letter to Roumanzoff, dated September 20, renewing -the same authority, only five days before Cathcart’s labored attempt -to explain the first. Of the second letter, as of the first, neither -Nesselrode nor Cathcart was informed. - -The Czar’s motive in thus ordering each of his two ministers to act -in ignorance and contradiction of the other’s instructions perplexed -Roumanzoff as it did Cathcart. Lieven first revealed to Roumanzoff -the strange misunderstanding by positively refusing to present to -Castlereagh the chancellor’s note of August 28 renewing the offer of -mediation. Roumanzoff was greatly mortified. He told Gallatin that -the mediation had been originally the Czar’s own idea; that it had -been the subject of repeated discussions at his own motion, and had -been adopted notwithstanding Roumanzoff’s hints at the possibility -of English reluctance.[458] The chancellor sent Lieven’s despatch -immediately to the Czar without comment, requesting the Czar to read -it and give his orders. The British officials, unwilling to blame -Alexander, attacked Roumanzoff. Lord Walpole, who came directly from -Bohemia to St. Petersburg to act as British ambassador, said “he was -as sure as he was of his own existence, and he believed he could prove -it, that Roumanzoff had been cheating us all.”[459] Cathcart wrote, -December 12, to Castlereagh,-- - - “I think Nesselrode knows nothing of the delay of communicating - with the American mission; that it was an intrigue of the - chancellor’s, if it is one; and that during the operations of - war the Emperor lost the clew to it, so that something has been - unanswered.”[460] - -Perhaps the Czar’s conduct admitted of several interpretations. He -might wish to keep the mediation alive in order to occupy Roumanzoff -until the campaign should be decided; or he might in his good nature -prefer to gratify his old favorite by allowing him to do what he -wished; or he took this method of signifying to Roumanzoff his disgrace -and the propriety of immediate retirement. Apparently Roumanzoff took -the last view, for he sent his resignation to the Czar, and at the -close of the year quitted his official residence at the Department of -Foreign Affairs, telling Gallatin that he remained in office only till -he should receive authority to close the American mission. - -The American commissioners in private resented Alexander’s treatment, -but were unable to leave Russia without authority. Gallatin learned, -October 19, that the Senate had refused to confirm his appointment, but -he remained at St. Petersburg, chiefly in deference to Roumanzoff’s -opinion, and probably with ideas of assisting the direct negotiation at -London or elsewhere. Meanwhile the campaign was decided, October 18, by -Napoleon’s decisive overthrow at Leipzig, which forced him to retreat -behind the Rhine. Still the Czar wrote nothing to Roumanzoff, and the -American commissioners remained month after month at St. Petersburg. -Not until Jan. 25, 1814, did Gallatin and Bayard begin their winter -journey to Amsterdam, where they arrived March 4 and remained a month. -Then Gallatin received, through Baring, permission to enter England, -and crossed the Channel to hasten if he could the direct negotiation -which Castlereagh had offered and Madison accepted. - -The diplomatic outlook had changed since March, 1813, when the -President accepted the offer of Russian mediation; but the change was -wholly for the worse. England’s triumphs girdled the world, and found -no check except where Perry’s squadron blocked the way to Detroit. -The allied armies crossed the Rhine in December and entered France -on the east. At the same time Wellington after a long campaign drove -Joseph from Spain, and entering France from the south pressed against -Bordeaux. The government and people of England, in their excitement and -exultation at daily conquests, thought as little as they could of the -American war. Society rarely mentioned it. Newspapers alone preserved -a record of British feelings toward the United States during the year -1813. The expressions of newspapers, like those of orators, could not -be accepted without allowance, for they aimed at producing some desired -effect, and said either more or less than the truth; as a rule, they -represented the cool opinion neither of the person who uttered nor -of the audience who heard them; but in the absence of other records, -public opinion was given only in the press, and the London newspapers -alone furnished evidence of its character. - -The “Morning Chronicle”--the only friend of the United States in the -daily press of England--showed its friendship by silence. Whatever the -liberal opposition thought in private, no one but Cobbett ventured -in public to oppose the war. Cobbett having become a radical at the -time of life when most men become conservative, published in his -“Weekly Register” many columns of vigorous criticism on the American -war without apparent effect, although in truth he expressed opinions -commonly held by intelligent people. Even Lord Castlereagh, Cobbett’s -antipathy, shared some of Cobbett’s least popular opinions in the -matter of the American war. - -English society, whatever shades of diversity might exist, was frank -and free in expressing indifference or contempt. Of the newspapers -which made a duty of reflecting what was believed to be the prevailing -public opinion, the “Times,” supposed to favor the interests of -Wellesley and Canning, was probably the ablest. During the early part -of the war, the “Times” showed a disposition to criticise the Ministry -rather than the Americans. From the “Times” came most of the bitter -complaints, widely copied by the American press, of the naval defeats -suffered by the “Guerriere,” the “Java,” and the “Macedonian.” British -successes were belittled, and abuse of Americans was exaggerated, in -order to deprive ministers of credit. “The world has seen President -Madison plunge into a war from the basest motives, and conduct it -with the most entire want of ability,” said the “Times” of February -9, 1813. “The American government has sounded the lowest depth of -military disgrace, insomuch that the official records of the campaign -take from us all possibility of exulting in our victories over such an -enemy.” The “Times” found in such reflections a reason for not exulting -in ministerial victories, but it bewailed defeats the more loudly, -and annoyed the Ministry by the violence of its attacks on naval -administration. - -As the year passed, and England’s triumph in Europe seemed to -overshadow the world, the “Times,” probably recognizing the uselessness -of attacking the Ministry, showed worse temper toward the United -States. The Americans were rarely mentioned, and always with language -of increasing ill humor. “Despicable in the cabinet, ridiculous in the -field,”[461] the Americans disappeared from sight in the splendor of -victory at Vittoria and Leipzig. No wish for peace was suggested, and -if the “Times” expressed the true feelings of the respectable middle -class, as it was supposed to aim at doing, no wish for peace could be -supposed to exist. - -Of the ministerial papers the “Courier” was the best, and of course was -emphatic in support of the American war. The Ministry were known to -be lukewarm about the United States, and for that reason they thought -themselves obliged to talk in public as strongly as the strongest -against a peace. When the Russian mediation called for notice, May 13, -the “Courier” at once declared against it:-- - - “Before the war commenced, concession might have been proper; we - always thought it unwise. But the hour of concession and compromise - is passed. America has rushed unnecessarily and unnaturally - into war, and she must be made to feel the effects of her folly - and injustice; peace must be the consequence of punishment, and - retraction of her insolent demands must precede negotiation. The - thunders of our cannon must first strike terror into the American - shores.” - -The “Courier” felt that Americans were not Englishmen, and could not -forgive it, but was unable to admit that they might still exercise a -considerable influence on human affairs:-- - - “They have added nothing to literature, nothing to any of - the sciences; they have not produced one good poet, not one - celebrated historian! Their statesmen are of a mixed breed,--half - metaphysicians, half politicians; all the coldness of the one with - all the cunning of the other. Hence we never see anything enlarged - in their conceptions or grand in their measures.”[462] - -These reasons were hardly sufficient to prove the right of impressing -American seamen. The literary, metaphysical, or social qualities -of Americans, their “enlarged conceptions,” and the grandeur or -littleness of their measures, had by common consent ceased to enter -into discussion, pending a settlement of the simpler issue, whether -Americans could fight. For a long time the English press encouraged the -belief that Americans were as incapable of fighting as of producing -poets and historians. Their naval victories were attributed to British -seamen. Perhaps the first turn of the tide was in November, 1813, -when news of Perry’s victory on Lake Erie crossed in London the news -of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. Perry’s victory, like those of Hull, -Decatur, and Bainbridge, was too complete for dispute: “It may, -however, serve to diminish our vexation at this occurrence to learn -that the flotilla in question was not any branch of the British navy, -... but a local force, a kind of mercantile military.”[463] - -By a curious coincidence, Castlereagh’s official letter to Monroe, -offering direct negotiation, was dated the same day, November 4, -when news of the victory at Leipzig met in London news of the defeat -on Lake Erie, and Castlereagh probably meant to allow no newspaper -prejudices to obstruct a peace; but public opinion was slow to recover -its balance. When news arrived that the Americans had captured Malden, -recovered Detroit, and destroyed Proctor’s army on the Thames, the -“Courier” showed the first symptom of change in opinion by expressing a -somewhat simple-minded wish to hear no more about the Americans:-- - - “The intelligence is unpleasant, but we confess that we do not - view, and have never from the beginning of the war viewed, the - events in America with any very powerful interest. The occurrences - in Europe will no doubt produce a very decisive effect upon the - American government; and unless it is more obstinate and stupid - in its hostility than even _we_ think it, it will do as the other - allies of Bonaparte have done,--abandon him.” - -If the national extravagance could be expected to show its full force -in one direction rather than in another, naturalized Americans taken -in arms were certain to produce it. The issue was regularly raised -after Van Rensselaer’s defeat at Queenston in 1812. When the American -prisoners arrived at Quebec, they were mustered, and twenty-three -native-born subjects of Great Britain, belonging to the First, Sixth, -and Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, were taken from the ranks and shipped to -England to be put on trial as British subjects for bearing arms against -their king. The American agent in London reported to the President that -the men had arrived there for the reason given. Secretary Armstrong, -May 15, 1813, then ordered twenty-three British soldiers into close -confinement as hostages. The British government directed Sir George -Prevost to put double the number of Americans in close confinement, -and Sir George, in giving notice of this measure to General Wilkinson, -October 17, 1813,[464] added:-- - - “I have been further instructed by his Majesty’s government to - notify to you for the information of the government of the United - States that the commanders of his Majesty’s armies and fleets on - the coasts of America have received instructions to prosecute - the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, - and villages belonging to the United States, and against the - inhabitants thereof, if, after this communication shall have been - made to you, and a reasonable time given for its being transmitted - to the American government, that government shall unhappily not be - deterred from putting to death any of the soldiers who now are or - who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in - the letter from Major-General Dearborn.” - -The limit of retaliation was soon reached, for the number of prisoners -was small on both sides. The British government somewhat carefully -refrained from committing itself too far; but the press treated the -matter as though it were vital. - - “If Mr. Madison,” said the “Courier” of July 24, “dare to retaliate - by taking away the life of one English prisoner in revenge for a - British subject fully proved to be such being taken in the act of - voluntarily bearing arms against his country, America puts herself - out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated - as an outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then be - absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and laws of war. - Hostilities may be carried on against her in any mode until she is - brought to a proper sense of her conduct.” - -The “Morning Post” of December 28 called for the execution of British -subjects taken in arms, and for retaliation on retaliation in defiance -of “the brutal wretches who, after betraying, are still suffered -to govern America.” The “Times” of May 24 spoke with hardly less -vehemence. Probably such talk was not shared by the government, for -the government never tested its sincerity by bringing the men to -trial; but at the close of 1813 public opinion in England was supposed -to be tending toward extreme measures against the United States. The -approaching fall of Napoleon threatened to throw America outside the -pale of civilization. Englishmen seemed ready to accept the idea that -Madison and Napoleon should be coupled together, and that no peace -should be made which did not include the removal of both from office -and power. Of all periods in American history this was probably the -least adapted to negotiation, but while England was at the moment of -her most extravagant sense of power, President Madison received and -accepted Castlereagh’s offer to negotiate, and Gallatin went with -Bayard to London to hasten the approach of peace. - - - - -CHAPTER XV. - - -CONGRESS assembled Dec. 6, 1813, at a time of general perplexity. -The victories of Perry and Harrison, September 10 and October 5, had -recovered Detroit and even conquered a part of West Canada, but their -successes were already dimmed by the failures of Wilkinson and Hampton -before Montreal, and the retreat of both generals November 13 within -United States territory. In the Creek country the Georgians had failed -to advance from the east, and Jackson was stopped at Fort Strother -by want of supplies and men. At sea the navy was doing little, while -the British blockade from New London southward was becoming more and -more ruinous to the Southern and Middle States, and through them to -the government. Abroad the situation was not yet desperate. The latest -news from Europe left Napoleon at Dresden, victorious for the moment, -before the great battles of October. From the American commissioners -at St. Petersburg no news had arrived, but England’s refusal to accept -mediation was unofficially known. With this material the President was -obliged to content himself in framing his Annual Message. - -The Message sent to Congress December 7 began by expressing regret that -the British government had disappointed the reasonable anticipation -of discussing and, if possible, adjusting the rights and pretensions -in dispute. From France nothing had been received on the subjects of -negotiation. Madison congratulated Congress on the success of the navy -upon the ocean and the Lakes, and the victory won by Harrison and R. M. -Johnson in Canada. He mentioned briefly the failure of the armies on -the St. Lawrence, and at greater length the success of Jackson on -the Coosa; and he entered in detail into the retaliatory measures -taken on either side in regard to naturalized soldiers. The finances -were treated with more show of confidence than was warranted by the -prospects of the Treasury; and the Message closed by a succession of -paragraphs which seemed written in a spirit of panegyric upon war:-- - - “The war has proved moreover that our free government like other - free governments, though slow in its early movements, acquires in - its progress a force proportioned to its freedom; and that the - Union of these States, the guardian of the freedom and safety of - all and of each, is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to - the test. In fine, the war with its vicissitudes is illustrating - the capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a - flourishing, and a powerful nation.” - -The rule that feeble and incompetent governments acquire strength by -exercise, and especially in war, had been as well understood in 1798 as -it was in 1813, and had been the chief cause of Republican antipathy -to war; but had Madison publicly expressed the same sentiment in 1798 -as in 1813, he would have found himself in a better position to enforce -the rights for which he was struggling when the extreme discontent of -nearly one third of the States contradicted his congratulations on “the -daily testimony of increasing harmony throughout the Union.” Whatever -the ultimate result of the war might be, it had certainly not thus far -strengthened the Union. On the contrary, public opinion seemed to be -rapidly taking the shape that usually preceded a rupture of friendly -relations between political societies. Elections in the Middle States -showed that the war, if not actually popular, had obliged the people -there to support the government for fear of worse evils. New Jersey by -a small majority returned to its allegiance, and the city of New York -elected a Republican to represent it in Congress; but the steady drift -of opinion in the Middle States toward the war was simultaneous with an -equally steady drift in the Eastern States against it. - -The evidences of chronic discontent in the Eastern States were -notorious. Less than a month before Madison wrote his Annual Message, -Governor Chittenden of Vermont, by proclamation November 10, recalled -the State militia from national service:[465] - - “He cannot conscientiously discharge the trust reposed in him by - the voice of his fellow-citizens, and by the Constitution of - this and the United States, without an unequivocal declaration - that in his opinion the military strength and resources of - this State must be reserved for its own defence and protection - exclusively, excepting in cases provided for by the Constitution - of the United States, and then under orders derived only from the - commander-in-chief.” - -The intercourse between the Eastern States and the enemy was notorious. -The Federalist press of Massachusetts, encouraged by Russian and -English success in Europe, discussed the idea of withdrawing the State -from all share in the war, and making a separate arrangement with -England. The President’s first act, after sending to Congress his -Annual Message, was to send a special Message incidentally calling -attention to the want of harmony that paralyzed the energy of the -government. - -The special and secret Message of December 9 asked Congress once more -to impose an embargo. Considering the notorious antipathy of the -Eastern States to the system of embargo, the new experiment was so -hazardous as to require proof of its necessity. That it was directed -against the commerce of the New England States was evident, for the -blockade answered the purposes of embargo elsewhere. The Message -seemed to propose that all commerce should cease because any commerce -must favor the enemy; in effect, it urged that New England should -be forbidden to sell or buy so long as the rest of the country was -prevented from doing so. - - “The tendency of our commercial and navigation laws in their - present state to favor the enemy,” said Madison,[466] “and thereby - prolong the war, is more and more developed by experience. Supplies - of the most essential kinds find their way not only to British - ports and British armies at a distance, but the armies in our - neighborhood with which our own are contending derive from our - ports and outlets a subsistence attainable with difficulty if at - all from other sources. Even the fleets and troops infesting our - coasts and waters are by like supplies accommodated and encouraged - in their predatory and incursive warfare. Abuses having a like - tendency take place in our import trade. British fabrics and - products find their way into our ports under the name and from the - ports of other countries, and often in British vessels disguised - as neutrals by false colors and papers.... To shorten as much as - possible the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the - enemy should feel all the pressure that can be given to it.” - -Although Madison pointed to the notorious supply of food for the -British forces in Canada as one of the motives for imposing an embargo, -no one supposed that motive to be decisive. Other laws already forbade -and punished such communication with the enemy; and experience proved -that a general embargo would be no more effective than any special -prohibition. The idea that England could be distressed by an embargo -seemed still less likely to influence Government. Congress knew that -Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Spain, and South America -were already open to English commerce, and that a few days must decide -whether Napoleon could much longer prevent Great Britain from trading -with France. The possibility of distressing England by closing Boston -and Salem, New Bedford and Newport to neutral ships was not to be -seriously treated. - -Whatever was the true motive of the President’s recommendation, -Congress instantly approved it. The next day, December 10, the House -went into secret session, and after two days of debate passed an -Embargo Act by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-seven, which quickly -passed the Senate by a vote of twenty to fourteen, and received the -President’s approval December 17, being the first legislation adopted -at the second session of the Thirteenth Congress.