NOTE: This doc is intended merely to state the problem at hand in all Internet platforms and to outline the necessary properties for any platform that wants to solve this problem. The specific protocol and technologies used to enforce these properties will be discussed in a separate doc.
The internet has enabled the emergence of incredibly large and valuable networks that have transformed virtually every aspect of modern life from social media to the sharing economy to member-generated content platforms. These networks typically exist on centralized platforms that are owned and operated by a single entity. Through their monopolistic control over their platforms, operators can unilaterally decide on issues that impact the entire community such as content and monetization policy.
Once a platform gains a sufficient network effect, the members of the platform are further disenfranchised since their ability to exit a platform with oppressive policies becomes less and less of a threat for operators. Thus we arrive at our present situation, an Internet dominated by a few mega-platforms whose operators have incentives that are not only misaligned but completely divorced from the welfare of the communities they are intended to serve.
A healthier Internet requires recalibrating the balance of power between the operator of a platform and its members. The network effect that members build up by joining and contributing to a platform should not work against them and solely benefit the operator. Instead, healthy Internet communities will need to align the incentives of all relevant parties: operators, moderators, producers, and members.
Accomplishing this will require providing two rights to platform members: the right of individual exit and the right of collective exit.
Firstly, any member that wants to exit a platform for any reason should be able to do so with minimal friction. This would entail being able to preserve (some) notion of identity across platforms and the ability to move any member-authored content onto a different platform. Of course, exiting a platform will always entail some lost utility from losing access to the network effect of the platform and potentially having to rebuild a social graph elsewhere, but minimizing the friction involved is a key goal of this project.
The other key goal is the right of collective exit. Often participation in a community becomes so valuable (due to network effects, established social graph, etc) that individual exit is infeasible no matter how draconian the platform policies become. These cases are ripe for exploitation by operators in current internet platforms since operators may charge whatever rent on members they wish; either directly in the form of commission rates or indirectly in the form of advertisements. In this case, the incentives of operators are no longer dependent on the continued welfare of the members of the platform.
To rectify this, there must be a mechanism for collective exit in which the entire community can elect to replace any central entity in the community (eg content moderator). If the vote succeeds, then the entire community should atomically recognize the new authority from that point on and follow whatever decisions the new authority makes. In order to ensure the integrity of the vote, the voting mechanism must be out of the control of the community's authorities and thus managed by a higher power (in Fora's case a sufficiently decentralized blockchain).
Fora is working on implementing protocols for building platforms that give communities an effective and cost-minimal way to exit either individually or collectively. Operators will no longer be able to hold communities "hostage", as the operation of the community will be decentralized while maintaining centralized yet accountable stewardship. By aligning the incentives of both the stewards and members of internet platforms, Fora hopes to foster a healthier generation of internet communities.