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🚧 | B2 (Pikachu): Securing membership and state checkpoints of BFT and PoS blockchains by anchoring into the Bitcoin blockchain #5
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2022-02-21 meeting notes
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2022-02-28✋ Attendees📣 Updates
🧵 Discussion
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2022-03-07✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-03-14✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-03-21✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-03-28✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-04-11✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-04-25✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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2022-05-09✋ Attendees📣 Updates
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@sa8 is it safe to close the pending issues in M5 and M6? Even if with a no-fix note at this time, when appropriate? |
I'm fine with closing them with a no-fix note although they would be easier to differentiate from other issues if we keep them open, so I don't have strong preferences! |
I left the relevant issues open for now; just tagged and descoped them from the milestones. We're just missing the RFP here so that we can wrap up officially. |
RFP live on Apply and going up in protocol/research-grants#18. I'm closing B2 now, though we might open a follow-up project later on. |
Description
Long range attacks on PoS blockchains and the related “I still work here” attack in BFT-based blockchains are some of the major security issues in these systems.
In short, these attacks rely on the inability of a client, or another participant in the system, Alice, who disconnects from the system at time T1 and reconnects at time T2>T1 to tell that validators who have been legitimate validators at time T1 and leave the system (or transfer their stake) at time T1’, where T2>T1’>T1, are not to be trusted anymore. These validators can fork Alice, without her being able to recognize the attack even if she is presented by a “valid” chain fork. See the illustration below:
These attacks have attracted the attention of the research community for a long time and have been a topic of a recent survey paper. Protocol Labs has also looked at addressing this problem in previous work (Winkle).
Resources
Talks
2021-10-07 ConsensusDays 21 / S2.2 / Securing Membership and State Checkpoints
2022-02-07 ConsensusLab Team Week 22Q1: B2 update
Demos
2021-09-23 B2 design (Sarah)
2021-12-20 B2 small-scale PoC (Sarah)
2022-03-11 B2 checkpointing onto BTC testnet (Sarah)
2022-04-08 BTC checkpointing capstone demo with failure and KVS
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