[467] The Act was at -once enforced with so much severity that within a month Congress was -obliged to consider and quickly adopted another Act[468] relieving -from its operation the people of Nantucket, who were in a state of -starvation, all communication with the main land having been forbidden -by the law; but nothing proved that the illicit communication with -Canada ceased. - -This beginning of legislation at a time when the crisis of the war -could be plainly seen approaching suggested much besides want of -harmony. The embargo strengthened the antipathy of New England to -the war,--a result sufficiently unfortunate; but it also led to a -number of other consequences that were doubtless foreseen by the -Administration, since they were prophesied by the Federalists. The Act -was approved December 17. Hardly had it gone into operation when the -British schooner “Bramble” arrived at Annapolis, December 30, bringing -a letter from Castlereagh to Monroe offering to negotiate directly, -though declining mediation. Important as this news was, it did not -compare with that in the newspapers brought by the “Bramble.” These -contained official reports from Germany of great battles fought at -Leipzig October 16, 18, and 19, in which the allies had overwhelmed -Napoleon in defeat so disastrous that any hope of his continuing to -make head against them in Germany was at an end. Except France, the -whole continent of Europe already was open to British commerce, or soon -must admit it. From that moment the New England Federalists no longer -doubted their own power. Their tone rose; their opposition to the war -became more threatening; their schemes ceased to be negative, and began -to include plans for positive interference; and the embargo added -strength to their hatred of Madison and the Union. - -Madison was seldom quick in changing his views, but the battle of -Leipzig was an event so portentous that optimism could not face it. -Other depressing news poured in. Fort George was evacuated; Fort -Niagara was disgracefully lost; Lewiston, Black Rock, and Buffalo were -burned, and the region about Niagara was laid waste; blue lights were -seen at New London. Every prospect was dark, but the battle of Leipzig -was fatal to the last glimmer of hope that England could be brought to -reason, or that New England could be kept quiet. A change of policy -could not safely be delayed. - -Castlereagh’s offer was instantly accepted. January 5 Monroe replied, -with some complaint at the refusal of mediation, that the President -acceded to the offer of negotiating at Gothenburg. The next day Madison -sent the correspondence to Congress, with a warning not to relax -“vigorous preparations for carrying on the war.” A week afterward, -January 14, he nominated J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and -Jonathan Russell as commissioners to negotiate directly with Great -Britain, and the Senate confirmed the nominations, January 18, with -little opposition except to Jonathan Russell’s further nomination as -Minister to Sweden, which was confirmed by the narrow vote of sixteen -to fourteen. Three weeks later, February 8, Albert Gallatin was added -to the commission, George W. Campbell being nominated to the Treasury. - -The prompt acceptance of Castlereagh’s offer, the addition of Henry -Clay to the negotiators, and the removal of Gallatin from the Treasury -showed that diplomacy had resumed more than its old importance. The -hope of peace might serve to quiet New England for a time, but mere -hope with so little to nourish it could not long pacify any one, if -the embargo was to remain in force. Several signs indicated there -also a change of policy. Besides the embargo, and in support of its -restrictions, Madison had recommended the passage of bills prohibiting -collusive captures, ransoming vessels captured by the enemy, and -interference by the courts, as well as the introduction of British -woollens, cottons, and spirits. The bill prohibiting woollens and other -articles was reported to the Senate December 30, the day when the -“Bramble” reached Annapolis. The Senate waited nearly a month, till -January 27, and then passed the bill, January 31, by a vote of sixteen -to twelve. The House referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations -February 3, where it remained. On the other hand, the bill prohibiting -ransoms was introduced in the House December 30, and passed January 26 -by a vote of eighty to fifty-seven. The Senate referred it January 28 -to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which never reported it. The -fate of these measures foreshadowed the destiny of the embargo. - -Yet the President clung to his favorite measure with a degree -of obstinacy that resembled desperation. Congress showed by its -indifference to the two supplementary bills that it had abandoned the -President’s system as early as January, but the embargo continued -throughout the winter, and the month of March passed without its -removal. The news from Europe at the close of that month left no doubt -that Napoleon could offer little effectual resistance even in France -to the allies, whose armies were known to have crossed the Rhine, -while Wellington advanced on Bordeaux. Holland was restored to her -ancient independence, and Napoleon was understood to have accepted in -principle, for a proposed Congress at Mannheim, the old boundaries of -France as a basis of negotiation. In theory, the overthrow of Napoleon -should have not essentially affected the embargo or the Non-importation -Acts, which were expected to press upon England independently of -Napoleon’s Continental system; but in practice the embargo having -produced no apparent effect on Europe during the war, could not be -expected to produce an effect after England had succeeded in conquering -France, and had abandoned her blockades as France had abandoned her -decrees. For that reason avowedly Madison at last yielded, and sent -a Message to Congress March 31, recommending that the system of -commercial restriction should cease:-- - - “Taking into view the mutual interests which the United States and - the foreign nations in amity with her have in a liberal commercial - intercourse, and the extensive changes favorable thereto which - have recently taken place; taking into view also the important - advantages which may otherwise result from adapting the state of - our commercial laws to the circumstances now existing,”-- - -Taking into view only these influences, Madison seemed to ignore the -supposed chief motive of the embargo in stopping supplies for Canada, -and to admit that embargo was an adjunct of Napoleon’s Continental -system; but in truth Madison’s motives, both political and financial, -were deeper and more decisive than any he alleged. His retreat was -absolute. He recommended that Congress should throw open the ports, and -should abandon all restriction on commerce beyond a guaranty of war -duties for two years after peace as a measure of protection to American -manufactures. The failure of the restrictive system was not disguised. - -The House received the Message with a mixed sense of relief and -consternation, and referred it to Calhoun’s committee, which reported -April 4 a bill for repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts, -together with the reasons which led the committee to unite with the -Executive in abandoning the restrictive system. - -Calhoun had always opposed the commercial policy of Jefferson and -Madison. For him the sudden Executive change was a conspicuous triumph; -but he showed remarkable caution in dealing with the House. Instead of -attempting to coerce the majority, according to his habit, by the force -of abstract principles, he adopted Madison’s reasoning and softened his -own tone, seeming disposed to coax his Southern and Western friends -from making a display of useless ill-temper. “Men cannot go straight -forward,” he said, “but must regard the obstacles which impede their -course. Inconsistency consists in a change of conduct when there is no -change of circumstances which justify it.” The changes in the world’s -circumstances required a return to free trade; but the manufactures -would not be left unprotected,--on the contrary, “he hoped at all times -and under every policy they would be protected with due care.”[469] - -As an example of political inconsistency, as Calhoun defined it, his -pledge to protect American manufactures deserved to be remembered; -but hardly had Calhoun’s words died on the echoes of the House when -another distinguished statesman offered a prospective example even -more striking of what Calhoun excused. Daniel Webster rose, and in -the measured and sonorous tones which impressed above all the idea of -steadfastness in character, he pronounced a funeral oration over the -restrictive system:-- - - “It was originally offered to the people of this country as a kind - of political faith; it was to be believed, not examined; ... it was - to be our political salvation, nobody knew exactly how; and any - departure from it would lead to political ruin, nobody could tell - exactly why.” - -Its opponents had uniformly contended that it was auxiliary to -Napoleon’s Continental system, in co-operation with Napoleon’s -government; and its abandonment with the fall of Napoleon showed the -truth. While thus exulting in the overthrow of the first “American -system,” Webster qualified his triumph by adding that he was, -“generally speaking,” not the enemy of manufactures; he disliked only -the rearing them in hot-beds:-- - - “I am not in haste to see Sheffields and Birminghams in America.... - I am not anxious to accelerate the approach of the period when - the great mass of American labor shall not find its employment in - the field; when the young men of the country shall be obliged to - shut their eyes upon external Nature,--upon the heavens and the - earth,--and immerse themselves in close and unwholesome workshops; - when they shall be obliged to shut their ears to the bleatings of - their own flocks upon their own hills, and to the voice of the lark - that cheers them at the plough, that they may open them in dust and - smoke and steam, to the perpetual whirl of spools and spindles and - the grating of rasps and saws.” - -Potter of Rhode Island, where the new manufactures centred, spoke hotly -against the change. Much Federalist capital had been drawn into the -manufacturing business as well as into speculation in all articles of -necessity which the blockade and the embargo made scarce. At heart -the Federalists were not unanimous in wishing for a repeal of the -restrictive system, and Potter represented a considerable class whose -interests were involved in maintaining high prices. He admitted that -the average duties would still give American manufactures an advantage -of thirty-six per cent, without including freight and marine risks, but -he insisted that the bill was intended to encourage importations of -British goods “that we do not want and can do very well without, in -order to raise a revenue from the people in an indirect way.” - -Probably Potter’s explanation of the change in system was correct. -The necessities of the Treasury were doubtless a decisive cause of -Madison’s step; but these necessities were foreseen by the Federalists -when Madison recommended the embargo, and the neglect to give them due -weight exposed the Administration to grave reproach. “A government -which cannot administer the affairs of a nation,” said Webster, -“without producing so frequent and such violent alterations in the -ordinary occupations and pursuits of private life, has in my opinion -little claim to the regard of the community.” - -The Republicans made no attempt to defend themselves from such -criticisms. Among the small number who refused to follow Calhoun was -Macon, who sat in his seat during the debate writing to his friend -Judge Nicholson. - - “Those who voted the embargo so very lately,” he said,[470] “and - those or him who recommended it must, I think, feel a little sore - under Webster’s rubs.... I have not for a long time seen the Feds - look in so good humor. They have all a smile on their countenances, - and look at each other as if they were the men which had brought - this great and good work about.... The Republicans have not the - most pleasing countenances. Those who support the bill do not look - gay or very much delighted with their majority, and those who - expect to be in the minority have a melancholy gloom over their - faces.” - -That the system of commercial restrictions had failed was admitted, but -the failure carried no conviction of error to its friends. Physical -force had also apparently failed. The Southern Republicans had no -choice but to adopt strong measures, giving to the government powers -which in their opinion they had no constitutional right to confer; but -they remained unshaken in their opinions. - - “I confess to you,” wrote Macon, “that the parties seem by their - acts to be approaching each other, and I fear that tough times is - a strong argument with many of us to stretch the Constitution; and - the difference between expediency and constitutionality becomes - every day less. Notwithstanding this, I do not despair of the - republic, because my dependence has always been on the people; and - their influence was felt in laying the embargo, and probably that - of the Executive in repealing it.” - -No one understood or represented so well as Macon the instincts and -ideas of the Southern people at that time, and he never represented -them more truly than in the matter of the embargo. Virginia and the -Carolinas were with him at heart. Macon’s hopes for the republic -depended on his confidence in the people; and that confidence in its -turn depended on his belief that the people were still true to a dogma -which the Government had abandoned as impracticable. The belief was -well founded, as the course of events proved. The House, April 7, by -a vote of one hundred and fifteen to thirty-seven, passed the bill -repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts; the Senate also passed -it, April 12, by a vote of twenty-six to four; the President, April -14, approved it; and from that day the restrictive system, which had -been the cardinal point of Jefferson’s and Madison’s statesmanship, -seemed to vanish from the public mind and the party politics of the -country. Yet so deeply riveted was the idea of its efficacy among the -Southern people, that at the next great crisis of their history they -staked their lives and fortunes on the same belief of their necessity -to Europe which had led them into the experiment of coercing Napoleon -and Canning by commercial deprivations; and their second experiment had -results still more striking than those which attended their first. - -The explanation of this curious popular trait certainly lay in the -nature of Southern society; but the experience was common to the whole -Union. When the restrictive system was abandoned of necessity in -April, 1814, it had brought the country to the verge of dissolution. -The Government could neither make war nor peace; the public seemed -indifferent or hostile; and the same traits which characterized the -restrictive system continued to paralyze the efforts of Congress to -adopt more energetic methods. - - “I will yet hope we may have no more war,” wrote Mrs. Madison to - Mrs. Gallatin Jan. 7, 1814.[471] “If we do, alas! alas! we are not - making ready as we ought to do. Congress trifle away the most - precious of their days,--days that ought to be devoted to the - defence of their divided country.” - -Mrs. Madison doubtless echoed the language she heard used at the White -House; yet the leaders of Congress were neither triflers nor idlers, -and they did all that public opinion permitted. Within a week after -Mrs. Madison’s complaint, the military committee of the House reported -a bill for encouraging enlistments. Viewed as a means of embodying the -whole military strength of the republic to resist the whole military -strength of Great Britain, about to be released from service in Europe, -Troup’s bill[472] was not an efficient measure; but it terrified -Congress. - -During the campaign of 1813, as the story has shown, the Government -never succeeded in placing more than ten or eleven thousand effective -rank-and-file in the field in a single body. About as many more were -in garrison, and the sick-list was always large. Armstrong reported to -the Ways and Means Committee that the aggregate strength of the army -in February, 1813, was 18,945; in June, 27,609; in December, 34,325; -and Jan. 17, 1814, it was 33,822.[473] Discouraging as this report was, -it concealed the worst part of the situation. In truth, the abstract -furnished by the adjutant-general’s office gave the number of regular -troops in service for January, 1814, not as 33,822, but as 23,614; -and to the return a note was appended, explaining that “although the -numerical force in January, 1814, was 23,614, the actual strength of -the army at that time was less than half that number, arising from the -expiration of the term of service of the troops raised in 1809 and -enlisted for five years, and of the twelve and eighteen-months men -enlisted in 1812–1813.”