draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01.txt

LAMPS WG                                                   P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                                 Q. Dang
Expires: August 20, 2018                                            NIST
                                                       February 16, 2018


 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional SHAKE Algorithms
                   and Identifiers for RSA and ECDSA
                     draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using the SHAKE family of
   hash functions in the Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with
   the RSA and ECDSA signature algorithms; the conventions for the
   associated subject public keys are also described.  Digital
   signatures are used to sign messages, certificates and CRLs
   (Certificate Revocation Lists).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 20, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Message Digest Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Public Key Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Change Log

   [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-01:

      *  Changed titles and section names.

      *  Removed DSA after WG discussions.

      *  Updated shake OID names and parameters, added MGF1 section.

      *  Updated RSASSA-PSS section.

      *  Added Public key algorithm OIDs.

      *  Populated Introduction and IANA sections.

   o  draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:

      *  Initial version






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2.  Introduction

   This document describes several cryptographic algorithms which may be
   used with the Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
   It describes the OIDs for variable length SHAKE algorithms introduced
   in [SHA3] and how they can be used in X.509 certificates. [ EDNOTE:
   Update here. ]

3.  Message Digest Algorithms

   This section describes two one-way hash functions and digital
   signature algorithms using these functions, which may be used to sign
   certificates and CRLs, and identifies OIDs (Object Identifiers) for
   public keys contained in certificates.

3.1.  One-way Extensible-Output-Function SHAKEs

   The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
   In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128
   and SHAKE256 are defined.  Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
   SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this
   document.  SHAKE is a variable length hash function.  The output
   lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions is defined by the
   parameter d.  The corresponding collision and preimage resistance
   security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively
   min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256).  The
   Object Identifiers (OIDs) for these two hash functions are defined in
   [shake-nist-oids] and are included here for convenience:

     id-shake128-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
                   country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                   nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 17 }

      ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets

   When using the id-shake128-len algorithm identifier, the parameters
   MUST be present, and they MUST employ the ShakeOutputLen syntax that
   contains an encoded positive integer value at least 32 in this
   specification.

      id-shake256-len OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
                   country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3)
                   nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 18 }

      ShakeOutputLen ::= INTEGER -- Output length in octets

   When using the id-shake256-len algorithm identifier, the parameters
   MUST be present, and they MUST employ the ShakeOutputLen syntax that



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   contains an encoded positive integer value at least 64 in this
   specification.

3.2.  Mask Generation SHAKEs

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm uses a mask generation function.
   A mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
   and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
   the desired length.  The mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS
   is defined in [RFC8017], but we include it here as well for
   convenience:

      id-mgf1  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 8 }

   The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a
   hashAlgorithm value that identifies the hash used with MGF1.  To use
   SHAKE as this hash, this parameter MUST be id-shake128-len or id-
   shake256-len as specified in Section 3.1 above.

4.  Signature Algorithms

4.1.  RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs

   The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm identifier and its parameters are
   specifed in [RFC4055]:

      id-RSASSA-PSS  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 10 }

      RSASSA-PSS-params  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
            hashAlgorithm      HashAlgorithm,
            maskGenAlgorithm   MaskGenAlgorithm,
            saltLength         INTEGER,
            trailerField       INTEGER }

   This document adds two new hash algorithm choices and two new choices
   for mask generation functions.  These are the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   algorithm identifiers specified in Section 3.1.

   When SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the hashAlgorithm, it MUST also
   be used as the maskGenAlgorithm.

   When used as the hashAlgorithm, the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output-
   length must be either 32 or 64 bytes respectively.  In these cases,
   the parameters MUST be present, and they MUST employ the
   ShakeOutputLen syntax that contains an encoded positive integer value
   of 32 or 64 for id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm
   identifier respectively.




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   When id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len algorithm identifier is used
   as the id-mfg1 maskGenAlgorithm parameter, the ShakeOutputLen
   parameter must be (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 respectively for
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.  For
   example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, ShakeOutputLen must be 223 or
   191 when id-shake128-len or id-shake256-len is are used respectively.

