credential_access_suspicious_lsass_access_generic.toml

[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/01/22"
integration = ["windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2024/10/21"
min_stack_version = "8.14.0"
min_stack_comments = "Breaking change at 8.14.0 for the Windows Integration."

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = "Identifies access attempts to LSASS handle, this may indicate an attempt to dump credentials from Lsass memory.\n"
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Lsass Process Access"
references = ["https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "128468bf-cab1-4637-99ea-fdf3780a4609"
setup = """## Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Endpoint",
    "OS: Windows",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Credential Access",
    "Data Source: Sysmon",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"

query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "10" and
  winlog.event_data.TargetImage : "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe" and
  not winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess :
                ("0x1000", "0x1400", "0x101400", "0x101000", "0x101001", "0x100000", "0x100040", "0x3200", "0x40", "0x3200") and
  not process.name : ("procexp64.exe", "procmon.exe", "procexp.exe", "Microsoft.Identity.AadConnect.Health.AadSync.Host.ex") and
  not process.executable : (
        "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\platform\\*",
        "?:\\ProgramData\\WebEx\\webex\\*",
        "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*",
        "?:\\Program Files\\*",
        "?:\\Windows\\CCM\\CcmExec.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\LTSvc\\LTSVC.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\Sysmon64.exe",
        "C:\\Windows\\CynetMS.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\csrss.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsm.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\MRT.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\wininit.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\GUM*.tmp\\GoogleUpdate.exe",
        "?:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe", 
        "C:\\oracle\\64\\02\\instantclient_19_13\\sqlplus.exe", 
        "C:\\oracle\\64\\02\\instantclient_19_13\\sqlldr.exe",
        "d:\\oracle\\product\\19\\dbhome1\\bin\\ORACLE.EXE",
        "C:\\wamp\\bin\\apache\\apache*\\bin\\httpd.exe",
        "C:\\Windows\\system32\\netstat.exe", 
        "C:\\PROGRA~1\\INFORM~1\\apps\\jdk\\*\\jre\\bin\\java.exe", 
        "C:\\PROGRA~2\\CyberCNSAgentV2\\osqueryi.exe",
        "C:\\Utilityw2k19\\packetbeat\\packetbeat.exe",
        "C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco\\Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client\\Temp\\CloudUpdate\\vpndownloader.exe", 
        "C:\\ProgramData\\Cisco\\Cisco Secure Client\\Temp\\CloudUpdate\\vpndownloader.exe"
  ) and
  not winlog.event_data.CallTrace : ("*mpengine.dll*", "*appresolver.dll*", "*sysmain.dll*")
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.001"
name = "LSASS Memory"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"



[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"