[474] The establishment consisted of 58,254 men -authorized by law; but the legal establishment was not half filled. -The European news showed that England would soon be able to reinforce -her army in Canada and take the offensive. Instead of sixty thousand -men, Armstrong needed twice that number for a moderately safe defence, -since every part of the sea-coast stood at the enemy’s mercy, and no -adequate defence was possible which did not include an offensive return -somewhere on the Canadian frontier. Needing more than one hundred -thousand,--authorized by law to enlist sixty thousand,--he could -depend on less than thirty thousand men. Yet so far from attempting to -increase the establishment, Armstrong hoped only to fill the ranks. - -Troup’s bill aimed at that object, purporting to be “A Bill making -further provision for filling of the ranks of the regular army.” No -system of draft was suggested. Troup’s committee proposed to treble the -bounty rather than raise the pay,--a system which might be economical -in a long war; but if the war should last only one year, the soldier -must gain four fifths of his bounty without return. Troup first -suggested one hundred dollars as bounty, which Congress raised to one -hundred and twenty-four dollars, together with three hundred and twenty -acres of land as already fixed. The pay of privates remained at ten -dollars. Twenty-four dollars of the bounty was to be paid only on the -soldier’s discharge. Recruiting-agents were to receive eight dollars -for each recruit. - -Such a provision for filling the ranks could not be called excessive. -Even if the whole bounty were added to the pay, and the soldier were to -serve but twelve months, he would receive only twenty dollars a month -and his land-certificate. If he served his whole term of five years, -he received little more than twelve dollars a month. The inducement -was not great in such a community as the United States. The chance -that such a measure would fill the ranks was small; yet the measure -seemed extravagant to a party that had formerly pledged itself against -mercenary armies. - -If the bill showed the timidity of the Republicans, it called out -worse qualities in the Federalists. The speeches of the opposition -were for the most part general in their criticisms and denunciations, -and deserved little attention; but that of Daniel Webster was doubly -interesting, because Webster was not only the ablest but among the -most cautious of his party. His speech[475] suggested much of the -famous eloquence of his later oratory, but dwelt on ideas to which his -later life was opposed, and followed lines of argument surprising in -a statesman of his great intellectual powers. His chief theme was the -duty of government to wage only a defensive war, except on the ocean. -“Give up your futile projects of invasion. Extinguish the fires that -blaze on your inland frontiers.” He wished the government to use its -forces only to repel invasion. - - “The enemy, as we have seen, can make no permanent stand in any - populous part of the country. Its citizens will drive back his - forces to the line; but at that line where defence ceases and - invasion begins, they stop. They do not pass it because they do not - choose to pass it. Offering no serious obstacle to their actual - power, it rises like a Chinese wall against their sentiments and - their feelings.” - -This advice, which echoed a Federalist idea reasonable or excusable -in 1812, was out of place in January, 1814. The battles of Leipzig -and Vittoria had settled the question of offensive and defensive in -Canada. The offensive had passed into British hands, and a successful -defence was all that the United States could hope. The interests of New -England as well as of New York and of the whole Union required that -the defensive campaign should, if possible, be fought on Canadian soil -rather than at Plattsburg, Washington, or New Orleans; and even the -most extreme Federalist could scarcely be believed blind to an idea so -obvious. - -Moderate as the bill was, fifty-eight members voted against it, while -ninety-seven voted in its favor. In the Senate the bill passed without -a division, and received, January 27, the President’s approval. -Meanwhile the Senate passed bills for converting the twelve-months -regiments into regiments enlisted for the war, as well as for raising -three rifle regiments for the same term, and any number of volunteers -that in the President’s opinion the public service required, offering -to all recruits for these corps the same inducements as to the regular -regiments. These bills produced another and a longer debate, but were -passed without serious opposition. No further addition was made to the -regular army, and no other effort to obtain recruits. - -Thus organized, the army consisted of forty-six regiments of infantry -enlisted for five years,--four rifle regiments; an artillery corps and -a regiment of light artillery; a regiment of dragoons; the engineer -corps, the rangers, and sea-fencibles,--an aggregate of 62,773 men -authorized by law, an increase of only five thousand men over that of -the previous year. - -The appropriations for the military establishment amounted to nearly -twenty-five million dollars, the Federalists alone voting against them. -The naval appropriations amounted to seven millions, and were voted -without opposition. The Secretary of the Navy discouraged the building -of more cruisers, owing to want of timber and seamen; but Congress -showed more than ordinary sagacity by appropriating half a million -dollars for the construction of floating batteries with steam-power. - -Such provision for the coming campaign offered little evidence of -increasing energy to make head against the vastly increased military -and naval power of England; but the financial outlook was much worse -than the military, and Congress dared not face it. The acting Secretary -of the Treasury, William Jones, sent his annual report to the House -January 8, and so far as his balance-sheet went, no difficulties were -apparent. He had disbursed thirty million dollars during the past -fiscal year, and needed nearly forty millions for the current year. -These sums were not excessive when compared with the wealth of the -country or its exertions at other periods of national danger. Half a -century afterward the people of the Southern States, not much more -numerous than the people of the Union in 1812, and with a far larger -proportion of slaves, supported during four years the burden of an -army numbering nearly five hundred thousand men. For the same period -the Northern people, not much exceeding twenty millions in number, -lent their government more than five hundred million dollars a year. -The efforts of 1864, proportioned to the population, were nearly ten -times as great as those of 1814, when Secretary Jones looked with -well-founded alarm at the prospect of borrowing thirty millions for the -year, and of maintaining an army which could scarcely be expected to -number forty thousand rank-and-file. - -The United States, with a proper currency and untouched resources, -should have found no serious difficulty in borrowing thirty or even -fifty millions a year in 1814; but they were in reality on the verge -of bankruptcy, although the national resources were probably ample. -The amount of private capital available for loans was uncertain, and -the amount of circulating medium was equally doubtful. Timothy Pitkin -of Connecticut, perhaps the best authority in Congress, thought that -the paid bank capital of the United States did not much exceed sixty -millions,[476] and that the notes of these banks in circulation did not -reach thirty millions. His estimate of paid bank capital was probably -liberal, but his estimate of the circulation was eight or ten millions -too small. Had the Treasury been able to count on the use of these -resources, they might have answered all necessary purposes; but between -the mistakes of the government and the divisions of the people, the -Treasury was left with no sound resources whatever. - -The first and fatal blow to the Treasury was the loss of the Bank -of the United States, which left the government without financial -machinery or a sound bank-note circulation. The next blow, almost -equally severe, was the loss of the Massachusetts and Connecticut -banks, which were the strongest in the Union. Whether the -responsibility for the loss rested on the Executive, Congress, or the -two States might be a subject for dispute; but whoever was responsible, -the effect was ruinous. The New England banks were financial agents -of the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including Maine was -about twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut -exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached -eighteen millions,[477] or nearly one third of the paid bank capital -of the whole country, if Pitkin’s estimate was correct. That nearly -one third of the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid -of government was serious enough; but in reality the loss was much -greater, for New England held a still larger proportion of the specie -on which the bank circulation of other States depended. - -The system of commercial restrictions was responsible for thus, at -the most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of the -national finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against -the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon -them by national legislation until New England supplied the Union -with articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own -manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward -Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after -the war was declared. The British blockade stimulated the movement, -and the embargo of December, 1813, which lasted till April, 1814, cut -off every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable -longer to send their crops even to New England for a market, they were -obliged to send specie, and they soon came to the end of their supply. -The Massachusetts banks, which reported about $820,000 in specie in -1809, returned more than $3,680,000 in June, 1812; which rose to -$5,780,000 in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in June, 1814. -In five years the Massachusetts banks alone drew more than six million -dollars in specie from the Southern and Middle States,[478] besides -what they sent to Canada in payment for British bills. - -No one knew how much specie the country contained. Gallatin afterward -estimated it at seventeen million dollars,[479] and of that amount the -banks of New England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions. The -Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in specie, had a bank-note -circulation of less than three millions. The Middle, Southern, and -Western States must have had a bank-note circulation approaching forty -millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in specie to support -it,[480] while the paper was constantly increasing in quantity and the -specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not -with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dollars to every -specie dollar in the bank vaults; but the banks in 1814 beyond New -England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver -or gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper without specie in -their possession. - -Already the banks of New England were pressing their demands on those -of New York, which in their turn called on Philadelphia and Baltimore. -The specie drained to New England could find its way back only by means -of government loans, which New England refused to make in any large -amount. On the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury notes -at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in payment of them.[481] -Probably New England lent to the British government during the war more -money than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New -England to the United States loans was less than three millions. - -This situation was well understood by Congress. In the debate of -February, 1814, the approaching dangers were repeatedly pointed out. -The alarm was then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means -reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank with a capital of -thirty million dollars, while Macon openly advocated the issue of -government paper,[482] declaring that “paper money never was beat.” -Congress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill for twenty-five -millions, and an Act for the issue of five million interest-bearing -Treasury notes, leaving with the President the option to issue five -millions more in case he could not borrow it. The legislation was -evidently insufficient, and satisfied no one. “You have authorized a -loan for twenty-five millions,” said Grundy in the debate of April 2, -“and have provided for the expenditure of so much money. Where is the -money?” - -Without attempting to answer this question, April 18 Congress -adjourned. - - - - -CHAPTER XVI. - - -WHILE Congress was thus employed, much occurred behind the scenes that -bore directly on the movements of war. The French minister, Serurier, -alone made official reports, and his letters became less interesting -as his importance diminished; but occasionally he still threw a ray -of light on Madison’s troubles. At midsummer in 1813 he was in high -spirits. - - “Within the past week,” Serurier wrote, July 21, 1813,[483] “we - have received, one after another, news of the fresh successes at - the beginning of the campaign,--the battle of Lützen, the offer of - armistice, and the battle of Bautzen. These events, so glorious for - France, have been so many thunder-strokes for the enemy in America. - Their consternation is equal to their previous confidence, which - had no bounds. The Republicans of Congress, on the other hand, have - received these news in triumph. All have come to congratulate me, - and have told me that they, not less than we, had been victorious - at Lützen. The ascendency, henceforward irresistible, which his - Majesty is acquiring over his enemies, will, I hope, supply a - little tone and vigor to this Government, which had need of them.” - -When the President returned to Washington, Oct. 25, 1813, Serurier -reported with less enthusiasm, but still with confidence, that Madison -remained firm: - - “He expressed himself in very proper, though very measured, - terms on the monstrous coalition that has been renewed against - his Majesty. I remarked to him that among our advantages we must - doubtless count the fact that the coalition had ten heads, while - France had but one. ‘And what a powerful head!’ replied the - President, instantly, with less grace than conviction in his whole - countenance.” - -The vigor of Napoleon postponed for a few months the total downfall of -Serurier’s influence, but it slowly waned, and he became more and more -grateful for consideration shown him. The President’s Annual Message, -December 7, met his approval. “All agree that nothing more energetic or -more warlike has yet come from Mr. Madison’s Cabinet.”[484] The secret -Message of December 9 and the embargo pleased him more. - - “Mr. Monroe assured me three days ago,” continued Serurier, writing - December 10, “that the Government had been informed of supplies to - the extent of nearly thirty thousand barrels of flour furnished - to Canada from ports of the United States. A rigorous embargo - can alone prevent such criminal speculations, and give the war a - decisive character which will shorten its duration and assure its - success.... In this affair is seen a new proof of Mr. Madison’s - obstinacy (_roideur_) which prevents him from abandoning a measure - he has once put forward, and judges to be for the public interest.” - -The arrival of the “Bramble” with news of the battle of Leipzig, and -with Castlereagh’s offer to negotiate, left Serurier helpless. “In -this state of things,” he wrote,[485] January 14, “it would have been -difficult for the Executive to refuse to negotiate; and I cannot but -think that he accedes to it only with regret and without illusions.” -In deference to Serurier’s opinion, the President appointed Henry -Clay as commissioner to treat for peace rather than Crawford, then -American envoy to Napoleon; but in the last week of March news arrived -from Bordeaux to February 10, announcing that the allies had reached -Troyes and were advancing on Paris, while Napoleon had accepted their -conditions of negotiation. - - “For the moment the public believed everything to be lost,” - reported Serurier, April 15.[486] “I ought in justice to say that - the President and his Cabinet showed more coolness and did not - share the universal alarm, and that they continued to show me great - confidence in the Emperor’s genius. I did not find them excessively - disturbed by the march of the allies, or doubtful of our power - to repulse them; but I know that his Majesty’s adhesion to the - preliminary conditions of the allies, and yet more the Congress of - Chatillon, and the irresistible influence necessarily acquired for - the British minister, greatly (_vivement_) alarmed Mr. Madison. - He thought he saw, in the announcement of our adoption of those - conditions, our renunciation of every kind of power and control - over Spain and Germany, where England was to rule. He believed - that a peace, dictated by Lord Castlereagh, must already have been - signed, and that the United States were to remain alone on the - field of battle. It was then that Mr. Madison, abruptly and without - having in any way prepared the public for it, addressed to Congress - the Message recommending an immediate repeal of the embargo and a - partial repeal of the non-importation.” - -While Serurier explained the suddenness of Madison’s action by the need -of conciliating the Continental powers and the manufacturing cities of -England, he added that domestic difficulties had a large share in the -decision. Contraband trade had become general in the Eastern States. -A sort of civil war, he said, was beginning between the officers of -customs and the smugglers; the Government also felt serious anxiety for -the success of its loan, and began to doubt its ability to maintain -payments for the army and navy. Revenue had become necessary. Such -was the terror caused by the French news that the capitalists who had -offered to contract for the loan began to withdraw their offers and to -say that it was no longer practicable. “Analyze it as you please,” -said Serurier, “you will still find that it was the passage of the -Rhine and the progress of the allies in France which, in spite of all -I could say, decided this retrograde movement of a Government which I -have hitherto always found firm, wise, and consequent. But fear does -not reason.” - -Serurier failed even to obtain permission for French letters-of-marque -to be received with their prizes in American ports. The President -recommended it to Congress, but Monroe told Serurier that the committee -of Congress had not dared to make a report, being persuaded that it -would be rejected.[487] “Mr. Monroe agreed to all I said; granted -that Congress was in the wrong, and I entirely in the right; but -nevertheless Congress has adjourned without considering the question.” -Serurier was disposed to advise the withdrawal by France of the -liberties granted to American privateers,--a measure which, he might -almost have foreseen, was likely in any case soon to be taken. - -With the repeal of the embargo ended the early period of United -States history, when diplomatists played a part at Washington equal -in importance to that of the Legislature or the Executive. The -statecraft of Jefferson and Madison was never renewed. Thenceforward -the government ceased to balance between great foreign Powers, and -depended on its own resources. As far as diplomacy had still a part to -play in the year 1814, its field of action was in Europe; and there the -ablest men in civil life were sent. Gallatin, Bayard, J. Q. Adams, and -Crawford were already on the spot; and Henry Clay, after, resigning the -Speaker’s chair, Jan. 19, 1814, sailed for Gothenburg to take part in -the negotiation. - -President Madison sought in vain for men of equal ability to supply -the gaps made by transferring so many of his strongest supporters to -Europe. The House of Representatives, January 19, elected Langdon -Cheves Speaker; but the choice was a defeat for Madison, whose friends -supported Felix Grundy. The Federalists, joining those Republicans who -were hostile to commercial restrictions, numbered ninety-four against -fifty-nine votes for Grundy,--and the success of Cheves foreshadowed -the overthrow of the embargo. In providing for other vacancies the -President fared worse. Cheves was a man of ability, and in general -policy was a friend of the Administration; but most of the other -material upon which the President must depend was greatly inferior to -Cheves. The Cabinet needed partial reconstruction, and Madison was at a -loss for choice. - -The President’s favorite candidate for the Treasury, after Gallatin -showed his determination to remain abroad, was Alexander James Dallas -of Pennsylvania. Dallas was one of Gallatin’s strongest personal -friends, an old Republican, and a lawyer of undoubted ability. Born in -Jamaica in 1759, like Gallatin and Hamilton he had become a citizen -of the United States before the Constitution or the confederation was -adopted. He had been a leader of the Republican party in Federalist -times, and was made district-attorney of Pennsylvania by Jefferson; but -Duane and the “Aurora” destroyed his influence and left him isolated. -In Pennsylvania Dallas commanded no support. Both the senators, Leib -and Lacock, opposed his appointment to the Treasury, and were able to -procure his rejection had Madison ventured to make it.[488] - -Obliged to abandon Dallas, the President offered the appointment -to Richard Rush, the comptroller, who declined it. At last Madison -pitched upon G. W. Campbell, of Tennessee. Since Crawford’s departure -Campbell had represented the Administration in the Senate, but neither -as senator nor as representative had he won great distinction. Best -known for his duel with Barent Gardenier, his physical courage was -more apparent than his financial fitness. Campbell brought no strength -to the Administration, and rather weakened its character among -capitalists; but Madison could think of no one better qualified for the -place. The Republicans were at a loss for leaders. “I do not complain -that Campbell is unfit,” wrote Macon to Nicholson;[489] “indeed, if the -choice of secretary must be made out of Congress, I do not know that a -better could be made.” Yet the selection was unfortunate. - -Madison was also obliged to select a new attorney-general in place of -William Pinkney. Till then the attorney-general had not been regarded -as standing on the same footing with other members of the Cabinet. -The Secretaries of State and Treasury were paid five thousand dollars -a year; those of the War and Navy were paid forty-five hundred; but -the attorney-general was paid only three thousand. He had neither -office-room nor clerks, and was not required to reside permanently at -Washington, but pursued the private business of his profession where -he liked, attending to the business of government rather as a counsel -under general retainer than as a head of Department. Pinkney lived -in Baltimore, and his abilities were so valuable that the President -was glad to employ them on any terms, and was not inclined to impose -conditions of residence which Pinkney could not accept without a -greater sacrifice than he was ready to make.