   The parameter saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively for the
   SHAKE128 and SHA256 OIDs.

4.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Standard (ECDSA)" [X9.62].  The
   ASN.1 OIDs of ECDSA signature algorithms using SHAKE128 and SHAKE256,
   are below:



   id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
                        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)
                        id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) x }



   id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
                        country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4)
                        id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) y }

   [ EDNOTE: "x" and "y" will be specified by NIST later. ]

   When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256, algorithm
   identifier appears in the algorithm field as an AlgorithmIdentifier,
   the encoding MUST omit the parameters field.  That is, the
   AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID
   ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.

   Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the hash algorithm
   explicitly using the OIDs specified in Section 3.2 above when
   encoding ECDSA/SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs.

   Conforming client implementations that process ECDSA signatures with
   any of the SHAKE hash algorithms when processing certificates and
   CRLs MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs specified in Sections 3.1
   and 3.2 above.





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   Encoding rules for ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055],
   Section 2.2.3, and [RFC5480].

   Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA signatures in
   certificates or CRLs MUST generate such ECDSA signatures in
   accordance with all the requirements specified in Sections 7.2 and
   7.3 of [X9.62] or with all the requirements specified in
   Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1].  They MAY also generate such ECDSA
   signatures in accordance with all the recommendations in [X9.62] or
   [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
   these standards.  These standards above may have not specified
   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options.  However, SHAKE128
   and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively
   are subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
   SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.

5.  Public Key Algorithms

   The conventions for RSA and ECDSA public keys are as specified in
   [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480].  We include them here for
   convenience.

   [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA with NULL parameters.

      rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=  { pkcs-1 1}

   Additionally, [RFC4055] adds the corresponding RSASSA-PSS OID public
   key identifier and parameters (also shown in Section 4 of this
   document).  The parameters may be either absent or present when
   RSASSA-PSS OID is used as subject public key information.

      id-RSASSA-PSS  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { pkcs-1 10 }

   If id-RSASSA-PSS is used in the public key identifier with
   parameters, Section 3.3 of [RFC4055] describes that the signature
   algorithm parameters MUST match the parameters in the key structure
   algorithm identifier except the saltLength field.  The saltLength
   field in the signature parameters MUST be greater or equal to that in
   the key parameters field.  If the id-RSASSA-PSS parameters are NULL
   no further parameter validation is necessary.

   For ECDSA, [RFC5480] defines the EC public key identifier and its
   parameters as








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      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
          iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }

      ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
          namedCurve         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
          -- implicitCurve   NULL
          -- specifiedCurve  SpecifiedECDomain }

   The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
   certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.

6.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Sean Turner for his valuable contributions to
   this document.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses several registries that were originally created in
   [shake-nist-oids].  No further registries are required. [ EDNOTE:
   Update here. ]

8.  Security Considerations

   SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are one-way extensible-output functions.  Their
   output length depends on a required length of the consumming
   application.

   The SHAKEs are deterministic functions.  Like any other deterministic
   functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
   will produce the same output.  Therefore, users should not expect
   unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
   excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.

   Implementations must protect the signer's private key.  Compromise of
   the signer's private key permits masquerade.

   When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
   data origin authentication is not provided.  Any party that knows the
   message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
   content could originate from any one of the parties.

   Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
   and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
   signature.  In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
   relies on random numbers.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number
   generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can result
   in little or no security.  The generation of quality random numbers



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   is difficult.  [RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area, and
   [SP800-90A] series provide acceptable PRNGs.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
   weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
   cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  Therefore, cryptographic
   algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
   to be readily inserted.  That is, implementers should be prepared to
   regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.








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   [SHA3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
              Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
              Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
              <https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
              permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [SEC1]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
              Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
              <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.

   [shake-nist-oids]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Computer
              Security Objects Register", October 2017,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Computer-Security-Objects-
              Register/Algorithm-Registration>.

   [SP800-90A]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
              Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
              June 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [X9.62]    American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
              "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
              Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 module

   [ EDNOTE: More here. ]

Authors' Addresses

   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com





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   Quynh Dang
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899-8930
   USA

   Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov












































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