[490] Congress was not -so forbearing as the President. John W. Taylor, a member from New -York, moved a resolution January 5, directing the Judiciary Committee -to inquire into the expediency of requiring the attorney-general to -reside in Washington during the session of Congress. The committee -reported a bill, January 22, requiring permanent residence from the -attorney-general, with an increase of salary. The bill failed to become -law, but Pinkney at once resigned. - -Madison offered the post to Richard Rush, who accepted it. Rush’s -abilities were more than respectable, and caused regret that he had not -accepted the Treasury, for which he was better fitted than Campbell; -but these changes did not improve the Cabinet. “His predecessor, -Pinkney, I believe considered him the best lawyer in the nation,” -wrote Macon;[491] “but that Campbell and Rush are equal to Gallatin -and Pinkney is not, I imagine, believed by any one who knows them.” In -the case of Pinkney and Rush, the advantages of permanent residence -balanced in part the loss of ability; but no such consideration -affected the change of Campbell for Gallatin. - -Fortunately Madison lost enemies as well as friends. Time worked -steadily in his favor. The old Smith faction, the Clinton party, -and the “Aurora” were already broken. Senators who claimed too much -independence of action found public opinion setting strongly against -them. Samuel Smith and Giles were near the end of their terms, and -had no chance of re-election. The legislature of North Carolina, in -December, 1813, censured so severely the conduct of Senator Stone that -the senator resigned his seat.[492] At the same time, Pennsylvania -succeeded in ridding herself of Senator Leib, and Madison was able to -punish the postmaster-general, Gideon Granger, whose friendship for -Leib made him obnoxious to his party. - -Granger was not a member of the Cabinet, but his patronage was the -more important because at that time, by some anomaly in the law, -it was not subject to approval by the Senate. Early in January one -of his best post-offices, that of Philadelphia, became vacant. One -senator of the United States had already resigned his seat to become -postmaster of New York; and the Pennsylvanians had reason to fear -that Leib, whose term was about to expire, would resign to become -postmaster of Philadelphia, and that Granger wished to gratify him. -Immediately all the Administration Republicans, including members of -Congress and of the State legislature, joined in recommending another -man, and warned Granger in private that his own removal from office -would follow the appointment of Leib.[493] C. J. Ingersoll--a young -member from Pennsylvania, among the warmest supporters of Madison and -the war--reinforced the threat by moving the House, January 7, for a -committee to amend the laws with a view to making postmasters subject -to the usual rule of confirmation. The committee was appointed. - -Irritated by this treatment, Granger in defiance of President and party -appointed Michael Leib to the office, and Leib instantly resigned -his seat and hastened to assume the duties of his new post. In this -transaction Madison was the chief gainer. Not only did he rid himself -of Leib, but he gained a warm ally in the person of Leib’s successor; -for the Pennsylvania legislature, February 28, transferred Jonathan -Roberts from the House to take Leib’s place in the Senate. Madison’s -advantage was not limited by Leib’s departure or Roberts’s accession. -He was able also to punish Granger in a manner at that time almost -or quite without parallel. Executive offices ran, as a rule, during -good behavior; and although Jefferson made removals of party enemies, -neither he nor Madison had ventured to remove party friends, except in -cases of misbehavior. Granger’s conduct exasperated the Pennsylvanians -to a point where no rules were regarded. Eighty-six members of the -Pennsylvania legislature joined in addressing a memorial to the -President demanding the removal of Granger as the only means of getting -rid of Leib, who had not only opposed Madison’s election, but who, -“when entrusted with one of the highest offices in the gift of the -State, ... acted in direct hostility to her wishes and interests, and -aided as far as possible her political enemies.” Madison needed little -urging. February 25 he nominated to the Senate as postmaster-general -the governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs. After some little delay, -the Senate confirmed the appointment, March 17, without a division. - -Scarcely was this matter settled, when Congress yielded to Madison’s -opinion in another instance where for ten years the House had -obstinately resisted his wishes. The Yazoo bill became law. For this -concession several reasons combined. The Supreme Court, through -Chief-Justice Marshall, by an elaborate decision in February, 1810, -settled the law in favor of the claimants. John Randolph’s defeat -removed from Congress the chief obstacle to the proposed agreement. The -threatening attitude of New England made every palliative necessary. -Under these inducements, the Senate passed the bill, February 28, by a -vote of twenty-four to eight, and the House passed it, March 26, by a -vote of eighty-four to seventy-six. - -Little by little the pressure of necessity compelled Congress and -the country to follow Madison’s lead. Whether for good or for evil, -he had his way. His enemies were overcome and driven from the field; -his friends were rewarded, and his advice followed. Of revolt within -the party he stood no longer in fear. Already political intrigue and -factiousness began to take a direction which concerned him only so far -as he felt an interest in the choice of his successor. Three years -more would complete Madison’s public career, and in all probability if -another President of the United States were ever elected, he would be -one of Madison’s friends; but many persons doubted whether the country -would reach another Presidential election, and the jealousy which -actuated New England against the South was not the only ground for -that opinion. In Madison’s immediate circle of friends, the jealousy -between Virginia and New York threatened to tear the government in -pieces. These States did not, like Massachusetts, threaten to leave -the Union, but their struggles for power promised to bring government -to a standstill. - -The antipathy of New York for Virginia was not lessened by the success -of Virginia in overthrowing Aaron Burr and DeWitt Clinton. The -Republican party in New York quickly produced two new aspirants to the -Presidency, whose hopes were founded on public weariness of Virginian -supremacy. One of the two candidates was Governor Daniel D. Tompkins, -whose services as war-governor of New York were great, and were -rewarded by great popularity. Governor Tompkins was too remote from the -capital to annoy Madison by direct contact with factions or activity -in intrigue; but the other rival stood at the centre of Executive -patronage. John Armstrong was a man capable of using power for personal -objects, and not easily to be prevented from using it as he pleased. - -Armstrong was an unusual character. The local influences which shaped -Americans were illustrated by the leaders whom New York produced, and -by none better than by Armstrong. Virginians could not understand, -and could still less trust, such a combination of keenness and will, -with absence of conventional morals as the Secretary of War displayed. -The Virginians were simple in everything; even their casuistry was -old-fashioned. Armstrong’s mind belonged to modern New York. The -Virginians were a knot of country gentlemen, inspired by faith in -rural virtues, and sustained by dislike for the city tendencies of -Northern society. Among themselves they were genial, reluctant to -offend, and eager to remove causes of offence. The domestic history of -the government at Washington repeated the Virginian traits. Jefferson -and his friends passed much time in making quarrels, and more in making -peace. Unlike Pennsylvania, New York, and New England, Virginia stood -stoutly by her own leaders; and however harsh Virginians might be in -their judgment of others, they carried delicacy to an extreme in their -treatment of each other. Even John Randolph and W. B. Giles, who seemed -to put themselves beyond the social pale, were treated with tenderness -and regarded with admiration. - -The appearance of a rough and harshly speaking friend in such a society -was no slight shock, and for that reason William Henry Crawford was -regarded with some alarm; but Crawford was socially one of themselves, -while Armstrong belonged to a different type and class. The faculty of -doing a harsh act in a harsh way, and of expressing rough opinions in a -caustic tone, was not what the Virginians most disliked in Armstrong. -His chief fault in their eyes, and one which they could not be blamed -for resenting, was his avowed want of admiration for the Virginians -themselves. Armstrong’s opinion on that subject, which was but the -universal opinion of New York politicians, became notorious long before -he entered the Cabinet, and even then annoyed Madison.[494] The -newspapers gossiped about the mean estimate which Armstrong expressed -for the capacities of the Virginia statesmen. So old and fixed was -the feud, that from the first the Virginians lost no opportunity to -express their opinion of Armstrong, especially in the Senate, whenever -he was nominated for office. Madison unwillingly selected him for -the post of secretary after Crawford refused it, but neither of the -Virginia senators voted on the question of confirmation. In appointing -Armstrong, Madison bestowed on him neither respect nor confidence. He -afterward declared the reasons that caused him to invite a person whom -he distrusted into a position of the highest importance. - - “Should it be asked,” wrote Madison ten years after the war,[495] - “why the individual in question was placed, and after such - developments of his career continued, at the head of the War - Department, the answer will readily occur to those best acquainted - with the circumstances of the period. Others may be referred for - an explanation to the difficulty, which had been felt in its - fullest pressure, of obtaining services which would have been - preferred, several eminent citizens to whom the station had been - offered having successively declined it. It was not unknown at the - time that objections existed to the person finally appointed, as - appeared when his nomination went to the Senate, where it received - the reluctant sanction of a scanty majority [eighteen to fifteen]. - Nor was the President unaware or unwarned of the temper and turn of - mind ascribed to him, which might be uncongenial with the official - relations in which he was to stand. But these considerations were - sacrificed to recommendations from esteemed friends; a belief - that he possessed, with known talents, a degree of military - information which might be useful; and a hope that a proper mixture - of conciliating confidence and interposing control would render - objectionable peculiarities less in practice than in prospect.” - -Possibly Armstrong took a different view of Madison’s conduct, and -regarded his own acceptance of the War Department in January, 1813, -as proof both of courage and disinterestedness. He knew that he could -expect no confidence from Virginians; but apparently he cared little -for Virginian enmity, and was chiefly fretted by what he thought -Virginian incompetence. No one could fail to see that he came into the -Government rather as a master than a servant. According to General -Wilkinson, he was quite as much feared as hated. “I am indeed shocked,” -wrote Wilkinson in his Memoirs,[496] “when I take a retrospect of -the evidence of the terror in which that minister kept more than one -great man at Washington.” Wilkinson, who hated Madison even more than -he hated Armstrong, evidently believed that the President was afraid -of his secretary. Madison himself explained that he thought it better -to bear with Armstrong’s faults than to risk another change in the -Department of War. - -In that decision Madison was doubtless right. Whatever were -Armstrong’s faults, he was the strongest Secretary of War the -government had yet seen. Hampered by an inheritance of mistakes not -easily corrected, and by a chief whose methods were unmilitary in the -extreme, Armstrong still introduced into the army an energy wholly new. -Before he had been a year in office he swept away the old generals -with whom Madison and Eustis had encumbered the service, and in their -place substituted new men. While Major-Generals Dearborn, Pinckney, -and Morgan Lewis were set over military districts where active service -was unnecessary, and while Major-General Wilkinson was summoned to the -last of his many courts of inquiry, the President sent to the Senate, -January 21 and February 21, the names of two new major-generals and -six brigadiers of a totally different character from the earlier -appointments. - -The first major-general was George Izard of South Carolina, born at -Paris in 1777, his father Ralph Izard being then American commissioner -with Franklin and Deane. Returning to America only for a few years -after the peace, George Izard at the age of fifteen was sent abroad to -receive a military education in England, Germany, and France in the -great school of the French Revolution. As far as education could make -generals, Izard was the most promising officer in the United States -service. Appointed in March, 1812, colonel of the Second Artillery, -promoted to brigadier in March, 1813, he served with credit under -Hampton at Chateaugay, and received his promotion over the heads of -Chandler, Boyd, and one or two other brigadiers his seniors. He was -intended to succeed Hampton on Lake Champlain. - -The second new major-general was Jacob Brown, who after receiving -the appointment of brigadier, July 19, 1813, was suddenly promoted -to major-general at the same time with Izard. The selection was the -more remarkable because Brown had no military education, and was taken -directly from the militia. Born in Pennsylvania in 1775 of Quaker -parentage, Brown began life as a schoolmaster. At the instance of the -Society of Friends, he taught their public school in New York city -for several years with credit.[497] He then bought a large tract of -land near Sackett’s Harbor, and in 1799 undertook to found a town of -Brownville. He soon became a leading citizen in that part of New York, -and in 1809 was appointed to the command of a militia regiment. In -1811 he was made a brigadier of militia, and at the beginning of the -war distinguished himself by activity and success at Ogdensburg. His -defence of Sackett’s Harbor in 1813 won him a brigade in the regular -service, and his share in Wilkinson’s descent of the St. Lawrence led -to his further promotion. - -Wilkinson, who regarded Brown as one of his enemies, declared that -he knew not enough of military duty to post the guards of his -camp,[498] and that he compelled his battery to form in a hollow -for the advantage of elevating the pieces to fire at the opposite -heights.[499] Winfield Scott, who was one of Brown’s warmest friends, -described him as full of zeal and vigor, but not a technical soldier, -and but little acquainted with organization, tactics, police, -and camp-duties in general.[500] The promotion of an officer so -inexperienced to the most important command on the frontier, gave a -measure of Armstrong’s boldness and judgment. - -The six new brigadiers were also well chosen. They were Alexander -Macomb, T. A. Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, -and Eleazer W. Ripley, all colonels of the regular army, selected for -their merits. Armstrong supplied Brown’s defects of education by giving -him the aid of Winfield Scott and Ripley, who were sent to organize -brigades at Niagara. - -The energy thus infused by Armstrong into the regular army lasted -for half a century; but perhaps his abrupt methods were better shown -in another instance, which brought upon him the displeasure of the -President. Against Harrison, Armstrong from the first entertained a -prejudice. Believing him to be weak and pretentious, the Secretary -of War showed the opinion by leaving him in nominal command in the -northwest, but sending all his troops in different directions, without -consulting him even in regard to movements within his own military -department. Harrison, taking just offence, sent his resignation as -major-general, May 11, 1814, but at the same time wrote to Governor -Shelby of Kentucky a letter which caused the governor to address to the -President a remonstrance against accepting the resignation.[501] - -At that moment Armstrong and Madison were discussing the means of -promoting Andrew Jackson in the regular service for his success in -the Creek campaigns. No commission higher than that of brigadier was -then at their disposal, and a commission as brigadier was accordingly -prepared for Jackson May 22, with a brevet of major-general.[502] -Harrison’s resignation had been received by Armstrong two days before -issuing Jackson’s brevet, and had been notified to the President, who -was then at Montpelier.[503] The President replied May 25, suggesting -that in view of Harrison’s resignation, the better way would be to send -a commission as major-general directly to Jackson: “I suspend a final -decision, however, till I see you, which will be in two or three days -after the arrival of this.”[504] No sooner did Armstrong receive the -letter, than without waiting for the President’s return he wrote to -Jackson, May 28: “Since the date of my letter of the 24th Major-General -Harrison has resigned his commission in the army, and thus is created -a vacancy in that grade, which I hasten to fill with your name.”[505] - -Armstrong’s course was irregular, and his account to Jackson of the -circumstances was incorrect; for Harrison’s resignation had been -received before, not after, Armstrong’s letter of the 24th. Madison -believed that Armstrong wished to appear as the source of favor to the -army. Armstrong attributed Madison’s hesitation to the wish of Madison -and Monroe that Harrison, rather than Jackson, should take command of -Mobile and New Orleans.[506] Both suspicions might be wrong or right; -but Armstrong’s conduct, while betraying the first motive, suggested -the fear that the President might change his mind; and Harrison -believed that the President would have done so, had not Armstrong’s -abrupt action made it impossible. “The President expressed his great -regret,” said Harrison’s biographer,[507] “that the letter of Governor -Shelby had not been received earlier, as in that case the valuable -services of General Harrison would have been preserved to the nation in -the ensuing campaign.” - -Little as the President liked his Secretary of War, his antipathy was -mild when compared with that of Monroe. The failure of the Canada -campaign gave a serious blow to Armstrong; but he had still recovered -Detroit, and was about to finish the Creek war. His hold upon the -army was becoming strong. His enemies charged him with ambition; they -said he was systematically engaged in strengthening his influence by -seducing the young officers of talents into his personal support, -teaching them to look for appreciation not to the President but to -himself, and appointing to office only his own tools, or the sons of -influential men. He was believed to favor a conscription, and to aim -at the position of lieutenant-general. These stories were constantly -brought to Monroe, and drove him to a condition of mind only to be -described as rabid. He took the unusual step of communicating them -to the President,[508] with confidential comments that, if known to -Armstrong, could hardly have failed to break up the Cabinet. - - “It is painful to me to make this communication to you,” wrote the - Secretary of State Dec. 27, 1813;[509] “nor should I do it if I - did not most conscientiously believe that this man, if continued - in office, will ruin not you and the Administration only, but the - whole Republican party and cause. He has already gone far to do - it, and it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will - soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections to him, if - the above facts are true, ... he wants a head fit for his station. - Indolent except to improper purposes, he is incapable of that - combination and activity which the times require. My advice to - you, therefore, is to remove him at once. The near prospect of a - conscription, adopted and acted on without your approbation or - knowledge, is a sufficient reason. The burning of Newark, if done - by his orders, is another. The failure to place troops at Fort - George is another. In short there are abundant reasons for it. - His removal for either of the three would revive the hopes of our - party now desponding, and give a stimulus to measures. I do not - however wish you to act on my advice,--consult any in whom you have - confidence. Mr. A. has, as you may see, few friends, and some of - them cling to him rather as I suspect from improper motives, or on - a presumption that you support him.” - -Armstrong’s faults were beyond dispute, but his abilities were very -considerable; and the President justly thought that nothing would be -gained by dismissing him, even to restore Monroe to the War Department. -Armstrong, struggling with the load of incapable officers and -insufficient means, for which Madison and Congress were responsible, -required the firm support of his chief and his colleagues, as well as -of the army and of Congress, to carry the burden of the war; but he had -not a friend to depend upon. Secretary Jones was as hostile as Monroe. -Pennsylvania and Virginia equally distrusted him, and the fate of any -public man distrusted by Pennsylvania and Virginia was commonly fixed -in advance. Armstrong was allowed to continue his preparations for -the next campaign, but Monroe remained actively hostile. In a private -letter to Crawford, written probably about the month of May, 1814, and -preserved with a memorandum that it was not sent, Monroe said:[510]-- - - “There is now no officer free to command to whom the public looks - with any sort of confidence or even hope. Izard stands next, but - he is as you see otherwise engaged [on a court of inquiry on - Wilkinson]. Thus the door is left open for some new pretender, and - Mr. Armstrong is that pretender. This has been his object from the - beginning.... The whole affair is beyond my control.” - -Thus the elements of confusion surrounding Armstrong were many. A -suspicious and hesitating President; a powerful and jealous Secretary -of State; a South Carolinian major-general, educated in the French -engineers, commanding on Lake Champlain; a Pennsylvania schoolmaster, -of Quaker parentage, without military knowledge, commanding at -Sackett’s Harbor and Niagara; a few young brigadiers eager to -distinguish themselves, and an army of some thirty thousand men,--these -were the elements with which Armstrong was to face the whole military -power of England; for Paris capitulated March 31, and the war in Europe -was ended. - -In one respect, Armstrong’s conduct seemed inconsistent with the idea -of selfishness or intrigue. The duty of organizing a court martial for -the trial of William Hull fell necessarily upon him. Hull’s defence -must inevitably impeach Hull’s superiors; his acquittal was possible -only on the ground that the Government had been criminally negligent -in supporting him. As far as Armstrong was interested in the result, -he was concerned in proving the incapacity of his predecessor Eustis, -and of the President, in their management of the war. He could have had -no personal object to gain in procuring the conviction of Hull, but he -might defend his own course by proving the imbecility of Dearborn. - -The President ordered a court martial on Hull before Armstrong entered -the War Department. A. J. Dallas drew up the specifications, and -inserted, contrary to his own judgment, a charge of treason made by -the Department. The other charges were cowardice, neglect of duty, and -unofficer-like conduct. Monroe, while temporarily at the head of the -Department, organized the first court to meet at Philadelphia Feb. 25, -1813. Major-General Wade Hampton was to preside. - -Before the trial could be held, Armstrong came into office, and was -obliged to order the members of the court to active service. Hampton -was sent to Lake Champlain, and when his campaign ended in November, -1813, he returned under charges resembling those against Hull.[511] -Finding that neither Wilkinson nor Armstrong cared to press them, and -satisfied that no inquiry could be impartial, Hampton determined to -settle the question by once more sending in his resignation,[512] -which he did in March, 1814, when it was accepted. Armstrong in effect -acquitted Hampton by accepting his resignation, and never publicly -affirmed any charge against him until after Hampton’s death, when he -attributed to the major-general “much professional error and great -moral depravity.”[513] Hampton’s opinion of Armstrong could be gathered -only from his conduct and his letters to the Secretary of War, but was -not materially different from Armstrong’s opinion of Hampton. - -Meanwhile Hull waited for trial. During the summer of 1813 he saw -nearly all his possible judges disgraced and demanding courts martial -like himself. Hampton was one; Wilkinson another; Dearborn a third. -Dearborn had been removed from command of his army in face of the -enemy, and loudly called for a court of inquiry. Instead of granting -the request, the President again assigned him to duty in command of -Military District No. 3, comprising the city of New York, and also made -him President of the court martial upon General Hull. - -The impropriety of such a selection could not be denied. Of all men in -the United States, Dearborn was most deeply interested in the result of -Hull’s trial, and the President, next to Dearborn, would be most deeply -injured by Hull’s acquittal. The judgment of Dearborn, or of any court -over which Dearborn presided, in a matter which affected both court and -government so closely could not command respect. That Armstrong lent -himself to such a measure was a new trait of character never explained; -but that Madison either ordered or permitted it showed that he must -have been unconscious either of Dearborn’s responsibility for Hull’s -disaster, or of his own. - -Hull offered no objection to his court, and the trial began at Albany, -Jan. 3, 1814, Dearborn presiding, and Martin Van Buren acting as -special judge-advocate. March 26 the court sentenced Hull to be shot to -death for cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-like conduct. April -25 President Madison approved the sentence, but remitted the execution, -and Hull’s name was ordered to be struck from the army roll. - -That some one should be punished for the loss of Detroit was evident, -and few persons were likely to complain because Hull was a selected -victim; but many thought that if Hull deserved to be shot, other men, -much higher than he in office and responsibility, merited punishment; -and the character of the court-martial added no credit to the -Government, which in effect it acquitted of blame. - - -END OF VOL. I. - - - - -FOOTNOTES - - -[1] Madison to Wheaton, Feb. 26, 1827; Works, iii. 553. - -[2] Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; State Papers, iii. 589. - -[3] Russell to Monroe, Sept. 17, 1812; State Papers, iii. 593. - -[4] Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; State Papers, iii. 592. - -[5] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 463; Feb. 18, 1813. - -[6] James, App. No. 77. - -[7] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 34; Nov. 30, 1812. - -[8] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 47, 48; Nov. 30. 1812. - -[9] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 72; Nov. 30, 1812. - -[10] The Times, Jan. 2, 1813. - -[11] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 625; Feb. 13, 1813. - -[12] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 582. - -[13] Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 586. - -[14] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 21, 1812; ii. 401. - -[15] VETUS, in the “Times,” Oct. 26, 1812. - -[16] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Oct. 21, 1812; ii. 414. - -[17] Diary of J. Q. Adams, ii. 433. Adams to Monroe, Dec. 11, 1812; -State Papers, iii. 626. - -[18] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Feb. 1, 1813; ii. 440. - -[19] State Papers, iii. 608. - -[20] Foster to Monroe, July 2, 1811; State Papers, iii. 542. - -[21] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 488. - -[22] Serurier to Bassano, Jan. 13, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[23] Monroe to Jefferson, June 7, 1813; Jefferson MSS. - -[24] Monroe to Madison, Feb. 25, 1813; Monroe MSS. State Department -Archives; Gilman’s Monroe, p. 108. - -[25] Armstrong’s Notices of the War, i. 113–116. - -[26] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 408. - -[27] Gallatin to Nicholson, May 5, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 482. - -[28] State Papers, iii. 624. - -[29] Monroe to Jefferson, June 7, 1813; Jefferson MSS. - -[30] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 483. - -[31] Gallatin’s Writings, i. 535. - -[32] Monroe to the Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; State Papers, -iii. 695. - -[33] Niles, iv. 168. - -[34] Gallatin to William Few, May 9, 1813; Gallatin MSS. - -[35] Pickering to Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 404. - -[36] Ingersoll’s History, i. 120. - -[37] Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[38] National Intelligencer, July 17, 20, 22, 1813. - -[39] Madison to Gallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Works, ii. 566. - -[40] Executive Journal, ii. 388. - -[41] Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 484. - -[42] Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 484. Cf. -Madison to the Senate, July 6, 1813; Executive Journal, ii. 381. - -[43] Hanson to Pickering, Oct. 16, 1813; Pickering MSS. - -[44] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 10, 1812; Dawson, p. 273. - -[45] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812; Dawson, p. 283. - -[46] Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812; Dawson, p. 283. - -[47] Dawson, p. 296. - -[48] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Sept. 16, 1816. - -[49] Eustis to Harrison, Sept. 17, 1812; Dawson, p. 299. Eustis to -Governor Shelby, Sept. 17, 1812. McAffee, p. 117. - -[50] Dawson, p. 312. - -[51] McAffee, p. 184. - -[52] Armstrong to Harrison, April 4, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 245. - -[53] Harrison to Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 337. - -[54] Dawson, p. 333. Armstrong’s Notices, i. 63, 86. - -[55] Dawson, p. 454. - -[56] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[57] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[58] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[59] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 8, 1813; Dawson, p. 339. - -[60] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Sept. 16, 1817; Major -Eves’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 203. Cf. Dawson, p. 443. - -[61] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 197. - -[62] McAffee, p. 230. - -[63] McAffee, p. 237. - -[64] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 199. - -[65] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 13, 1817. - -[66] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 13, 1817. - -[67] James, i. 185; Richardson, p. 74. - -[68] Richardson, p. 75. - -[69] Winchester’s Statement; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 198. - -[70] Winchester to the “National Intelligencer,” Dec. 17, 1817. - -[71] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 26, 1813; Official Letters, -p. 125. - -[72] Harrison to Governor Meigs, Jan. 19, 1813; “National -Intelligencer,” Feb. 11, 1813. - -[73] McAffee, p. 210; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 200. - -[74] Harrison to the Secretary of War, Feb. [Jan.] 20, 1813; MSS. War -Department Archives. - -[75] McAffee, p. 233. - -[76] Dawson, p. 364. - -[77] Life of Sir George Prevost; App. xxv. p 74. Christie, ii. 115. - -[78] Return of the whole of the troops engaged at Frenchtown, Jan. 22, -1813; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 678, p. 18. - -[79] Christie, ii. 69; James, i. 186; Richardson, p. 75. - -[80] Proctor’s Report of Jan. 25, 1813; James, i. 418. - -[81] James, i. 185, 186. - -[82] Return, etc.; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 648, p. 18. - -[83] Richardson, p. 76. - -[84] Statement of Madison, March 13, 1813; Niles, iv. 83. - -[85] Richardson’s War of 1812, p. 79. - -[86] Dawson, p. 362. - -[87] Dawson, p. 356. - -[88] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 85. - -[89] Dawson, p. 370. - -[90] McAffee, p. 240. - -[91] Dawson, p. 375. - -[92] Dawson, p. 373. - -[93] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 242. - -[94] Dawson, p. 337. - -[95] Proctor’s Report of May 4, 1813; Richardson, p. 94; James, i. 196, -429. - -[96] Lossing, p. 486, _note_. - -[97] Richardson, p. 86; James, i. 198. - -[98] Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[99] Richardson, pp. 87, 88. Harrison to Armstrong, May 9, 1813; MSS. -War Department Archives. - -[100] Richardson, p. 88. - -[101] Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[102] Proctor’s Report of May 14, 1813; James, i. 428; Richardson, pp. -93, 94. - -[103] Prevost to Proctor, July 11, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices i. 228. - -[104] Richardson, p. 111. - -[105] James, i. 264, 265; Richardson, p. 104; Christie, p. 117. - -[106] Dawson, p. 408. - -[107] McAffee, p. 322. - -[108] McAffee, p. 323. - -[109] Governor Duncan’s Report, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 230. - -[110] Dawson, p. 408. - -[111] Richardson, p. 105. - -[112] Proctor to Prevost, Aug. 9, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives. - -[113] Life of Prevost, p. 106, _note_. - -[114] Governor Duncan’s Report, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 230. - -[115] Richardson, p. 104. - -[116] James, ii. 264. - -[117] Dawson, p. 407; McAffee, p. 302. - -[118] Armstrong’s Notices, i. 166, _note_. - -[119] Harrison to Armstrong, March 17, 1813; Notices, i. 242. - -[120] Richardson, p. 110; James, Naval Occurrences, p. 285. - -[121] Barclay’s Report of Sept. 12, 1813; James, Naval Occurrences. -Appendix, no. 54. - -[122] McAffee, p. 334. - -[123] Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239. - -[124] Armstrong, i. 171, _note_; McAffee, p. 286. - -[125] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1834; Armstrong, i. 232. - -[126] Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 24, 1813; Official Letters, p. -215. - -[127] James, i. 269. - -[128] Richardson, p. 119. - -[129] Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239. - -[130] Richardson, pp. 126, 133, 134. - -[131] Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 27, 1813; Official Letters, p. -220. - -[132] Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 27, 1813; Dawson, p. 421. - -[133] Harrison to Armstrong, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 233. - -[134] Report of Oct. 23, 1813; MSS. British Archives. Lower Canada, -vol. cxxiii. - -[135] Richardson, pp. 133, 134. - -[136] Harrison’s Report, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 234. - -[137] Narrative of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 137. - -[138] Proctor’s Report of Oct. 23, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[139] Richardson, pp. 122, 139. - -[140] Richardson, p. 136. - -[141] James, i. 278. - -[142] Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 140. - -[143] Harrison’s Report of Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 233. - -[144] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1834; Armstrong’s Notices, -i. 232. - -[145] Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 140. - -[146] Richardson, p. 136. - -[147] R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Nov. 21, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[148] Richardson, p. 125. Lewis Cass to Armstrong, Oct. 28, 1813; MSS. -War Department Archives. - -[149] Return of Right Division, Richardson, p. 129. - -[150] Prevost to Bathurst, Feb. 14, 1815; MSS. British Archives. - -[151] W. H. Robinson to Prevost, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives. - -[152] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives, Lower -Canada, vol. cxxviii. no. 190. - -[153] James, i. 140. - -[154] Report of Major Macdonnell, Feb. 23, 1813; James, i. Appendix no. -16. - -[155] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 608. - -[156] Armstrong to Dearborn, Feb. 10, 1813; Armstrong’s Notices, i. 221. - -[157] Note presented to Cabinet, Feb. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -iii. Appendix xxvi.; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 439. - -[158] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 440. - -[159] Distribution of Forces in Canada; Canadian Archives, Freer -Papers, 1812–1813, p. 47. - -[160] Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 441. - -[161] Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 442. - -[162] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442. - -[163] Armstrong to Dearborn, April 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 442. - -[164] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442. - -[165] James, i. 143, 149. - -[166] Letter of Dearborn, Oct. 17, 1814; Niles, viii. 36. - -[167] Niles, iv. 238. - -[168] Table of Land Battles; Niles, x. 154. - -[169] Dearborn to Armstrong, April 28, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 443. - -[170] Dearborn to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 444. - -[171] James, i. p. 151. - -[172] Vincent to Sir George Prevost, May 28, 1813; James, i. 407; -Appendix no. 21. - -[173] Return of killed, etc.; James, i. 410. - -[174] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[175] James, i. 203. - -[176] Armstrong to Dearborn, June 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 449. - -[177] Table of land battles; Niles, x. 154. - -[178] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14, 1813; Official Letters, p. -165. Chandler to Dearborn, June 18, 1813; Official Letters, p. 169. - -[179] Vincent to Prevost, June 6, 1813; James, i. p. 431. - -[180] Chandler’s Report of June 18, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. p. 448. - -[181] Report of Colonel Harvey, June 6, 1813; Canadiana, April, 1889. -Report of General Vincent, June 6, 1813; James, i. p. 431. - -[182] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14 (8?), 1813; Official Letters, -p. 165. - -[183] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 445. - -[184] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 447. - -[185] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 448. - -[186] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 446. - -[187] State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 449. - -[188] Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[189] Memoir of Dearborn, etc., compiled by Charles Coffin, p. 139. - -[190] Court of Inquiry on Colonel Boerstler, Feb. 17, 1815; Niles x. 19. - -[191] James, i. 216. - -[192] Dearborn to Armstrong, June 25, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs; i. 449. - -[193] James, i. 165; Colonel Baynes to Prevost, May 30, 1813; James, i. -413. - -[194] Report of Sir George Prevost, June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[195] Prevost to Bathurst, June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. -Prevost’s Life, p. 82, 83. - -[196] James, i. 165, 166. Brenton to Freer, May 30, 1813; MSS. Canadian -Archives, Freer Papers, 1812–1813, p. 183. - -[197] Report of Colonel Baynes, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[198] Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS. - -[199] Prevost’s Report of June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[200] James, i. 175. - -[201] Report of Colonel Baynes, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[202] Brenton to Freer, May 30, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives. Freer -Papers, 1812–1813. - -[203] Quarterly Review, xxvii. 419; Christie, ii. 81; James, i. 177. - -[204] Brown’s Report of June 1, 1813; Niles, iv. 260. - -[205] Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS. - -[206] James, i. 165. - -[207] Return, etc.; James, i. 417. - -[208] Baynes’s Report of May 30, 1813; James, i. 413. - -[209] Strictures on General Wilkinson’s Defence; from the Albany -“Argus.” Niles, ix. 425. - -[210] Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 10, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -341. - -[211] Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 12, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -342. - -[212] Autobiography, p. 94, _note_. - -[213] Strictures; Niles, ix. 425. - -[214] Wilkinson, to Armstrong, May 23, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -341. - -[215] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 23. - -[216] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 23. - -[217] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 50. - -[218] Scott’s Autobiography, p. 36. - -[219] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xxxvi. - -[220] Memorandum by Armstrong, July 23, 1813; Wilkinson to Armstrong, -Aug. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463; Armstrong’s -Notices, ii. 31. - -[221] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Aug. 8, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 464. - -[222] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 32. - -[223] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxv. - -[224] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvi. - -[225] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 358. - -[226] Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 31, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -iii. Appendix xxxvii. - -[227] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 33; Memorandum of July 23, 1813; State -Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463. - -[228] Minutes, etc.; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix no. 1. - -[229] Wilkinson to Swartwout, Aug. 25, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -51. - -[230] Cf. Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[231] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xxxvii. - -[232] Testimony of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 80. - -[233] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 354. - -[234] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 357. - -[235] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 353. - -[236] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 190; Paper A, _note_. - -[237] Armstrong to Hampton, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -361. - -[238] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[239] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 472. - -[240] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 63. - -[241] Armstrong to Swartwout, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -70. - -[242] Council of War, Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix -xxiv. Report of Adjutant-General, Dec. 1, 1813, Appendix vii. - -[243] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 28, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[244] General Order of Encampment; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 126; Order -of October 9, Appendix iii. - -[245] Minutes etc.; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxiv. - -[246] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 27, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix xli. - -[247] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 474. - -[248] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Nov. 12, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 474. - -[249] Journal etc.; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 477. - -[250] Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 84; Evidence -of Doctor Bull; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 214. - -[251] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 364. - -[252] Autobiography, pp. 93, 94. - -[253] Wilkinson’s Defence, Memoirs, iii. 451; Ripley’s Evidence, -Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 139. - -[254] Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 85. - -[255] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 18, 1813; Niles, v. 235. - -[256] Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 151. - -[257] James, i. 323–325, 467. - -[258] Return, etc., State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 476. - -[259] Morrison’s Report of Nov. 12, 1813; James, i. 451. - -[260] Journal, Nov. 11, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 478. - -[261] Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 145; -Evidence of Colonel Pinkney, iii. 311. - -[262] Evidence of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 91. - -[263] James, i. 242; Christie, ii. 94. - -[264] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Aug. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 466. - -[265] Armstrong to Hampton, Sept. 28, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 460. Cf. Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 25. - -[266] State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 461. - -[267] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 8, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[268] Weekly General Return, Sept. 15, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives, -Freer Papers, 1813, p. 35. - -[269] Cf. Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxiv.; Council of War, -Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson’s Defence, Memoirs, iii. 449. - -[270] Hampton to Armstrong, Oct. 12, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 460. - -[271] James, i. 307. - -[272] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 461. - -[273] Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 30, 1813; James, i. 462. - -[274] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 461. - -[275] Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs iii. -Appendix lxix. - -[276] Wilkinson to Hampton, Nov. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 462. - -[277] Hampton to Wilkinson, Nov. 8, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, 462. - -[278] Wilkinson to Hampton; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. Appendix v. -Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, -i. 480. - -[279] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 17, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 478. - -[280] Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 43. - -[281] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 362, _note_. - -[282] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 486. - -[283] Armstrong to McClure, Oct. 4, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 484. - -[284] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Sept. 16, 1813; Sept. 20, 1813; State -Papers, Military Affairs, i. 467, 469. - -[285] Armstrong to McClure, Nov. 25, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 485. - -[286] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10 and 13, 1813; State Papers, -Military Affairs, i. 486. - -[287] James, ii. 77. - -[288] McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1813; State Papers, Military -Affairs, i. 487. - -[289] Christie, ii. 140. - -[290] James, ii. 20, 21. - -[291] James, ii. 23. - -[292] Christie, ii. 143; Niles, v. 382. - -[293] Parton’s Jackson, i. 372. - -[294] Monroe to Pinckney, Jan. 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[295] Monroe to Wilkinson, Jan. 30, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[296] Annals of Congress, 1812–1813, p. 124. - -[297] Annals of Congress, 1812–1813, p. 127. - -[298] Act of Feb. 12, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 339. - -[299] Parton’s Jackson, i. 377. - -[300] Armstrong to Jackson, March 22, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[301] Armstrong to Pinckney, Feb. 15, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[302] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 7, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[303] Gallatin’s Works, i. 539, _note_. - -[304] Gallatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 539. - -[305] Monroe to Gallatin, May 5, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 540. - -[306] Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, 1. 542. - -[307] Gallatin to Monroe, May 8, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 544. - -[308] Armstrong to Wilkinson, Feb. 16, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -339. - -[309] Minutes of a Council of War, Aug. 4, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, -i. 498–503. - -[310] Eustis to Wilkinson, April 15, 1812; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 495. - -[311] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 507–522. - -[312] Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 22, 1813; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 521. - -[313] Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 27, 1813; MSS. War Department Records. - -[314] Hawkins’s Sketch, p. 24. - -[315] U. S. Commissioners to Governor Irwin, July 1, 1796; State -Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 611. - -[316] Talk of the Creek Indians, June 24, 1796; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 604. - -[317] Life of Sam Dale, p. 59. - -[318] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, June 16, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845. - -[319] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845, 846. - -[320] Hawkins to General Pinckney, July 9, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 848. - -[321] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 839. - -[322] Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i 851. - -[323] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 846. - -[324] Letter from Kaskaskias, Feb. 27, 1813; Niles, iv. 135. - -[325] Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 839. - -[326] Hawkins to Armstrong, March 25, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 840. - -[327] Report of the Big Warrior, April 26, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 843. - -[328] Report of Nimrod Doyell, May 3, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 843. - -[329] Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 845. - -[330] Talosee Fixico to Hawkins, July 5, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 847. - -[331] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 849. - -[332] Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 851. - -[333] Carson to Claiborne, July 29, 1813; Life of Dale, p. 78. - -[334] Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 854. - -[335] Pickett’s Alabama, ii. 264. - -[336] Life of Dale, 106. - -[337] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 849. - -[338] Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 854. - -[339] Big Warrior to Hawkins, Aug. 4, 1813; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 851. - -[340] Report of General Coffee, Nov. 4, 1813; Niles, v. 218. - -[341] Jackson to Blount, Nov. 11, 1813; Niles, v. 267. - -[342] Parton’s Jackson, i. 445. - -[343] Blount to Jackson, Dec. 22, 1813; Parton’s Jackson, i. 479, -480–484. - -[344] Hawkins’s Sketch, pp. 43, 44. - -[345] Cocke to the Secretary of War, Nov. 28, 1813; Niles, v. 282, 283. - -[346] Cocke to White; Parton’s Jackson, i. 451. - -[347] Floyd to Pinckney, Dec. 4, 1813; Niles, v. 283. - -[348] Pinckney to Armstrong, Dec. 28, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[349] Pinckney to Jackson, Jan. 19, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives. - -[350] Parton, i. 864. - -[351] Hawkins’s Sketch, p. 45. - -[352] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[353] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[354] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427. - -[355] Pickett’s Alabama, ii. 336. - -[356] Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles v. 427. - -[357] Letter from Milledgeville, March 16, 1814; “The War,” April 5, -1814. - -[358] Floyd to Pinckney, Jan. 27, 1814; Niles, v. 411. - -[359] Floyd to Pinckney, Feb. 2, 1814; Military and Naval Letters, p. -306. Hawkins to Armstrong, June 7, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, -i. 858. - -[360] Pinckney to the Governor of Georgia, Feb. 20, 1814; Niles, vi. -132. - -[361] Pinckney to Colonel Williams, Dec. 23, 1813; MSS. War Department -Archives. - -[362] Parton’s Jackson, i. 503. - -[363] Parton’s Jackson, i. 454. - -[364] Cocke’s Defence; “National Intelligencer,” October, 1852. -Parton’s Jackson, i. 455. Eaton’s Jackson, p. 155. - -[365] Parton’s Jackson, i. 511. - -[366] Col. Gideon Morgan to Governor Blount, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. -148. - -[367] Eaton’s Jackson, p. 156. - -[368] Jackson to Pinckney, March 28, 1814; Military and Naval Letters, -p. 319. - -[369] Coffee to Jackson, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. 148. - -[370] Colonel Morgan to Governor Blount, April 1, 1814; Niles, vi. 148. - -[371] Jackson to Governor Blount, March 31, 1814; Niles, vi. 147. - -[372] Jackson to Governor Blount, April 18, 1814; Niles, vi. 212. April -25, 1814; Niles, vi. 219. - -[373] Hawkins to Pinckney, April 25, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 858. - -[374] Hawkins to Armstrong, July 19, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 860. - -[375] Abstract of Correspondence, Expedition to New Orleans, 1814–1815; -MSS. British Archives. - -[376] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 17, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 836. - -[377] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 20, 1814; State Papers, Indian -Affairs, i. 837. - -[378] Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 399. -Madison’s Works, iii. 400, 401. - -[379] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826. - -[380] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826. - -[381] Proclamation and Notice; Niles, v. 264. - -[382] Prices Current; Niles, v. 41. - -[383] Table No. II.; Pitkin, p. 56. - -[384] Table No. I.; Pitkin, p. 415. - -[385] Admiral Warren to J. W. Croker, May 28, 1813; London “Gazette,” -July 6, 1813. - -[386] Warren’s Report of May 28, 1813; London “Gazette.” - -[387] Cockburn to Warren, May 3, 1813; London “Gazette,” July 6, 1813. - -[388] Cassin to Secretary Jones, June 21, 1813; Niles, iv. 291. - -[389] James, ii. 55. - -[390] Report of Robert Taylor, July 4, 1813; Niles, iv. 324. - -[391] James, ii. 54. - -[392] Warren’s Report of June 24, 1813; James, ii. 414. - -[393] James, ii. 59. - -[394] Napier’s Life, i. 221. - -[395] Warren’s Report of June 24, 1813; London “Gazette,” Aug. 10, 1813. - -[396] Return, etc.; James, ii. 414, 415. - -[397] Colonel Beatty’s Report of June 25, 1813; Niles, iv. 324. - -[398] Warren’s Report of June 27, 1813; James, ii. 414. - -[399] Niles, v. 302. - -[400] Broke to Lawrence, June 1, 1813; Broke’s Life, 159. Niles, v. 29. - -[401] Broke’s Life, pp. 150, 151. - -[402] Broke’s Life, p. 156. - -[403] Broke’s Life, pp. 160, 383. - -[404] Letter of Captain Greene; James, Appendix, no. 35. - -[405] James, p. 209. - -[406] James, p. 202. - -[407] James, p. 206; Roosevelt’s Naval War of 1812, p. 48. - -[408] Lawrence’s Report of March 19, 1813; Niles, iv. 84. - -[409] Biography; from “The Portfolio.” Niles, Supplement to vol. v. p. -29. Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 247. - -[410] Broke’s Life, p. 333. - -[411] Cooper’s Naval History, ii. 247. - -[412] Life of Broke, p. 203. - -[413] Evidence of Midshipman Edmund Russell; Court-Martial of -Lieutenant Cox. MSS. Navy Department Archives. - -[414] List of killed and wounded; Life of Broke, p. 203. - -[415] James, p. 216. - -[416] Life of Broke, p. 170. - -[417] Broke’s letter of challenge; James, Appendix, p. 36. - -[418] Broke’s Life, p. 298. - -[419] Broke’s Life, p. 300. - -[420] Cobbett’s Debates, xxvi. 1160. - -[421] Report of Captain Maples, Aug. 14, 1813; James, Appendix no. 42, -p. lxv. - -[422] James, pp. 275–282. - -[423] Report of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815; Niles, viii. 43. - -[424] Niles, v. 118. - -[425] Report of Captain Maples, Aug. 14, 1813; Niles, v. 118. James, -Appendix no. 42. - -[426] James, p. 273. - -[427] Lieutenant Creighton to Secretary Jones, March 9, 1814; Niles, -vi. 69. - -[428] Niles, vi. 391. - -[429] James, p. 18. - -[430] Coggeshall’s History of American Privateers, p. 188. - -[431] Extract of letter from Captain Champlin; Niles, viii. 110. - -[432] Extract from log, March 11, 1813; Niles, iv. 133. - -[433] Shaler’s Report of Jan. 1, 1813; Niles, v. 429. - -[434] London Gazette for 1813, p. 1574. - -[435] Emmons’s Navy of the United States, pp. 170–197. - -[436] Memorial of Baltimore merchants, Feb. 19, 1814; State Papers, -Naval Affairs, p. 300. - -[437] Emmons’s Navy of the United States. - -[438] Gallatin to Langdon Cheves, Dec. 8, 1812; Annals, 1812–1813, p. -434. - -[439] Annals, 1813–1814, i. 473. - -[440] Roads’s Marblehead, p. 255. - -[441] Diary of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813, ii. 479. - -[442] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 5, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[443] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 13, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[444] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh Papers, Third -Series, i. 35. - -[445] Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 546. - -[446] Castlereagh to Cathcart, Sept. 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[447] Diary of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813, ii. 479. - -[448] Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813; MSS. State Department Archives. - -[449] Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 489. - -[450] Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 501. - -[451] Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh’s Papers, -Third Series, i. 35. - -[452] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 23, 1813, ii. 539, 542. - -[453] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 593. - -[454] Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. 1, 1813; State Papers, iii. 622. - -[455] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 23, 1814, ii. 599. - -[456] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 10, 1813, ii. 531. - -[457] Cathcart to Castlereagh, Sept. 25, 1813; MSS. British Archives. - -[458] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 3, 1813, ii. 541. - -[459] Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 591. - -[460] Cathcart to Castlereagh, Dec. 12, 1813; Castlereagh Papers. - -[461] The Times, Oct. 17, 1813. - -[462] The Courier, July 27, 1813. - -[463] The Courier, Nov. 4, 1813. - -[464] Prevost to Wilkinson, Oct. 17, 1813; State Papers, Foreign -Relations, iii. 635. Bathurst to Prevost, Aug. 12, 1813; State Papers, -Foreign Relations, iii. 641. - -[465] Proclamation of Nov. 10, 1813; Niles, v. 212. - -[466] Message of Dec. 9, 1813; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2031. - -[467] Act laying an Embargo, Dec. 17, 1813; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2781. - -[468] Act of Jan. 25, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2788. - -[469] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1965. - -[470] Macon to Nicholson, April 6, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[471] Gallatin MSS. - -[472] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 928. - -[473] Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94. - -[474] Note to abstract of regular troops in service, January, 1814; -adjutant-general’s office. MSS. War Department Archives. - -[475] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 940. - -[476] Speech of Timothy Pitkin, Feb. 10, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. -1297. - -[477] Considerations on Currency, etc. By Albert Gallatin, 1831. -Statements II. and III., pp. 101, 103. - -[478] Schedule, 1803–1837; Senate Document No. 38. Massachusetts -Legislature, 1838. - -[479] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45. - -[480] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45. Schedules II. and III., pp. -101, 103. Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 286, 357, 359. - -[481] Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 284. - -[482] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1787. - -[483] Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[484] Serurier to Bassano, Dec. 10, 1813; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[485] Serurier to Bassano, Jan. 14, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[486] Serurier to Bassano, April 15, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[487] Serurier to Bassano, April 25, 1814; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS. - -[488] Ingersoll’s History, ii. 253. - -[489] Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 8, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[490] Madison to Pinkney, Jan. 29, 1814; Works, ii. 581. - -[491] Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 17, 1814; Nicholson MSS. - -[492] Report and Resolution of Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, v. 356. - -[493] Granger to John Todd, February, 1814; New England “Palladium,” -March 4, 1814. - -[494] Madison to Jefferson, April 19, 1811; Works, ii. 493. - -[495] Works, iii. 384. - -[496] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, i. 762. - -[497] Memoir of Brown from the “Port Folio;” Niles, vii. 32. - -[498] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 402. - -[499] Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 65. - -[500] Autobiography, p. 118. - -[501] Dawson, p. 436; Lossing, p. 563. - -[502] Armstrong to Jackson, May 23, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 376. - -[503] Armstrong to Madison, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 375. - -[504] Madison’s Works, iii. 375. - -[505] Madison’s Works, iii. 377. - -[506] Kosciusko Armstrong’s Notice of J. Q. Adams’s Eulogy on James -Monroe, p. 32, _note_. - -[507] Dawson, p. 436. - -[508] Gilman’s Monroe, p. 114. - -[509] Monroe to Madison, Dec. 27, 1813; Monroe MSS. State Department -Archives. - -[510] Monroe MSS. State Department Archives. - -[511] Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, and Dec. 8, 1813. State Papers, -Military Affairs, p. 480. Order of Arrest. Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. -Appendix v. - -[512] Defence of General Hampton; “National Intelligencer,” June 7, -1814. - -[513] Notices, etc., ii. 26. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. - -Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of pages, have been collected, -renumbered, and placed near the end of this eBook. - -The Title Page and Table of Contents indicate that this is Volume I, -but that refers to its position in the “Second Administration of James -Madison” subset of the full “History”. 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This is your - AI playground inside of VSCode. - - - Try switching the model below to llama or mixtral: - - * Select `AnyscaleEndpoint` as the model selection - - * Open the settings tab, and enter one of `mistralai/Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1` - or `meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf` as the model' -metadata: - models: {} - parameters: - context: " New England open to neutrals.\nFrom that time nothing entered or left\ - \ the blockaded coast except swift\nprivateers, or occasional fast-sailing vessels\ - \ which risked capture\nin the attempt. Toward the close of the year Admiral\ - \ Warren extended\nhis blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given\ - \ at Halifax\nNovember 16, and by the blockading squadron off New London December\ - \ 2,\nthus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of every description.[381]\n\ - \nThe pressure of the blockade was immediately felt. In August[382]\nsuperfine\ - \ flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for\n$6.00, and at\ - \ Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston for\ntwenty cents a pound;\ - \ at Charleston for nine cents. Rice sold at\nPhiladelphia for $12.00 a hundred\ - \ weight; in Charleston and Savannah\nfor $3.00. Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75\ - \ a hundred weight; in\nBaltimore for $26.50. Already the American staples were\ - \ unsalable at\nthe places of their production. No rate of profit could cause\ - \ cotton,\nrice, or \nwheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk\ - \ to\nBoston. Soon speculation began. The price of imported articles rose to\n\ - extravagant points. At the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight\ncents\ - \ a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August. Tea which\ncould be\ - \ bought for $1.70 per pound in August, sold for three and four\ndollars in\ - \ December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred\nweight in New\ - \ Orleans, and in August sold for twenty-one or twenty-two\ndollars in New York\ - \ and Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in\nDecember.\n\nMore sweeping in\ - \ its effects on exports than on imports, the blockade\nrapidly reduced the\ - \ means of the people. After the summer of 1813,\nGeorgia alone, owing to its\ - \ contiguity with Florida, succeeded in\ncontinuing to send out cotton. The\ - \ exports of New York, which exceeded\n$12,250,000 in 1811, fell to $209,000\ - \ for the year ending in 1814. The\ndomestic exports of Virginia diminished\ - \ in four years from $4,800,000\nto $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,\nand supplied the\ - \ Union\nwith articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own\n\ - manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward\nBoston as\ - \ early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after\nthe war was declared.\ - \ The British blockade stimulated the movement,\nand the embargo of December,\ - \ 1813, which lasted till April, 1814, cut\noff every other resource from the\ - \ Southern and Western States. Unable\nlonger to send their crops even to New\ - \ England for a market, they were\nobliged to send specie, and they soon came\ - \ to the end of their supply.\nThe Massachusetts banks, which reported about\ - \ $820,000 in specie in\n1809, returned more than $3,680,000 in June, 1812;\ - \ which rose to\n$5,780,000 in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in\ - \ June, 1814.\nIn five years the Massachusetts banks alone drew more than six\ - \ million\ndollars in specie from the Southern and Middle States,[478] besides\n\ - what they sent to Canada in payment for British bills.\n\nNo one knew how much\ - \ s\nn be given to it.\u201D\n\nAlthough Madison pointed to the notorious supply\ - \ of food for the\nBritish forces in Canada as one of the motives for imposing\ - \ an embargo,\nno one supposed that motive to be decisive. Other laws already\ - \ forbade\nand punished such communication with the enemy; and experience proved\n\ - that a general embargo would be no more effective than any special\nprohibition.\ - \ The idea that England could be distressed by an embargo\nseemed still less\ - \ likely to influence Government. Congress knew that\nRussia, Prussia, Denmark,\ - \ Sweden and Norway, Spain, and South America\nwere already open to English\ - \ commerce, and that a few days must decide\nwhether Napoleon could much longer\ - \ prevent Great Britain from trading\nwith France. The possibility of distressing\ - \ England by closing Boston\nand Salem, New Bedford and Newport to neutral ships\ - \ was not to be\nseriously treated.\n\nWhatever was the true motive of the President\u2019\ - s recommendation,\nCongress instantly approved it. The next day, December 10,\ - \ the Hou\nr was responsible,\nthe effect was ruinous. The New England banks\ - \ were financial agents\nof the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including\ - \ Maine was\nabout twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut\n\ - exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached\neighteen\ - \ millions,[477] or nearly one third of the paid bank capital\nof the whole\ - \ country, if Pitkin\u2019s estimate was correct. That nearly\none third of\ - \ the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid\nof government was\ - \ serious enough; but in reality the loss was much\ngreater, for New England\ - \ held a still larger proportion of the specie\non which the bank circulation\ - \ of other States depended.\n\nThe system of commercial restrictions was responsible\ - \ for thus, at\nthe most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of\ - \ the\nnational finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against\n\ - the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon\nthem by\ - \ national legislation until New Engl\n17, 1813; Annals, 1813\u20131814, p.\ - \ 2781.\n" - query: in July, flour sold at Boston for _? - remember_chat_context: false -name: RAG Demo With Model-graded Eval -prompts: -- input: 'Answer the following question using the provided context. Question: {{query}} - Context: {{context}}' - metadata: - model: - name: gpt-3.5-turbo - settings: {} - parameters: {} - name: generate_baseline - outputs: - - data: In July, flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel. - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342850 - id: chatcmpl-8pk9qicvDEenHkHyOJZPUivwEYbwm - model: gpt-3.5-turbo-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: In July, flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel. - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -- input: "Given the following question, and answer, does the answer satisfactorily\ - \ answer the question? \n\nQuestion: {{query}}\nAnswer: {{generate_baseline.output}}" - metadata: - model: gpt-4 - parameters: {} - remember_chat_context: false - name: evaluate_relevance - outputs: - - data: Yes, the answer satisfactorily answers the question. - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342854 - id: chatcmpl-8pk9uOnWR9uM4MFKXgR7xUsvCdtfv - model: gpt-4-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: Yes, the answer satisfactorily answers the question. - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -- input: "Given the following question, context, and answer, does the answer adhere\ - \ strictly to the context? \n\nGive a faithfulness verdict (YES or NO) with an\ - \ explanation.\n\nQuestion: {{query}}\nAnswer: {{generate_baseline.output}}\n\n\ - Verdict:\nExplanation:" - metadata: - model: gpt-4 - parameters: {} - remember_chat_context: false - name: evaluate_faithfulness_baseline - outputs: - - data: 'NO Explanation: The context does not provide any information on the price - at which flour was sold in Boston in July.' - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342862 - id: chatcmpl-8pkA2opsT7yYITM9ZeNEb6Ptmpxni - model: gpt-4-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: 'NO Explanation: The context does not provide any information on - the price at which flour was sold in Boston in July.' - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -- input: 'Given the following answer, is the answer self-consistent and easy to understand? - Answer: {{generate_baseline.output}}' - metadata: - model: gpt-4 - parameters: {} - remember_chat_context: false - name: evaluate_coherence - outputs: - - data: Yes, the answer is self-consistent and easy to understand. It clearly states - that in the specified month and location, flour was sold for a specific price. - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342885 - id: chatcmpl-8pkAPsRKRDAkMWTblxgNHkAUvyA7Y - model: gpt-4-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: Yes, the answer is self-consistent and easy to understand. It clearly - states that in the specified month and location, flour was sold for a specific - price. - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -- input: 'Answer the following question using the provided context. Review your answer. - Consider all the claims in your answer. Is each one justified by the context. - Revise your answer to accord ONLY with the context, paying careful attention to - details. Review your answer again. Does it answer the question? Exclude details - that are irrelevant to the question. If you cannot answer the question, simply - state that and nothing else. Question: {{query}} Context: {{context}} ANSWER: - REVISED ANSWER:' - metadata: - model: gpt-3.5-turbo - parameters: {} - name: generate_improved - outputs: - - data: Based on the context, there is no specific information provided about the - price of flour in July. - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342892 - id: chatcmpl-8pkAWtSxabIaQgTVHTc7o4XrybUFj - model: gpt-3.5-turbo-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: Based on the context, there is no specific information provided about - the price of flour in July. - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -- input: "Given the following question, context, and answer, does the answer adhere\ - \ strictly to the context? \n\nGive a faithfulness verdict (YES or NO) with an\ - \ explanation.\n\nQuestion: {{query}}\nAnswer: {{generate_improved.output}}\n\n\ - Verdict:\nExplanation:" - metadata: - model: gpt-4 - parameters: {} - name: evaluate_faithfulness_improved - outputs: - - data: 'YES Explanation: The answer accurately lines up with the context where - there is no specific information provided about the price of flour in July.' - execution_count: 0 - metadata: - created: 1707342924 - id: chatcmpl-8pkB2pDap3Bld3Lc1aEDheOHJs6vP - model: gpt-4-0613 - object: chat.completion.chunk - raw_response: - content: 'YES Explanation: The answer accurately lines up with the context - where there is no specific information provided about the price of flour - in July.' - role: assistant - role: assistant - output_type: execute_result -schema_version: latest diff --git a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag.py b/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag.py deleted file mode 100644 index 1324c9c7a..000000000 --- a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag.py +++ /dev/null @@ -1,142 +0,0 @@ -import argparse -import asyncio -import sys -from aiconfig import AIConfigRuntime -import chromadb -from glob import glob - - -import os - -dir_path = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__)) - - -def chunk_markdown(text, chunk_size=1000): - chunks = [] - for i in range(0, len(text), chunk_size): - yield text[i : i + chunk_size] - return chunks - - -async def run_ingest(directory, collection_name): - chroma_client = chromadb.PersistentClient(path="chroma_2.db") - collection = chroma_client.create_collection(name=collection_name) - - for i, filename in enumerate(glob(f"{directory}/**/*", recursive=True)): - print("Ingesting:", i, filename) - documents = [] - metadatas = [] - ids = [] - - with open(filename, "r") as f: - data = f.read() - for j, chunk in enumerate(chunk_markdown(data)): - documents.append(chunk) - metadatas.append({"source": filename}) - ids.append(f"doc_{i}_chunk{j}") - - collection.add(documents=documents, metadatas=metadatas, ids=ids) - - -def retrieve_data(collection, query, k): - print("Querying for:", query) - context = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=k) - return context - - -def serialize_retrieved_data(data): - # print("Serializing data:", type(data), data) - return "\n".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in data.items()) - - -async def generate(query, context): - aiconfig_path = os.path.join(dir_path, "rag.aiconfig.yaml") - config = AIConfigRuntime.load(aiconfig_path) - params = {"query": query, "context": context} - # print("Running generate with params:", params) - return await config.run_and_get_output_text( - "generate_baseline", params=params - ) - - -async def run_evals(query, context, answer): - aiconfig_path = os.path.join(dir_path, "rag.aiconfig.yaml") - config = AIConfigRuntime.load(aiconfig_path) - return [ - await config.run_and_get_output_text( - f"evaluate_{criterion}", - params={ - "query": query, - "context": context, - "answer": answer, - }, - ) - for criterion in ["relevance", "faithfulness_baseline", "coherence"] - ] - - -async def run_query(query, collection_name, k): - chroma_client = chromadb.PersistentClient(path="chroma_2.db") - collection = chroma_client.get_collection(name=collection_name) - data = retrieve_data(collection, query, k) - print("Retrieved data:\n", "\n".join(data["documents"][0])) - context = serialize_retrieved_data(data) - result = await generate(query, context) - print("\n\nResponse:\n", result) - - print("\n\nEvaluating...") - evals = await run_evals(query, context, result) - print("Evaluations:") - for criterion, score in zip( - ["relevance", "faithfulness_baseline", "coherence"], evals - ): - print(f"{criterion}: {score}") - - -def info(): - print("Starting info") - chroma_client = chromadb.PersistentClient(path="chroma_2.db") - collections = chroma_client.list_collections() - print("Available Chroma Collections:", collections) - - -async def main(): - parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="RAG demo") - subparsers = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command") - - ingest_parser = subparsers.add_parser("ingest", help="Ingest data") - ingest_parser.add_argument("directory", help="Directory to ingest") - ingest_parser.add_argument( - "--chroma-collection-name", - help="Name of the collection", - default="10ks_v4", - ) - - query_parser = subparsers.add_parser("query", help="Run a query") - query_parser.add_argument("input_query", help="input query to run") - query_parser.add_argument( - "--chroma-collection-name", - help="Name of the collection", - default="10ks_v4", - ) - query_parser.add_argument("-k", type=int, default=100) - - info_parser = subparsers.add_parser("info") - - args = parser.parse_args() - - if args.command == "ingest": - await run_ingest(args.directory, args.chroma_collection_name) - elif args.command == "query": - await run_query(args.input_query, args.chroma_collection_name, args.k) - elif args.command == "info": - info() - else: - parser.print_help() - - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - result = asyncio.run(main()) - sys.exit(result) diff --git a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag_demo.ipynb b/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag_demo.ipynb deleted file mode 100644 index 121223810..000000000 --- a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/rag_demo.ipynb +++ /dev/null @@ -1,621 +0,0 @@ -{ - "cells": [ - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "# Basic RAG with Model-graded Eval\n", - "\n", - "In this example we'll build a simple RAG application on Volume 7 of History of the United States of America, \n", - "and evaluate it across \n", - "* **relevance** -- does the answer make sense in context of the original question?, \n", - "* **faithfulness** -- is the final answer faithful to the data that we fed into the LLM?\n", - "* **coherence** -- is the answer consistent and easy to understand?\n", - "\n", - "We'll use AIConfig to manage and iterate on all our prompts, both for the generation step of the RAG pipeline, as well as its evaluation." - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Install dependencies\n", - "\n", - "Create .env file containing the following line:\n", - "`OPENAI_API_KEY=`\n", - "> You can get your key from https://platform.openai.com/api-keys \n" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": null, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "%pip install python-aiconfig==1.1.22\n", - "%pip install chromadb\n", - "\n", - "import dotenv\n", - "dotenv.load_dotenv()" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 2, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stderr", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "/Users/saqadri/lm/aiconfig2/cookbooks/.conda/lib/python3.11/site-packages/pydantic/_internal/_fields.py:128: UserWarning: Field \"model_parsers\" has conflict with protected namespace \"model_\".\n", - "\n", - "You may be able to resolve this warning by setting `model_config['protected_namespaces'] = ()`.\n", - " warnings.warn(\n", - "/Users/saqadri/lm/aiconfig2/cookbooks/.conda/lib/python3.11/site-packages/tqdm/auto.py:21: TqdmWarning: IProgress not found. Please update jupyter and ipywidgets. See https://ipywidgets.readthedocs.io/en/stable/user_install.html\n", - " from .autonotebook import tqdm as notebook_tqdm\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "import argparse\n", - "import asyncio\n", - "import os\n", - "import sys\n", - "from aiconfig import AIConfigRuntime\n", - "import chromadb\n", - "from glob import glob" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Download the raw data\n", - "Fetch Volume 7 of the History of the United States of America (our raw unstructured dataset)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 6, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - " % Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current\n", - " Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed\n", - "100 636k 100 636k 0 0 262k 0 0:00:02 0:00:02 --:--:-- 262k\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "!mkdir -p data/books/\n", - "!curl https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/72846/pg72846.txt -o data/books/pg72846.txt" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 8, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of the United States of America, Volume 7 (of 9)\n", - " \n", - "This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and\n", - "most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions\n", - "whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms\n", - "of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online\n", - "at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,\n", - "you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located\n", - "before using this eBook.\n", - "\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "!head data/books/pg72846.txt" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 10, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "collection_name=\"us_history_volume_7\"\n", - "chromadb_path=\"index.db\"" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## RAG Data Ingestion & Indexing\n", - "Chunk the data and ingest it into a Chroma DB collection.\n", - "\n", - "> We use a very naive text splitting strategy with fixed-size chunks. For a production environment, this step will be critical to optimize.\n", - "\n", - "**Note:** You can also run this as a CLI script using the command \n", - "```\n", - "!python rag.py ingest `data/books/` --chroma-collection-name us_history_volume_7\n", - "```" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 11, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "def chunk_markdown(text, chunk_size=1000):\n", - " chunks = []\n", - " for i in range(0, len(text), chunk_size):\n", - " yield text[i : i + chunk_size]\n", - " return chunks" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 12, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "async def run_ingest(directory, collection_name):\n", - " chroma_client = chromadb.PersistentClient(path=chromadb_path)\n", - " collection = chroma_client.create_collection(name=collection_name)\n", - "\n", - " for i, filename in enumerate(glob(f\"{directory}/**/*\", recursive=True)):\n", - " print(\"Ingesting:\", i, filename)\n", - " documents = []\n", - " metadatas = []\n", - " ids = []\n", - "\n", - " with open(filename, \"r\") as f:\n", - " data = f.read()\n", - " for j, chunk in enumerate(chunk_markdown(data)):\n", - " documents.append(chunk)\n", - " metadatas.append({\"source\": filename})\n", - " ids.append(f\"doc_{i}_chunk{j}\")\n", - "\n", - " collection.add(documents=documents, metadatas=metadatas, ids=ids)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 13, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Ingesting: 0 data/books/pg72846.txt\n" - ] - }, - { - "name": "stderr", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "\u001b[0;93m2024-02-08 14:51:25.264872 [W:onnxruntime:, helper.cc:67 IsInputSupported] CoreML does not support input dim > 16384. Input:embeddings.word_embeddings.weight, shape: {30522,384}\u001b[m\n", - "\u001b[0;93m2024-02-08 14:51:25.265375 [W:onnxruntime:, coreml_execution_provider.cc:81 GetCapability] CoreMLExecutionProvider::GetCapability, number of partitions supported by CoreML: 49 number of nodes in the graph: 323 number of nodes supported by CoreML: 231\u001b[m\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "await run_ingest(directory=\"data/books\", collection_name=collection_name)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## RAG Query & Response Generation\n", - "Query the index for context given a user-supplied question, and use that context to generate a response\n", - "\n", - "**Note:** You can also run this as a CLI script using the command \n", - "```\n", - "!python rag.py query \"In July, flour sold at Boston for _?\" -k=10 --chroma-collection-name us_history_volume_7\n", - "```" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 14, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "def retrieve_data(collection, query, k):\n", - " print(\"Querying for:\", query)\n", - " context = collection.query(query_texts=[query], n_results=k)\n", - " return context\n", - "\n", - "\n", - "def serialize_retrieved_data(data):\n", - " # print(\"Serializing data:\", type(data), data)\n", - " return \"\\n\".join(f\"{k}={v}\" for k, v in data.items())\n", - "\n", - "\n", - "async def generate(query, context):\n", - " config = AIConfigRuntime.load(\"rag.aiconfig.yaml\")\n", - " params = {\"query\": query, \"context\": context}\n", - " # print(\"Running generate with params:\", params)\n", - " return await config.run_and_get_output_text(\n", - " \"generate_baseline\", params=params\n", - " )\n", - "\n", - "async def run_query(query, collection_name, k):\n", - " chroma_client = chromadb.PersistentClient(path=chromadb_path)\n", - " collection = chroma_client.get_collection(name=collection_name)\n", - " data = retrieve_data(collection, query, k)\n", - " print(\"Retrieved data:\\n\", \"\\n\".join(data[\"documents\"][0]))\n", - " context = serialize_retrieved_data(data)\n", - " result = await generate(query, context)\n", - " print(\"\\n\\nResponse:\\n\", result)\n", - "\n", - " return (query, context, result)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 15, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "queries = [\n", - " \"What was the price of flour sold in Boston in July?\",\n", - " \"When and why did the british Blockade happen?\"\n", - "]" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 22, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Querying for: What was the price of flour sold in Boston in July?\n", - "Retrieved data:\n", - " wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to\n", - "Boston. Soon speculation began. The price of imported articles rose to\n", - "extravagant points. At the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight\n", - "cents a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August. Tea which\n", - "could be bought for $1.70 per pound in August, sold for three and four\n", - "dollars in December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred\n", - "weight in New Orleans, and in August sold for twenty-one or twenty-two\n", - "dollars in New York and Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in\n", - "December.\n", - "\n", - "More sweeping in its effects on exports than on imports, the blockade\n", - "rapidly reduced the means of the people. After the summer of 1813,\n", - "Georgia alone, owing to its contiguity with Florida, succeeded in\n", - "continuing to send out cotton. The exports of New York, which exceeded\n", - "$12,250,000 in 1811, fell to $209,000 for the year ending in 1814. The\n", - "domestic exports of Virginia diminished in four years from $4,800,000\n", - "to $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,\n", - "New England open to neutrals.\n", - "From that time nothing entered or left the blockaded coast except swift\n", - "privateers, or occasional fast-sailing vessels which risked capture\n", - "in the attempt. Toward the close of the year Admiral Warren extended\n", - "his blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given at Halifax\n", - "November 16, and by the blockading squadron off New London December 2,\n", - "thus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of every description.[381]\n", - "\n", - "The pressure of the blockade was immediately felt. In August[382]\n", - "superfine flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for\n", - "$6.00, and at Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston for\n", - "twenty cents a pound; at Charleston for nine cents. Rice sold at\n", - "Philadelphia for $12.00 a hundred weight; in Charleston and Savannah\n", - "for $3.00. Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75 a hundred weight; in\n", - "Baltimore for $26.50. Already the American staples were unsalable at\n", - "the places of their production. No rate of profit could cause cotton,\n", - "rice, or \n", - "and supplied the Union\n", - "with articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own\n", - "manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward\n", - "Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after\n", - "the war was declared. The British blockade stimulated the movement,\n", - "and the embargo of December, 1813, which lasted till April, 1814, cut\n", - "off every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable\n", - "longer to send their crops even to New England for a market, they were\n", - "obliged to send specie, and they soon came to the end of their supply.\n", - "The Massachusetts banks, which reported about $820,000 in specie in\n", - "1809, returned more than $3,680,000 in June, 1812; which rose to\n", - "$5,780,000 in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in June, 1814.\n", - "In five years the Massachusetts banks alone drew more than six million\n", - "dollars in specie from the Southern and Middle States,[478] besides\n", - "what they sent to Canada in payment for British bills.\n", - "\n", - "No one knew how much s\n", - "17, 1813; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2781.\n", - "\n", - "[468] Act of Jan. 25, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p. 2788.\n", - "\n", - "[469] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1965.\n", - "\n", - "[470] Macon to Nicholson, April 6, 1814; Nicholson MSS.\n", - "\n", - "[471] Gallatin MSS.\n", - "\n", - "[472] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 928.\n", - "\n", - "[473] Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94.\n", - "\n", - "[474] Note to abstract of regular troops in service, January, 1814;\n", - "adjutant-general’s office. MSS. War Department Archives.\n", - "\n", - "[475] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 940.\n", - "\n", - "[476] Speech of Timothy Pitkin, Feb. 10, 1814; Annals, 1813–1814, p.\n", - "1297.\n", - "\n", - "[477] Considerations on Currency, etc. By Albert Gallatin, 1831.\n", - "Statements II. and III., pp. 101, 103.\n", - "\n", - "[478] Schedule, 1803–1837; Senate Document No. 38. Massachusetts\n", - "Legislature, 1838.\n", - "\n", - "[479] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45.\n", - "\n", - "[480] Gallatin’s Considerations, p. 45. Schedules II. and III., pp.\n", - "101, 103. Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 286, 357, 359.\n", - "\n", - "[481] Gallatin’s Writings, iii. 284.\n", - "\n", - "[482] Annals, 1813–1814, p. 1787.\n", - "\n", - "[483] Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813\n", - "r was responsible,\n", - "the effect was ruinous. The New England banks were financial agents\n", - "of the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including Maine was\n", - "about twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut\n", - "exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached\n", - "eighteen millions,[477] or nearly one third of the paid bank capital\n", - "of the whole country, if Pitkin’s estimate was correct. That nearly\n", - "one third of the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid\n", - "of government was serious enough; but in reality the loss was much\n", - "greater, for New England held a still larger proportion of the specie\n", - "on which the bank circulation of other States depended.\n", - "\n", - "The system of commercial restrictions was responsible for thus, at\n", - "the most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of the\n", - "national finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against\n", - "the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon\n", - "them by national legislation until New Engl\n", - "he\n", - "rate was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government paid 7.487\n", - "per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years.\n", - "The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England\n", - "in effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could not have been\n", - "taken at all, had not credit and currency been already expanded to the\n", - "danger-point, as the allotment showed; for while New England, where\n", - "most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half a million, and\n", - "Boston took but seventy-five thousand, Pennsylvania, where banking had\n", - "become a frenzy, took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore\n", - "together contributed only half a million more than was given by\n", - "Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars were taken by Astor, Girard,\n", - "and Parish,--three foreign-born Americans, without whose aid the money\n", - "could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all. Doubtless they\n", - "were bold operators; but Americans were supposed to be not wanting in\n", - "the taste for speculation, and\n", - "lled on Philadelphia and Baltimore.\n", - "The specie drained to New England could find its way back only by means\n", - "of government loans, which New England refused to make in any large\n", - "amount. On the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury notes\n", - "at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in payment of them.[481]\n", - "Probably New England lent to the British government during the war more\n", - "money than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New\n", - "England to the United States loans was less than three millions.\n", - "\n", - "This situation was well understood by Congress. In the debate of\n", - "February, 1814, the approaching dangers were repeatedly pointed out.\n", - "The alarm was then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means\n", - "reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank with a capital of\n", - "thirty million dollars, while Macon openly advocated the issue of\n", - "government paper,[482] declaring that “paper money never was beat.”\n", - "Congress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill for twenty-five\n", - "mill\n", - "pecie the country contained. Gallatin afterward\n", - "estimated it at seventeen million dollars,[479] and of that amount the\n", - "banks of New England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions. The\n", - "Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in specie, had a bank-note\n", - "circulation of less than three millions. The Middle, Southern, and\n", - "Western States must have had a bank-note circulation approaching forty\n", - "millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in specie to support\n", - "it,[480] while the paper was constantly increasing in quantity and the\n", - "specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not\n", - "with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dollars to every\n", - "specie dollar in the bank vaults; but the banks in 1814 beyond New\n", - "England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver\n", - "or gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper without specie in\n", - "their possession.\n", - "\n", - "Already the banks of New England were pressing their demands on those\n", - "of New York, which in their turn ca\n", - "819,000 for 1813, and $17,581 for the year\n", - "ending Sept. 30, 1814. At the close of 1813 exports, except from\n", - "Georgia and New England, ceased.[383]\n", - "\n", - "On the revenue the blockade acted with equal effect. Owing to the\n", - "increase of duties and to open ports, the New England States rather\n", - "increased than diminished their customs receipts. Until the summer of\n", - "1813, when the blockade began in earnest, New York showed the same\n", - "result; but after that time the receipts fell, until they averaged\n", - "less than $50,000 a month instead of $500,000, which would have been\n", - "a normal average if peace had been preserved. Philadelphia suffered\n", - "sooner. In 1810 the State of Pennsylvania contributed more than\n", - "$200,000 a month to the Treasury; in 1813 it contributed about $25,000\n", - "a month. Maryland, where was collected in 1812 no less than $1,780,000\n", - "of net revenue, paid only $182,000 in 1813, and showed an actual excess\n", - "of expenditures in 1814. After the summer, the total net revenue\n", - "collected in every port of the Unit\n", - "British Archives.\n", - "\n", - "[376] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 17, 1814; State Papers, Indian\n", - "Affairs, i. 836.\n", - "\n", - "[377] Armstrong to Pinckney, March 20, 1814; State Papers, Indian\n", - "Affairs, i. 837.\n", - "\n", - "[378] Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison’s Works, iii. 399.\n", - "Madison’s Works, iii. 400, 401.\n", - "\n", - "[379] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826.\n", - "\n", - "[380] State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826.\n", - "\n", - "[381] Proclamation and Notice; Niles, v. 264.\n", - "\n", - "[382] Prices Current; Niles, v. 41.\n", - "\n", - "[383] Table No. II.; Pitkin, p. 56.\n", - "\n", - "[384] Table No. I.; Pitkin, p. 415.\n", - "\n", - "[385] Admiral Warren to J. W. Croker, May 28, 1813; London “Gazette,”\n", - "July 6, 1813.\n", - "\n", - "[386] Warren’s Report of May 28, 1813; London “Gazette.”\n", - "\n", - "[387] Cockburn to Warren, May 3, 1813; London “Gazette,” July 6, 1813.\n", - "\n", - "[388] Cassin to Secretary Jones, June 21, 1813; Niles, iv. 291.\n", - "\n", - "[389] James, ii. 55.\n", - "\n", - "[390] Report of Robert Taylor, July 4, 1813; Niles, iv. 324.\n", - "\n", - "[391] James, ii. 54.\n", - "\n", - "[392] Warren’s Report of June 24, 1813; James, ii. 414.\n", - "\n", - "[393] James, ii. 59.\n", - "\n", - "\n", - "Response:\n", - " The price of flour sold in Boston in July is not mentioned in the provided context.\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "query, context, result = await run_query(queries[0], collection_name, k=10)" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Evaluate the response\n", - "Run evals on the responses across \n", - "* **relevance** -- does the answer make sense in context of the original question?, \n", - "* **faithfulness** -- is the final answer faithful to the data that we fed into the LLM?\n", - "* **coherence** -- is the answer consistent and easy to understand?" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 23, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [], - "source": [ - "async def run_evals(query, context, answer):\n", - " config = AIConfigRuntime.load(\"rag.aiconfig.yaml\")\n", - " \n", - " return [\n", - " await config.run_and_get_output_text(\n", - " f\"{criterion}\",\n", - " params={\n", - " \"query\": query,\n", - " \"context\": context,\n", - " \"answer\": answer,\n", - " },\n", - " run_with_dependencies=True,\n", - " )\n", - " for criterion in [\"evaluate_relevance\", \"evaluate_faithfulness_baseline\", \"evaluate_coherence\"]\n", - " ]\n" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "code", - "execution_count": 27, - "metadata": {}, - "outputs": [ - { - "name": "stdout", - "output_type": "stream", - "text": [ - "Evaluating Response Quality...\n", - "Query: What was the price of flour sold in Boston in July? \n", - "Answer: The price of flour sold in Boston in July is not mentioned in the provided context.\n", - "\n", - "\n", - "Evaluations:\n", - "\n", - "relevance: Yes\n", - "\n", - "faithfulness_baseline: YES\n", - "The verdict is faithful as no context is provided from which to draw an answer.\n", - "\n", - "coherence: Yes, the answer is self-consistent and easy to understand. It clearly communicates that the provided information did not include the cost of flour sold in Boston in July.\n", - "\n" - ] - } - ], - "source": [ - "print(f\"Evaluating Response Quality...\\nQuery: {query} \\nAnswer: {result}\\n\\n\")\n", - "evals = await run_evals(query, context, result)\n", - "print(\"Evaluations:\\n\")\n", - "for criterion, score in zip(\n", - " [\"relevance\", \"faithfulness_baseline\", \"coherence\"], evals\n", - "):\n", - " print(f\"{criterion}: {score}\\n\")\n" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Let's improve the prompt\n", - "\n", - "Head over to `rag.aiconfig.yaml` and update the `generate_baseline` prompt. Then rerun the queries above to see how it affects the overall behavior" - ] - }, - { - "cell_type": "markdown", - "metadata": {}, - "source": [ - "## Try your own queries!\n", - "\n", - "Try out other queries, try improving the retrieval pipeline (e.g. chunking strategy), and see how it affects the final results" - ] - } - ], - "metadata": { - "kernelspec": { - "display_name": "base", - "language": "python", - "name": "python3" - }, - "language_info": { - "codemirror_mode": { - "name": "ipython", - "version": 3 - }, - "file_extension": ".py", - "mimetype": "text/x-python", - "name": "python", - "nbconvert_exporter": "python", - "pygments_lexer": "ipython3", - "version": "3.11.7" - } - }, - "nbformat": 4, - "nbformat_minor": 2 -} diff --git a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/requirements.txt b/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/requirements.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a6d9bdcd8..000000000 --- a/cookbooks/RAG-with-Model-Graded-Eval/requirements.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -python-aiconfig==1.1.20 -chromadb \ No newline at end of file